Fr. Luis de Lossada, S.J.

Philosophical Course of Salamanca 2

According to the Mind of the Eximius Doctor

Translated by Osvaldo R.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE OF SALAMANCA

FR. LUIS DE LOSSADA, S.J.

PHILOSOPHICAL COURSE OF SALAMANCA

ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF THE EXIMIUS
DOCTOR FRANCISCO SUÁREZ, S.J.

TOME II.

I. ON PHYSICS, OR NATURAL PHILOSOPHY.

LATIN PRINTED AT THE PRESS OF THE WIDOW AND
SONS OF J. SUBIRANA, IN BARCELONA, SPAIN

1883

This rendering into English of the work of the Reverend Father Luis de Lossada, S.J., is offered freely and without recompense, for the edification of students and the greater flourishing of the School of the Eximious Doctor, Francisco Suárez, from whose ocean of wisdom this most faithful disciple drew, and whose streams he caused to flow anew through the fields of his own age; he who, though ever reputed a true son of the Angelic Doctor, refuted the Thomists themselves by the authority of St. Thomas; that the light kindled by such great masters may not fail among us, but spread, multiply, and abide.

To the Eximious Doctor Francisco Suárez
and to St. Thomas Aquinas.

August 15, 2026.

Osvaldo A. R. | Sol 5.6
Translator.

The right of ownership of this translation being reserved.

TO THE VENERABLE FRANCISCO SUÁREZ AND
THE FLOURISHING OF HIS SCHOOL

Permission of the Reverend Father Provincial

I, Francis Paul Mazzario, Provincial of the Society of Jesus in the Province of Castile, by the authority granted to me for this purpose by our Very Reverend Father Michael Angelo Tamburino, Superior General of the same Society, grant permission for the book entitled *Cursus Philosophicus Regalis Collegii Salmanticensis Societatis Jesu*, divided into three parts, composed by Father Luis Lossada, theologian of our Society and interpreter of Sacred Scripture, and approved by the judgment of grave and learned men of the same Society, to be committed to print. In testimony whereof, we have issued these letters, signed by our own hand and that of our Secretary, and secured with our seal. At this our Royal College of Salamanca, on 7º December, in the year 1720.

IHS
Francis Paul Mazzario.

Emmanuel de Prado,
Secretary.

Permission of the Ordinary

The Most Illustrious Lord Don Sylvester García Escalona, Bishop of Salamanca, granted to any printer of this City permission to commit to print this book, entitled *Cursus Philosophicus Regalis Collegii Salmanticensis Societatis Jesu*, divided into three parts, together with the Dialectical Institutions pertaining to the first part.

Salamanca, 5 September, in the year 1721.

Summary of the Privilege

Father Luis de Lossada of the Society of Jesus holds a privilege from His Majesty to print this book for a period of ten years, and so that no one may print it without his permission, as appears from the original thereof, certified by Don Balthasar de San Pedro, Secretary of His Majesty's Chamber.

Given at San Lorenzo on 3 August 1721.

Summary of the Price Assessment

The Lords of the Council assessed this book at eight maravedís per sheet, as appears from the certification of Don Balthasar de San Pedro, Secretary of the Chamber of the King our Lord.

Madrid on 19 February 1724.

Table of Contents.

Philosophy Course of Salamanca 2

Preliminary Dissertation: On the New, or Renewed, Philosophy Called Cartesian, Corpuscular, and Atomistic.		1

On Physics or Natural Philosophy

Treatise I.	On the Intrinsic Principles of Natural Body.	45
Disputation I.	How Many and Which Are the First Intrinsic Principles of Natural Body?	45
Chapter I.	The Notion of Principle Having Been Premised, Aristotle's Definition of the First Principles Is Explained.	45
Chapter II.	The First Intrinsic Principles of Natural Body in Completed Being Are Designated.	49
Chapter III.	Second Assertion Designating the First Intrinsic Principles of Body in Becoming.	54
Chapter IV.	Objections Are Resolved.	60
Chapter V.	Third Assertion Concerning Body in Becoming Through Pure or Simple Generation.	69

Chapter VI.	Various Opinions of Our Adversaries Are Examined.	72
Chapter VII.	Other Authors Opposing Us Are Refuted.	78
Chapter VIII.	How Valid Is the Proof Drawn from the Generation Following the Corruption of the Eucharistic Species?	83
Disputation II.	On the Quiddity and Existence of Prime Matter.	92
Chapter I.	Whether Prime Matter Exists?	92
Chapter II.	Prime Matter Is Defined, and Certain of Its Attributes and Properties Are Explained.	98
Chapter III.	Whether Prime Matter Has Its Own Existence?	115
§ 1.	Certain Preliminary Points.	115
§ 2.	The Proper Existence of Matter Is Proved from the Ground of Priority.	118
§ 3.	Other Proofs of Our Opinion.	126
Chapter IV.	Contrary Arguments Are Solved.	129
Chapter V.	The Solution of the Arguments Is Completed.	142
Disputation III.	The Remaining Questions Concerning Prime Matter Are Discussed.	154
Chapter I.	On the Appetite of Prime Matter for Forms.	154
Chapter II.	Whether First Matter Desires Corrupted Forms.	168
Chapter III.	Whether First Matter Can Naturally Be Deprived of Every Form.	177
Chapter IV.	Whether First Matter Can Be Preserved by God Without Form.	184
§ 1.	First Proof of Our Opinion from the Failure to Show Repugnance. Whether a Proof of This Kind Is Efficacious.	184
§ 2.	Other Positive Proofs.	189
§ 3.	Contrary Arguments Are Solved.	192
Chapter V.	By What Action Matter Deprived by God of Every Form Would Be Preserved.	197

Chapter VI.	On the Unity and Distinction of First Matter.	207
Disputation IV.	On Substantial Form.	216
Chapter I.	The Peripatetic Substantial Form Is Proved.	217
Chapter II.	The First Objection from Authority Is Solved and Retorted.	222
Chapter III.	Other Objections Are Repelled.	229
Chapter IV.	The Final Objection Is Solved, and the Eduction of Forms Is Explained.	237
Chapter V.	Substantial Form Is Defined. Whether It Is the Whole Quiddity of a Natural Body.	247
Disputation V.	On the Multiplicity of Forms in the Same Matter.	256
Chapter I.	Are There Subordinate Substantial Forms?	256
Chapter II.	Arguments Against the Form of Corporeity.	277
Chapter III.	Another Opinion Concerning Subordinate Forms Is Examined.	282
Chapter IV.	Whether Several Non-Subordinate Forms Can Be Joined in the Same Matter.	290
Disputation VI.	On the Union of Matter and Form in the Substantial Composite.	307
Chapter I.	Whether Union Is Really Distinguished from Matter and Form, and in What It Consists.	308
Chapter II.	Objections Are Solved.	316
Chapter III.	Whether the Eduction of a Material Form Is Identified with Its Union with Matter.	323
Chapter IV.	Contrary Arguments Are Answered.	328
Chapter V.	Two Further Questions Concerning Union Are Resolved.	336
Disputation VII.	On the Distinction of the Substantial Whole from Its Parts. Where Also Something Is Said of the Suppositum.	342

Chapter I.	The Substantial Whole Is Really Indistinct from Its Parts and Union, Taken Together.	343
Chapter II.	The Contrary Arguments Are Answered.	351
Chapter III.	Certain Peculiar Opinions of Authors Distinguishing the Whole from the Parts Are Rejected.	361
Chapter IV.	On the Suppositum in Brief.	365
Treatise II.	On Causes, or the Extrinsic Principles of Natural Things.	373
Disputation I.	On Nature and Art.	373
Chapter I.	What Is Nature?	373
Chapter II.	On Natural and Violent Motion.	377
Chapter III.	Art Is Defined and Compared with Nature.	389
Disputation II.	What Is a Cause, and How Many Kinds Are There? Where the Fourfold Aristotelian Division Is Explained in Particular.	395
Chapter I.	Cause Is Defined, Distinguished from a Mere Condition, and Divided in Various Ways.	395
Chapter II.	On Material and Formal Causes.	407
Chapter III.	On the Final Cause.	416
Chapter IV.	On the Exemplar Cause.	427
Chapter V.	On the Efficient Cause.	431
Disputation III.	On the Prerequisites, or Conditions for Causing.	444
Chapter I.	Whether the Existence of the Cause Is Prerequired for Causing.	445
Chapter II.	To What Extent the Location, Duration, and Subsistence of the Cause Are Required for Causing.	449
Chapter III.	On the Approximation of the Agent to What Is Acted Upon.	452
Chapter IV.	Arguments Against the Preceding Doctrine Are Solved.	459
Chapter V.	Other General Prerequisites Are Indicated.	469

Disputation IV.	On Priority of Nature. Whether Mutual Priority Is Possible.	474
Chapter I.	Priority of Nature Is Explained.	474
Chapter II.	Whether Mutual Priority of Nature Is Possible.	483
Chapter III.	The Objections Are Resolved.	490
Chapter IV.	On Mutual Priority with Respect to Second Being.	496
Chapter V.	Whether Something Can Produce Itself with Respect to Second Being.	499
Disputation V.	On the Plurality of Total Causes of the Same Effect.	509
Chapter I.	Whether the Same Effect Can Be Produced Separately by Several Total Causes.	509
Chapter II.	Whether the Same Effect Can by Divine Power Be Produced Simultaneously by Two Total Causes.	519
Chapter III.	Whether the Same Effect Can Naturally Be Produced Simultaneously by Two Total Causes in Second Act.	531
Disputation VI.	On the Power by Which Created Causes Produce Their Effects.	538
Chapter I.	Created Substance Is a Power Immediately Active of Another Substance.	539
Chapter II.	Reply to the Arguments of the Contrary Opinion.	547
Chapter III.	Accident Often Immediately Influences Substance as an Instrumental Cause.	562
§ 1.	What Is an Instrumental Cause?	562
§ 2.	The Stated Assertion Is Proved.	565
§ 2.	The Meaning of St. Thomas Is Explained.	568
§ 4.	Is Substance of Itself a Power Adequately Productive of Substance?	571
§ 5.	Arguments Against the Activity of Accidents Upon Substance Are Resolved.	573
Chapter IV.	On the Power Productive of an Accidental Effect.	575

Chapter V.	On Obediential Potency.	581
§ 1.	What Is Obediential Potency?	581
§ 2.	The Light or Habit Is Not the Entire Reason for Acting, or the Entire Power, for Supernatural Acts.	584
§ 3.	Response to the Objections.	589
§ 4.	Anything Can Be Divinely Elevated to Produce Anything, With Certain Exceptions.	595
§ 5.	Contrary Arguments Are Forestalled.	597

PRELIMINARY DISSERTATION ON PHYSICS.

On the New, or Renewed, Philosophy Called Cartesian, Corpuscular, and Atomistic.

The Peripatetic philosophy, which for a long course of centuries reigned peacefully in the Schools and, although its peace has now been disturbed, still reigns, explains the structure of corporeal things as follows. A natural body, which is also called a substantial composite, such as an animal, plant, stone, or gold, is constituted, as from essential parts, of primary matter and substantial form. Primary matter is an incomplete or partial substance, created by God alone, which of itself is the common subject of all forms, that is, indifferent to receiving any form whatever and, through it, becoming the matter of a lion, a tree, a stone, etc.; hence it is called "pure potency," because of itself it actually belongs properly to no composite, although it can belong to any. It is called "ingenerable," because it is presupposed, as created by God, for every generation. It is likewise called "incorruptible," because when the composite is corrupted, it does not perish, but assumes another form. Substantial form is likewise a partial and absolute substance, that is, not modal, which, completing and actuating matter, constitutes with it a natural body in a determinate species. Hence it is called "act," and indeed "first act," because it makes the composite actually be of this species rather than another, and is the first or primary root of the accidents and

operations of the composite. A form of this kind is either spiritual or material. A spiritual form, namely the human soul, is produced by God through creation and does not depend upon matter. A material form, which is found in every body except man, is produced by natural agents through eduction, and therefore depends upon matter as a presupposed subject in becoming and in being conserved, and consequently perishes when the composite is corrupted.

2. Both matter and form are said to be "essentially simple," because neither is composed of "act and potency." Nevertheless, each, except a spiritual form, is "integrally" composed. Integral composition is that which unites parts that do not regard one another after the manner of act and potency, and which so integrate one body that what suffices to verify the definition of such a composite can nevertheless exist or be understood without any one of them. Thus are related a drop in seawater, a fragment in a stone, a branch in a tree, and a foot in an animal.

3. The Peripatetics furthermore acknowledge various accidents, or entitative and absolute accidental forms, which cannot naturally exist outside a substantial subject, but can do so by Divine power, as happens with the Eucharistic accidents. Such are light, color, heat, cold, etc., whose office is both to adorn and perfect the composite and to serve it in operating. They also acknowledge modes, that is, certain exceedingly tenuous entities, yet truly and on the side of the thing distinct from the subject which they qualify, which are the ultimate and formal determinations of a thing whereby it performs some function or actually possesses some real denomination. Of these modes some are substantial, such as, according to the common opinion, subsistence and the union of matter and form in the composite; others are accidental, such as action, passion, the union of an absolute accident with a subject, and location or local presence. Both kinds are so essentially bound to their subject that they cannot exist without it even by Divine power, although the subject can exist without them.

4. Peripatetic philosophy rather presupposed than disputed all these things until, in the preceding century, certain philosophers brought into new light an opinion of certain ancients, such as Leucippus, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Epicurus, and Lucretius, which had been buried or consigned to oblivion, purging it as far as they could of errors against the Catholic faith. They did so with such success that they gained many acute and learned followers. The principal author of this novelty, passing over Galileo, Gassendi, Francis Bacon, Hobbes, and others, is celebrated as René Descartes, or Cartesius, a Frenchman by nation, who revived that dead philosophy with such genius and applause, arranged it in a new form, and

augmented it with discoveries of his own, that although few follow his physical system in every respect, nevertheless all those who today compose all things from corpuscles variously joined are commonly called Cartesians. France produced most of these. From it also came sufficiently celebrated promoters of the same philosophy from the Order of Minims, the Reverend Fathers Emmanuel Maignan, who is nevertheless more a Gassendist than a Cartesian, and his disciple Jean Saguens. Other nations produced not so many; our Spain very few. Among these Thomas Vincent Tosca of Valencia deserves commendation, who in his recently published *Compendium Philosophicum*, imitating partly Cartesius and partly Maignan, expounds the said philosophy in such a way that nothing is lacking in him as regards ingenuity, elegance, and modesty.

5. The chief doctrine of these philosophers is that no true entity, however partial, of which nothing previously existed, is newly produced by natural agents and, generally, by secondary or created causes; nor is any entity destroyed or reduced to nothing of itself. For secondary causes do not create, or do not act by creation, as no one denies. But if they produced some entity, or some particle of entity, which previously was nothing, they would produce it from nothing and consequently would truly create, because creation is "the production of a thing from nothing." Likewise it is certain that secondary causes cannot annihilate anything. But if they so dissolved a composite that some part of it passed into nothing, they would truly annihilate it, because annihilation is "the cessation of a thing into nothing." Hence, excepting the rational soul, which is known to be produced by creation by God alone, they deny and banish from the nature of things every substantial form that is an entity really distinct from matter, such as the Peripatetics posit. For since such a form is nothing before the generation of the composite, for example fire, it will truly be created when it receives being from a secondary cause generating fire, because it will truly be produced from nothing; and since nothing of that form remains when the fire is extinguished, it will truly be annihilated, because it truly passes into nothing. From the same principle they deny every absolute accident, or every entitative accidental form, really distinct from every substance, lest they fall into the same absurdity of creation and annihilation. They nevertheless quite commonly acknowledge modes, or modifications and determinations of a substantial subject, which by the power of natural agents now begin and now cease to be. But they deny that these modes are entitatively distinguished from the subject; they also deny that they are properly made, produced, or corrupted.

6. They therefore say that the primary matter from which all bodies are constituted is composed of corpuscles exceedingly minute and beyond our senses, created by God at the beginning of the world. Some, such as Maignan, Saguens, and Tosca following Gassendi, hold that these corpuscles, points, or physical minima are properly "atoms," that is, physical entities incapable of division, or really indivisible into parts, although they are mathematically divisible, that is, endowed with figure and local extension. Others, such as Cartesius and his followers, hold that these corpuscles are infinitely divisible, just as the Peripatetics commonly judge of the continuum. Yet because these Cartesian corpuscles escape every sense by reason of their excessive subtlety, they too are ordinarily called "atoms." Hence all defenders of the renewed philosophy of which we are speaking are commonly called "Atomists," and for brevity we shall henceforth include them all under this same designation. But if one prefers to read "corpuscles" for "atoms," and "Corpuscularians" for "Atomists," that is permissible. From these atoms, which have various figures, some spherical, some angular, some striated, some hooked or barbed, etc., moved, coordinated, and joined in manifold ways, in a certain multitude and in a certain dosage, they say that all substantial composites result; so that form is nothing other than the position, proportion, coordination, and interweaving of atoms, or even their motion, or a motive force which they identify with the atoms themselves, tempered by the combination of many. Consequently, form adds nothing entitatively distinct from the simple substance of the atoms, but only modes or certain modifications at most. To explain this they repeatedly insist upon the example of artifacts.

7. If one asks whether the primordial atoms differ substantially among themselves, many reply with Maignan that atoms are intrinsically heterogeneous or dissimilar and of diverse substantial species, so that from this the four common elements, fire, air, water, and earth, may differ substantially among themselves, and so that from these, mixed in manifold proportions, diverse bodies called "mixed bodies" may be constituted, such as stones, metals, plants, and brute animals, in all of which there is nothing except elements variously combined. And because the four common elements do not seem sufficient for so many diverse combinations as there are mixed bodies unlike one another, some add a fifth unnamed element, composed of nobler atoms, which serves especially for constituting brutes and plants. Saguens adds thirty others, which he likewise leaves anonymous. Maignan, however, admits almost innumerable ones, at least as many as there are diverse influences of the heavenly bodies, some of which he declares common, others noble and illustrious. Others reply with Cartesius

and Tosca that the particles of matter, or atoms, are substantially homogeneous or similar and of the same species, and differ only in figure and motion. This diversity alone, together with variety of dosage, is sufficient, they say, to account for the whole variety of natural composites, as can be seen in artifacts. Therefore the whole difference of a lion from an eagle, or of gold from coal, consists in a different figure and disposition of atoms, or also in a different motion. These authors deny that motion, just like one figure rather than another, proceeds from the intrinsic nature of the corpuscles. For they hold every body to be of itself indifferent to every figure and to motion and rest, and incapable of being moved except by a spirit.

8. Moreover, although Cartesians and other innovators in philosophy initially despised the authority of Aristotle, more recent Atomists now strive to fortify themselves by the patronage of so great a philosopher, and commonly oppose both him and St. Thomas to the Peripatetics. Yet they use the same terms concerning physical matters as the Peripatetics, although endowing them with another sense and a different notion. For among Atomists a "substantial composite" is nothing other than a certain mass artfully constructed from atoms variously intertwined, or even from molecules previously formed from primordial atoms, in such quantity that it becomes sensible. "Generation," which is the production of a substantial composite, is a mere local motion by which atoms are set in motion, gathered, coordinated, and interwoven into one sensible mass that deserves the name of some physical species, for example, a stone or a tree. "Alteration" is the excitation or local introduction of new corpuscles by which that mass is sensibly changed without yet losing its name. For example, wine is altered when it is heated by fiery corpuscles, but still retains the name of wine. "Corruption" is such a disjunction and dispersion of corpuscles that the mass no longer remains under the same name, but another of a different species succeeds it. For example, that wood is corrupted when it is burned consists in this: so many fiery corpuscles flow together into one place that, the structure of the wooden atoms having been dissolved and those atoms imperceptibly dispersed, a fiery mass succeeds there and is sensed.

9. Matter is the whole substance and entity of natural things. "Primary matter" consists in primitive atoms or corpuscles not yet cohering, to which what is customarily said of primary matter is easily applied, namely that it is a simple substance, ingenerable, incorruptible, pure potency, indifferent to every form, and of itself belonging to no physical existence, that is, to none perceptible by sense, since sensible existence alone pertains to physical science, which does not abstract from sensible matter. Nevertheless, in

reality each atom taken separately is a substance really existing before God, indeed even before Metaphysics, which abstracts from sensible matter. "Secondary matter," which in some mixed bodies can also be tertiary, quaternary, etc., consists of molecules made up of primitive corpuscles, or of other more subtle molecules, which are then intertwined among themselves to compose a mixed body. For every mixed body is immediately composed of secondary matter, because atoms are first formed into various molecules, which are portions either of the common elements, fire, water, etc., or of the chemical elements, salt, sulfur, etc., or of other unnamed elements, so that these may afterward be formed into the mixed body.

10. Substantial form is either the manifold motion of corpuscles, according to Cartesius and his followers. This motion was impressed by God at the beginning of the world beyond the exigency of matter, which of itself inclines to no motion, except perhaps rectilinear motion; but once impressed, it endures perpetually, because no part of matter loses motion except by laying it aside and transferring it, as though a burden, to other corpuscles. Or it is, as Maignan judges, a motive force really identified with atoms and distinguished from them only by reason, insofar as, when tempered, it coalesces from heterogeneous atoms, as happens in mixed bodies; for if that force is homogeneous, as in pure elements, it is not called substantial form. Or finally, as most hold, it is the combination of atoms, importing a certain multitude of them together with the absence of others, a certain figure, such a position, interweaving, proportion, and harmony, all of which are something modal and relative and add nothing entitatively distinct from the substance of the atoms. They say that there is an example of this in the form of an army, a house, or any artifact; for as regards the general character of form, they admit no difference between artificial and natural things. Tosca holds this notion of form together with many others, and it seems to have been accepted in practice among all Atomists and Corpuscularians, even followers of Cartesius or Maignan. For this reason they are all commonly called "Combinationists," and their philosophy is called "Combinatorial," and also "Mechanical and Artificial," because, namely, they construct the whole variety of nature by combinatorial art alone, reduce the whole to mechanical laws, and constitute it after the manner of artifacts.

11. But it must be noted that the Maignanists, whom Tosca follows, acknowledge besides the combination just described, which they call the "general form" of all bodies, another "special form," especially in those composites in which there is some portion of matter more subtle, active, and mobile, for example, in brute animals. For in these there is some portion of

matter that is very subtle and agitated with extremely rapid motion, whether it consists in spirits which they call vital and animal, or in particles of the purest fire or of another nobler element, according to the various opinions of the Atomists. This portion is moved and wanders throughout the whole body through the veins, arteries, nerves, and fibers, and causes various motions of the members according as it is variously moved, partly from the internal commotion of the parts and partly from the impression of objects encountered externally. This portion of matter can therefore, they say, be called the "special form" of the brute, because it moves the other parts of the brute and as it were actuates and perfects them; indeed it even gives them life, since it is the intrinsic principle of immanent motions. Hence they conclude that this very thing, and nothing else, is the soul of the brute.

12. It is customary for the Atomists to banish the souls of brutes such as the Peripatetics acknowledge, namely certain substantial forms really distinct from matter but dependent upon it, which are materially cognitive or perceptive of objects, so that from material perception they elicit even a material appetite by which they seek what is advantageous to themselves and flee what is harmful. But these Corpuscularian philosophers are divided into two opinions, or rather into two modes of speaking that in reality agree. For Cartesius and his followers say that brute animals are mere automata, or certain machines fabricated by the Divine Artificer, whose whole form consists in the organization, proportion, and disposition of the parts of matter, which is thereby rendered capable of the whole variety of motions we experience in brutes. To these motions it is determined partly by spirits coursing through the organs and partly by external objects. They therefore command us to conceive the structure of brutes after the manner of a wound clock, which without any form other than its artistry and the due disposition of its parts produces its own motions, marks the hours, and emits sounds; or after the manner of a pneumatic organ, which, when the keys are pressed by hand and air enters through various pipes, resounds with such manifold and musical harmony. But because this manner of speaking, contrary to the sense of the whole human race, denies to brutes not only cognition but every sensation, and leaves them no life except a highly metaphorical one, such as the Chinese attributed to a wound clock first brought from Europe, which they called a European animal and a sounding beast, others, whom Tosca imitates, speak more mildly. They indeed deny cognitive power to brutes, but concede "soul and life," because according to Aristotle the soul is "the act of a physical organic body having life in potency," a definition which they adapt to the subtler portion of matter that they call the "special form," discussed in no. 11. Life, moreover, is "motion

from within," immanent, or terminated in the agent itself; and they say that such a motion proceeds in brutes from that "special form." They also concede "sensation," not indeed complete sensation, which includes cognition, but incomplete sensation, consisting in this: objects move the organs of the external senses with a tremulous motion, which, immediately communicated through the nerves and little fibers to the common sensory organ situated in the brain, is thence diffused through the organs of the locomotor power and determines the whole animal either to flight or to pursuit of the object. But Maignan is more liberal than the others in his use of names. In *Philosoph. natur.* cap. 24 and 28, he concedes to brutes complete sensation, cognition, knowledge, thought, memory, indeed even material reasoning, and a certain shadow and as it were image of human free choice. Yet under names of this kind he attributes no other meaning than a certain local motion of the internal particles of matter.

13. Finally, the Atomists acknowledge no action and no motion in corporeal things except local motion. For among them life and sensation, or even material cognition, imagination, and thought, are local motions in these or those organs of animals. And in general, a corporeal efficient cause has no activity except toward local motion, by whose aid, by joining various corpuscles, it is said to generate or alter, and by dispersing other corpuscles it is said to corrupt or destroy. It accomplishes this by emitting from its own bosom effluvia of corpuscles which adhere to the patient and excite therein kindred atoms lying hidden there, and thus alter or corrupt the patient, that is, either begin or complete its resolution into insensible particles. Likewise they acknowledge no entity in the nature of things which is not in itself a substance, although in relation to others they call some "accidents," taking this name according to the Porphyrian definition known in Logic, namely, "That which can be present or absent without corruption of the subject." Hence, whenever one substance is so mingled with another that it can again be separated without the other being corrupted, that is, without losing that principal property or sensibility by reason of which it has such a name, for example fire or apple, they then call the mingled substance an accident of the other. Thus, they say, light is in itself a substance; yet when it is diffused through the air, it is called an accident of the air because it can be present or absent without corruption of the air. Finally, they hold that no new entity can be produced by secondary causes, even spiritual ones; and they restrict all their activity to modifications or relations, which they deny to be entities, at least truly and on the side of the thing distinct from the substantial subject.

14. The Physics of the Chemists does not differ greatly from this Atomistic philosophy. They say that the first principles of mixed bodies consist in five elements, namely Mercury, Sulfur, Salt, Phlegm, and Earth. Their more common explanation is as follows. "Mercury," which is also called "Spirit," is a very subtle, mobile, and inflammable liquid. "Sulfur," which they also call "Oil," is another liquid, fatty, oily, and viscous. "Salt" is a more fixed portion of matter imitating ordinary salt. "Phlegm" is a liquid or watery and tasteless moisture. "Earth" is a coarse and friable portion of matter, like drier earth; this they also call "damned earth" and "dead head." They divide the offices among these in such a way that salt in the constitution of the mixed body stands for matter, Mercury for form, and Sulfur for union, because, being viscous, it glues the other parts together. They neglect Phlegm and Earth as inert elements performing scarcely any function. They prove this opinion concerning the elements from the fact that those five are always extracted from any mixed body in its analysis or resolution, which is accomplished through an alembic and other instruments by the action of fire; but everything is composed of those things into which it is resolved. These chemical principles do not displease the Atomists, provided they are not called first principles but secondary, that is, things themselves principled from others; for experiments of the chemical art itself clearly demonstrate that they can be further resolved into diverse bodies. Nor perhaps do the Chemists disagree, for provided they obtain the point that the better-known mixed bodies are immediately constituted only from these elements, they will easily concede that the ultimate resolution can reach atoms or insensible corpuscles of manifold nature or figure.

15. It is not my intention at present to refute Atomistic philosophy formally, nor to touch upon objections which particularly militate against Cartesius, Maignan, Tosca, and others, each of whom constructs for himself his own physical series of things and differs not a little from the others. This is the work of a larger volume. For now I shall merely propose, as briefly as I can, some of those arguments which attack Atomists generally and by which I am willingly induced to prefer the beaten and Peripatetic way of philosophizing. But first I wish to warn you of this. Whenever you dispute with an Atomist, concede or permit certain things in which he exults and triumphs, armed with many experiments, but which do not touch the head of the controversy and are also true or probable among the Peripatetics. Such are the following.

16. 1º That every body consists either of exceedingly subtle corpuscles which can be divided and subdivided at least by an Angel or by God, both down to complete insensibility and indefinitely; or even of atoms entitatively

altogether incapable of division, each of which nevertheless has its own local extension and consequently figure. Both opinions have Peripatetic patrons, provided that each corpuscle, point, or atom is constituted of matter and substantial form, or of an atom of matter and an atom of form; likewise provided that such corpuscles, thus essentially composed, are united among themselves only by integral or continuative union.

17. 2º That either the four common elements or the chemical elements remain formally in mixed bodies, provided that in perfect mixed bodies another specific substantial form is superadded. This can be permitted in two ways: either so that the elements mixed together perform the office of subject with respect to the proper form of the mixed body, to which the forms of the elements are subordinated, as many Peripatetics opine concerning forms of corporeity in living things; or, more easily, so that the mixed body, beyond its primary constitution and integrity, requires for its conservation and for operations proper to itself that it have within itself many elementary particles pertaining to its secondary integrity without being informed by the form of the mixed body. This is no different from what very many Peripatetics judge concerning blood, the three other humors, tears, and almost every juice and fat of the human body. Indeed, beyond these integrating particles, perhaps most mixed bodies everywhere receive without exigency innumerable corpuscles flying through the air into their pores, both elementary and of another nature, which nevertheless are always constituted of their own form and matter, and in that internal contiguity communicate to them to some degree their proper qualities. Once this is granted or permitted, one may easily free oneself from the furnaces and alembics in which the Atomist trusts too much, without any need to seek occult causes productive of new effects. For what wonder is it if the elements, whether common or chemical, are extracted from most mixed bodies by the action of fire, since they are formally contained there either as at least integrating parts or as adventitious corpuscles? With this it coheres perfectly well that the proper substantial form of the mixed body preexisted and perishes, and that its proper matter, if one wishes the elements to pertain only to secondary integrity, receives by the power of the fire then present a new substantial form of some volatile spirit. For after all corpuscles, both integrating and adventitious, have been extracted, only a very small portion of matter will certainly remain from the mixed body; and there is otherwise no reason why the new production of a volatile substance should exceed the power of fire.

18. 3º That effluvia of corpuscles often, or always, flow from very many mixed bodies. The Atomists are greatly delighted with these effluvia and

place in them the influences of the heavenly bodies and all the influxes of natural agents toward producing anything. But the Peripatetics do not deny them; rather, they everywhere suppose the same thing under the names of vapors, spirits, or manifold exhalations, especially those proceeding from living or dead bodies and from all odoriferous things. These effluvia can be derived from that abundance of corpuscles, either integrating or adventitious, just mentioned, together with particles of the proper matter which the mixed body loses through the action of natural heat or contrary agents. But let the Atomists explain how the mixed body repairs the loss of so many corpuscles, lest it shortly vanish entirely. Moreover, although effluvia of this kind can, by motion and impact alone, cause certain effects, at least indirectly, in other bodies by exciting and moving their proper corpuscles, it must altogether be denied that the whole action of natural agents, or the explanation of their power, consists in these effluvia: both because many effects are caused independently of effluvia, as will become clear in their places, and because most phenomena depend upon effluvia only insofar as these are vehicles of qualities through which, as instrumental powers, the agent operates.

19. 4º That in the celestial and sublunary world, besides bodies known to sense, there is found a certain corporeal substance, but exceedingly subtle and fluid, agitated with exceedingly swift motion, which not only fills whatever space is left anywhere by other bodies, but also easily penetrates the pores of other bodies, however narrow, so that nothing is impervious to its subtlety. This is ordinarily called "ether," "subtle matter," or "ethereal substance." By its aid, as though by theatrical machinery, the Cartesians, whom Tosca follows, think themselves freed from many phenomena exceedingly difficult to explain. Nor is this so alien to the Peripatetic school that it does not please many Peripatetics as being in accord with Aristotle's mind. Finally, one may admit the weight of air and its elastic force, by which, when violently compressed or stretched, it restores itself to its due extension, and many other things which we owe to the diligent and successful discoveries of the experiments of those physicists who are therefore called "Experimentalists." Nor should one greatly reject anything except what cannot cohere with Peripatetic forms and qualities. The whole pivot of the controversy must therefore turn upon the entity of substantial and accidental form newly produced by secondary causes and perishing in physical changes. But now let us judge the arguments by which this philosophy must be rejected.

20. 1º Because there will be no substantial composite and no substantial generation. The Atomists deny this consequence. But it is proved: because

there is no substantial composite without matter and substantial form, as no one denies. But the form you posit is not substantial. For it is either the motion of corpuscles or the combination discussed above in no. 10, passing over the motive force indistinct from the atoms, which certainly does not make a physical composition with matter; and in either case it is nothing except a purely accidental modification. First, because it can be present or absent without corruption of the subject, which among you is the notion of an accident. Second, because no one says that the form of artifacts is substantial, although natural form does not differ from it, as you maintain, except in greater and lesser subtlety, just as the form of a more delicate image differs from the form of a rougher one. Third, because the form induced through alteration is accidental, and yet it differs only by more and less from that which is induced through generation. Finally, because what has nothing of true entity has nothing of substantiality, as is evident of itself; but that form, insofar as it physically supervenes upon matter, has nothing of true entity, as you say. Yet substantial form must be the principal quiddity of the composite, or the account of its essence and substance, and the principal or sole specific constitutive principle by which one composite differs essentially from others; all of which Tosca concedes with Aristotle. But who can perceive that all these belong to a modal form which does not add even the least little entity really distinct from matter? Nor does recourse to that special form of no. 11 help. For that form, as its authors admit, is a form only insofar as, compared with the other parts of matter, it is nobler or subtler. Otherwise it is one of the parts of matter which, together with the others, is formed by the modal form, to which alone is attributed the fact that an unarranged and formless heap of atoms becomes a substantial composite. For this reason Tosca, *Tract.* 3, Lib. 1, cap. 2, propos. 26, 27, 28, and 30, attempts to verify of this modal form whatever belongs to the concept of a form required and sufficient for constituting a substantial composite. But now, if there is no composite of this kind, there will also be no substantial generation, as is evident of itself. Certainly whatever of substance, indeed whatever of entity, newly appears was already there before, since your combination is nothing entitative; only what was not sensed becomes sensible, what lay hidden is disclosed, what was in a state of dispersion passes into a state of collection, and it varies its position and connection. But a change of this kind is no more substantial generation than the gathering of dispersed soldiers, or their arrangement into a square or semicircle, or their sudden departure from a hidden place into an open field. Hence the whole business of natural transmutations is reduced to mere appearances and deceptions of our senses. I ask you: why is the fabrication

of a wound clock not substantial generation? Is it because it is the work not of God but of man? If therefore God alone wished to fabricate that very thing, the clock would then be a substantial composite, although differing in nothing from others fabricated by men; which would be astonishing. Is it because it is less artfully constructed than a natural machine? But among natural machines some are less artful than others, as you yourself do not doubt. Moreover, everything that you say belongs to the concept of substantial form in reality belongs to the form of a clock; nor is this machine lacking that "special form" which you acknowledge in living things. Such indeed is the coiled steel spring which "by its elasticity," to use Tosca's words at the place cited, propos. 34, "imparts the most orderly motion to that whole organic body; and therefore it is the principal form of the clock and as it were its soul, by which the wheels turn in fixed numbers and the whole machine is set in motion by an internal motion." Dare therefore, and fearlessly call all works of art substantially generated composites, whatever craftsmen may laugh together with the philosophers; nor indeed will this be more discordant than calling beasts machines or automata, as you have long been accustomed to do.

21. 2° Because it follows that natural agents, and secondary causes generally, can do nothing. This too is absurd among these philosophers; and as regards free causes, it was condemned by the Council of Trent as heretical. Yet it is proved. According to you, natural agents act only insofar as they induce local motion, or insofar as they make corpuscles change place. But this change of place, according to Maignan, imports nothing distinct in the nature of the thing from body and place, neither of which natural agents can cause. According to others, however, change of place imports a certain modification modally distinct from body and place. At most a secondary cause, even a spiritual one, can produce a modification, and nothing else. But I ask: does this modification have anything of entity, or absolutely nothing? If you say the first, beware of your absurdity of creation and annihilation by a created cause. If the second, then secondary causes, if they act nothing except modification, act absolutely nothing. Add that, according to the Cartesians, all the local motion there is in the world was produced by God at the beginning of the world beyond the exigency of matter, which thereafter does nothing except undergo such motion or lay it down into other matter encountered. But one who carries a burden imposed by another or lays it upon another's shoulders can only ridiculously be said to produce or cause the burden. Likewise, according to Tosca, *tract.* 3, lib. 5, cap. 1, every body is indifferent to motion and rest and cannot elicit motion by its own power or intrinsic exigency, but must receive it from God or from

another spiritual mover, or even from the impact of another body which was previously moved mediately or immediately by a spiritual mover. And when one body strikes another, this impact, which is the whole action of moving, has no other terminus, Tosca says, "except the very creation or conservation of the body successively in diverse places, accomplished by God at the exigency of the moving body, not indeed considered absolutely and in itself, but insofar as by its motion it runs into and strikes another." Hence it plainly follows that every body is merely passive with respect to its motion, and no more produces that motion than its own creation or conservation. Nor can the impact by which one body impels another be called a physical action of moving proper to the impacting body, because it neither proceeds from the power or exigency of that body by reason of itself, but only by reason of motion received from elsewhere; nor does such an impact physically cause the motion of the struck body, but only requires that God cause it, unless one absurdly wishes organized and duly disposed matter to be said physically to cause the rational soul because it requires its creation by God. Since, therefore, according to the Atomists, natural agents can act nothing except local motion, and with respect to it are merely passive, in reality they act absolutely nothing; for according to Trent, Sess. 6, can. 4, "to act absolutely nothing" is the same as "to be merely passive." Hence it also follows that there is no "nature" in physical things, insofar as nature is defined as "the principle and cause of the motion and rest of that in which it is primarily and of itself, and not accidentally." Tosca presupposes that nature thus defined is found in physical things; but anyone will easily gather from what has been said that this cannot be reconciled with the doctrine just related. Maignan also uses this argument in *Philosoph. natur.* cap. 13, propos. 14, to prove that motive force is intrinsic to atoms. But neither does he preserve true physical activity if bodies act nothing except local motion, as he maintains. First, because in cap. 10, propos. 12, he establishes that "motion is not something physically distinct before the operation of the mind from the mover from which it is, from the movable thing whose motion it is, and from the space in which it is." Second, because, as is clear from his doctrine in cap. 19, a body acts and moves itself or another only insofar as it naturally requires that God act and move, namely through the continued creation or conservation of such a body in the space in which the motion occurs; so that the exigency, which is identified with the thing requiring, considered in itself is the first act of the secondary cause, but is its second act insofar as it has actually accommodated and joined to itself the act of creation. Thus in the cited cap. 19, propos. 12, num. 10. But to require is not physically to cause, as I was just saying by the example of the rational

soul. Moreover, who can endure the claim that the movable thing is properly said to cause its own creation in space?

22. 3º Because there will be no substantial specific difference between a horse and a plant, and similarly concerning the other species of bodies, if the atoms are homogeneous, as most Atomists teach, although they show themselves wholly averse to this consequence. It is proved: because the entire difference will consist in the figure, position, interweaving, and dosage of atoms. Of these, dosage, or a certain portion or multitude of corpuscles, contributes nothing to specific difference; for, as they say, "more and less do not vary the species." Variety of figure, position, and interweaving cannot make a substantial difference, as is evident, especially when the entity of the subject does not require this figure rather than that, etc., as the adversaries maintain. Otherwise a seated man would differ in species from himself standing. This also presses the patrons of heterogeneous atoms. For many mixed bodies known to be specifically distinct differ not in the substance of their atoms, but only in diverse proportion and harmony. Their difference must therefore be reduced to diverse dosages of elements and diverse figures or textures. For example, the wolf and the sheep consist of atoms of the same character, as do the stork and the serpent; for the wolf feeds on sheep and the stork on serpents, and everything consists of the same things on which it is nourished, according to the common axiom from which Maignan, defender of heterogeneity, cap. 21, n. 8, proves that the food of vegetative things consists of the same elements as the vegetative things themselves. He confirms this in cap. 22, n. 22, by the example of a heron accustomed to feed on little fish, whose corpse, putrefying in water, is reduced to shoals of little fish formed from it. Therefore a sheep is not a wolf, nor a serpent a stork, for no other reason than diversity of figure, position, or interweaving, even considering that portion of nobler matter which performs the office of soul, for this too undoubtedly increases in brutes and plants when they are nourished. Hence this author undeservedly attacks the homogeneity of atoms in cap. 13, prop. 14, n. 7, on the ground that gold, a magnet, and any other bodies whatsoever throughout the whole world would be of the same lowest species, "which," he says, "without doubt no man of sound mind will concede." Undeservedly, I say; for specific identity is no more absurd in gold and a magnet than in an ox and hay, a horse and barley, a heron and little fish, and generally in animals or plants compared with their food.

23. From what has been said, another argument can be made, and at the same time the fundamental argument of the Atomists overthrown. The combination, or that whole complex and harmony which you call the form of

bodies, is something positive, truly distinct from the atoms on the side of the thing and prior to the operation of the mind. Therefore, since such a combination begins and ceases to be through the activity of natural agents, some new entity is now produced and destroyed by those agents; and consequently you too must solve that celebrated difficulty concerning creation and annihilation. I prove the antecedent. First, that such a combination is something positive is clear, because in it consist the symmetry, beauty, and artful perfection of the whole corporeal world; in it consists the specific being of each body and the specific difference of one from another; through it, for example, a wolf is a wolf and is neither a sheep nor a pig. But in these things the light of reason compels us to conceive something positive. Conceive the whole multitude of atoms of which the world consists as not yet coordinated by any motion, connection, or harmony. Such a multitude is not yet the world, just as a confused multitude of stones and pieces of wood is not yet a house. Let the combination which the Atomists require for the fabric of the world be added. Behold, there is now the world with that perfection and beauty which carries men and Angels away in admiration of it and compels them to burst forth into praises of the Divine Artificer. Who can conceive that nothing positive intervenes between world and non-world, between world and chaos, or an unformed heap of atoms? Does no real perfection accrue to such a multitude when it is formed into a most perfect work complete in every respect? But real perfection is undoubtedly real goodness, and this is an attribute of positive being, as no one is ignorant. Likewise the whole multitude of corpuscles of which a horse consists, placed in a state of dispersion, is not a horse; but placed in the state of collection required for a horse, it is thereby a horse. Therefore that state of collection is something positive. The consequence is clear: otherwise a horse would differ from a non-horse by nothing positive; horse and non-horse would be identified according to their whole positive being and total reality; the horse would be generated and die without anything positive beginning or ceasing to be in the nature of things; and the definition of horse would properly belong to that unformed multitude of corpuscles, since the same definition is where there is the same quiddity, and nothing of equine quiddity is lacking to such a multitude, since only the state of collection is lacking, which is not the quiddity. Who would believe such things? But that the aforesaid combination is something distinct from the atoms on the side of the thing and prior to the operation of the mind, which was the second part of the first antecedent, is shown no less clearly. For that which on the side of the thing comes and goes while the whole substance of the atoms remains is distinguished on the side of the thing from such substance;

otherwise something could supervene upon itself and be separated from itself, which is plainly chimerical. Nor does it matter that separability is not mutual. For it is equally chimerical that the other extreme, namely the whole substance of the atoms, should exist without that which is really indistinct from it or identified with it; otherwise it would exist without itself, that is, would simultaneously exist and not exist. But combination comes and goes while the whole substance of the atoms remains, as you maintain. Therefore, etc. Certainly things to which contradictory predicates belong on the side of the thing are distinguished on the side of the thing. But combination and the substance of atoms are thus related, since one varies and the other does not; one begins to be through the activity of natural agents and the other does not thus begin to be; one ceases and the other does not. Therefore, etc. Nor seek a hiding place with Tosca in modal distinction, which many Peripatetics also say is less than real distinction. For whatever may be the case concerning this, it suffices for me to obtain these three points: 1º that the mode which you posit as the form of bodies is a true reality and positive perfection; 2º that it is truly distinguished prior to the operation of the mind from the substance of the atoms; 3º that by the power of natural agents it truly begins to be and truly ceases from the nature of things. For once these are granted, whatever difficulty you object against the eduction and cessation of forms must equally be solved by you.

24. 4º Because the opinion concerning brute animals related in no. 12 is a paradox alien in every place and age from the sense of all nations, if one or another rare bird among the ancients be excepted who chose to fly outside the common air, just as there was once one who said that snow was black. And since this opinion follows spontaneously from the principles of Atomistic philosophy, it alone would suffice for such principles to be hissed off as altogether exotic. Certainly a material soul participating in cognition, such as the Peripatetics posit, is not impossible. For what is usually objected against it is very far from demonstration and is refuted with the same ease with which it is stated, as will become clear in its place. But if a dog, ape, or fox had such a soul, by what other more manifest signs would it reveal it? Nor answer with the Atomists that this argument is against us; for they do not consider it repugnant that the supreme Artificer should know and be able to construct a machine with such art that, without a cognitive soul, by the laws of Mechanics alone it would be fitted for the motions we see in brutes. For since such wondrous things are made by human art, what must be thought of Divine art? But if this is not repugnant, they say, it must be believed actually to occur, because "beings are not to be multiplied without necessity," and "what can be done through fewer is done in vain through

more." In vain, I say, do you reply thus. For sufficiently strong arguments prove that this is altogether impossible. Some are proposed by Fr. Jean Gisbert in *Dissert.* 8, *Academico*, and others can be deduced from what Fr. Gabriel Daniel proposes in an ingenious and pleasant manner in the work entitled *Voyage du Monde de Descartes*, that is, "Journey" or "Travel into the World of Cartesius," 5, part. But to omit these now for brevity, it is at least unknown and cannot be humanly traced whether it is possible that in one and the same machine there should cohere so many hidden mechanisms, so many springs, so many contrivances as would be necessary for producing the motions of an ape or dog from the laws of Mechanics alone, especially irregular or spontaneous motions which manifestly seem contrary to those laws. For this it is necessary distinctly to conceive all those mechanisms, and also their order, connection, dependence, etc.; and no Atomist has yet presumed to do this. One may indeed find among these authors very beautiful descriptions and pages full of anatomical terms. But when they come to explaining particular varieties of motion, they know nothing else to say except that the impression of objects, carried through the animal spirits to the brain, where lies the origin of the nerves serving the locomotor power, immediately opens the orifices of those nerves; whence it happens that the same spirits run through the open little tubes to the feet, for example, whose muscles they determine to run, leap, etc. But if one asks further why a sheep, upon seeing a wolf, is determined to run, not indeed toward the wolf, as the laws of Mechanics would seem to require, or at least backward with reversed steps, but first by turning the whole machine through a semicircle and then fleeing in a straight line; why the machine of a dog very gently takes bread offered close to its mouth while its feet remain unmoved, but seeks the same bread when shown from a higher place by many violent leaps; why the same machine is inclined by blows and caresses to regulate its motions, although nothing similar has ever been seen in clocks or other machines of human art; why that very machine of a hunting dog, while attracted by corpuscles from a hare, omits the first and second sides of the triangle traversed by the hare and often takes the third, by which it meets the hare more quickly and easily: in these, I say, and other matters, however common and obvious, for I do not choose the most complicated motions and those most similar to human ones which we admire in bees, apes, and elephants, the Atomist falls silent; or at most says that such variety of motions proceeds from "a certain" agitation of spirits running through nerves and muscles "in a certain way" unknown to us. Thus in this hypothesis of the Atomists the origin of animal motions from the laws of Mechanics alone is not only incredible but also unknowable or inconceivable. On the other hand, the Peripatetic hypothesis

has seemed credible in all ages and is conceived so easily, whatever the Atomists may dissemble, that it immediately appears plain even to beginners in the science of the soul. If that definition of the rational soul handed down by Augustine is clear to you Atomists, "A substance participating in reason, fitted for governing a body," why should this definition of a purely sensitive soul be obscure: "A substance participating only in sensation, fitted for moving a body"? You ask how it moves. But I ask you in turn: how does the rational soul govern? If you conceive this government well through the subordination of the spirits and organs of the body to the acts of our soul, why do you not know how to conceive a similar subordination to the sensations of pleasure and pain elicited by the soul of the brute? Then thus. When two hypotheses are disputed, of which one is not apprehended as possible except at most under a merely negative doubt, and it is not known how it corresponds with experience, and moreover appears incredible and discordant to all peoples and almost all the wise, while the other has conditions opposite to these, no prudent man will judge that the former rather than the latter actually exists. But the latter is our hypothesis; the former is yours. Therefore, etc. Hence it must be denied that there is no necessity here, at least moral and prudential, of adding the entity of a cognitive soul, or that this entity is superfluous, lest we philosophize exotically and without foundation. Cartesius established as a criterion or norm of truth a clear and distinct "idea" of the object, and he will admit nothing as true which we do not see to accord with such a criterion. "I have never," he says in *Medit.* 6, "judged that anything could not be done by God except because I perceived distinctly that it involved contradiction." Let any Cartesian therefore be asked whether he has a clear and distinct idea of the mechanisms with which the little machines of bees must be equipped in order that without sense and cognition they should form a commonwealth most orderly in so great a variety of offices. If he has it, let him explain it, and he will be a great Apollo for us. If he does not, why does he abandon the criterion of his master?

25. Moreover, the Atomists' most familiar way of philosophizing is by analogy, namely by explaining hidden things of nature through likeness to known and obvious things. Hence that recourse to artificial things, repeated to the point of nausea, especially when the structure of brutes is discussed. But in this matter the Peripatetics have available a better, livelier, and more natural analogy, namely one taken from the human composite. For since they know that in man, besides organized matter disposed with no less art and subtlety than in brutes, a soul entitatively distinct from matter is necessary as the principle not only of understanding but also of sensing and

vegetating, operations for which, if the soul departs, the whole structure of the human body, however exquisite, is insufficient, from this they take an analogy for philosophizing about brutes, whose organic construction and manner of vegetating and sensing have so great an affinity with man. Hence in brutes too they acknowledge a soul entitatively distinct from matter, which is the root of such operations, indeed perceptive and appetitive of objects, but purely materially, since it does not rise to the spiritual mode of thinking proper to man. Therefore they assert such a soul to be entitatively material, immersed in matter, and naturally incapable of existing outside matter. What could be more congruent than this analogy?

26. You will say: even man, insofar as he vegetates and senses, is a mere automaton and does not differ from brutes except by the more exquisite fabrication of the machine, although it is subordinated to the command of the rational soul as regards very many motions; therefore the rational soul elicits only spiritual acts. I admit that many Atomists say this expressly, and all are bound by consequence to say the same. But from this it follows that the rational soul will not be the form of the human body, the opposite of which was defined in Clementin. unic. *de summa Trinit.*, and in the Lateran Council under Leo X. For it neither has operations common to itself and the body as active and passive principles, since material acts belong to the body alone, just as spiritual acts belong to the soul alone; nor does it truly complete and actuate the human body, since the latter of itself is a complete substance and, prescinding from the rational soul, has in itself a full faculty for its motions no less than a horse, namely by reason of the organic disposition or of the subtler matter which you call the "special form" and which is no less present in a human body than in that of a horse. Therefore, just as a horse endowed with that quasi-soul of its own is a substance altogether complete and incapable of being completed by a further form, so too is the human body as contradistinguished from the rational soul. This soul therefore will not make with the body "one of itself," contrary to that statement of the Athanasian Creed, "As body and soul are one man, so God and man are one Christ," but will be a merely assisting spirit, as is a demon when it enters human corpses and moves them as though they were living bodies, or when it possesses the possessed and determines their organs and many acts. You will perceive the force of this argument if you observe certain things that Tosca teaches which bear upon this matter. He teaches 1º that the union of the rational soul with the body, beyond "coexistence and local penetration," includes only "the prepared concurrence of God, namely through a decree by which He determined not to concur with the soul toward eliciting human operations separately from the body, but only

toward producing them together with it and dependently upon it"; and that in this partnership of operation consists the fact that the soul produces with the body "one adequate and singular principle of operations." Thus *tract.* 3, lib. 1, cap. 3, prop. 52. He teaches 2º that in the human body there truly is everything which in a plant is called the vegetative soul and in a brute the sensitive soul, namely that portion of subtler matter discussed in no. 11. For according to him a human fetus is first a plant, then a certain brute animal, and finally a man, in such a way that through these degrees it loses none of the souls previously possessed, taken entitatively, although the first two cease to be souls through the arrival of the third because they lose primacy in such an organic body and are subjected to the rational soul as its instrumental faculties. Thus *tract.* 10, lib. 7, cap. 3, prop. 19. He teaches 3º that a duly disposed human body, if God did not infuse a rational soul into it, "would then be a brute animal altogether similar to man as regards body and organic powers," and would live by the sensitive soul, that very one which upon the arrival of the rational soul loses the name of soul and is called an instrumental faculty. He adds that "if God withdrew the rational soul from a healthy body and conserved the rest, it would again become a brute animal similar to man as regards body and organs," and that instrumental faculty would again recover primacy and consequently the name of sensitive soul. Thus in the place cited immediately above, prop. 18, where he seems to acknowledge no natural exigency of mutual union either on the part of the human body or on the part of the rational soul. For he assigns no other reason why God infuses a rational soul into a duly organized body except this one: "lest that deception have place," that is, lest perhaps we be deceived in believing that what is a brute is a man. Elsewhere, however, namely *tract.* 10, lib. 2, prop. 3, the same Tosca, together with the other Atomists, despises a similar reason alleged by the Peripatetics for a cognitive soul in brutes, "because," he says, "God would by no means produce those automata with an intention to deceive, but rather to display the wondrous art of His workmanship... where there is no intention to deceive, no deception can be alleged." Whatever may be the value of the consequence,

27. no small absurdities spring from the doctrine related. For 1º if the union of the rational soul with the body is nothing other than Tosca said, an Angel or demon could be the form of a human body; for what prevents there being penetration of both together with a decree of God concerning partnership and dependence in operation such as is posited for man? For the same reason one man could be the form of another man, or one Angel the form of another Angel, and constitute with him one adequate and singular principle of operations. 2º The soul will not properly be a cause of

sensations and of the other material operations of man, but only a mere condition without which they do not occur, constituted solely by the will of God beyond the natural exigency of the body, which prior to the soul is as complete a principle of those operations as any brute. Indeed the partnership of the soul will be contrary to the exigency of the body and will not so much assist as impede it. For the human body left to itself and remaining in the class of brutes would by mechanical artifice alone exercise many operations which it now cannot perform without the command of the soul. Through the absence of this command it very often neither runs nor leaps nor produces other motions, although there is present an impression of objects which would cause such motions in brutes by the laws of Mechanics alone. Those laws will therefore continually be violated in the human body through the partnership of the soul. If this is so, it is astonishing how a man lives longer than a dog, or how the most subtle structure of the human machine is not quickly ruptured when it is so often compelled to move contrary to the law of its mechanical structure. Offer bread to a hungry dog and man. The dog will at once be moved toward the bread by the artifice of the machine. The human body, which would have to be moved in the same way if the rational soul were not present, will remain unmoved until the soul wills; indeed, if the soul wills, it will be moved in the contrary direction. Does not this motion and that omission of motion inflict violence upon the internal mechanism of the body? 3º If body and rational soul are united only insofar as they mutually assist one another in operating, although they may make one in the being of a principle, they will not thereby constitute one in the being of an entity. In the same way, two men mutually assisting one another to lift a weight, or two horses drawing a cart, indeed make one adequate principle of lifting or drawing, but do not thereby constitute one of itself. 4º There will be no physical reason, for Tosca's reason "lest any deception have place" is merely a moral congruity, why a rational soul should be said to exist in adult fools and in children before the use of reason. For a machine duly disposed in the being of a certain brute similar to man as regards its organs could suffice for all the motions and acts we see in them; and, according to Tosca, the human body does not of itself need a rational soul in order to be fully constituted in the being of a vegetative and sensitive thing. Thus constituted, it is no more substantially incomplete than a horse or a bull. Finally, it could happen naturally that, after the rational soul departs, a human body remain for a long time sensing and vegetating. Why not? If the human body, as contradistinguished from the rational soul, is a machine no less constructed with faculties required for sensing and vegetating than any brute, why does it need the presence of the

rational soul for these motions? You will say: the rational soul does not depart unless the disposition of the machine is so injured that it no longer remains fit for motions of this kind nor can retain the fiery spirits which are vital and animal. But why, I ask, could the human soul not depart without injury to the machine, since neither does it need the body for its proper operations nor does the human body need it in order to be as well compacted by mechanical artifice as a living horse? It remains that you recur to a law of God enacted by mere free choice without exigency of the things. But a law of this kind does not remove the natural possibility of the thing, as is clear from the possibility of another world or of other rational souls similar to those which have actually been created and will be created.

28. But since we have begun to proceed by absurdities, which is the shorter way of proceeding against those who deny principles, we add that from Atomistic doctrine an Angel could by his own powers recall a dog, horse, or any dead animal to life. For he intuitively knows the whole structure of a dog, for example, and in what the defect or injury of the machine consists, as also where the vital and animal spirits, or fiery particles of which the canine soul was woven, have gone and where they are. He furthermore possesses ready power to move locally any atoms and corpuscles and to interweave and coordinate them as he pleases. He could therefore very easily repair the machine of a dead dog and render it living again. For the same reason an Angel could generate any animal anew without the intervention of male and female, for he knows where the seminal atoms lie hidden, dwell, or wander, and can easily gather and bind them either to form semen or to form an animal without semen. But these things are altogether alien to the sense of the faithful, who count it among true miracles that a dead dog should revive, etc. What then? For the same reason an Angel could naturally accomplish the very same thing regarding a man, both by forming and preparing a human body anew outside the maternal womb and by repairing a body injured by some lethal wound and deprived of life, and gathering the dispersed spirits. Once this formation or repair is posited, the rational soul must immediately be created or return by the law of nature; or at least the human body will remain by Angelic art merely vegetative and sensitive and truly a brute. Much more easily could an Angel by natural power cure the blind, mute, deaf, and any sick persons whatsoever. But according to the sense of the Catholic Church, to raise the dead, cure the blind, etc., are miracles proper to Omnipotence alone; therefore Christ the Lord willed through them to prove His Divinity and the truth of heavenly doctrine. Nor say that an Angel is prohibited from these works by Divine command. For a prohibition does not remove from an Angel

the natural power for such works. Is a most skilled architect, because he is extrinsically prohibited from building a house, truly said to be incapable of building it? Does the construction of a house therefore exceed his art? Add that an Angel could by his own powers also be the fabricator and author of heaven and earth and of the whole corporeal world. For the whole fabric of the world, according to the Atomists, contains no greater mystery than coordinating various corpuscles and moving them locally toward diverse centers designated at the mover's pleasure; and the corpuscles are of themselves most apt for these coordinations and motions. But it is very easy for an Angel to impress these motions upon corpuscles, nor is there any reason why the purely mechanical texture or coordination of them, which the Atomists require for forming stars, elements, and mixed bodies, should exceed his art. Read, if you please, the description of the fabrication of the world in Cartesius or Tosca, and you will find nothing that exceeds Angelic art and locomotor power. At least after an Angel sees this worldly fabric made by God and intuitively discerns it down to the atoms, he could with no difficulty form another similar world if a supply of matter or corpuscles were available. I admit that primary matter, or the formless and chaotic heap of atoms, can be created by God alone. But this does not prevent an Angel from being called absolutely and simply the artificer and author of the world and claiming for himself the whole praise of the workmanship, just as one who skillfully constructs a house from wood, stones, and other things transported and gathered by another is simply the author of the house and does not divide the glory of the art with him who supplied the raw matter. But everyone must judge this consequence most absurd. For the ability to fabricate the world is so proper a prerogative of God alone that His Omnipotence and infinite Art are everywhere commended from it and extolled with the highest praises by Scripture, the Fathers, and the Church.

29. Nor must it be omitted that this doctrine concerning brute animals seems to pave the way for Epicureans and Atheists to deny the spirituality and immortality of the rational soul and to say that our soul too consists in corporeal spirits which are dispersed when we die. For by what philosophical argument, prescinding from the principles of Faith, which the Atheist will deny, and from the arguments of the Peripatetics, which the Cartesians are accustomed to despise, will you press one who, following the example of brutes approved by you and the analogy of the pneumatic or hydraulic organ so greatly vaunted by you, contends that a merely corporeal machine equipped with wondrous and highly artful internal mechanisms suffices for all human operations? You will say: he will be pressed by the argument of Cartesius, namely that man thinks, and thought is not corporeal since it has

no extension; therefore that by which man thinks is something incorporeal and independent of the body, and that very thing is the rational soul. But first, this argument rests upon the false Cartesian principle concerning the essence of body, which he says consists in actual extension. This principle, passing over other absurdities now, coheres with the mystery of the Eucharist only through another doctrine altogether exotic and not once alone taught by Cartesius, namely that God by absolute power can change the essences of things, unite contradictories, make twice three not be six, and violate the law "Everything either is or is not," and other similar laws. Second, the Atheist will deny that thought is not extended, although its extension is not perceived by us, just as you contend that primitive atoms taken separately have extension, although we can perceive the smallness of this extension neither by sense nor imagination. Certainly, if he reads Maignan at the place cited above in no. 12, he will find that these names, "phantasy, imagination, memory, cognition, thought," and similar names are fully verified by the local motion alone of corporeal spirits in the brain. Confidently, therefore, relying on Maignan's authority, he will deny that thought is not corporeal motion and will laugh at Cartesius. Finally, whatever may be the case concerning thought, each man could at least philosophically believe that all other men are mere automata and do not need a rational soul. For although you experience your own thought within yourself, whence do you know that other men think? What do you perceive in them except words common to parrots and magpies and other external motions very similar to those of beasts? I perceive, you say, appropriate and coherent speech, which can proceed only from internal thought. Very well. Therefore until you hear other men speaking coherently and appropriately, you will meanwhile think them all mere machines. Therefore you will perpetually deny a rational soul to all mute persons. Therefore if you travel through some region whose language you do not know and understand no more than the sounds of little birds in a forest, you will number all the inhabitants among automata, notwithstanding motions, certain actions, services, or duties, perhaps none of which you will see that apes or bees do not imitate with an equal or perhaps greater indication of internal dexterity. And although some difference between the motions of the two should appear, nothing will thereby be proved except a more or less artful construction of machines, as from the diverse motions of a fox and an ass. Moreover, whence do you prove that coherent speech proceeds from internal thought? Why could not Divine Art, infinitely wise and powerful and foreseeing all future occasions of speaking, dispose a machine with such art that it produces appropriate and coherent motions of the tongue, even those

necessary for external syllogisms or long descriptions, whenever you strike its organs in a certain way either by asking questions or otherwise? If human art can do such things, what can Divine art not do? Show, I ask, the repugnance. But if this is not repugnant, it will actually occur; for "beings are not to be multiplied, etc.," and "what can be done through fewer is done in vain through more, etc." Behold your own argument for brutish automata. Let Fr. Gabriel Daniel be read in his Dissertation on the Soul of Brutes, which is the fifth part of the work cited above in no. 24, where he plainly demonstrates that no reason remains to a Cartesian man why he should not think all other men besides himself machines devoid of a rational soul.

30. It must be noted here that only through a remarkable abuse of terms, and in order to escape the laughter or hatred of all nations, do certain Atomists concede to brutes "soul, life, sensation, cognition, thought," etc., as we saw in no. 12. For that subtle and mobile matter which flows through the nerves and other organs of the body cannot philosophically be called a "soul," that is, the act or form of a physical organic body, since it is a substance complete of itself and has no other union with the rest of the body except mere local inclusion, like air in a bellows or a coin in a chest, and consequently does not make with the body one of itself. Otherwise wind running through the pipes of a pneumatic organ could with equal right be called the soul of the organ; a demon too, when it enters and moves the body of a possessed person, could be called its soul, form, or act. Add that if that portion of matter deserves the name of soul, man will have two or three souls, an error condemned by the Eighth General Synod, since besides the rational soul he has, according to the Atomists, everything that in a brute is the sensitive soul and in a tree the vegetative soul, and which would render the human body living after the manner of cattle if God did not infuse the rational soul. Add again that the subtle and ethereal matter discussed above in no. 19 should be called the soul of the world, since it is borne through all the spaces and little spaces of the world, agitated by exceedingly rapid motion, and causes many motions in other parts of the world. The world therefore will truly be animated and will be a great animal and an enormous beast; which Tosca nevertheless denies in Lib. 1, *De Mundo etc.*, cap. unic. prop. 10. Next, the name of "life" is gratuitously attributed to that motion which spiritual matter receives in itself and communicates to the other members of the body. First, because that motion is accidentally an immanent motion, or one remaining within the body of the brute, for it is of the same species as other motions *ad extra*, for example those which the same spirits or corpuscles produce when they fly outside the animal's body. Second, because there will be no natural body that is not living, since there is

none within which some atoms do not sometimes move, whether by fermentation or otherwise. Third, because it is not truly called a motion from within, since it is always or for the most part merely a continuation of external motion impressed by objects upon the organs of the external senses, no otherwise than, to use the Cartesian example, when a stick is struck at one end, motion is continued to the other. It should therefore rather be called motion from without. Fourth, because such motion is altogether similar to the artificial motions we see, for example, in a wound clock, which no sane person would call truly vital, although they could with equal right be called immanent motions and motions from within. Nor is it an objection that artifacts, in order to move themselves internally, need some motion or application of an external agent. For animals likewise need that motion or impulse according to the adversaries. See Maignan, cited cap. 24, where he extensively develops the example of the pneumatic organ and finds in it a likeness to all the motions of beasts, especially sensitive ones, and says that external objects, when they strike the nerves of the eyes, ears, etc., are as so many organists who press the keys and thus cause the internal motions of the machine. Hence much less does that motion deserve the names "sensation, cognition, thought," etc., since these signify life, not just any life but one of a nobler species. And truly who can endure that these names should signify nothing other than a certain excursion of corpuscles here and there? Read Maignan at the place cited and you will be indignant that the abuse of words has reached this point. Certainly there will be nothing by which a Maignanist could refute one who with similar license or abuse said that a pneumatic organ or a mill truly senses, imagines, cognizes, and thinks.

31. 5° Because Atomistic philosophy does not seem capable of being reconciled with the truths of Faith and the doctrine of Christian Theology. This is ordinarily shown especially from three heads. First, from the mystery of the Eucharist, where, when the whole substance of bread and wine perishes, the accidents remain conserved by Divine power without a subject. Therefore there are in things absolute accidents entitatively distinct from every substance and capable of existing separately by Divine power. The Atomists utterly deny this consequence, and in order to reconcile Catholic doctrine concerning the Eucharist with their philosophy, they twist and turn themselves in various and wondrous ways, scarcely one altogether agreeing with another. Cartesius indeed, besides the difficulty of preserving the truth of the Lord's body without actual extension, in which he teaches that the essence of body generally consists, when treating of the Eucharistic accidents in "responses to the fourth and sixth objections," says nothing

coherent with Faith or reason. For he says that in the Sacrament of the Eucharist only the surface remains from the bread and wine, and that this is not a part of the substance or quantity of bodies, but only a modal entity, the extremity both of the contained and surrounding body, and a common mode of both. But the surface of bread cannot fail to be a part of its substance. First, because it is one of the three dimensions of which a mathematical body consists, and Cartesius does not distinguish mathematical body from physical body; nor is there any reason why line and depth should be parts of a body or its quantity, but surface not. Second, because surface imports extension in length and breadth, as no one doubts; but this author places the essence of matter or corporeal thing in extension. Therefore something of the substance of bread remains in the Eucharist, which is heretical. There was even a Cartesian in France who, led by the consequence of the doctrine, taught that in the Eucharist the substance remains which before was mere bread, but which through consecration has now become the body of Christ the Lord because the soul of Christ is united to such a body and makes it His body. Since this doctrine most openly destroys the Catholic dogma of Transubstantiation, it sufficiently shows how dangerous the principles of Cartesius are. Add that the surface alone is certainly not the color, odor, taste, hardness, moisture, etc., all of which remain from the bread and wine. Or if it contains all these, it will be a corporeal surface possessing the whole sensibility of bread. How then, according to your principles, is it not bread? Add also that this surface is some entity, even though modal, as Cartesius supposes. Either therefore it is a substantial entity, and thus not the whole substance of bread has perished; or it is an accidental entity, and thus there is already an entitative accident distinct and separable from every substance, as we maintain. I pass over the fact that one common extremity of contained and surrounding bodies when they are contiguous is fictitious, as is also the separability and permanence of a mode without the thing which it modifies, an exotic doctrine and absurd even to other Atomists, as though union remained without its extremes, sitting without one sitting, or the curvature of a nose without the nose.

32. For these reasons Maignan and Saguens, whom Tosca follows, deservedly abandon so slippery a path of Cartesius. They say that in the Eucharist the "species" of bread and wine remain, using the term employed by the Councils of Florence, Lateran under Innocent III, and Trent, while omitting the name "accidents." They say, however, that these species are not real accidents but only appearances by which the color, odor, figure, etc., of bread and wine are represented. For just as the Holy Spirit appeared under the species of a dove, and Christ to Magdalene under the species of a

gardener and to the disciples under the species of a traveler, without there being need in these apparitions for feathers of a dove or garments of a gardener and traveler, so it can happen that Christ in the Eucharist offers Himself to us under the species of bread and wine without needing the accidents with which those substances had previously been clothed. But because someone will say that those apparitions either were imaginary or at least displayed some corporeal object which imitated the feathers of a dove or the garments of a gardener and traveler in figure and color, whereas Catholic doctrine concerning the Eucharist cannot be preserved unless something sensible remains on the part of the Sacrament which affects the senses after the manner of bread and wine, and consequently that the Atomists must be compelled to explain what that is, therefore these authors, explaining the said "species" more distinctly, say that they consist in God supplying by His actions whatever the substance of bread would do, if present, toward affecting the senses. For color is nothing other than light variously modified by the disposition and roughness of an opaque body, especially on the surface. Therefore the disposition of the atoms of which bread consists is its color in first act, and this, since it is a mode of the substance of bread, does not remain in the Eucharist. But light so modified is the color of bread in second act, and this remains the same in the Sacrament, because after the consecration God reflects and modifies the light coming there in the same manner as it was modified before, and therefore sight is affected by it just as if it saw bread. Hence the figure of bread also remains, not indeed numerically the same, since it is a mode, but the same in species, because from each part of that round place where the bread was, light is so reflected by the actions of God toward the sight that a round figure is depicted on the fundus of the retina just as before. Odor is an effluvium of corpuscles emitted by an odoriferous body, which corpuscles on reaching the nostrils prick their little fibers in diverse ways. Taste consists in various salts which affect the palate in diverse ways. God supplies both in the Eucharist by His actions, causing the corpuscles of air to prick the nostrils and affect the palate just as if the effluvia and salts of bread and wine were present. God supplies weight by pressing and moving downward the bodies beneath, as bread ordinarily does; impenetrability by prohibiting the entrance of any other body into that place; and hardness by resisting fracture as bread would resist. These actions of God these authors call "objective actions," because they accomplish the same thing that the object would accomplish if it were present. This in summary is Tosca's doctrine, *tract.* 3, lib. 1, cap. 2, prop. 41. But against it stands the fact that according to Catholic doctrine the Eucharist truly remains in the being of a Sacrament

even at night or enclosed within the tabernacle, and consequently is truly then a "sensible sign," since this belongs to the account of a Sacrament. Therefore even then it truly retains something by reason of which it can be sensed by sight, smell, taste, etc., as bread and wine are sensed. But this truth cannot stand if your doctrine stands. For first, there is no color of bread there, neither in first act, as you concede, nor in second act, since there is then no light arriving there to be modified by objective actions. Next, there is no figure of bread, neither numerically the same, as you admit, nor specifically the same, since light and the fundus of a retina are absent. Likewise there is no odor or taste, since neither are there effluvia of corpuscles of bread and wine or their salts, as you suppose in a Catholic manner, nor do corpuscles of air then affect any palate or nostrils. Finally, if God annihilated the surrounding bodies, the Sacrament would not therefore vanish; and yet then there would be no weight such as you assign, nor impenetrability or hardness as explained by you. What then would truly remain sensible there? You will say that the objective actions remain, prepared to cause those effects whenever the occasion offers itself. But you say nothing; for no one has said that the actions of God alone, considered in themselves, are sensible, especially since according to the doctrine of the Atomists they are not distinguished from God Himself. You will say again that the Eucharistic state remains, certainly a real one, which is produced by Divine actions and is a certain external sensible being of bread. But again you say nothing. For you never explain what that Eucharistic state, certainly real as you say, is; whether it is made from nothing or from something, whether it is substance or accident. If it is substance, why is it not bread? For a sensible substance possessing the whole sensibility of bread is certainly bread. But if it is an accident distinct from every substance, this is precisely what we maintain. Moreover, according to the sense of the Catholic Church, it is a great miracle, proper to Omnipotence alone, that the species of bread and wine remain in the Eucharist. But if Tosca's doctrine just related is true, no great miracle is needed for the species to remain; for nothing intervenes there which a demon or Angel could not accomplish by his own natural power. Add that by this explanation it is not preserved that the species properly "remain," as the Councils speak and the faithful believe. For that is not properly said to remain for which another of the same species is substituted. Otherwise it would properly be said that today the bread eaten yesterday remains, or the wine consumed yesterday, and the crops of the preceding year would truly remain this year in the fields. But why, you ask, do the Councils only define that the "species" remain and abstain from the name "accidents"? I answer: first, they have not always abstained. For the

Council of Constance condemned the second article of Wycliffe conceived in these terms: "The accidents do not remain without a subject in the same Sacrament." Next, since the name "accident" connotes a subject, while the name "species" expresses a relation to the senses, color, odor, quantity, etc., are more aptly called by the latter than by the former name when they exist without a subject and nevertheless affect the senses as before. Moreover, the Church has taken the name "species" for accidents: first, in the Breviary for the Feast of Corpus Christi, approving that lesson of St. Thomas: "The accidents, however, subsist in the same without a subject, that faith may have place, while the invisible is received invisibly, hidden under another species, and the senses are rendered immune from deception, since they judge concerning accidents known to them." Second, in the Roman Catechism, part. 2, cap. 4, where among those things "which Catholic faith without any doubt believes and confesses to be effected in this Sacrament by the words of consecration" is numbered this: "the accidents which are either seen with the eyes or perceived by the other senses exist without any subject thing." Third, by the consent of all theologians who wrote after Trent, both scholastic and dogmatic, down to Maignan, without anyone having doubted this meaning or understanding. Whoever wants more on this argument may consult the Most Illustrious Palanco in *Dialog. contra Philosoph. novator.*, dial. 66 and following through 75.

33. Secondly, the opposition of this philosophy to Faith and Christian Theology is ordinarily proved from the vital acts, especially free acts, of the rational creature. For acts of intellect and will are certainly not substances. Since therefore they are some entities, unless one wishes astonishingly to say that the beatific vision or a most perfect act of charity is of no entity and does not truly exist really, it follows that they are accidental entities distinct from every substance; yet the Atomists universally reject this genus of entities. Moreover, a rational creature actively causes such acts: first, because they are supremely vital acts and therefore elicited from within; second, because otherwise there would be no true liberty of man regarding acts of the will; third, because the Council of Trent anathematizes one who asserts that man's free choice acts absolutely nothing and is merely passive. Therefore a created cause can newly produce some entity worthy of the name, and consequently also destroy one, although it is certain that created causes do not have the power of creating or properly annihilating. Once this is granted, the fundamental argument of the Atomists against Peripatetic substantial and accidental forms collapses. They say that such acts are determinations or affections either altogether indistinct from the soul or distinguished only modally, that is, improperly, so that they add nothing of

new entity. But first it cannot be denied that those acts have some proper reality or entity. First, because they are real perfections and perfect the soul not only morally but also physically, that is, really and prior to the fiction or reflexion of the mind and the estimation of prudent men. For who doubts that the soul is really perfected and is in a better condition with beatific vision and love than without them? Or even in the natural order, with sciences and virtues than with errors and vices? Or in a most wise man than in a fool? But true perfection without true reality and entity is altogether chimerical. Second, because when such acts are supernatural, supernatural powers and the concurrence of God as a special Author are required for eliciting them. Why would so great an expenditure be needed for a shadowy affection importing no reality? Third, because if an act of love adds nothing of entity, the will producing it will properly produce nothing, which is contrary to Trent. Now thus. If that affection has its own entity, it cannot fail to be distinguished entitatively, truly, and properly from the substance of the soul. First, because according to Atomistic doctrine, if proper entity is once conceded to an affection, determination, or modification, entitative distinction must consequently be conceded; and according to the same authors, a purely modal distinction is not entitative precisely because it is not between two entities. Second, because if the entity of love is not truly distinct, it will be truly indistinct from the substance of the soul and really identified with it. Therefore 1º it cannot be intrinsically supernatural, because the whole entity of the soul is certainly natural and is wholly created by God as Author of nature. Therefore 2º the soul will not be the cause of that act, nor will it truly produce it, much less freely, because it neither produces its own entity freely nor necessarily, nor is it the cause of itself. Therefore 3º the entity of love, whether good or depraved, will be coeval with the soul and can never be retracted or cast away by the soul. All these things Christian doctrine detests. But, you say, do not many Peripatetics say that a mode is not really distinguished from its subject and that modal distinction is less than real? Do not many likewise say that acts of intellect and will are not absolute qualities but modes? I answer: you are playing upon an equivocation. For although Atomists sometimes employ our words and phrases, the notion is very different. When Peripatetics admit "modes," they acknowledge in them true entity, insofar as entity is opposed to nothing and to chimeras, although they do not wish absolutely to call this entity a "thing" or "being simply," because they reserve these names for absolute substances, especially complete ones, or also, though less strictly, for absolute accidents, that is, those capable by Divine power of existing separately. Therefore they concede that modal entities are truly produced and truly destroyed by

created causes. Nor do they deny that modal distinction is entitative, that is, existing between entity and entity on the side of the thing and independently of anyone's thinking, and in this sense truly real. They therefore only sometimes refuse to call it simply real because a distinction is ordinarily denominated from its extremes, and modal distinction is not between thing and thing, that is, between entities that are absolute on both sides and mutually separable. Only in this sense, therefore, do they call it less than real. See now whether our expressions thus understood cohere with Atomistic principles, namely that there is no true entity in things which is entitatively distinguished from substance, and that nothing entitative can be newly produced except by creation.

34. Thirdly, the same opposition is proved from infused supernatural qualities, such as the light of glory, the habits of faith, hope, charity, and habitual Grace. For Grace, and think the same concerning the others, is produced by God in the soul through eduction, according to the more common opinion of theologians. Therefore the new production of some true form and entity is possible without being creation. Hence the fundamental principle upon which Atomistic philosophy is built collapses. But if you wish Grace not to be educed but created, you must at least confess that by creation there can exist an absolute quality entitatively distinct from every substance, which likewise conflicts with Atomistic principles, among whom whatever is created, whatever is properly produced, is substance, as also is whatever simply or properly has entity; and an absolute quality entitatively distinct from every substance is a mere dream of the Peripatetics. Tosca offers two solutions in *Tract.* 3, Lib. 1, cap. 2, prop. 39, and seems to approve both. The first, for which he cites Maignan, is that Grace is produced by creation and has its own supernatural quiddity and entity really distinct from the soul, and consequently is in reality a substance, although it is rightly called a quality and accident of the soul because it affects, adorns, and illuminates it; just as corporeal light, although truly a substance, is called a quality and accident of illuminated air, as pleases the Atomists, among whom these are called "relative" accidents, not "entitative." But against this solution stands, 1º the consensus of theologians, who acknowledge no actually existing absolute supernatural substance and for the most part deny that one is possible. 2º It follows that Grace will truly be intellective and rational "as that which operates." First, because an immaterial substance is necessarily intellective, as theologians prove with St. Thomas. Second, because Grace is the true root of supernatural operations of understanding and loving; but there is no reason why an absolute substance having the power to root such operations should not understand

and love "as that which operates." Third, because Grace, if it is of such a character, is without doubt properly and simply a spirit; but Tosca defines spirit in *tract.* 11, L. 1, cap. 1, prop. 1, as "an intellective substance." 3º Grace, as is clear from Trent, Sess. 6, cap. 7 and can. 11, is truly a form of the soul and truly inheres in it; and of itself it is instituted to be united to a rational subject and inform it, no less, indeed more, than the rational soul with respect to the body, since Grace cannot exist outside a subject without a great miracle, whereas the soul can exist outside the body. But from this it follows that if Grace is a substance, it will be a substantial form with respect to the soul or an Angel, and with an Angel or man it will make one of itself, or one substantial composite, with an equal or stronger right than the rational soul with an organic body. But this consequence is unheard of and intolerable. First, because from it a just man would differ in substantial species from a sinner. Likewise man would be substantially changed when from a sinner he becomes just, and substantially corrupted when he loses Grace. Indeed he could not lose it, because Grace would be incorruptible and immortal under the same title as the rational soul, and yet could not exist separated from a subject. Second, because Grace would properly be the soul of an Angel, and indeed a properly rational soul, since it is a spiritual form substantially completing the Angel and is moreover the root of rational operations of the supernatural order. Likewise a just man would have two rational souls substantially united among themselves after the manner of act and potency, by one of which he would be a complete intellective substance in the natural order, and by the other a complete intellective substance in the supernatural order. This would be just as, according to the Atomists, the human body, after it is a complete vegetative substance, is completed by a new form in the being of a sensitive substance, and retaining this completion is again completed through the rational soul in the being of man or a rational substance. Finally, to omit other things, there would actually exist a rational creature impeccable by its own substantial nature and having the intuitive vision of God due to itself, namely that one of itself, or that substantial composite, which would result from man and Grace. Nor does Tosca remedy these inconveniences by saying that Grace can be called an "entitative accident," for which he sends us to Lib. 3, prop. 24 of his Metaphysics. But in that proposition he only says that entitative accidents can at least by Divine power exist without a subject. He should have cited the following prop. 25, where among entitative accidents he numbers sanctifying Grace and infused habits. He then objects to himself that these are not properly accidents but substances, since they have their own quiddity and are in themselves absolutely and simply beings, and since, moreover, whatever has being in

itself is substance. He responds in these words: "For this reason, to confess the truth, I do not sufficiently see why the account of substance should be denied to them. But since we have now come to a question of terminology, we must stop; and I rather judge that one should speak with the majority, and therefore they should be called entitative accidents." You see, I think, what this author intends, namely Cicero's dictum: "In speaking I have conceded usage to the people; knowledge I have reserved to myself." He acknowledges in the entity of Grace whatever the account of substance requires and does not see how it can be denied while Atomistic principles stand, which he himself follows; but he reserves this truth to himself and in speaking indulges Peripatetic usage, lest he dispute about a word. As though that were merely a verbal dispute prudently to be despised which seeks to extort the thing defined from one who concedes the definition, as if someone refused to call that which is a rational animal "man," or that which is a Being from itself "God." It is known that errors and heresies in theological matters can arise, and have been accustomed to arise, from a depraved use of terms. Whatever may be the case, however, regarding the philosophical name by which you please to call Grace, we ask that you confess the truth as regards the genus of quiddity which your conscience attributes to Grace: namely, whether in your judgment there belongs to Grace the quiddity, account, and definition of substance or not. If it does, which Tosca, standing with the truth, does not sufficiently see how to deny, the inconveniences just indicated follow. If it does not, you vainly reject generally the idea of an absolute accident entitatively distinct from every substance which the Peripatetics prove, and you falsely say universally that whatever is properly produced and has entity simply or properly is substance.

35. The other solution belongs to Jean Saguens, who asserts that habitual Grace is not entitatively distinguished from the sanctified soul, but is a certain wondrous modification of it made by God. Hence, Tosca adds, since it is a mode of the soul, it is not properly produced or made, according to what the Atomists teach generally of all modes. But this solution, to speak as mildly as possible, most harshly denies to habitual Grace true "being," true reality or entity properly such. For if entity of this kind is conceded to Grace, entitative distinction from the soul must likewise be conceded to it, as all Atomists admit; and Grace will no longer be a modification but an absolute entity. Most harshly, I say, because if this is so, those things which Christian Faith teaches concerning Grace do not seem capable of being seriously understood. For example, that this most precious form is a certain Divine being, an imitation of Divine holiness, and a participation of the Divine

nature, according to that saying of Sacred Scripture: "He has given us great and precious promises, that through these you may be made sharers in the Divine nature." For who can seriously understand these things of an object having no reality? Will that be worthy of being called Divine "being" which properly has no "being"? Will that truly imitate Divine holiness or truly participate in the nature of God which properly imitates no perfection and properly participates in no entity, but is mere nothing, or I know not what intermediate thing between something and nothing? Moreover, whatever is a real perfection is a real entity, as we argued above in a similar case. But who doubts that that form is a real perfection and really perfects the soul of the just and makes it truly better, that form which is a certain Divine beauty of the soul, a supercelestial adornment, ornament, necklace, ring, and robe more precious than all gold and gems, by which it is worthily clothed, adorned, and constituted the spouse of God, daughter of God, and heir of heaven? That form, I say, "with which, having been endowed by God," as Trent speaks in the cited cap. 7, "we are renewed in the spirit of our mind, and are not merely reputed but are truly called and are just, each receiving his own justice within himself." Or who can conceive these things as being verified of a perfection really nothing, unless, which is impious, one has recourse to mere moralities or extrinsic imputations? Does he who loses this treasure suffer the loss of no thing and no entity? I pass over many other things which can easily be weighed against this solution. I merely note that many Atomists who generally reject every kind of distinction prior to the operation of the mind between a subject and those things they call "modes" must consequently confess that Grace, if it is a mode, is altogether indistinct from the soul. From this spring absurdities which no Catholic can swallow: that the entity of the soul is supernatural, or that Grace is natural; that every created soul is in Grace; that it can never lose Grace; that the doctrine of Trent concerning the "reception and inherence" of Grace in the soul of the just has no place. Tosca, however, who acknowledges modal distinction in things, for example between a body and its location or local presence, teaches without exception that modes do not properly have quiddity, nor are they properly produced or destroyed. Hence, if Grace is a mode, it will perfect man no more than location in place A; nor will man properly acquire or lose anything by acquiring or losing Grace; nor will the Holy Spirit properly be the Author and cause of Grace, since Grace is not properly producible; nor will sin properly destroy Grace, since Grace cannot properly be destroyed.

36. From other heads the incompatibility of Corpuscular philosophy, especially Cartesian philosophy, with dogmas of Faith could be shown.

Whoever wishes to know these more distinctly should consult the Most Illustrious Huet in *Censura Philosophiae Cartesianae*, especially cap. 5 and 8, and the Most Illustrious Palanco in the cited *Dialog. contra Philosophiae novatores*. For this reason Cartesian principles were proscribed by most academies in France and Belgium, and even forbidden by royal decrees. Various books of Cartesius are likewise prohibited until corrected in the Roman Index of Prohibited Books. Nor should it be passed over that the doctrine of Cartesius has generally been too pleasing to the heterodox; and after it began to become widespread, scarcely a Jansenist appeared among professors of philosophy who was not a Cartesian. Thus the passion for innovation persuaded them, perhaps also the friendship and literary correspondence which once existed between Cartesius and Antoine Arnauld, leader of the Jansenist faction. Certain Atomists, especially Cartesians, are indeed vehemently indignant whenever we draw arguments against their philosophy from the principles and doctrine of the Catholic Faith, and reproach us, not without anger, for having recourse through lack of physical arguments to mysteries placed above reason. Believing, they say, is one thing; knowing is another. Here physical science is sought, and this must be investigated by natural reason, not revelation. Therefore one who acts as a physicist prescinds meanwhile from revealed principles and is not bound to answer arguments drawn from them insofar as he is a physicist, although he venerates and believes the mysteries themselves insofar as he is a Christian. But surely this indignation deserves far sharper indignation. 1º Because if in physical matters the reins must be loosened for natural reason, and assent freely given to all things that seem true to it, meanwhile giving no care to their consonance with the truths of Faith, then although human reason proposes many deliriums under the appearance of truth, for example that the world is eternal, that God operates not freely but from necessity of nature, that the rational soul is mortal, that all things were formed from atoms by a fortuitous combination, which and other deliriums once pleased philosophers of great name who seemed endowed with much light of reason, it will be lawful for us to assent and embrace them as physical truths. And when truths of Faith are objected, it will be lawful to reply: "I prescind from these because I am acting as a physicist"; or, "These truths I believe, those I know, and I am not bound to reconcile the two, lest otherwise reason be confused with Faith or rashly rise to mysteries placed above reason." What truly Catholic man would speak thus, or hear one speaking thus without indignation? Can one and the same man seriously act now as a faithful Christian, now as an atheistic physicist? 2º Because the mysteries of Faith, although above reason, are not contrary to reason. Hence so many books of

the Holy Fathers and Catholic Doctors labor to show against pagans and heretics that there is nothing in our mysteries which right reason can disapprove. Therefore one who neglects this labor condemns the effort of the Catholic Fathers and Doctors, exposes our Religion to the contempt and laughter of unbelievers, and does not care whether his own reason is right. 3º Because the doctrine of Faith is most true, most certain, and infallible. Therefore if your philosophy in reality disagrees with it, however evidently it may seem to be demonstrated, it cannot fail to be false and erroneous, because "truth accords with truth," and what is opposed to most certain truth is most certainly error; nor can he fail to be deceived who in reasoning deviates from infallible truth. Therefore if you prescind from the doctrine of Faith while acting as physicists, you care nothing whether your Physics is in reality false and erroneous. 4º Because no one knows physical things better than God, the Creator of them all, who moreover, if He says anything, can never deceive. Therefore if He deigns Himself to disclose or reveal to us something concerning the object of Physics, as in fact He has revealed many things in Sacred Scripture, what lover of physical truth would not keep it before his eyes both to correct erring reason and condemn as error whatever he finds opposed to it, and to receive from it some light for investigating other physical truths? If God wished to reveal by Himself all the secrets of nature and whatever pertains to the object of Physics, could a sensible philosopher turn the eyes of his mind away from them and construct for himself another Physics by his own effort, giving no care to its consonance with revealed Physics? He ought indeed to test whether natural reason, prescinding from revelation, could discover the same truths by reasoning and demonstrating, so that the object of Physics would be not only believed but known. But only rashly and foolishly could he then trust human reason altogether and assent to his demonstrations as legitimate until he compared them with revealed Physics and found consonance, or certainly no dissonance. The same reason applies to a part of Physics as to its whole object.

37. Therefore this new, or renewed, philosophy chiefly displeases because it can only with the greatest difficulty, if perhaps at all, be brought into concord with Sacred Theology, to which all natural sciences, unless they are pagan, ought to be servants, and to which Peripatetic philosophy renders most useful service without having any principle inconvenient to Theology. There also displeases in many followers of this philosophy their arrogance, pride, and contempt of those who think otherwise, whom they seem to account as nothing in comparison with themselves and whose arguments they esteem as trifles, while meanwhile boasting of their own petty reasons,

which very often are mere arbitrary guesses or mere congruities or mechanical analogies, as though they were the clearest and most evident demonstrations. They are accustomed contemptuously to call Peripatetic philosophy "the Philosophy of Monks," as though it should be despised because it is greatly approved as most useful for preserving the purity of the Catholic Faith by religious men especially solicitous for that end, for example St. Thomas, Scotus, and Suárez. Spaniards, to whom nothing is dearer than Religion, commonly reject Cartesian philosophy. They in turn also ridicule it as mechanical and sometimes call it "the philosophy of laymen, the philosophy of the unlettered, and of women," commonly "Philosophia lega, Philosophia de capa y espada, Philosophia de Estrados," that is, "lay philosophy, cloak-and-sword philosophy, drawing-room philosophy." Nor are the inner recesses of nature better known to us by the light of this philosophy. For when something more deeply hidden in physical things must be explained, the Atomists for the most part know how to give no *a priori* reason except in these terms: "This depends upon corpuscles combined in a manifold manner, disposed thus or thus, interwoven in such or such a way, or even upon the powers of various unnamed elements." Sometimes, guessing, they add that perhaps something similar to the mechanism of a mill, clock, or pneumatic organ is found in the matter. Not rarely they flee to subtle or ethereal matter, however invisible and hidden. And thus, if it please the heavenly powers, they complete the most lucid explanation of all nature. But certainly by those expressions "thus or thus, such or such," or by ethereal matter known to no sense, or even by Maignan's anonymous elements, the secrets of nature are no more clearly laid open than by the forms and occult qualities of the Peripatetics. Let this novelty of philosophy therefore depart from our Schools: a philosophy which, while bringing no light to physical things, moreover incurs insuperable difficulties merely to avoid one or another difficulty in the Peripatetic school that no moderate intellect need fear.

Index of the Preliminary Dissertation.

Summary of Peripatetic doctrine concerning natural body generally, and its parts and affections, nos. 1, 2, 3.
Authors and restorers of Atomistic or Corpuscular philosophy, n. 4.
Foundation upon which the whole rests, n. 5.
What it establishes as the first principles of natural body, n. 6 and 7.
What substantial composite, generation, alteration, and corruption are among the Atomists, n. 8.

What primary matter is, n. 9.
What substantial form is, both general and special, n. 10 and 11.
Whether, or to what extent, the new philosophers acknowledge the souls of brutes, n. 12.
The other general doctrines of the Atomists, n. 13.
First principles of mixed bodies among the Chemists, n. 14.
Certain things to be permitted to the Atomists, from n. 15 to 19.
Pivot of the controversy, n. 19.
First argument against Corpuscular philosophy: because there will be no substantial composite and likewise no substantial generation, n. 20.
Second argument: because secondary causes will possess no activity, n. 21.
Third argument: because no body will differ from another in substantial species, n. 22.
The foundation of Corpuscular philosophy is overthrown, n. 23.
Fourth argument, drawn from the paradox concerning brute animals, from n. 24 to 30.
Fifth argument: because the new philosophy conflicts with Faith and Sacred Theology, n. 31.
Shown first from the Eucharistic accidents, n. 31 and 32.
Shown secondly from the acts of intellect and will, n. 33.
Shown thirdly from supernatural qualities, particularly sanctifying Grace, n. 34 and 35.
Cartesian philosophy hateful to the orthodox and pleasing to the heterodox, n. 36.
Whether one who acts as a physicist ought to prescind from the principles of Christian Faith, there.
Why Peripatetic philosophy should especially be preferred to Corpuscular philosophy, n. 37.
Corpuscular philosophy has brought no new light to physical things, there.
Conclusion of the Dissertation, ibid.

PYSICS OR NATURAL PHILOSOPHY[1]

— PROOEMIUM —

Philosophy,[2] which means the same as "love of wisdom," received its name from the modesty of Pythagoras. For whereas previously, as St. Augustine says (*De Civitate Dei* l. 8, c. 2), those were called Wise who seemed in some manner to excel others in a praiseworthy life, Pythagoras, when asked what he professed, answered that he was a Philosopher, that is, a student or lover of wisdom, because to profess oneself Wise seemed exceedingly arrogant. The novelty of the word pleased others; and thereafter the name "Philosopher" came into use in place of Wise, and "Philosophy" in place of Wisdom. The ancient definition of philosophy taken generally is "the science of human and divine things." By "human things" are understood those that pertain to morals; by "divine things," those that pertain to the contemplation of the universe. Philosophy is divided into Moral, Rational, and Natural. Moral Philosophy, or Ethics, is that which treats of virtues and vices according to the prescription of right reason, so as to moderate the affections of the will and form morals. Rational Philosophy, or Logic, is that which directs reason and teaches the Method of Knowing. Natural Philosophy investigates, by the natural light, the other things

[1] On the natural body in general.

[2] no. 1.

knowable in the universe. This is subdivided into Metaphysics, Mathematics, and Physics; the last of these is at present the subject of our labor.

2. Physics, therefore, may be defined as "the science of nature," according to the etymology of its name, for "physis" means nature; and for this reason it is peculiarly, and almost antonomastically, called "Natural Philosophy," and also "Physiology," that is, "discourse on nature." It is, I say, the science of "sensible nature," namely, that which can be investigated from accidents falling under sense; or of "nature" insofar as it is "the principle of motion" in corporeal substance. For Physics does not treat of the nature of God or of Angels except insofar as corporeal motions depend upon them; namely, it treats of Angels insofar as they move the heavenly bodies, and of God insofar as He is the first Mover, or first Cause of all sensible or material changes. By the name "motion," moreover, is meant not only local motion, but also mixture, generation, nutrition, growth, alteration, intensification, etc., of which Physics treats expressly.

3. The adequate object of Physics embraces everything of which the corporeal world consists, namely, all heavenly and sublunary bodies, their parts, and their affections. The formal aspect "under which" may be called mobile or natural being, insofar as it is the common character of corporeal substances and accidents. The object of attribution is designated by various names: some call it natural being; others mobile being; others mobile body; others a substantial composite; others a complete body in the category of Substance. By this variety of expressions all seem to understand the same thing, namely, "a natural body complete in the genus of Substance," to the perfect knowledge of which everything treated in Physics contributes.

4. Now Body simply so called, lest this preliminary notion be wanting at the threshold, is "a complete substance naturally requiring the impenetrability of itself with another of the same kind." Hence it must necessarily yield its place to the entrance of another, or prevent such entrance. It may also be described in other ways, namely: "a complete substance by its own nature perpetually destined to be the root of sensible properties or effects"; likewise, "a complete substance naturally requiring local extension." Any of these descriptions sufficiently declares, for the present purpose, what physicists signify by the name "Body," unless they add "incomplete," because then primary matter awaiting a specific form is understood; or unless they add "organic," for then matter prepared to receive a soul is understood. But two things must be noted. First: all things which by natural connection pertain to Body are corporeal or material beings, namely, all parts incapable of existing separately, and likewise all accidents, affections, and modes of body. Hence "corporeal being" or

"material being" extends more widely than "Body." Second: when Body is considered precisely according to threefold dimension, namely, length, breadth, and depth, it is then called "mathematical body"; but when it is regarded as mobile, or as subject to sensible changes, both substantial and accidental, it is then called "physical body" or "natural body," the name being derived from "nature" insofar as nature is defined as "the principle of motion," etc. From this, therefore, it is clear in what sense natural Body is called the Subject of Physics, or its object of attribution. It is also clear why Physics is said indeed to abstract from singular matter, but not from sensible matter: because it considers its object under the aspect of being sensibly mobile.

5. By order to this object Physics is called one science, although subjectively it is not a simple quality, but consists of several habits; which is evident from the same arguments by which the plurality of habits was proved in Logic. Physics is truly a science, because, since it demonstrates many things concerning its object, it is a habit acquired through demonstration; although it also contains many acts and habits of opinion, as the condition of every human science requires. Nor is it an objection, 1º, that the object of Physics is contingent and corruptible, whereas science must concern necessary things. For although it is contingent as regards existence, it is necessary as regards the connection of predicates which Physics demonstrates concerning it. For example, Physics demonstrates that a mixed body is corruptible; and in truth it is necessary that it be corruptible. Nor is it an objection, 2º, that knowledge of the object of Physics is acquired through the senses, which are often deceived. For first, the senses cannot be deceived concerning their proper objects when duly applied; and secondly, the natural light of the intellect, assisted by first principles, can guard against the dangers of deception which sometimes threaten from the senses. Finally, this science is simply speculative, because for the most part it treats of objects not subject to our operation. Yet I readily admit with many that it is practical in a qualified sense, because some physical cognitions can direct toward the production of their subject. And let this suffice concerning the preliminary matters of Physiology, about which the more recent authors treat at excessive length. Let anyone who desires more consult the Conimbricenses.

6. Aristotle, without doubt the Prince of all Philosophers, especially in physical matters, wrote very many books on this subject, part of which have perished through the injury of time. Those which now survive are the eight books of the *Physics*, entitled *De Physico auditu* or *Physicae auscultationis*; likewise the books *De caelo et mundo*, *De generatione et corruptione*, or *De ortu*

et interitu, *De meteoris*, *De anima*, *Parva naturalia*, *De partibus animalium*, *De generatione animalium*, *De incessu*, *De motu animalium*, and *De historia animalium*. Of these books Aristotle called some exoteric, that is, external and popular, because they were written in an easy style adapted to the understanding of the common people, such as the *Historia animalium*; others he called acroamatic, that is, intended for hearing, because they proceed by a subtler manner of argument and therefore require a teacher and attentive hearing. Chiefly numbered among these are the eight books of the *Physics*, or *De Physico auditu*, which claim this title almost antonomastically, because, on account of the many difficult questions they contain, they must especially be heard from a master and demand the attentive ears of disciples. These very books we now undertake to explain before the others, because they treat of natural Body in general and hand down doctrine necessary for all parts of Physics; hence they teach General Physics, whereas the others each select their own portion of the Object of Physics. Their order is as follows. In the first book there is treatment of the intrinsic principles of natural Body. In the second, of nature and causes. In the third, of motion and the infinite. In the fourth, of place, vacuum, and time. In the fifth and sixth, of the species, unity, contrariety, and division of motion. In the seventh and eighth, of the first Mover.

7. We shall embrace all these matters in three Treatises, observing the method customary in the Schools. Nor shall we now delay long in refuting Atomists or Cartesians; for in order that our path might be more expedient, we prefixed a preliminary Dissertation, which anyone who wishes to know the defects of Corpuscular Philosophy must read. If, however, they oppose anything of some importance, we shall resolve it when the occasion arises.

TREATISE I.
ON THE INTRINSIC PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL BODY.

As nature begins its work from first principles, and, resting upon them as upon foundations, raises the structure of the entire World to its summit, so physical treatment will fittingly take its beginning from the same principles, so that from them the intrinsic structure of "natural Body," or of the "substantial Composite," may become evident. We take these names for the same thing, because it is certain that the more familiar Bodies, and perhaps all that in fact exist, concerning which in their proper places, are substantially composed of parts.

DISPUTATION I.
HOW MANY AND WHICH ARE THE FIRST INTRINSIC PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL BODY?

CHAPTER I.
The Notion of Principle Having Been Premised, Aristotle's Definition of the First Principles Is Explained.

1. The name Principle is analogical, or almost equivocal. It often means the same as beginning; thus January is called the beginning of the year. It often signifies a foundation; thus unity is called the principle of number. It often signifies what is first in order of place, dignity, or any other order.

Under these acceptions Principle is opposed to End. Philosophically, however, something is not called a Principle unless it is that from which something in some way arises of itself. Hence it may be defined with St. Thomas as "that from which something proceeds in any way whatever," or with Fr. Suárez as "that from which something is."

2. Here three things must be noted. 1º, Principle taken philosophically is not opposed to End, for final cause is one of the principles from which every effect of itself arises. 2º, Every cause is a principle, yet not every principle is a cause; for the eternal Father, although He is truly the principle of the Son, is not His cause. If Aristotle says that Cause is said in as many ways as Principle, he speaks in a common and broad sense, in which Cause is said of whatever in some manner affords an occasion or supplies power for something to exist. Cause, therefore, beyond the notion of Principle, connotes dependence and distinction of essence in the term. Hence the correlative of Principle as such is not "what is principled," for this name signifies "effect," or "what is caused," which is the correlative of Cause; and therefore the Divine Son, although He proceeds from a Principle, is not principled. The correlative of Principle as such, therefore, will be "the proceeding term." 3º, Every Principle among creatures is prior to its term, at least by priority of nature, concerning which in Treatise 2. Indeed, even in divine things theologians commonly admit some priority of Principle, not indeed a strict priority, such as priority of time or nature, for the Athanasian Creed rejects this by the words, "In this Trinity nothing is before or after"; but another, which they call priority of origin, and which denotes only that the Son has His origin from the Father, not conversely.

3. A scientific Principle, or principle in the order of the known, is one thing; a real principle, or principle in the order of the thing, is another. Principles in the order of the known are Premises with respect to Conclusions. A Principle in the order of the thing is that which gives being that does not depend upon the intellect; and it is divided into intrinsic and extrinsic. An intrinsic Principle, also called conjoined, is that which intrinsically constitutes the thing. Thus body and soul are principles of man. An extrinsic Principle, also called separated, is that from which something arises which is adequately distinct from it. Thus God is the principle of creatures, the Sun of light, and whatever exercises the office of an efficient, final, or exemplar cause.

4. Some number among intrinsic principles not only constitutive principles, but also things connoted without which a thing can neither be made nor understood. But they are not to be followed. 1º, because neither can an action be made or understood without an agent or without a term,

nor a creature without God; yet neither the agent, nor the term, nor God exercises the office of intrinsic principle with respect to the action or creature. 2º, because common usage is opposed to this, and indeed usage founded upon the proper meaning of the word itself; for that is not properly called "intrinsic" which, although connoted and required, nevertheless remains not within but outside the entire constitution of the thing.

5. Principle is otherwise divided into first and second. In the strictest sense God alone is called the first Principle, since, while He gives being to all things, He Himself is in no genus principled by another. But less strictly, though still properly, that is called a first Principle which is not principled by another in the genus in which it itself principles; hence, besides influx into the term, it implies negation of dependence upon another principle. This negation seems to be denoted by the name "Principle" when uttered absolutely and with complete propriety. Thus primary matter is the first principle of natural Body, because, although it arises from God in the genus of efficient cause, it arises from nothing in the genus of material cause, in which it is itself a principle. A second Principle is that which, in the genus in which it is a principle, is principled by another. Thus a man who generates a man is himself generated by another man. This division belongs both to Principles in the order of the known and to Principles in the order of the thing, both extrinsic and intrinsic.

6. Intrinsic principles, however, when they are first and positive, are called Elements. For we call elements the first constituents of things which in the same order are not constituted from others. Thus letters are called the Elements of words. Hence fire, air, earth, and water, which are commonly called Elements, if they are not simple bodies but substantially composite, as the common opinion holds, are not Elements philosophically considered with respect to the first constitution of things.

7. These points concerning the notion of Principle having been premised, Aristotle's definition of the first Principles of natural Body must be explained. These Principles are, says Aristotle (c. 5 of this book), "those which neither arise from one another nor from others, but from which all things arise." That is, the first intrinsic principles, or elements, of natural Body are those which, in the genus in which they principle, neither principle one another nor arise from other principles, and from which all substantial physical Composites are principled. All this, according to the Peripatetic system, belongs to primary matter and substantial form. It also belongs to privation, which, however, since it is not anything positive, is not properly called an element, at least whenever and insofar as Body is made through a change of matter. For these three first principle in the genus of intrinsic

Principle, in which genus neither matter can be made from form, nor form from matter, nor either of them from privation. Next, neither are they made from others under that peculiar aspect under which each principles; because matter is not made from another subject or material cause, nor form from another formal cause, nor privation from another privative and intrinsic term "from which." Finally, from these is made every Body which is made by natural change, as will presently appear.

8. It is objected: form is made from matter as from a presupposed subject and material cause; therefore one first principle is now made from another. 2º, matter and material form are made from integral parts; therefore they are made from others. 3º, both matter and form are made from genus and difference; therefore each is made from others. But we anticipated these objections when we said that the concept of a first Principle requires only that it not be made from another in the genus and under the peculiar aspect under which it principles. Hence I answer to 1º: whatever may be the case as to whether form is properly said to be made, concerning which later, it certainly is not made from matter as from an intrinsic principle from which it is constituted, much less as from a formal cause; in which sense form principles natural Body.

9. To 2º: matter and form principle Body as essential parts after the manner of act and potency; in this genus they are not made from integral parts. For these parts neither regard one another as act and potency, nor are they essential, since they merely cause a thing to be integral or unmutilated, and are such that without any one of them there can be conceived that which suffices to verify the essential definition of the thing. Indeed, they often fail naturally while the essence remains, for example a hand in a man, a branch in a tree, a drop in water. To 3º: genus and difference are not principles of things in the physical line, but only in the metaphysical or logical line. We are now seeking only the first principles or elements in the physical genus.

10. It is replied: form is made from privation as from a term "from which," and similarly privation is made from form; for as fire is made from non-fire, so non-fire is made from fire. Therefore privation and form are made from one another in the same sense. I answer: this proves at most that form is made from privation, and conversely, as from an extrinsic term "from which," or one adequately distinct from it. Hence it does not follow that they are made from one another in the sense in which they are called first principles, namely, by intrinsically constituting what is principled.

11. If it is asked whether the aforesaid definition belongs only to first intrinsic principles, or also to extrinsic principles, the common answer is

that it properly belongs only to intrinsic principles, because the particle "from" properly denotes parts and constituents of things, and is adapted to an efficient or other extrinsic cause only improperly. Thus a house is not said to be made from the artisan, but by the artisan; nor from the end, but for the sake of the end; nor from the exemplar, but after the likeness of the exemplar; although it is properly said to be made from stones, wood, etc. Nor does Aristotle seem to have any other meaning, since in the present place he treats only of intrinsic Principles and intends to define only these. I grant that this is the more frequent use of the preposition "from," especially when joined to the verbs "to be" or "to be made."

12. Yet I deny that it is improperly adapted to extrinsic causes. For it is properly said in the Gospel, "He who is from God hears the words of God," and, "You are from your father the devil"; and by the Apostle, "God the Father, from whom are all things." Similarly, this or that external Work is properly said to "be done" by us "from intention, from custom, from hatred, from love, from the dictate" or "rule of conscience, from a decree of the King, from a command of the Senate." I omit that an Angel is said to "be made from nothing," and a material form "from a presupposed subject," without intrinsic constitution being denoted. Therefore the stated definition, as it stands and separated from its context, belongs to any first Principles whatsoever. But because Aristotle in that place treats only of intrinsic ones, the definition is limited by the context itself to intrinsic principles alone, among which it distinguishes first Principles from second, as though saying: the Principles with which we are now concerned are those first and absolutely principles "which neither arise from one another nor from others," etc.

CHAPTER II.
The First Intrinsic Principles of Natural Body in Completed Being Are Designated.

1. Natural Body is customarily considered in two ways. 1º, insofar as it exists completely in the nature of things with those parts and constituents with which it endures and remains, while prescinding from whether it was recently or long ago produced; and thus it is called Body "in completed being." 2º, insofar as it begins to be, or insofar as it is in transition from non-being to being, under which aspect it is called Body "in becoming." These things having been premised,

2. It must be known that Aristotle, cc. 5, 6, and 7 of Book I, acknowledges only three principles of natural Body, namely matter, form, and privation. He

confirms this position by various arguments, which may summarily be reduced to the following two. 1º, Among the principles of natural Body some must be contraries. Thus the ancient Philosophers unanimously judged, although otherwise they disagreed excessively among themselves. Parmenides posited hot and cold as the first elements of things; Melissus rarity and density; Democritus the solid and the void; the Pythagoreans even and odd; Zareta the Chaldean light and darkness; Hippus of Rhegium water and fire; Empedocles strife and friendship; Plato the great and the small. Finally, says Aristotle in c. 5, "those things which they call principles, although they posit them without reason, they nevertheless establish as contraries, as though compelled by truth itself." They indeed erred in the particular designation of the contraries; nevertheless, the very agreement of so many Wise men in maintaining contrariety in general sufficiently indicates that this is a dictate of nature.

3. Moreover, this contrariety must be in the genus of Substance, since it concerns principles of a substantial thing. Furthermore, it must be privative contrariety, because substance has no positive contrary. Among the principles of natural Body, therefore, there must be numbered some simple substance, for if it were composed of others it would no longer be a first principle, and its privation. These are called "first contraries": both because they pertain to the first genus of Being, which is Substance; because every contrariety is reduced to privative contrariety, for heat and cold, for example, are contraries because cold has annexed to it privation of heat, and conversely; and finally because a thing and its lack or privation are supremely opposed.

4. Besides these, a third principle must be admitted, as a subject which successively underlies either contrary as though it were a form, while being contrary to neither. For every contrariety is exercised about a common subject, for the possession of which the contraries contend. This subject, since it is the first basis from which natural Body arises, is called "primary matter"; and it must necessarily be a substance, because from it together with another substantial principle, which is one of the contraries, as from a form, the substantial composite is composed in its being; nor can a substance consist of non-substances. It is therefore concluded that there are three principles of natural body: primary matter, substantial form, and privation of that form.

5. That there are not more is proved because "what can be done by fewer is done in vain by more." But once only these three are posited, any natural Body can both come to be and subsist, since from them there results, and not without the intervention of contraries, a composite substance

containing in itself the root of its accidental effects and properties, which root, according to all, is substantial form. This is confirmed by the example of artifacts: for in order that a statue be made, nothing else is required than the matter of marble, which is indeed unformed and therefore has privation of figure, and the figure itself, which is the artificial form. Thus far the first argument.

6. 2º, Every natural generation, namely that which proceeds from secondary Causes according to the natural order, implies a transition and change of matter from privation of form to form. But in this transition there necessarily intervene the matter which passes, the privation from which it passes, and the form to which it passes; nor need anything else be conceived in order that this change be fully conceived. Therefore every natural generation is content with these three principles. The minor premise seems sufficiently certain. The major premise is proved: natural generation is necessarily from some pre-existing matter; for if it were from nothing, it would be creation. But that matter pre-exists without the form of the Body which is now generated; otherwise nothing would be made anew, but the whole would already be made. Generation therefore transfers pre-existing matter from the state in which it was under the lack of such a form, of which it is capable, and this is privation, namely lack of form in a subject capable of the form, to the state in which it has the form itself. But this is to imply the said change, as is evident of itself. Therefore, etc. This is again confirmed by the example of artifacts: for the construction of a house is always from pre-existing matter without the form now introduced and of which that matter is capable; it therefore always implies a change of matter from privation of form to form. Such, in summary, is the teaching of the Philosopher in the places cited.

7. But in order that the sense in which this doctrine is true may be clear, I shall add three Assertions. I assert 1º: the first intrinsic principles of Body "in completed being" are only two: primary Matter and substantial Form. It is proved. Body "in completed being" is a wholly substantial Composite, for example a stone or a tree; therefore it is intrinsically principled only by substantial elements or first principles, for, as the Philosopher says here in c. 6, "How could it be that a substance consists of non-substances?" But there are no other first substantial principles besides primary matter and substantial form. This is clear: for first, privation, since it is not a being, is not a substance; secondly, there is no other substance to which the definition of first principles belongs besides matter and form, as will appear by induction. Therefore, etc. Furthermore, Body "in completed being" is Body insofar as constituted in permanent being, from n. 1. But it cannot be

so constituted from privation, which certainly does not remain in matter together with form. This proof supposes that primary matter and substantial form exist, the truth of which is sufficiently evident from the preceding discourse of the Philosopher and will be shown more fully below. Meanwhile, know that even the Atomists themselves, and all who say that everything consists of corpuscles variously coordinated, agree with our Assertion as it stands; for they call the atoms matter and the coordination form, and by both complete the structure of natural Body.

8. It is objected, 1º: the union of matter and form must be counted among the principles of natural Body, since it too constitutes it intrinsically, and moreover has whatever the definition of first principles requires. 2º, subsistence must likewise be counted among the principles for the same reasons, especially if it consists in something positive. 3º, the dispositions preparing matter for form must also be counted, for example heat and dryness for the form of fire; for the Composite is not made except from disposed matter. 4º, privation must likewise be counted, both because Aristotle universally establishes three principles of natural Body, matter, form, and privation; because the first principles are first contraries, according to Aristotle, which is not verified of matter and form alone, but of form and its privation; and because privation of form remains when the Composite is dissolved, and therefore the Composite is resolved into privation; but each thing is composed, as of parts and principles, of those things into which it is resolved.

9. I answer to 1º: union is not a principle "as that which," but "as that by which," and consequently it is not properly and simply a principle, because it is not that "which" principles or constitutes, but that "by which" the principles constitute. For it is the mere exercise of principling, or the ultimate formal determination whereby matter and form principle in second act. Therefore it does not increase the number of principles, nor does the definition according to the clause "all things are made from them" properly belong to it. Thus a productive action does not increase the number of efficient causes, because it causes only "as that by which," or as the exercise of causing, and therefore the definition of efficient cause does not properly belong to it.

10. To 2º: subsistence does not intrinsically constitute Body in the being of nature or of the essence of the natural Composite, but only in the being of a *suppositum*; because the Divine Word, without assuming human subsistence, assumed the whole human nature and essence. But now we are concerned only with the principles of Body in the being of nature, since this alone belongs to physical consideration, which investigates the constituents

of things from sensible effects and changes. For a *suppositum*, insofar as it adds subsistence distinct from nature, is known from no sensible effect, but from the mystery of the Lord's Incarnation; and therefore it belongs to a higher consideration, namely theological or metaphysical. Or say that the subsistence of natural Body is not one simple form, but is compounded from a twofold partial subsistence, one proper to matter and the other proper to form, neither of which is an absolute entity but modal. Hence one is an appendage of matter, the other of form; consequently they do not increase the number of principles, but are understood to be comprehended under the name of matter and form. The same reasoning must be used concerning existence, if it is distinguished from essence, as the Thomists maintain.

11. To 3º: those dispositions, since they are not substances but accidents, remain outside the constitution of the substantial Composite, whose essence would remain entire even if God introduced the form into matter without any preceding disposition. The Composite is therefore said to be made from disposed matter, the disposition exercising the office of a naturally prerequisite condition, but not of a constitutive principle.

12. To 4º: the assumption is badly proved. For first, Aristotle universally establishes three principles for Body "in becoming," concerning which immediately below, but by no means for Body "in completed being," as is sufficiently gathered especially from c. 6 of this book. Secondly, although Aristotle teaches that among first principles there must necessarily be first contraries, he does not therefore mean that all first principles are contraries, but only some. For throughout c. 6 he proves that besides those two which are contrary, a third must be admitted which is contrary to neither but receptive of either, namely of form and privation. Nor does he establish those two contraries as principles of Body "in completed being," or in permanent being; for, rather, to exclude this he teaches in the same chapter and in the following c. 7 that the essence of no thing can consist of contraries simultaneously, just as neither can substance consist of non-substances. He therefore intends only that contrariety be found in the transient constitution of Body "in becoming."

13. If it is said: according to Aristotle, the principles are not made from one another precisely because they are contraries. Therefore, since matter and form do not have contrariety, they will be made from one another and will not be first principles. I answer: that reason is not adduced by the Philosopher for all first principles, since afterward he proves that not all can be contraries, but only for form and privation. For matter and form, however, there is another reason why they cannot be made or constituted from one another, namely that matter can be joined with total non-being, or

with the lack of every form, from which it must therefore be adequately distinct.

14. It should be noted here in passing that one contrariety is positive, which exists between two positive forms, as between heat and cold; another is privative, which exists between a form and its lack in a capable subject. Aristotle speaks of the latter when he says that the first principles are contraries. It should further be noted that among privative contraries some are called first contraries, namely those which conflict in their entirety, such as form and privation; and of these the Philosopher speaks when he proves that one principle cannot be made from another because they are contraries. Others are called second contraries, namely those which conflict only according to one part, since the other part can be found in both, such as "white" and "non-white," when "non-white" is taken for a subject not possessing whiteness of which it is capable. Of these it is verified, as Aristotle says, that all things which are made are made from contraries, as white from non-white, musical from non-musical; for these concretes can be made from one another inadequately, namely in such a way that the subject of the one remains in the other.

15. Finally, it is false that the Composite is resolved into privation. For when the Composite is dissolved, privation does not remain as something surviving, but supervenes as something new, so that it is certain that it supervenes anew. But things which remain in this manner are not shown to have constituted the Composite; otherwise the form of fire which remains in matter after wood is dissolved would have been a part of the wood. Indeed, every Composite would be constituted from its own non-being, which is ridiculous.

CHAPTER III.
Second Assertion Designating the First Intrinsic Principles of Body in Becoming.

1. I assert 2º: there are only three first intrinsic principles of Body "in becoming" through change: Matter, Form, and Privation. Before the proof, some things must be premised for clearer use of the terms. 1º, the "becoming" of Body is the same as the "generation" of Body; and this can be taken both actively or causally, that is, as a process, and formally or terminatively. Generation taken in the first way, and understand the same of "becoming," is that action whereby natural Body is made by an extrinsic agent; and it differs from creation because creation is the production of a thing from nothing, whereas generation is production of a thing from a

presupposed subject. Generation taken in the second way is the intrinsic fabrication, formation, or structure of Body which terminates the said action. We speak in both ways even of artifacts; for the "construction" of a house, for example, is sometimes taken for the action of the artisan, sometimes for the intrinsic fabrication or structure of the house.

2. 2º, Generation, or "becoming," is called "change" when it causes matter to pass from privation of form to form; it is called "conversion" when it transfers matter from one form to another; it is called "pure," "simple," or "precise" generation when it produces Body from matter then first created, in which therefore neither privation nor another form preceded. Hence Body "in becoming" is one thing through change, another through conversion, another through pure generation. But the name "change" also admits the two acceptions described in the preceding number. For change can be taken causally or as a process, in which sense it is the action of an extrinsic agent presupposing matter deprived of form; or formally or terminatively, in which sense it is that which is accomplished by such an action, namely, "that the subject now has a form of which immediately before it was deprived."

3. The latter sense is more proper to the name "change." First, because this name generally signifies a novelty by which a subject is now otherwise disposed than before, at least when that novelty implies something intrinsically received which renders the subject intrinsically better or worse; but such novelty properly consists in the very "having of a form," etc. Secondly, because change is divided by all into "positive" or "acquisitive," by which a subject passes from privation to form, and "negative" or "amissive," by which a subject passes from form to privation; for in either way the subject is otherwise disposed than before, which is to be changed. Thus air is changed now from dark to luminous, now from luminous to dark. But this division does not fall upon the generative action, which certainly does not pertain to the concept of negative change.

4. Furthermore, prescinding from the generative action, whatever belongs to the proper concept even of positive change can be understood by this alone, that a subject is understood now to have a form without which it existed immediately before. And this can even really occur with the generative action excluded, namely if God were to create both the form and its union. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, explaining the concept of change, makes no mention of generative action: "It belongs to the notion of change," he says, "that one and the same thing be otherwise now than before." Say the same concerning the name "conversion," with due proportion. Hence generative action is not change or conversion except with the addition "as process," "active," or "causal"; and

it will more properly be called "change-producing" and "conversion-producing."

5. 3º, Since change is the transition of a subject from one state to another, it necessarily requires three things, namely, the subject which passes, the term from which it passes, and the term to which it passes. If the change is positive, privation is the term "from which" and form the term "to which"; the reverse occurs if the change is negative. The change will be called substantial or accidental according as the form acquired or lost by the subject is substantial or accidental. In these matters all agree, as also that the subject is properly said to be changed, since it underlies the change by undergoing diverse states, now of privation, now of possession. The Composite, however, or concrete consisting of subject and form or privation, is not said to be changed except denominatively from the subject, although it is properly said to "be made through change."

6. Conversion, however, since it is the passage of a subject from one form to another, necessarily implies a twofold change, one negative and the other positive. For the subject cannot lose one form without passing to its privation, which is a negative change, nor acquire a new form without losing its privation, which is a positive change. Hence Conversion, I speak of natural, not miraculous conversion, besides the subject requires a twofold term "from which," one positive and one negative, namely the old form and the privation of the new; and also a twofold term "to which," one positive and one negative, namely the new form and the privation of the old.

7. 4º, Not all understand Body "in becoming" in the same way. Many maintain that it is nothing other than the "becoming" of Body, with "becoming" taken for generative action. If one objects that this overthrows the common doctrine of the Peripatetics asserting that matter, form, and privation are intrinsic principles of Body "in becoming," since generative action is a modal entity, essentially simple, or certainly not constituted from those three principles, some grant the consequence and contend that the doctrine is altogether false and absurd. Given the accepted meaning of Body "in becoming" as the bare action of the generator, these men speak rightly; and concerning that acceptance itself they raise no dispute except over a mere name. Others deny the consequence, but are then divided into two classes.

8. The first class consists of those who number among intrinsic principles not only composing parts, but also all those connoted things without which a thing can neither be defined nor conceived, especially if they perform the office of a receiving subject or of a term "from which" or "to which." Hence they say that matter, form, and privation are intrinsic

principles of Body "in becoming," that is, of the generative action, although this is not intrinsically constituted from them. Thus Cardinal Aguirre and another Benedictine, Babenstuber. These likewise dispute merely verbally, both concerning the acceptance of Body "in becoming" and concerning the explanation of intrinsic principle, which we sufficiently rejected from common usage in c. 1.

9. The other class consists of those asserting that matter, form, and privation are intrinsic, that is, constitutive principles of Body "in becoming" through change, that is, of the generative action insofar as it is a change and is taken in the being of change. In this sense, they say, Body "in becoming," according to the mind of Aristotle, is nothing other than the generative action directly signified, constituted obliquely in the being of change through those three principles. Thus Fr. Peinado with several others. This manner of speaking displeases me, 1º, because generative action is not formally change, nor does it have the being of the natural change of which we speak, as we saw in nn. 3 and 4. Hence the expression "action which is a change" or "in the being of change" is false, or rests on a false supposition, if it signifies formal change. But if it signifies causal change, or change as a process, and the action is taken "insofar as it produces change," there is no reason why it should be constituted from matter and form. For the fact that action insofar as change-producing cannot be, be defined, or be understood without these things proves only that it is essentially connected with them. Thus action without an agent, union without extremes, intellection without an object, can neither be, be defined, nor be understood; yet it is not thereby proved that intellection is intrinsically constituted by the object, etc. At most action insofar as change-producing is obliquely constituted by privation, with which it is not connected of itself, since the same action could exist even if privation had not preceded but matter were then first created. Hence if privation belongs to the concept of action "in the being of change," since it does not belong as a connoted thing or term of connection, it will belong as a constituent.

10. It displeases me, 2º, because it follows contrary to the express opinion of the Philosopher that there are more than three principles of Body "in becoming." For besides matter, privation, and form, the generative action will be a fourth principle, since it intrinsically constitutes Body "in becoming," not purely "as that by which" but "as that which," and more principally than the others, since according to you it alone constitutes directly, while the others constitute obliquely. It should nevertheless be noted that if generation, which is the eduction of a material form, is identified with union, as many maintain, it will indeed belong to the intrinsic

constitution of Body "in becoming," but not insofar as it is action, rather insofar as it is union, and in this sense purely "as that by which," so that it does not increase the number of principles, according to c. 2, n. 4. Nor is this the meaning of the Authors whom we are opposing here.

11. It displeases me, 3º, so that in general the opinion reported in n. 7 may be rejected, because it is less apt and less proper to say that Body "in becoming" is the same as the "becoming" of Body taken for the generative action, either alone or directly signified. Surely, if we say, "Air while being illuminated ceases to be dark," "Water while being heated suffers violence," will the affirmation fall upon the action of illuminating or heating, either alone or directly? Certainly, if "being," which is existence, is really distinguished from the essence of things, as the Thomists believe, no one will say that Body "in completed being" signifies the same as the existence of Body; rather all will understand that by "completed being" is denoted the essence fully and permanently constituted. In like manner, therefore, Body "in becoming" is not the same as the "becoming" of Body taken for an action really and adequately distinct from Body; rather, it is more fittingly taken for Body regarded according to the terminative making by which it formally begins to be constituted, or is first constituted.

12. Hence it follows that Body "in becoming," as presently taken, is not Body "as underlying generative action," if this reduplication involves the action among the constituents of Body "in becoming." Yet that expression may be admitted if it merely reduplicates the action as an extrinsic circumstance, and "as underlying" means the same as "while it underlies." Body "in becoming," therefore, is the same as Body "as beginning to be," or insofar as it is "in a formal transition from non-being to being," or "according to its first constitution or structure." This acceptance seems today the more common in the Schools; and unless it is retained as indivisible from the state of the question, whatever is objected against our doctrine concerning the principles of Body "in becoming" will be beside the point.

13. These things having been premised, the Assertion proposed in n. 1 is now proved. Body "in becoming" through change is nothing other, as is clear from the foregoing, than the first and intrinsic making of Body implying a change of the subject; or, to speak more briefly, it is substantial change itself formally taken. But such change constitutively includes matter, form, and privation, and nothing further. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved: those things which, when conceived by the mind, fully explain the constitution of a change, and any one of which, if mentally excluded or prescinded from even while the others are conceived to remain, cause the

change to be understood as immediately and formally lacking, are all and only the constitutive principles of that change, as is evident by constant induction in all denominations or things constituted. But when matter with privation of form in one instant, and matter with form in another immediately following instant, are conceived, substantial change is fully understood as constituted, namely matter passing from not having to having a substantial form; and this same change is understood formally to fail if either matter, form, or privation is mentally prescinded from, as anyone will readily experience. Therefore, etc.

14. Moreover, these three principles are required and sufficient that there be a passing subject, a term "from which," and a term "to which"; consequently, that there be the full concept of change, from n. 5. In this way the meaning of Aristotle in establishing three principles of natural Body remains explained. For in establishing them he regarded only Body "in becoming" through change, as is gathered from the arguments proposed in the preceding Chapter from n. 1 to 7. Why, however, he does not speak here of Body "in becoming" through conversion or pure generation I shall state in the following cc. 4 and 5, where I shall also designate the principles of Body taken in either manner.

15. I believe nothing solid can be objected against this Assertion. Yet even subtleties and shadows must be dispelled. First, however, observe 1º, that by the abstract name "change" the same thing is signified as by the concrete expression "to be changed," or by the phrase "the subject is now otherwise disposed than before." For change is a concretive form which consists of the same constituents as the concrete from which it is abstracted and differs from it only in the manner of signifying, just as in this manner alone "truth of cognition" and "true cognition," as also "freedom of an act" and "a free act," differ from each other. Observe 2º, that the terms "from which" and "to which" are not so denominated with respect to the whole change, but with respect to matter; for matter is that which leaves one term and proceeds to another. Thus, when man is said to consist of form and subject, the denomination "subject" is referred not to the whole man but to one part of him, namely the form.

16. Observe 3º, that change is a certain quasi-successive whole which requires its constituents, not all posited simultaneously, but some succeeding one another in two instants. Likewise it is not a wholly positive whole, but partly negative. Observe 4º, that two instants of time, although required for change, are not constitutive of it, but connoted things with which form and its privation, as existing in the same matter, are essentially connected. Or, if preferred, they will be quasi-accessory constituents of form

and privation, which are here taken insofar as successively existing in matter. Finally observe that the union of form with matter is not a principle except "as that by which"; and it can moreover be comprehended under the name of form, of which it is an appendage.

CHAPTER IV.
Objections Are Resolved.

1. It is objected, 1º: when fire is made from the matter of wood, the matter passes not only from privation of the form of fire but also from the form of wood. Therefore this form too is a term "from which," and consequently a principle of Fire "in becoming," no less than privation. The same must be said in every other natural generation, which always expels some positive form previously existing in matter. I answer by granting the antecedent and distinguishing the consequence: if Fire "in becoming" through conversion is considered, I grant it; if only "in becoming" through change, I deny the consequence. Body "in becoming" through conversion, or natural and substantial conversion itself, is constituted from the subject and from the twofold term "from which" and twofold term "to which" designated in the preceding chapter, n. 6. It is constituted, I say, from them by the same argument by which we established the constituents of change. But our Assertion speaks only of Body "in becoming" through change, of which alone Aristotle spoke.

2. It is replied: every natural generation no less necessarily implies conversion than change. Why, therefore, in assigning the principles of generation or of Body "in becoming," should either Aristotle or we speak rather of the principles of change than of conversion? I answer: Aristotle did not everywhere omit generation insofar as it is conversion, but treated of it in the books *De generatione et corruptione*, where generation is defined by him as "a change of the whole into the whole, with nothing sensible remaining as the same subject"; which is a definition of conversion. But in the present place the discussion concerns generation only according to those things required by the proper condition of natural agents in order that Body be understood to be generated. For this there is required a "progression from non-being to being," thus generation is here defined by the ancients, not in any manner whatsoever, but with the pre-existence of a subject, lest otherwise that "being" which is made be made from nothing. That another form previously existed, however, follows essentially from the condition of matter, which cannot in any instant be destitute of every form; but it follows accidentally with respect to the condition of natural agents, by which the

generation of the new Body would occur in the same way, indeed more readily and briefly, if matter had pre-existed without participation in any form. It is objected: Aristotle in this book, text 66, also calls privation a principle accidentally. I answer: the Philosopher is speaking there either of Body not "in becoming" but "in completed being," or, as St. Thomas explains there, of the privation of a previously possessed form, not of the form newly produced.

3. It is objected, 2º: form cannot be a principle of change, both because the title of term "to which" belongs not to form but to the whole Composite, and because a principle must be prior to what is principled; but form is not prior to change, but posterior, since it follows generation. I answer by denying the assumption. To the first proof: the title of term "to which" founds the office of a principle only when it falls upon a term wholly new, adequately distinct from the subject, and moreover simple or not principled from others, as the definition of principles requires. Form possesses these conditions, but the Composite does not, although it is called the term "to which" the intention of nature principally and ultimately tends. To 2º: form is posterior to causal change or change as a process, namely to generative action; yet it is prior to formal change, to which alone it is compared as a principle. For it is an intrinsic part thereof, and every part is in some manner prior, or is understood prior, to the whole. Similarly, form follows generation as a process; but it does not follow, rather it constitutes, formal or terminative generation.

4. It is objected, 3º: matter is the subject receiving change; likewise it is the subject presupposed to generation; therefore it is adequately distinct from change and generation. I distinguish the antecedent: it is the subject receiving causal change, I grant; formal change, I subdistinguish: taken inadequately, insofar as it implies privation and united form, I grant; taken adequately, I deny. The other part of the antecedent is similarly distinguished, and I deny the consequence. The reason for the distinctions is clear from what has been said; no further doctrine is needed here.

Against Privation in Particular.

5. It is objected, 4º: privation seems for many reasons to be excluded from the office of principle. For 1º, privation is nothing; but "from nothing nothing is made," according to the old axiom; therefore natural Body cannot be made from privation. 2º, privation is contradictorily opposed to form; therefore it does not constitute Body "in becoming" with form. The consequence is clear, both because only a chimera is composed of

contradictories, and because contradictories, since they mutually destroy one another, will destroy Body "in becoming" rather than constitute it; for what destroys one constituent destroys what is constituted. 3º, privation is understood to *inesse* in matter at no instant. For it does not *inesse* in the instant in which the form exists, as is evident. Nor does it *inesse* in the preceding instant; because privation does not exist without the capacity of the subject for the form, but this capacity does not belong to matter in the preceding instant, both because matter in that instant still possesses another form and is not naturally apt to receive two in the composite sense, and because it does not yet have the ultimate disposition for the following form and, until it has this, is not proximately capable.

6. 4º, Privation principles change neither when it is in matter nor when it is not; therefore never. The antecedent is proved: first, in the instant in which privation exists, change is not yet principled, because the subject does not yet begin to be changed, but still rests under the term "from which," just as Peter, so long as he is in place A, does not begin to be moved toward place B. Therefore privation does not yet principle at that time. Secondly, it seems certain that it does not principle in the instant in which it no longer exists. First, because the exercise of principling presupposes a principle actually posited, especially when the discussion concerns intrinsic principles, which principle only by "composing," that is, by placing themselves together with the others within what is principled. Secondly, because actual predicates presuppose the subject actually to be; and in such propositions a proposition with a third element implies a proposition with a second. For it is rightly inferred, "Peter is actually disputing, therefore he actually is." Whenever, therefore, it is truly said, "Privation actually principles," it will also truly be said, "Privation actually is."

7. I answer to 1º: from nothing nothing wholly positive can be made; yet some denomination or concrete can be made which is partly positive and partly negative, such as Body "in becoming" through change, since it implies non-being of the form at instant A and being of the form at instant B. Thus the temperament of the human body is constituted partly from the absence of redundant humors, and the beauty of a nose from the absence of superfluous matter. To 2º, I grant the antecedent and distinguish the consequence: it does not constitute Body "in becoming" together with form by concurring in the same instant, I grant; by existing successively, I deny the consequence. Nor do the proofs obstruct this. For it is proper to a chimera to be composed of contradictories simultaneously verified, not successively posited; nor do contradictories mutually destroy one another except with respect to the same instant. Remember that change is a

successive whole with respect to two of its constituents, and the whole difficulty will disappear, because nothing prevents parts of a successive whole from being entirely incapable of coexisting, as is seen in the parts of a year or day.

8. To 3º: privation *inesse*s in matter in the instant preceding the introduction of the form of fire, for example. In that instant matter has a true aptitude and capacity for such a form, even in the composite sense of another form which it still possesses, provided that "in the composite sense" is referred not to the simultaneous reception of both forms but to the conjunction of the capacity for either with the actual possession of either. In this manner one sitting is capable of walking, the just man is capable of sin, and the sinner of grace. Nor is it an obstacle that matter lacks the ultimate disposition whereby it is rendered proximately capable and ready, because a subject truly and simply capable of the form suffices for privation, although it is not ultimately disposed. Thus a sinner is truly deprived of the grace of God, although he is not proximately disposed to obtain it; and a blind man has privation of sight, although he cannot receive sight without a miracle. This is especially true when the subject is already so prepared that in the immediately following instant it will undergo the ultimate disposition and the form.

9. To 4º: that argument is fallacious, as is clear in the examples I shall give. The posteriority of time whereby Caesar is said to be posterior to Alexander, at least taken fundamentally, is constituted by Alexander's existence in an earlier time. I ask, when does Alexander's existence constitute this posteriority? When it existed? By no means, because Caesar had not yet begun to be posterior. When it no longer existed? Neither, if the proposed objection has any force. Similarly, the denomination "an old house" is constituted by past years; yet while those years existed, they did not constitute the antiquity of the house, since the house was then new and recent; and, on the other hand, when they no longer exist they cannot constitute it, if the objection has force.

10. It must therefore be said that privation principles only when it does not exist, namely in the first instant in which form is introduced. It is proved: privation principles insofar as it is the term "from which" matter passes to form, for it principles under no other title. But to be a term "from which" is to be a term left behind and lost. Therefore privation actually principles when it is actually left behind and lost. But this is verified only in the instant of the advent of the form, in which privation no longer exists; for since privation and form are immediately opposed, to lose privation is the same as to acquire form.

11. Put somewhat differently: the actual exercise of principling on the part of privation is its loss and formal exclusion, for by this privation is constituted in the being of a term "from which." But this formal exclusion is the formal introduction of the form itself, which occurs only when privation does not exist. Therefore only then does the actual exercise exist whereby privation is rendered actually principling. Moreover, privation belongs to the intrinsic concept of change in no other manner than insofar as it was and is not. For we do not conceive change unless by conceiving that matter actually loses one state or term and receives another. But the term "from which" does not belong to this objective concept except insofar as it is conceived actually to be lost and consequently actually to cease to be, after having been. For the same reason, preceding years constitute the antiquity of a house when they no longer exist, because they belong to its concept only insofar as past and consequently insofar as they have now ceased to be, after previously having been.

12. Hence it follows, 1º, that the denomination "principling" or "constituting" Body "in becoming" is not verified of privation except in the instant of the form; yet it falls upon privation insofar as previously possessed in its own instant. For privation principles and constitutes in the instant of the form, not as then existing, but as pre-existing in the antecedent instant, or as now for the first time past. Hence this denomination, "privation actually principling," expresses two things: privation in the antecedent instant, and the exercise of principling in the present instant, by which exercise the denomination is determined. It is no otherwise than with the denomination "Antichrist now foreknown," which expresses both an actual cognition or foreknowledge in the present time and Antichrist in the future, yet in such a way that it is verified only now, while the foreknowledge exists; because Antichrist constitutes such a denomination not afterward but now, although it falls upon him not as existing now but as existing at the end of the World. The same is seen in posteriority of time and the antiquity of a house.

13. It follows, 2º, that Body "in becoming" through change is not understood or preserved absolutely except in the instant of the introduction of form, because only then is it verified that matter is actually changed and passes from privation to form. Before that, it was not passing but was going to pass; nor was Body being made, but was going to be made. Nor is it therefore a simultaneous whole or one having all its constituents simultaneously in that instant; for although it is principled by all simultaneously, it is not principled by all as simultaneously existing, but by

some as dispersed through two instants. This can be explained by the preceding examples.

14. It may be said: a successive whole is said absolutely to exist in every instant in which any part of it exists, as is clear in a day, month, or year. I answer: this is true in those successive wholes whose parts are of the same kind and one of which has no greater role than another in determining the whole to existence. But when the parts principle under diverse titles, and one has a peculiar role in determining another or the others to principle and the whole itself to exist, then the name of the whole taken absolutely signifies rather the existence of one part than of the others, as is evident in the examples adduced. Hence Body "in becoming" through change is not well signified by these words, "Matter with privation, immediately going to possess form"; but it is well signified by these, "Matter possessing form and losing the privation immediately previously possessed."

15. It follows, 3º, that Body "in becoming" formally includes the union of form with matter. This is clear because union is the exercise of principling, or actual principiation, whereby form and privation actually principle. For union denominates form as formally acquired, which is to be the term "to which," and privation as formally excluded from matter, which is to be the term "from which." Hence it follows that Body "in becoming" and Body "in completed being" are not opposed, but rather are inadequately identified and verified for the same instant. For Body "in becoming" includes whatever is proper to Body "in completed being" and something further, namely the lack or privation of form, which, insofar as now excluded, although it does not constitute Body "in completed being," does not prejudice it. Body "in becoming" and Body "in conservation" are indeed opposed for the same instant, insofar as "being conserved" denotes existence in preceding time. But Body "in completed being" of itself prescinds from whether it is "in becoming" or "in conservation," and can be joined with either and is included in both.

16. It may be said: only that is said to be "in becoming" which is not yet complete and finished, which is on the way and in transition to its being, which recedes from the term "from which" but has not yet arrived at the term "to which." Therefore it is contradictory for Body to be verified simultaneously as "in becoming" and "in completed being." I answer: those expressions hold in artificial "becoming," for example of a house, which we call "in becoming" while it is not yet perfected; but not in the natural "becoming" of things, especially substantial things, which occurs through an instantaneous action. For in such things to be made or to begin to be is the same as wholly to be. St. Thomas teaches this beautifully, Summa Theologiae

III[a], q. 75, a. 7, where, after saying regarding Body that the introduction of substantial form is instantaneous, he adds, "To 2º, in instantaneous changes the becoming and the completed being are simultaneous, just as to be illuminated and to have been illuminated are the same." He teaches the same at Summa Theologiae I[a], q. 45, a. 2, ad 3, adding: "And in these things that which is made exists when it is said to be made, but it is signified as having being from another and as previously not having been." What is on the road in the common sense through passage to a distant place has not yet reached its term; but what is on the philosophical and instantaneous road by that very fact already possesses the term.

16. [**bis**] With these things established, both arguments of n. 6 against privation principling when it does not exist are now easily solved. For the exercise of principling after the manner of a term "from which" requires the principle to be actually excluded, so far is it from requiring it to be actually posited. Nor is this novel even in intrinsic principles, as is clear in the exercise of principling whereby Antichrist now constitutes the denomination "foreknown." One must therefore attend both to the title of principling and to the nature of the thing or denomination which is principled. As regards the verb "to compose," if it means the same as to place oneself simultaneously with the other constituents, I grant that privation does not compose Body "in becoming"; but this manner of composition is not required in the intrinsic principles of a successive whole, as anyone sees. But if it means the same as to be an intrinsic part of the essence of the whole, privation indeed composes, although it is not posited in the instant in which it principles. Moreover, not every actual predicate supposes the subject actually to exist, nor does every truth with a third element imply a truth with a second, as is seen in these: "Antichrist is now foreknown," "A goat-stag is known," "The wood is burned," "The lion is dead." That doctrine, therefore, is not true when the very nature of the predicate permits or causes the subject and verb to be amplified or alienated, as occurs in the present case, since "Privation actually principles" is equivalent to "Privation is actually excluded."

17. It may be said: therefore privation principles not according to its being but according to its non-being; therefore it does not principle as an extreme distinct from form insofar as form alone belongs to matter. The consequence is clear because the non-being of privation is formally the very being of form in matter. I distinguish the first consequence: if "according to" denotes the mere exercise of principling, I grant; if it denotes the principle "as that which," I deny the first and second consequence. The principle "as that which," after the manner of a term "from which," is privation according

to that negative being which it has in the antecedent instant; but this being of privation is not denominated actually principling except from its immediately following non-being, as from the exercise of principling consisting in the union of form or in form insofar as united to matter.

18. It is objected, 5º: the passage from place A to place B is not intrinsically constituted by the terms "from which" and "to which"; therefore the same must be said of change, which is a passage from privation to form. I answer by denying the antecedent if the discussion concerns passage formally taken and intrinsic places. Suppose place B to be immediately contiguous to place A. What else will my passing from A to B be than losing the previously possessed location in A and acquiring a location in B? But in this object each location is constitutively included, one as the term "from which," the other as the term "to which"; and intrinsic places consist in these. With this local passage the natural passage of matter from privation to form must be compared, with the immediate succession of two instants.

19. But if the objection speaks of passage to a distant place, that passage is commonly taken for motion alone through the intervening space; yet if taken adequately, it necessarily includes both that location from which the Body first departs and that at which it finally arrives. Finally, if the objection speaks of extrinsic places, I grant the antecedent, because without them the essence of motion and local passage can be understood, unless perhaps there is a reduplication "according to extrinsic places"; but I deny the consequence for the contrary reason.

Seminal Reasons Asserted by St. Augustine Are No Obstacle.

20. It is objected, 6º: among the first principles, besides the three which we posit, there must be numbered "seminal" or "causal reasons," which the great Augustine acknowledges as necessary for every generation of natural things in *De Genesi ad litteram*, especially l. 6, cc. 14, 15, 16, and l. 9, c. 17, where he says that they are the primordial beginnings of things: "From these, as from the primordial beginnings of things, all things which are generated take at their proper time their origin and development, and the ends and cessations proper to each kind. Hence it comes about that a bean is not born from a grain of wheat, nor wheat from a bean, nor a man from a beast, nor a beast from a man." And *De Trinitate* l. 3, c. 8: "Hidden seeds of all things which are born corporeally and visibly lie concealed in these corporeal elements of this world." From this doctrine of Augustine some gather that privation must be struck from the number of principles of Body "in becoming," and that in its place seminal reasons must be added to

matter and form as a third principle. Master Manso expressly promotes this opinion, *Physica* l. 1, q. 2.

21. I answer: it is doubtful what the great Augustine understood by the name "seminal reasons." St. Thomas reports and refutes various explanations in II, dist. 18, q. 1, a. 2. He himself, both there and at Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 115, a. 2, teaches that nothing else is to be understood than the active and passive powers of natural things, especially those destined for propagation of their own species or for producing univocal effects, and which generally, even in inanimate things, can be called "seminal" by a certain analogy with seeds, by which plants and animals are propagated. But Master Manso, with Giles, holds that seminal reasons properly consist in a certain order superadded by divine disposition to the powers of things, by virtue of which each active thing subjects to itself certain passive things, and these are subjected to certain active things. In this way tow is subjected to fire because it is rendered liable to combustion, and fire subjects tow to itself because it is rendered capable of burning it. This order, subjection, and aptitude, says Manso, is a relation or relative quiddity really distinct from the things and their powers.

22. Either explanation can be admitted for the present without any prejudice to our Assertion. First, the explanation of St. Thomas. For seminal reason, if taken for a power of an extrinsic agent, will indeed be a principle of generation, but an extrinsic principle, and therefore will not increase the number of intrinsic principles, with which we are now concerned. But if it is taken for the power or aptitude of form to inform and of matter to receive, it is not something distinct from matter and form; for the one through itself is an informative act, and the other through itself is a receptive subject. And although matter, in the being of a proximate recipient, implies accidental dispositions, these do not belong to the concept of substantial change; or, granted that they do belong, they are comprehended under the name of matter as appendages in the enumeration of the principles.

23. Next, the explanation of Giles. For if seminal reasons are taken for the relations explained by Manso, he selects two for the office of principling, one on the side of form and the other on the side of matter, they can either be said intrinsically to principle Body "in becoming," not as a third principle but as appendages of matter and form comprehended under their names; or, rather, they should be numbered among extrinsic principles, because, prescinding from those superadded relations, it can be understood that matter now begins to have a form which it did not have, just as this very thing is understood when prescinding from an extrinsic agent.

24. Moreover, Manso's doctrine displeases me under three heads, to omit others now. 1º, because he removes privation from the number of principles, although without it Body "in becoming" through change can neither subsist nor be understood, whatever seminal reasons one adds. 2º, because he assigns the office of intrinsic principle only to seminal reasons which stand on the side of matter and form, excluding those which stand on the side of efficient Causes; although St. Augustine nowhere makes such a distinction, but rather chiefly regards active causes, as will be clear to the reader.

25. 3º, because, lest the principles be four, he maintains that from both seminal reasons, of matter and of form, one principle is completed; although first principles, according to their definition, must be simple and not principled from others. Certainly that seminal principle would be principled from two simple ones, and indeed not merely integrally; because those two relations would have to partake of the nature of their foundation, and one would be after the manner of act, the other after the manner of potency, and consequently they would effect an essential constitution. Add that he incongruously attributes to form, with respect to matter, a seminal reason; for according to him this is a relation between active and passive things, whereas form does not regard its matter in the genus of active cause, but in the genus of formal cause or informative act.

CHAPTER V.

Third Assertion Concerning Body in Becoming Through Pure or Simple Generation.

1. I assert 3º: Privation is not a principle of Body "in becoming" under every hypothesis; or, what amounts to the same, a generation of natural Body is possible which does not presuppose privation and therefore is "pure," "simple," or "precise" generation, or Body "in becoming" through pure generation. It is proved: a generation is possible which does not imply change; therefore one is possible which does not presuppose privation. The antecedent is proved: generation is possible in the first instant of the creation of matter; but then it does not imply change, since change requires the existence of the subject through at least two instants, as was established above. Therefore, etc. The major premise is proved: in the first instant of the creation of matter a form can be produced through an action essentially dependent upon matter as upon a presupposed subject; but such an action would be eduction of the form and generation of the Composite. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is clear from the proper concept of eduction and

generation as contradistinguished from creation. The major premise is proved: in order that an action depend upon matter as upon a presupposed subject, a presupposition of time is not required, but priority of nature suffices; and matter can possess this in the first instant. Therefore, etc.

2. The minor premise is clear both from the parallel of an efficient cause, which, although it requires priority of nature, can operate in the first instant of its existence, and because priority of nature does not imply an extent of time but only a distinction of signs within the same instant, as will be explained in Treatise 2. The major premise also seems clear, both from the same parallel of an efficient cause, upon which the action as presupposed depends no less than upon the subject; and because priority of time is accidental and material with respect to matter concurring passively toward an action or in the genus of sustaining material cause, in which consists the dependence of an action upon matter as a presupposed subject. For matter passively causes and sustains an action only through its potency as now actually present; but this potency is wholly the same in the first instant as in the others, and in order that it now be truly present it makes no difference that it existed before.

3. Confirmation 1º: let God create in the midst of fire a new portion of matter not forestalled by another form. I ask why fire could not immediately produce in it and from it a fiery form. Because of lack of the ultimate disposition? But fire itself could produce this instantaneously, since no contrary would obstruct it, just as for the same reason air is illuminated in an instant; or, if preferred, suppose that disposition to be created by God simultaneously. Because of lack of capacity in matter? But that capacity is the same in every instant, since it is identified with the entity of matter. Because of lack of power in the fire? Who would say this? Finally, because of lack of previous existence in time on the side of matter? But according to all Philosophers, in order that natural agents immediately produce effects contained in their power, nothing else is required than that there be present a capable, ultimately disposed, and applied subject. All this is present in our case apart from previous temporal existence. Then thus: but the fire would then act through true generation, since creation belongs to God alone, as no one is ignorant. Therefore, etc.

4. Confirmation 2º: if, when the Eucharistic species are corrupted, a worm is generated, a new portion of matter is then created by God for such generation, as the common opinion holds. But since matter cannot in any instant exist without form, it is necessary that that generation be made from matter in the first instant of its creation. Confirmation 3º, from the unavoidable example of accidental form, which can be educed in the first

instant of the existence of the subject, as in fact the first grace of the soul of the Most Blessed Virgin was educed, and according to common Theology also the first grace of the Angels; likewise their vital acts elicited in the first instant, especially free acts, certainly were not created, therefore they were educed. Indeed, if God were to create a new diaphanous body before the Sun, who would doubt that it would be illuminated in the first instant, and indeed by the eduction of light through the power of the Sun?

5. Hence one may infer that the elemental forms at the beginning of the world could have been generated or educed, as far as the previous existence of matter is concerned. Whether their eduction is incompatible for some other reason, and whether it in fact occurred, many dispute here. But that dispute will be more conveniently undertaken in the Treatise on the Elements.

6. But it is objected: if there can be Body "in becoming" not constituted from privation, it will not be a successive whole and will not be distinguished from Body "in completed being." I answer: Body "in becoming through pure generation" is not distinguished from Body "in completed being" except insofar as it connotes the first instant of its existence. For Body "in completed being" prescinds from whether it is in the first, second, or another instant; but Body "in becoming," whatever kind it may be, always connotes the first instant and implies a beginning of being. If one wishes, however, that in this denomination "Body beginning to be" there be included the preceding lack of such "being," although that lack is not privation, and in this manner that denomination is a successive whole by a mere order of immediate succession between being and non-being, let it be so, provided that physical change and a proper term "from which" are not then posited. Hence one can gather that such Body "in becoming" also consists of three principles, matter, form, and lack of this form which is not privation; and consequently that it is principled from opposites or contradictories, although not from properly contrary things, because contrariety must be concerned with a common subject.

7. When Aristotle universally teaches that privation is a principle of natural things, first, he is not speaking of the first formation of the elements and the world, which was made by God alone. For, as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 45, a. 2, ad 1, "The ancient Philosophers considered only the emanation of particular effects from particular causes, which necessarily presuppose something in their action." Secondly, neither is he speaking of the production of things in the first instant of the creation of matter. Both because he erroneously thought the World, and consequently matter, to have existed from eternity; and because he did not concern

himself with miraculous events, in which alone new matter can be created after the beginning of the world. The Philosopher therefore considered only the generation of things which proceeds from secondary causes according to the wholly natural order and which causes matter to pass from form to form. St. Thomas likewise testifies to this, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 44, a. 2, ad 1, saying: "The Philosopher in *Physics* I speaks of particular becoming, which is from form to form, whether accidental or substantial." For him to establish as a general rule that all things are made from privation, and with the ancients to say that all things are made from contraries, it is sufficient that all those things which are made by secondary causes according to the natural order are so made.

CHAPTER VI.

Various Opinions of Our Adversaries Are Examined.

1. Although the Assertion established in the preceding Chapter is sufficiently common in our School and in the Thomistic School, nevertheless not a few from both Schools oppose us, some of whom will be refuted here and others in the following Chapter. Some therefore grant that generation in the first instant of the creation of matter is possible, and nevertheless assert that even then matter is changed from privation to form. But they do not all reason in the same way. 1º, some of them place privation in the sign prior by nature in which matter even in the first instant precedes form as material cause; hence matter, acquiring the form in the posterior sign of the first instant, already passes from privation to form.

2. But against this, 1º: the prior and posterior signs in the order of causing exist in the same instant, that is, in the same indivisible point of time. If, therefore, privation exists in the sign prior by nature and form in the posterior sign, two contradictories will now concur in the same matter in the same indivisible time, and form will simultaneously be and not be, which is chimerical. Against this, 2º: those signs are not cells or parts of an instant, for an instant, being indivisible, lacks parts. Rather, "prior sign" is nothing other than the cause with those things required on its part for causing, and "posterior sign" is nothing other than the effect as dependent upon such a cause. Nothing therefore is placed in the sign prior by nature except what is a cause or is required on the side of the cause for causing. But privation is neither a cause of form nor required that form be caused, since rather it is extremely opposed to it.

3. Moreover, otherwise the will in the sign of freedom for loving would have a lack of love and therefore would not be indifferent to love and its

omission. Likewise the soul of the Virgin Mother of God, in the prior sign of the first instant, would have had privation of grace and would have been changed from the state of sin or from privation of holiness to the opposite state. Likewise, when anyone is first justified, grace would be joined in the same instant with sin, since it would be joined with its own privation caused by past sin. All these things are altogether removed from the truth. Finally, against them: by the same reasoning privation would be introduced in matter for every instant of the conservation of form, for in each there is a prior sign in which matter is understood as material cause.

4. Yet one may say: in the prior sign matter does not have form; therefore it has privation of form, for two contradictories cannot both be absent. Or otherwise: for the prior sign it is verified that "form is not in a capable subject"; therefore privation is verified. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: it does not have form merely by way of prescinding, I grant; negatively or privatively, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. Two contradictories cannot both be absent in a real instant; but they can in some sign, namely by prescissive absence, insofar as one prescinds from both because neither is a cause nor a prerequisite for causing. Similarly, "form not being in a capable subject" signifies privation when referred to an instant of time, but by no means when referred to a prior sign, because then it yields a prescissive sense. If it yields a privative sense, it must be denied that it is verified. Or, if preferred, grant both antecedents and deny the consequences, because by the addition "in the prior sign," "does not have" and "not being" are determined so as to signify only that form is neither its own cause nor a prerequisite condition that it itself be caused. From this it by no means follows that privation exists in the prior sign. For two contradictories to be absent in such a sign is nothing other than neither to be identified with matter nor with its prerequisites for causing form, which is entirely true.

5. It may further be said: indifference and determination are no less opposed than form and privation; but indifference and determination coexist in the same instant under diverse signs, as is clear in the instant of freedom. Therefore likewise, etc. Confirmation: in the same instant and the same subject dominion and lack of dominion can exist. For if one gives one's book to Peter, who immediately accepts it, in the same instant one has dominion because one exercises it, and simultaneously lacks dominion because it is transferred from oneself to Peter. The same therefore must be said of form and its privation. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: indifference and determination are no less opposed when they arise from the same source, I grant; when from different sources, I deny the major premise. The minor is similarly distinguished, and I deny the consequence.

In the instant of freedom indifference exists only from the side of the free potency, and determination only from the side of the effect; under this aspect there is no opposition in them. But form and privation in the same subject and instant cannot fail to be contradictorily opposed. To the Confirmation, I deny the antecedent; for in the first instant of an accepted donation either dominion over the thing is not in the giver but only in the recipient, as some maintain, or it is in both simultaneously, as Cardinal de Lugo very probably teaches, both disp. 3, *De Incarnatione*, sect. 1, and disp. 2, *De iustitia et iure*, sect. 2, where the difficulties of this opinion, which would be out of place here, will be found subtly resolved.

6. 2º, Others say that even in the first instant of the creation of matter generation is principled from privation, not one which existed, but one which would exist unless prevented by form; or from privation which, although it did not precede in itself, nevertheless preceded as due and by presumption. They prove this because lack of form preceded the creation of matter, and this lack, as though from possession of being, had a right that when matter was created it should exist in it and thus become privation. Hence it follows that for the prior sign of the first instant of matter there is a due privation and also a presumption of it, founded both on that preceding possession and on the fact that for such a sign form does not yet appear, and "among created things the negative is presumed where the positive does not appear." They confirm this because, if an Angel were created from eternity, it would truly be from nothing; and yet it would not be from an absolutely preceding nothing, but from a nothing which would precede unless prevented.

7. But this conception is easily rejected, because matter in the prior sign naturally requires form and rejects privation, especially if it is already ultimately disposed. This requirement grounds with greater right a due form and a presumption of form than of privation, for the right of matter is positive and naturally incapable of frustration; not so the right of the preceding lack. Hence the foundation of the Adversaries falls, according to whom that due privation or presumption must exist in the prior sign, because the right to form possessed by disposed matter destroys the right of the preceding lack, if there was any; and among created things the negative is not presumed when the positive, even if it does not appear in itself, nevertheless appears in the natural requirement of another extreme connected with it.

8. The disparity with the creation of an Angel, if creation from eternity is not contradictory, is also clear. For the nature of an Angel from no source resists the precedence of its own nothingness; indeed, from the proper

condition of a created thing it ought not to begin except in time, to such a degree that creation from eternity seems wholly chimerical to many. Therefore there is a foundation in the thing itself for an Angel, if created from eternity, to be said to be from a nothing which ought to precede. But although matter and form do not resist their lack before matter is created, matter positively resists privation immediately from the first instant of its creation and from the prior sign. Add that creation from eternity would indeed be from nothing of a subject, that is, from no subject; yet it would not be from nothing of its term except with the addition "possibly," insofar as, considering the nature of the term, it could presuppose the nothingness thereof.

9. 3º, Others establish privation as the term "from which," and true change, even in the first instant of matter, as follows. The lack of form preceding the creation of matter can not improperly be called privation and the term "from which." It is proved, 1º, because Aristotle numbers privation among the principles for this reason, that what is made must previously not be; for what already is is not made. Hence he concludes that a tree, for example, must be made from a non-tree, just as white from non-white, musical from non-musical. Therefore by the name privation he understood the mere "non-being" of the Body which is made. But this "non-being" is absolutely verified through lack of form, whether a subject pre-exists or not. 2º, because strict privation principles change only insofar as it is contrary to form; therefore it principles only insofar as it is contradistinguished from the capacity of the subject, since this capacity is not contrary to form. But strict privation, insofar as distinguished from the capacity of the subject, is a mere lack in no way different from that which exists without a subject. Therefore, as regards the office of principling, such lack will properly be called privation.

10. 3º, Because such lack expresses an order to an apt subject, at least a possible one; for it is not like the lack of an Angel, which expresses no such order. Therefore it is not mere negation, as is the lack of an Angel, but is properly privation. Add that by virtue of such lack it is verified that "form is not in a capable subject," which is the characteristic of privation. Add further that then there would truly be a "passage from non-being to being," which is the definition of change-producing generation, and that every creature is truly changed when it receives being.

11. Even if a generation of Body from eternity were posited, it would still be principled from privation, not one which had existed but one which infallibly would exist in matter unless prevented by form. This suffices, although with the preceding opinion there is no recourse to presumption

and what is due in the prior sign, for privation truly to be called the term "from which," because it is truly said to be "lost" and "excluded." For one is commonly said to lose what one certainly would have unless prevented; and that is commonly said to be excluded whose entrance is prevented. By this manner of speaking, for which Scotus and our Suárez are alleged, privation can be preserved as the term "from which" of temporal generation in the first instant of matter, even without recourse to preceding lack of form. Moreover, if God were from eternity to receive something distinct from Himself, He would truly be changed, for no other reason than that He would be apt for privation and would receive it if He were not preoccupied by the form.

12. This opinion disputes only about the name privation and the term "from which." For all agree concerning the thing itself that generation in time is impossible unless a lack or "non-being" of form precedes. Likewise it is agreed that matter created in the first instant, or even from eternity if that is not contradictory, would infallibly have had privation unless form forestalled it. Whether, however, lack without a subject is to be called privation, and whether a privation which did not exist but would exist unless prevented is to be called the term "from which," seems to pertain to manner of speaking.

13. Nevertheless, this opinion must be rejected by refuting its proofs. To 1º: although "privation" in a broad and improper sense sometimes signifies mere lack, nevertheless, properly speaking, it signifies only lack of form in a subject apt for the form, as St. Thomas very frequently teaches from the Philosopher; for example, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 11, a. 2, body: "No privation," he says, "wholly takes away being, because privation is negation in a subject according to the Philosopher." Thus blindness, ignorance, and deafness, because they are privations, necessarily connote an existing subject. Certainly our Assertion speaks only of privation thus understood; nor did Aristotle speak of another when he numbered privation among the principles, as is manifest from cc. 6 and 7. But when he says that all things are made from contraries or from things which are not such, as the musical from the non-musical, a tree from a non-tree, because what already was is not made, he speaks on the supposition of that maxim, "From nothing nothing is made," which he himself in c. 4 commends as a principle known by the natural light to all the ancients, and from which he infers that whatever is made is made from matter already previously existing under privation of form, as occurs in artifacts. Therefore his doctrine contains this reasoning: since every Body is made from what is not such, as man from non-man, and on the other hand nothing is made from nothing, it is

necessary that a man, for example, be made from a non-man indefinitely, that is, from some subject already previously existing which is not man because of lack of form and therefore underlies privation of the human form.

14. To 2º: the name "privation" directly signifies lack of form and obliquely the capacity of the subject as actually existing. And although privation in its own genus principles only according to what is directly signified, nevertheless what is obliquely signified is required for the office of principling as a condition "without which not," because it principles after the manner of a term "from which," that is, after the manner of a term expelled from the subject in which it existed. Hence, formally, I distinguish the antecedent: it principles only insofar as it is contrary to form, with contrariety behaving after the manner of a term "from which," I grant; otherwise, I deny the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: only insofar as it is contradistinguished, etc., "only" excluding the subject from the office of a term "from which," I grant; excluding the subject from the office of a necessary condition, I deny the consequence. Let the subsumed minor premise then pass, and I deny the final consequence.

15. To 3º: an order to a possible subject does not suffice for privation; otherwise the negation of sight or knowledge which now exists with respect to purely possible men would properly be called blindness or ignorance. That lack, therefore, is truly a negation, although not under as many titles as the lack of an Angel. Nor is "form not being in a capable subject" the characteristic of privation when "not" excludes the existence both of the subject and of the form. Nor would there then be a physical "passage" from non-being to being, for such passage requires a subject which, being physically the same now and before, is successively under opposite terms; just as physical "change" does not exist unless the same physical subject successively undergoes diverse states. "It belongs to the notion of change," says St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2, "that one and the same thing be otherwise now than before." There would therefore be only a logical passage and a logical change, such as is verified in the production of any being, even from nothing, insofar as the essence of the same thing is conceived by us when it is merely possible and when it is nothing, with only a variation of state, although physically it is not the same, but the existing thing differs from the possible as being from non-being. In this logical sense must be understood whatever expressions of the ancients concerning this matter may perhaps be alleged.

16. Finally, privation which did not exist but would exist unless form preceded it, although it may be said to be lost and excluded preventively, so to speak, nevertheless is not lost by ceasing or cessation; and this is

altogether required in order that it properly be the term "from which" of physical change or passage. Who would say that Adam, when first created, properly passed from the state of pure nature to the state of elevation? Or that the Virgin Mother of God was properly changed from the stain of original sin to Grace? Or that one who is prevented from obtaining the Pontificate truly becomes from a Pontiff a non-Pontiff? Or that one who conquers in battle necessarily passes from the state of the defeated to that of the victor? Or even that primary matter itself, in its first instant, undergoes infinitely many corruptive or privative changes because with one form it has the privations of infinitely many forms, each of which will be properly a term "from which" if it would infallibly be in matter unless its own privation were preceded?

17. If God from eternity received something distinct from Himself, He would not for this precise reason be changed philosophically, although theological change, which is opposed to supreme simplicity, requires only reception of a perfection distinct from the subject; rather, He would be shown to be changeable because He would be proved apt for privation of that form. Thus also from the argument of the Adversaries matter is proved not changed but changeable, and actually to be changed if sufficient interval were given for form to succeed privation. Nor do Scotus and Suárez intend anything else than that privation is always prior to form, not properly and simply, but with the addition "as far as concerns matter or action," namely in a negative sense, insofar as neither action nor matter essentially excludes the precedence of privation. Similarly, creation from eternity would be from nothing "as far as concerns itself," that is, it would be an action not essentially excluding the precedence of nothingness. But this is not to attribute to nothingness or privation the office of an actual term "from which," or an actual principle, but only of a possible one; nor is it to acknowledge change, but changeability. In the same way, when the Saints say that of themselves they are nothing or worse than the devil, they do not signify what they actually are, but what they would be or could be unless preserved by God's protection. See Fr. Suárez, *Disputationes metaphysicae* disp. 20, sect. 6, n. 11.

CHAPTER VII.

Other Authors Opposing Us Are Refuted.

1. There are other Authors who deny that generation of natural Body is possible in the first instant of the creation of matter. Thus some Thomists, with Palanco and Manso subscribing. The foundation of Palanco, *Physica* l. 1,

q. 13, is that generation, or eduction of form, necessarily presupposes pre-existing matter, but cannot so presuppose it in the first instant of the creation of matter. Therefore, etc. The major premise is clear because eduction of form necessarily presupposes matter produced in the nature of things; but it is contradictory that matter be produced without being existent. The minor premise is also clear because matter in the first instant is presupposed existent neither by priority of time, as is evident, nor by priority of nature; because, since it exists only through the existence of form, it is altogether contradictory for it to exist prior to every form. Hence is derived the disparity with the eduction of accidental form, which this Author grants can be made in the first instant of the production of the subject, because the subject of accidents, since it is a being in act, is presupposed in the prior order of nature as produced and existent.

2. The foundation of Manso, *Physica* l. 1, q. 12, is that eduction of form is essentially a transmutation of the subject; but transmutation, since it is a successive motion, cannot be made in an instant. Therefore eduction necessarily presupposes matter existing through at least two instants. He proves the major premise from Giles thus: "For a form to be contained in the active power of a natural agent is nothing other than for the agent to be able to transmute the subject by means of altering qualities disposing matter so that it comes to be under such a form. Therefore for a form to be sufficiently contained in the passive potency of matter so that it is educed from matter is nothing other than for matter to be able to be transmuted through altering qualities so that it comes to be under such a form." He confirms this, 1º, from St. Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* l. 9, c. 15, who says that the formation of Eve was creation because it was made without motion and transmutation. He confirms it, 2º, from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 90, a. 2, ad 2, who requires for eduction that "something become actual which previously was in potency"; which words Cajetan and other Thomists interpret of transmutation.

3. But first, the foundation of Palanco, although perhaps valid against those Thomists who agree with us in the present matter, against whom Palanco disputes at length in the place cited, is weak in our School. For we deny that matter exists through the existence of form, as will be abundantly established in the following Disputation. Hence I grant the major premise and deny the minor; and in the proof it must be denied that matter in the first instant is not understood in the prior order of nature as created and existent. Therefore a substantial form can then be educed from it for the same reason that an accidental form can be educed in the first instant of the

production of the subject. Secondly, it does not appear by what right this Author demands priority of time in matter.

4. For whenever generation occurs from matter created long before, for example when fire is made from the matter of wood at instant A, matter is not understood, in the prior order of nature, to exist through the existence of the wood, since this is destroyed in that instant; nor is matter understood to terminate the productive action which it terminated in the preceding instant, since according to Palanco's doctrine, l. cit., q. 7, matter in no instant terminates any production other than that which is simultaneously the production of the form then possessed. On the other hand, matter does not exercise the office of material cause and proximately receptive subject of the fiery form except in the prior sign of instant A, as is certain. Therefore, when matter is understood as material cause and proximate potency from which fire is generated, neither existence nor production antecedent in time is present. Consequently, the fact that such existence preceded production is material to the generation of fire; for it can be required under no other title than to sustain in matter the office of material cause or proximate potency, an office which certainly cannot be sustained by a production or existence which no longer is.

5. The point is pressed: must matter exist in the prior order of nature to the fiery form at instant A, or not? If the first is said, then, since in that prior order it no longer exists through the existence of the preceding form, it must exist either through its own existence or through the existence of the very fire then to be generated; and thus the foundation of Palanco falls, nor does the disparity with the eduction of accidental form remain. If the second is said, then priority of existence in the preceding instant is demanded in vain. The consequence is proved: this existence is material to eduction in the present instant. First, because for physical causation an existence which was does not contribute, but one which now is, as is clear in the efficient cause, the formal cause, and also in the material cause of the eduction of accidents. Secondly, because form does not depend upon matter as existing in anterior instants; it depends upon it only insofar as it is educed from it, and it is not educed in those instants but in A. That priority of time is therefore irrelevant to eduction, just as for the same reason it is irrelevant in the efficient cause.

6. The authority of St. Thomas, *Compendium theologiae* c. 95, is objected, where he teaches that Heaven could not be produced "except by creation," because it cannot be said to have been made "from some pre-existing matter"; where he speaks of temporal pre-existence, as is clear from the context. I answer: St. Thomas teaches our doctrine much more clearly in

Opusc. 42, c. 15. Moreover, the objected passage is easily explained of creation taken broadly, insofar as it signifies the production of a composite none of whose parts existed before that instant; in which sense the earth too is said in Sacred Scripture to have been created, as we shall show elsewhere. Creation so taken is compatible with eduction of form philosophically understood.

7. The foundation of Manso is arbitrary. I deny the major premise, or distinguish it: eduction reduplicatively as effected by secondary causes according to the wholly natural order of things, I grant; eduction according to itself or under every possible hypothesis, I deny the major premise; and with the minor granted, I deny the consequence, or distinguish it in the same way. To the proof, I either similarly distinguish the antecedent and consequence, or rather deny the antecedent, which, taken baldly as it stands, absurdly proves that the rational soul is contained in the active power of a natural agent and in the passive potency of matter sufficiently to be educed from matter. For if "nothing else" is required for form to be educed than that matter be transmuted by a natural agent through altering qualities so as to come to be under such a form, since all this is verified in the generation of man, nothing will be lacking for the eduction of the rational soul.

8. St. Augustine indeed says that Eve was created "not by any motion of already existing natures," but he does not say that she was therefore created because she was made without motion. He takes the verb "to create" in a broad sense, namely in the same sense in which Gen. 1 says, "God created the great sea creatures and every living and moving soul," where eduction properly so called is not excluded, according to the common opinion in every School; or in the sense in which Augustine himself in that c. 15 of l. 9 says that Angels furnish matter from subject things so that according to seminal reasons "something may be created in time," where certainly he does not speak of strict creation. St. Thomas refers that "previously" to priority not of time but of nature, whatever the alleged Thomists may interpret.

9. Moreover, Manso, driven by the force of the consequence, likewise denies that eduction of accidental form can occur without successive motion and without alteration of the subject through a quality having a contrary. If one objects the vital acts, intentional species, and light, which forms can be produced by a natural agent in the first instant of the subject's existence and in fact are produced without alteration and corruption of a contrary, he answers, n. 15, q. 12 cited, that such forms are not properly forms, nor are they properly made, but result; and therefore they are neither created nor educed, although the action by which they are produced is

similar to creation. He repeats the same in q. 14, n. 11, saying that such forms "are as though created," and that "to create as though does not exceed a finite agent." These things are astonishing.

10. First, however, there is no reason, nor shadow of reason, why light should be less properly a form than heat, why it should be less properly made, or why its production by the Sun in the air should be a resultation rather than the production of heat by fire in wood. Secondly, philosophically only that is said to "result" which is posited upon the position of another as a natural consequence. How therefore, without abuse of the word, can these forms, especially free acts, be said not to be made but to result? Moreover, according to St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 77, a. 6, ad 3, the production of accidental properties is not "by transmutation" but "by natural resultation"; and yet Manso, q. 14 cited, n. 11, supposes that heat and the other properties of fire, for example, are truly made by eduction.

11. Again, the illumination of air or the production of a free act of love is undoubtedly a true action. I therefore ask whether it is essentially diverse from eduction properly so called. If denied, we have our conclusion. If asserted, then it is not "as though creation," but properly creation; for a true action, at least one productive of an absolute form, is adequately divided into eduction and creation according to the opinion of all, which Manso approves, q. 12 cited, n. 3. Add that with the same license one could invent an action which is neither supernatural nor natural but as though supernatural; and so with other things.

12. Finally, one can argue thus: the distinction of eduction from creation is not taken from transmutation of the subject. Therefore it is not the same, as Manso contends, for a form to be educed and for a subject to be transmuted. The antecedent is proved because there is just as truly a transmutation of matter when the rational soul is created as when the form of a horse is educed; and yet there is a most true distinction between creation of the one and eduction of the other. Thus the specific distinction of a lion from a horse is not taken from matter, because, although matter of the same species exists in both, they nevertheless differ specifically. The true distinction therefore consists in this: eduction is an action essentially dependent upon a subject produced by another action, as upon a sustaining material cause; whereas creation is an action not so dependent. All this can be verified independently of priority of time and transmutation. Certainly St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 45, a. 1, ad 3, expressly teaches that creation properly so called is called production from nothing not only insofar as "from nothing" denies that something of the thing immediately preceded, but also insofar as it "implies a relation to a material cause, which

is denied." Therefore both are required for strict creation; hence, although the first be present, if the second is lacking, namely the negation of material cause with respect to the action, there will not be strict creation but eduction.

CHAPTER VIII.
How Valid Is the Proof Drawn from the Generation Following the Corruption of the Eucharistic Species?

1. Perhaps one will wish to know what Palanco and Manso answer to the example of a worm generated from corrupted Eucharistic species, concerning which above, c. 5, n. 4. Both first suppose false, and Palanco vigorously attacks, the opinion of some Thomists who say that the worm is then generated not from primary matter but from the Eucharistic quantity, which intrinsically constitutes the worm in place of matter and remains in it without a subject, just as it remained in the Sacrament. This opinion Master Froylán expressly maintains and attempts to defend, *Physica* l. 1, q. 1, a. 2, §§ 3 and 4, believing it to be St. Thomas's; and to soften the incredibility of this opinion, he addresses the Holy Doctor with those words of Tertullian: "Lord, if what we believe is error, we have been deceived by You."

2. To the difficulties which thence arise in crowds, for example, that quantity, since it is an accident, cannot constitute something one essentially, or a substantial Composite, such as the worm; nor can it be the first receptive subject of substantial form, since this is the very essence of primary matter; nor is it a natural passive potency for substantial form, which potency alone is subjected to the active power of natural agents; to these, I say, and other difficulties Froylán replies that quantity, on the supposition of the miracle by which through consecration it exists of itself without a subject, has in all respects the power and office of primary matter. And although "materially and entitatively," or "in the being of being," it is an accident and always remains in the accidental line, nevertheless "formally, substitutively, and in office" it is matter and substance. Hence it will be able to constitute a substantially One essentially, receive the form of the worm as first subject, be a natural potency for it on the supposition of the miracle, and discharge the other offices just as if it were matter.

3. Nor, according to this opinion, does quantity enjoy these privileges only in passing, but permanently. For from this doctrine Froylán concludes that once quantity has received some substantial form, it will be the subject of subsequent forms until the end of the world; and that if a man were for a long time nourished solely by sacramental species, in the course of time all

his matter, or the greater part of it, would be that very quantity, in which the rational soul would be found as in its proper matter, and with which, in addition to the proper matter in which the man was generated from the beginning, he would also rise on the day of judgment.

4. Whoever wishes this opinion extensively and forcefully refuted should consult Fr. Suárez, tom. 3, on III[a], disp. 5, sect. 3, and Palanco here, q. 1, from n. 40. For the present we briefly reject it, 1º, because by the aid of the expressions "formally, substitutively, in office," anyone could easily devise whatever paradoxes he pleases in the constitution of a substantial Composite. For example, that from two substantial forms there result something one essentially, one of them exercising the role of matter; for although both are first act "materially and entitatively," one could be pure potency "formally and in office." Certainly matter has a greater proximity and kinship with substantial form than with quantity. And since, in the worm in question, one quantity is received in another quantity according to Froylán, why could not one substantial form be received in another?

5. Similarly, one substantial form could be substituted for another of a different species, for example the leonine form for the equine, so that from the soul of a lion and an equine body there would arise a true horse. For it is evident that a leonine soul is much less distant from an equine soul than quantity is from matter. If one objects that the form of a lion gives the species of lion and no other, I shall easily distinguish: from a leonine form which is such only materially and in the being of being, but formally and in office is equine, I deny; one which is such both formally and materially, I grant. In the same way quantity or quality could exercise the office of substantial form, and thus from two accidents some remarkable worm would be constituted. Why not? Because, one says, accidental form does not give being simply. I distinguish: accidental form which is such both materially and formally, I grant; which is accidental materially but formally and substitutively substantial, I deny.

6. But, one says, nothing of an inferior genus can attain what is highest in a superior genus. I distinguish: entitatively, I grant; substitutively, I deny. There is also the maxim that "the highest of the lower does not attain the lowest of the higher," which is indeed most true in the being of being. Yet Froylán judges otherwise by way of substitution, saying that quantity, because it is something supreme in the genus of accident, which is false, since several qualities are more perfect, can attain the office of primary matter, which is lowest in the genus of substance. Finally, by the same way a Composite could be constituted from matter and form with their offices

inverted, so that matter exercises the role of form and form the role of matter.

7. It is rejected, 2º, because God cannot vary the essential constituents of things "in the being of being" without varying and overturning the essence of the Whole. It is proved, 1º, *a priori*. First, because an essential constituent, if varied in the being of being, is varied in the being of a constituent; for it constitutes only by communicating its entity. Secondly, because the essence of the Whole is the very entity of the same; but this entity, since it consists in the entities of the parts or constituents, cannot fail to vary if any of the partial entities is varied.

8. It is proved, 2º, by examples, even of accidental concretes. First on the side of the form: God cannot make "a hot thing" result from a form which entitatively is whiteness, nor "an intelligent thing" or "a thing understood" from a form which in the being of being is nothing but love. Secondly on the side of the subject: by no power can it be brought about that in a stone or brute there result the denomination "intelligent" or "loving," even if by divine power intellection or love were placed in them; for no other reason than that such a denomination is essentially constituted from an entitatively rational subject. Hence, although a sufficient form is present, the denomination fails through defect of the proper subject entitatively taken. The same is evident in the denominations "holy," "adoptive son of God," and "seeing God."

9. God can indeed supply the office of extrinsic causes which remain outside the constitution of the effect, or even use those causes supernaturally for opposite effects, making, for example, fire cool or snow heat. But He cannot supply or invert intrinsic and constitutive causes even entitatively taken, making, namely, a hot thing without the entity of heat, a cold thing without the entity of cold, a man without a rational soul entitatively such, or an intelligent thing without intellection or an entitatively rational subject.

10. Since, therefore, according to all, the intrinsic constitutive causes of a worm and of every substantial Composite are two partial substances, matter and form, it is wholly contradictory for either of them to be entitatively varied or to fail without the essence of the Composite being varied and failing. Therefore recourse to the way of substitution is a mere circle and begging of the question. For we contend that quantity cannot possess the office of constituting the substantial Whole after the manner of a subject because it is not substantial matter, and Aristotle's statement in the present c. 6 is self-evident: "A substance cannot consist of non-substances"; and because otherwise the essential constituents of things

would be inverted. But when it is replied that the constituents are not formally and in office inverted, and that quantity is substantial matter formally and in office, what else is this than to argue in a circle and give the office itself as the sole reason for the office?

11. Nor should the absurdity deduced by the Excellent Doctor be omitted: "It could happen," he says, "that this quantity, through various transmutations, should be informed by another form of bread and be consecrated. How then would transubstantiation occur? For if the whole composite were transmuted, quantity would not remain; if only the form, it would not be transubstantiation. It would therefore have to be said that consecration could not be effected from such bread. This indeed would not be badly said, because it would not be bread, since it would not consist of the essential principles of bread. But then the same would consequently have to be said of every thing generated from such species, that it is not truly the substance which it appears to be, but a semi-substance, so to speak."

12. Froylán opposes the authority of St. Thomas, both Summa Theologiae III^{a}, q. 77, a. 5, and *Quodlibet* IX, a. 5, ad 3, in which places he maintains this opinion so clearly that it can scarcely be explained otherwise. Nevertheless, the gravest Thomists, Capreolus, Cajetan, Soto, and others cited and followed by Palanco, and previously cited by Fr. Suárez in his Commentary on that a. 5, q. 77, deny that it is the mind of St. Thomas and endeavor by various conjectures to draw the excessively explicit letter into another sense. Would that they kept this before their eyes when they are indignant at us for sometimes interpreting words of the Holy Doctor far less pressing against us. Certainly they will never allege any text of St. Thomas more explicit against any opinion of our School. Moreover, St. Thomas in the places cited commends as probable the opinion concerning a new creation of matter from which the worm is generated; nor does he prefer the opposite except with hesitation, by the words "It seems better to say," etc. The former opinion may therefore be approved without St. Thomas being unwilling or opposed. Let this be the first solution.

13. Moreover, it can be answered that St. Thomas in the case under discussion denies only a new creation of matter which is not conversive. The reason is, 1º, because in III^{a}, the cited question and article, after teaching the opinion objected against us, in the following a. 6 he teaches that a man can be nourished from the Sacramental species; and to the second argument, which he had objected to himself in these words, "As is said in *De generatione* II, we are nourished from the same things from which we are constituted. But the sacramental species are accidents, from which man is not constituted, for an accident is not a part of substance," the Angelic Doctor

by no means answers with Froylán's solution, namely that quantity is substance formally and in office although it is an accident materially and entitatively; rather, he answers in these words: "To 2º, it must be said that the sacramental species, although they are not those things from which the body of man is constituted, nevertheless are converted into them." What could be clearer against Froylán, who teaches, as we saw, that it could happen that almost the whole human body should consist of sacramental quantity?

14. It is therefore foreign to the mind of St. Thomas that sacramental species nourish in such a way as to enter into the constitution of the human body. The Holy Doctor intends only that they are converted into those things from which the human Body consists, namely portions of matter. But nutrition is effected from those species in the same manner as generation of the worm, both because sound Philosophy so dictates and because the same St. Thomas teaches it in the body of the article, saying: "It has been said," namely in the preceding article alleged against us, "that the sacramental species can be converted into some substance generated from them. By the same reason they can be converted into the human body by which they can be converted into ashes or worms. And therefore it is manifest that they nourish." Therefore according to St. Thomas the worm is generated from them not insofar as the worm consists of them or of any one of them, but insofar as they are converted into those things from which the worm consists, namely matter and form.

15. 2º, Because St. Thomas in that a. 5, q. 77, denies the return or creation of matter for this reason: "because," he says, "it does not seem reasonable to say that anything miraculously occurs in this sacrament except from the consecration itself, from which it does not follow that matter be created or return." Hence I argue, 1º: it does not follow from the consecration itself that quantity constitute the worm in place of matter. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, this does not seem reasonable to say. The antecedent is proved, first, because this would be to posit as though a consequence of one miracle, which is opposed to no principle of Philosophy, another miracle much more difficult and incredible to most Catholics, indeed impossible, namely that an accident be a part of substance; that from two acts or forms, accidental and substantial, there be made something one essentially; and that quantity receive supernaturally a natural potency from which substantial form is educed by natural power. Secondly, because it does not follow from consecration that quantity remain without a subject except for the purpose of concealing under an alien species the Body of Christ the Lord; for this is the end of that miracle whereby accidents are conserved without a subject.

But for this end the continuation of that miracle is neither necessary nor useful after the sacramental presence of the Lord's body ceases under such quantity, much less until the end of the world or even eternally in the glorious body of one who had been nourished from the species of the Sacrament. Therefore, etc.

16. I argue, 2º: from the consecration itself it follows that matter be created by conversive creation. Therefore, according to St. Thomas, this can reasonably be said. The antecedent is proved, first, because, as the Holy Doctor expressly taught us above, the previously consecrated species must afterward be converted into those things from which the substance nourished or generated from them consists. Secondly, because from consecration it follows, as all grant, that the series of natural corruptions and generations proceed just as if the substance of bread existed there. Hence it follows, 1º, that from the corrupted Eucharistic accidents there must be generated a worm of the same species as would be generated from corrupted bread, which certainly would not be a worm consisting of quantity in place of matter.

17. It follows, 2º, that it must be generated by natural agents, which certainly cannot generate except from a naturally apt subject, such as matter alone. For who can prove what Froylán said, namely that quantity is given a natural potency on the supposition of a miracle? As though a miracle changed the nature and essence of quantity, or as though that could be natural which is not from nature but essentially depends upon supernatural providence. It follows, 3º, that whatever is produced for the existence of the worm must be produced by conversive action, imitating, as far as possible, generation from corrupted bread. Therefore, just as when bread is corrupted whatever is lacking for the existence of the worm is made by conversion, so too it must be made in our case. And since in our case both matter and form are lacking for the existence of a true worm, each must be made by conversion on the supposition of consecration.

18. Therefore, when St. Thomas denies that it follows from consecration itself "that matter be created or return," he excludes return, that is, reproduction of the old matter of the bread, because reproduction of a thing once destroyed implies a new and unnecessary miracle. He also excludes creation, not every creation, but only that which is so from nothing that it expresses no relation to a positive term "from which," which is proper to conversion. And when, *Quodlibet* IX, the cited article, he does not approve "that, once the species are destroyed, some matter should be provided there by God, whether by creation or in any other way whatever," he is to be understood of every other way distinct from conversion.

19. If it is asked what St. Thomas means when, Summa Theologiae III[a], q. 77, a. 5, he asserts "that in the consecration itself quantity is miraculously given… that it be the first subject of subsequent forms. But this," he adds, "is proper to matter; and therefore consequently quantity is given everything that pertains to matter. And therefore whatever could be generated from the matter of bread or wine, if it were present, can all be generated from the aforesaid quantity," etc. And in the answer to 1º: "although there is no matter there from which something is generated, nevertheless dimensional quantity supplies the place of matter." And in the answers to 2º and 3º, that quantity, although retaining the nature of an accident, nevertheless miraculously receives "the act, power, and property of substance."

20. I answer: St. Thomas intends only that quantity be the first subject, not indeed a subject receptive of substantial form or constitutive of the Composite, which he nowhere asserts and indeed openly denies, as we saw concerning nutrition, but a conversive subject, that is, one founding conversion. The reason is that matter founds natural conversion insofar as it previously receives altering qualities disposing toward the introduction of the new form and expulsion of the old; but a previous alteration of this kind is received in the Eucharistic quantity just as if the matter of bread were there. Therefore, with respect to this office, quantity is the first subject of subsequent forms, and everything belonging to matter as previously disposable or alterable is given to it. Likewise, in this office it supplies the place of matter, although matter "is not there," namely in the instant or time of the preparing alteration. Likewise from it there can be generated whatever could be generated from the matter of bread, "from" denoting a subject prepared in antecedent time; for only with respect to this office does it receive the act, power, and property of substance. The interpretation is clear from St. Thomas himself there, in the answer to 3º, where he teaches that from quantity there is made not only a new substance but a new accident, and that the quantity passes into either because it has the power and property of substance. But it is certain that a new accident is not made from quantity as from a constitutive subject, nor in this sense does quantity pass into it.

21. Therefore, according to the mind of St. Thomas, the production of the worm, insofar as it includes creation of matter and eduction of form, is in some manner a conversion, because by virtue of it the species of bread cease as though they were a positive term "from which." For such a production is posited with the intention of concealing the mystery and continuing the series of generations according to the requirement of natural causes, without sensible novelty; and insofar as posited in these

circumstances, it requires the cessation of the species of bread just as if bread to be corrupted were there. It therefore imitates in some manner the conversion of bread into a worm. And although it differs greatly from wholly natural conversion and also from transubstantiation, and perhaps is not properly conversion because of lack of a subject or of some other thing common to both the term "from which" and the term "to which," nevertheless it can analogically and less properly be called conversion. Certainly it is so called by St. Thomas in the places cited; see also IV, dist. 12, q. 1, a. 2.

Another Answer Is Refuted.

22. Having rejected this doctrine, therefore, Palanco, q. 13 cited, nn. 31 sqq., and Manso, q. 14, n. 11, answer that in that production of the worm there is presupposed matter pre-existing in time, not in itself but in a substitute, namely in the Eucharistic quantity, which exercised the role of matter in receiving the preceding alteration; and they say that this suffices for the eduction of the form of the worm, although this then occurs in the first instant of the production or reproduction of matter. But since the production of the worm in such an event does not touch the preceding quantity, nor educe the form from it, but regards it as though an extrinsic circumstance, how can the action thereby be rendered essentially diverse from what it would be without such a circumstance? Secondly, what pre-exists only in a substitute does not truly and properly pre-exist; otherwise the substance of bread would properly be said to exist in the Eucharist. Therefore eduction can occur from matter not truly and properly pre-existing in an antecedent instant, and consequently, properly speaking, what you assert is false. Finally, that quantity is only the vicar of matter in the office of receiving altering qualities. But this office is not essentially required for eduction, which, at least by a reluctant concession, can occur without preceding alteration, as naturally occurs even in the eduction of light and vital acts.

23. Add that the preceding alteration is required for eduction under no other title than to dispose matter and expel contrary qualities from it. But in our case the preceding alteration neither disposes matter, since it is not received in matter, nor expels anything from it, since that matter previously possessed nothing, being now first produced. Therefore such alteration, although on the supposition of the institution of the mystery it is essentially required for generation of the new body, is nevertheless not required by the proper nature of eduction. Provided that matter created in the prior sign

were present from any motive whatever, the action would be the same even though no such alteration had preceded. Much less does any privation of the form of the worm precede in the Eucharistic quantity; and consequently there is already Body "in becoming" not principled from privation.

DISPUTATION II.

ON THE QUIDDITY AND EXISTENCE OF PRIME MATTER.

We must now treat expressly and individually of the intrinsic principles of the natural body, which we designated in the preceding Disputation. And, leaving Privation to Metaphysics, concerning which for the present it is enough to know that it is the mere non-being of form in a capable subject, we begin with the first basis of natural being, which is prime matter.

CHAPTER I.

Whether Prime Matter Exists?

1. By the name "prime matter" the Peripatetics understand a substantial, simple, and incomplete entity, which is the first foundation of corporeal things and the first subject of natural transmutations. This entity is subjected, or placed beneath, another substance likewise simple and incomplete, which is called "substantial form," and which constitutes the substantial composite in a determinate species, for example, of stone or tree, and is the first root of the properties and operations of that same composite.

2. That in physical things there is some first subject which is indifferent to any substantial form, from which, as presupposed, bodies of every species are generated, and which remains in their destruction, is usually demonstrated by these arguments. 1º From the daily transmutation of bodies, whereby some are made from others, as when fire is made from wood, ashes from fire, earth from ashes, etc. For in this transmutation

something always remains from the perishing body, which takes on the form of the new composite, and to which, consequently, all the functions just mentioned belong. For if nothing is common to corrupted and generated bodies, why do some succeed others as though in the place of heirs? Why is fire neither generated nor increased without fuel? Or why is it increased by as much as it consumes of wooden fuel? To this pertains the analogy of accidental changes: for it is the same water, for example, which passes from cold to hot, or conversely. Likewise there is the analogy of artificial things, which are always made from presupposed matter and are resolved again into that same surviving matter.

3. 2º, and this confirms the preceding argument, from the nutrition of living things. Here it is evident from experience, first, that food does not remain uncorrupted, as the very cooking and digestion of foods makes manifest; next, that something of the substance of the food remains in what is nourished, for we hunger for and take foods for no other purpose; finally, that the substance remaining from the food once cooked and digested is united with the living thing, becomes a part of it, and is vivified by the soul, as is evident from the very growth of living bodies. From this, however, it is plainly concluded that in the nourishment of animals and of all vegetative things there is something substantial which is now the subject of one form, now of another, and which does not perish when one composite perishes, but passes into another. And the same reasoning applies to other bodies, as anyone can see.

4. 3º From the destruction of a man and of any animal. Here the matter of the dead body is the same as it had been in the living body, and that same matter afterward takes on various forms, as when a corpse is resolved into ashes or dust. This is proved from the agreement of all nations, which believe not only the bones but also the ashes of dead men to be relics of the living. But what is accepted among all peoples must be regarded as a dictate of nature and as evident by the natural light. And as regards Christians, the same truth is wholly established by the doctrine and practice of the Catholic Church concerning the relics of the Saints.

5. 4º From the perpetual conflict of natural agents, for example, of fire and water. For why do these agents, by altering one another through contrary qualities, fight until the weaker is destroyed, unless so as to obtain a subject from which they may generate their own effects? No other end or fruit of so great an enmity appears. For the mere annihilation of the vanquished composite is not a fruit worthy of an impulse of nature, if the axiom has any force, "No agent acts intending evil." Nor, because of the narrowness of place, is the destruction of one body always necessary for the

production of another new body, if nothing from the old body must remain in the new. For it is enough that the old body yield its place and move elsewhere, or compress itself or the surrounding air. Add that heat and dryness, by which wood is altered by fire, if they endeavor utterly to annihilate the wood, will directly and essentially tend to their own destruction, since those qualities must perish together with the wood through lack of a subject. But nothing, under the guidance of nature, essentially and directly contrives its own destruction.

6. 5º, and as though *a priori*, from the very condition of natural agents, and universally of every created cause. For no secondary cause produces its effects from nothing, because production from nothing is creation; but to create belongs to infinite power alone, as is certain among Philosophers and Theologians, who likewise agree that no created cause has the power to annihilate anything. Hence those principles approved by all, if they are understood of secondary causes: "From nothing, nothing is made," and, "Nothing passes into nothing." Whatever, therefore, is produced by natural agents, as every body, at least every sublunary body, is certainly produced, is produced from something presupposed, to which a new form is added; likewise whatever is corrupted is resolved into something which remains after losing its former form. But this is the first subject of which we speak, or at least necessarily implies it. For if it is not composed from another subject, it is already first. But if it is composed from another, I ask whether that other presupposes yet another? If this is denied, that will already be the first subject. If it is granted, the question will be asked again and again until one stops at some first subject; for it is not permissible to proceed to infinity in the series of causes, especially material causes.

7. These arguments sufficiently demonstrate that there is prime matter according to the notion of a first subject from which, as presupposed, every corporeal thing is generated and into which it is afterward resolved. In this sense no one has hitherto denied prime matter except one or another who had no followers and deserved to have none. For he maintained that every body is simple, or not composed of matter and form, and consequently that the whole of it is produced when it is generated and the whole destroyed when it is corrupted. He further held that a new body is not produced unless another perishes because, since God filled the whole World with bodies from the beginning, some one of them must be removed so that another may enter. And in this alone generation sufficiently differs from creation, because creation destroys nothing and does not convert one being into another, whereas generation always converts one thing into another, which it substitutes in place of the former; and consequently it is truly called

production from something presupposed, namely, as from a purely extrinsic "term from which." From this also, he says, the difference between corruption and annihilation is to be derived.

8. But this amounts to nothing. 1º Because in this way secondary causes are in fact granted the power of creating, since they produce their effects from the nothingness of the whole entity without any beginning or foundation of them preceding. Nor does that imaginary conversion or wholly extrinsic "term from which" prevent this. For something similar would occur if God determined to produce a new Angel while simultaneously destroying one of the former Angels; in that case there would still truly and properly be the creation of one and the annihilation of the other. Add that the necessity of first destroying something because of lack of space does not vary the mode and nature of the production; for it is a merely extrinsic and accidental circumstance that space for locating the new body cannot otherwise be had.

9. Certainly, given this doctrine, if God placed fire in a vacuum; or if He removed uncorrupted the tow that was to be destroyed by the acting fire and placed it outside the World; or if, while the fire was present, wax or oil were condensed and left part of the previously occupied space free: in these cases, I say, fire could produce new fire without destroying another body. But then nothing can be imagined by which such a production would cease to be creation. Likewise, if at the same moment in which the tow is burned the surrounding air were so expanded or rarefied that it occupied the space left behind, it would necessarily prevent the production of new fire; and thus no pretext would remain for not calling the destruction of the tow annihilation, since it could not be called conversion and would have no "term to which." Add, moreover, that the action of fire, even if it were not creation, would be an action more powerful than creation; because, besides the labor of producing from nothing, it would also labor in overcoming a contrary that does not perish without resistance.

10. 2º Because the remaining arguments given above still press. The first presses, both from the analogy of accidental and artificial changes, and because, if the combustion of wood or other matter tends only to emptying a place, why does the fire generated from it in some way savor of the nature of the matter burned, so that it is now denser, now rarer, etc.? And this even if the combustible materials had previously occupied an equal space, for example, wood and gunpowder, or sulphur and tow. Is it not clear from this that the fire is constituted from something belonging to the burned thing, which either retains or imitates some of its preceding qualities?

11. The second argument, drawn from nutrition, presses, especially since nutrition is accommodated not merely to the space but also to the qualities of the foods. The third, concerning the relics of the dead, presses. The fourth, concerning the struggle of natural agents until one of the two is destroyed, presses. For if the destruction of some body were necessary precisely in order to empty space, whenever one body is rarefied it would have to destroy another; yet no Physicist would admit this, since it is evident that air, for example, is often so rarefied as to occupy a much greater space than before without thereby destroying other bodies, but merely compressing them and reducing them to a narrower space.

12. You will say: is not generation, or natural conversion, defined by Aristotle as "a change of the whole into the whole"? It is indeed; but Aristotle adds, "with no sensible thing remaining as the same subject," signifying that some subject remains, but not sensible in the same way, because together with the substantial form it also changes the principal qualities by which it is made sensible. You will say again: does not St. Thomas deny that the destruction of the substance of bread in the Eucharist is annihilation? He does indeed deny it. But, besides the fact that weighty Theologians speak otherwise, which seems to be a verbal question, in the Eucharist something proper to the destroyed substance remains, namely, the accidents of bread; whereas in the conversion you imagine nothing, whether substance or accident, remains from the destroyed body, since an accident cannot naturally migrate from one subject to another adequately distinct subject.

13. Moreover, whatever may be true of the name "annihilation," the destruction and conversion you posit is a work more difficult than annihilation. This is so both because it implies a doubled labor, as we noted above in the similar case, and because transubstantiation, or conversion of one whole substance into another substance, is an entirely miraculous work, and hence is regarded by all Catholics as a great miracle in the Eucharist; and St. Thomas himself, 3, p. q. 75, art. 8, judges it a miracle greater than creation.

14. You will finally say: an Angel is truly produced from nothing, although he is not intrinsically constituted from such nothing; therefore, likewise, fire will truly be able to be produced from something, although it is not constituted from such something. First, I care little about the phrase "from something" as you take it, for I have already shown above that this production from something is something greater and more difficult than production from nothing. Next, I also proved that, according to your principles, it can happen that fire is produced by another fire without the

destruction of any thing, and consequently without that "from something." Finally, when creation is said to be production from nothing, "nothing" is not taken categorematically, as though it were some extreme, but syncategorematically, insofar as it means the same as "not from anything." Hence to be produced "from nothing" is the same as to be produced "from no subject," or "with no part of itself presupposed." But this is altogether properly verified of the fire produced in your hypothesis, however much it may in another sense be said to be produced "from something."

15. This doctrine being rejected, therefore, all ancient and modern Philosophers posit certain seeds or beginnings of things which are neither generated nor corrupted, and from which, as first principles, all bodies are made, as from a subject taking on the various appearances and forms of things. Yet there was remarkable disagreement among the ancients in explaining what this was. For, omitting the opinions of those Philosophers who spoke of the first matter of things as though in riddles, some place one, others two, of the four Elements of the World beneath the first constitution of things; others all of them together; others wandering atoms. The Conimbricenses recount these and other opinions of the ancients, together with their Authors, in cap. 7, Lib. 1 *Physica*, quaest. unic., and the Excellent Doctor in disp. 13, *Metaphysica*, where he also forcefully refutes them. We do not now delay over refuting them, since all have today been banished from the Schools and are devoid of all probability, if only two are excepted.

16. One of these maintains as prime matter, indeed as the entire substance of natural things, atoms or insensible corpuscles, from whose distribution into various portions the entire variety of bodies results solely through variety of position, coordination, and interweaving, without any other superadded form, no differently than various works of art are made from stones, wood, etc., variously disposed. Thus the Cartesians and Atomists philosophize today; their doctrine is more fully explained and refuted in the *Dissertatio praeliminaris*. The other opinion says that the matter of mixed bodies is the four common elements, fire, air, water, and earth, mixed and tempered together. Thus several hold, especially among Physicians.

17. But this opinion, if it grants that the elements themselves are composed of matter and substantial form really distinct, does not deny Peripatetic prime matter; for such will be the matter from which the elements are composed. Whether, however, a mixed body, besides its own form, also includes the forms of the elements is a difficulty belonging elsewhere. But if the said opinion holds that the elements are simple bodies, then it either denies an absolute substantial form in mixed bodies or

acknowledges it. If the first, it coincides with the opinion of the Atomists and is subject to the same difficulties; and it will be further attacked in disp. 4 when we have proved substantial form. If the second, the elements themselves will be the prime matter we intend as regards its principal predicates, since they are a simple, incomplete substance and the first subject of every composite and substantial form.

18. Nevertheless, this opinion, even so understood, must be rejected, because obvious experiments, of which we shall speak in the treatise *De elementis*, demonstrate that the elements are not simple bodies. Prime matter must therefore be admitted as a simple and incomplete substance, and as not being any of the bodies which we see and experience as existing separately.

CHAPTER II.
Prime Matter Is Defined, and Certain of Its Attributes and Properties Are Explained.

1. The Philosopher explains prime matter in three ways. 1º From a likeness. For in cap. 7 of this book, text. 69, he says that prime matter is related to substantial forms as bronze or wood is to artificial forms. Namely, just as bronze or wood is of itself something rude and unformed, yet indifferent to receiving various figures from art and becoming either a statue, a table, or some other artifact, so prime matter, at least sublunary matter, is of itself a certain unformed and imperfect substance which is perfected now by these, now by those substantial forms, and becomes stone, or gold, or plant, etc. Yet this is an analogy, not identity or perfect similarity, since natural matter and form differ in many respects from artificial matter and form, as will appear from what follows.

2. 2º By negation. For in 7, *Metaphysica* cap. 3, text. 8, he says: "Matter, according to itself, is neither a what, nor a quantity, nor any of those things by which a being is determined; nor, indeed, the negations of these." It is not a "what," that is, it is not a complete being or substantial composite, which alone, in Aristotelian language, is called absolutely "a what and a this something." It is not a quantity, that is, it is not quantity; for Aristotle, when speaking of accidents, is accustomed to use concrete expressions for abstract ones. It is not "any of those things," etc., that is, it is none of the beings numbered in the ten Predicaments, because it is neither any accident nor a predicamental substance, since only complete substance directly belongs to the Predicament of Substance. Or, rather, understand those words as meaning that matter is no substantial or accidental form; for these

forms are those by which a being is determined to this or that physical species. Finally, it is not the "negations" or privations of those beings, because it is a positive entity.

3. Although the way of negation does not explain so much what a thing is as what it is not, it nevertheless helps in some way toward knowledge of a thing, especially one that is very imperfect; just as, conversely, God, because of His supreme perfection, is also commonly described negatively, as when He is said to be incorporeal, immortal, and infinite. Hence the great Augustine, 12, *Confessiones* cap. 3, likewise explaining matter by removal, declares that he was taught by God that matter, prior to form, "was not a thing, not color, not figure, not body, not spirit, yet not altogether nothing." Here everything is clear, provided that "not body" is understood according to the descriptions of Body given in the Proemium, or even of a body three-dimensionally extended; for matter according to itself does not require determinate dimensions, although perhaps it grounds quantity.

4. 3° By affirmation, or a positive definition. For in cap. 9 of this Book, text. 82, he says: "By matter I mean that which is the first subject of each thing, from which, as something intrinsic and not accidentally, something arises, and into which, if anything perishes, it ultimately passes." Prime matter, therefore, is the first subject of every natural body, from which, "as something intrinsic," that is, internal and remaining within the composite, something is made, "not accidentally," that is, not something accidental, such as white, but something essentially, or a substantial whole; and into this subject whatever perishes passes or terminates, for it is incorruptible and successively composes various things. Hence arose that common definition of prime matter: "The first subject from which something is made while it remains in it primarily and essentially, and not accidentally."

5. But because this definition is also accommodated by the Corpuscular Philosophers to atoms or corpuscles, which await no other form than coordination, position, and interweaving, therefore, according to the Peripatetic System, prime matter is more clearly defined thus: "An incomplete," or "partial, substance apt to constitute a natural Body," namely, a corporeal substantial Whole, "with another incomplete substance, as first subject." These last words explain the difference between prime matter and substantial form; the rest distinguish it from every accident, privation, and composite.

In What Does the Notion of Subject Belonging to the Metaphysical Essence of Prime Matter Consist?

6. The reason for doubting is twofold. The first is that it does not immediately appear why matter rather than form should be called the subject. For matter does not receive form as a vessel receives water, nor does it put it on as a body does clothing; rather, matter is united to form, and form to matter, intrinsically through an intimate communication which presupposes the complete local penetration of both. Nor does matter less properly complete form than conversely. Why, then, is matter rather than form the subject? The other reason for doubt is taken from the manifold acceptation of "subject."

7. For there is one subject of pure denomination, another of adhesion, another of inherence, another of sustentation, and another of pure reception or information. Of these, the name "subject" belongs improperly to the first and second, but properly to the others. Each may be explained as follows. Although every subject is a subject "of denomination," because it always draws some denomination from a form, nevertheless it is not a subject "of pure denomination" unless it is that into which some denomination is transferred from an improper form, that is, from an extreme which is either not intrinsically united, or not truly distinct, or which otherwise fulfills the function of a subject properly so called. Examples are found when God is denominated known from our cognition, offended from sin, or wise from His own wisdom; or when ferocity is called leonine, or an intellect angelic. The subject "of predication" may also be reduced to this.

8. A subject "of adhesion" is that to which some modal entity so adheres that it nevertheless is not properly its complement, nor can it depend upon it as upon a material cause. Thus the mode of creation adheres to an Angel, and the hypostatic union to the Divine Word. But discussion of this kind of subject will return elsewhere. A subject "of inherence" is that which materially causes some accident and is intrinsically affected by it, as air with respect to light. A subject "of sustentation" is that which materially causes its substantial complement, for which it is consequently as a presupposed basis and foundation, and is therefore said to sustain it, for example, matter with respect to the soul of a horse. What it is "to cause materially" we shall say in disp. 4 and again in tract. 2. An accidental form is also sustained by its subject; but usage has established that its subject be called one "of

inherence," reserving the name "of sustentation" for the subject of a substantial form.

9. Finally, a subject "of pure reception" or "information" is that which is intrinsically completed, through intimate and penetrative union, by another entity which it in no way causes or sustains. Thus matter is the subject of the rational soul. But because this description also belongs to our soul with respect to matter, the question is why matter rather than the soul is the subject "of information." And the question has place in every composite, whether substantial or accidental, constituted through the intrinsic union of form and subject; for in each there is a subject "of reception" or "information," although not "of pure" reception, but one joined with "inherence" or "sustentation." Yet abstraction can be made from these when considering the subject of the form of a stone or of whiteness, for example, insofar as it is "informed" by such a form. Some confuse "reception" with "sustentation," and therefore deny that the rational soul is "received" in the body. But more common usage takes "to receive" and "to be informed" for the same thing. So that we may not dispute about a word, however, I shall speak of a subject "of information." We therefore seek some concept common to every subject "of information" in relation both to substantial and accidental form.

10. Omitting other concepts variously proposed by various authors, the following seems sufficiently apt: "An entity incomplete in some genus, capable of constituting some Whole by intrinsic and penetrative union with another likewise incomplete co-part, which is the principal distinguishing physical difference of the resulting Whole." This explanation belongs to every and only receptive, or informable, subject, as induction will show; and as to its sense it is sufficiently commonly approved by our Recent Authors, although they differ somewhat in words. Thus they say that form is "that which bestows the principal denomination and the more notable predicates of the composite as such," whereas the subject is "that which participates in those predicates from another co-part." Likewise, the subject is "that which is the more passive than active principle of the operations of the composite," whereas form "is related in the opposite way." Likewise, form is "that which ultimately and principally determines and denominates the composite in the being of such," whereas the subject "does not perform that function." These explanations, I say, which always presuppose really distinct and incomplete parts, agree with ours, because whatever they attribute to subject and form arises from the fact that form rather than subject is the principal physical difference of the resulting Whole. Moreover, our explanation is commended, 1º, by that axiom: "It is act that distinguishes." Its meaning is that to act, or

form, it belongs to be the principal distinguishing feature of the composite; hence, conversely, it will be proper to potency, or subject, or the material part, not to distinguish the composite in this way.

11. It is commended, 2º, because in this way the verb "to receive" or "to take up" aptly agrees with the subject, which means the same as "to contain something superinduced, to be that to which something is given," or "that in which something is." For this reason form is said to be in the subject, not the subject in the form; the soul in the body, not the body in the soul; light in the air, not air in the light. It agrees aptly, I say, because form is as it were the token or character of the composite; but a token, symbol, insignia, character, or mark is of itself ordered to be in something and to be bestowed upon it, not conversely. Likewise, it belongs to the subject "to be informed" and "actualized," that is, physically perfected, determined, and fixed in some definite species of composite being, and to receive its more specific denomination. For that part which is the principal physical difference of the Whole always bestows this upon the other co-part; this is also seen in metaphysical matter and form, that is, in genus and difference. Finally, the verb "to be subjected" also fits, because the principal difference in some way predominates, at least in the order of denomination and of measuring the character and perfection of the composite, or concrete, as such. And from this subjection and predominance it comes that form is called the "formal part," whereas the subject is called the "material part."

12. But objection 1º: in this Whole, "Christ," the principal distinguishing element is the Divine Word; yet the Word is not a form. I answer: our explanation does not belong to the Word, since it requires for the notion of form that it be an incomplete entity; but the Word has no incompleteness. Nevertheless, the Word is eminently a form insofar as He supplies, in a more eminent manner, for the absence of created subsistence. Hence Humanity is not the subject of the Word, because subject as such implies an order to another incomplete co-part.

13. Objection 2º: prime matter determined of itself to a single species of forms is possible, such as many judge celestial matter to be. But such matter would distinguish its composite just as form does, although it would truly be an informable subject. I answer: such matter would indeed distinguish the composite, but not after the manner of its principal physical difference; for form would always principally have to be attended to in discerning the character and nature of the Whole. Hence, if the form of earth were united to celestial matter, on the stated opinion, by something possible or impossible, the resulting composite would be judged earth rather than heaven; and conversely, if a celestial form were united to terrestrial matter.

14. Objection 3º: the subject in accidental composites is frequently the nobler and principal part; for example, the rational soul is nobler than the intellection which it receives as a form. Confirmation: these concrete things, "white milk, white snow," differ from one another not by their forms but by their subjects. I answer: we do not intend that form always be the principal part entitatively, but only that it be the principal difference, or that from which the distinction of one composite from others is principally taken. This distinction, and indeed the nobility of the composite as such, is always derived from form, even if the form is accidental and less noble than the subject. Therefore, if a man understands more clearly than an Angel, the denomination "intelligent" will be more perfect in the man than in the Angel; and it will be of the same species in both if it is bestowed by intellections of the same species. To the Confirmation: milk and snow indeed differ insofar as they are substantial composites, but not insofar as they are subjects of the denomination "white," if the whiteness is of the same intensity; for with respect to this function, the intrinsic diversity of subjects is material.

15. From what has been said you will infer that the following do not belong to the proper notion of a subject as informable, at least insofar as it abstracts from a substantial and an accidental composite. 1º That it be indifferent to forms diverse in species; for this also belongs to certain forms, such as Grace, which of itself is indifferent to man or Angel; and moreover a subject not so indifferent can exist, as celestial matter according to many. 2º Nor that it have priority with respect to form, at least in the Divine foreknowledge, as body with respect to the rational soul; for, abstracting from priority, the proper notion of form and of a subject "of information" can be preserved from what has been said. Nor is there any reason why form and matter should be incapable of being so commensurated with one another that they must be created together at the same sign.

16. 3º Nor that the subject in no way denominate but be denominated, nor that it perfect not but be perfected; for matter also denominates form "complete" and perfects it insofar as it causes form to be in a state good and connatural to it. And accidental forms often seem to be perfected by the subject more than to perfect it; although, if the discussion concerns the proper and specific perfection of the composite as such, this always proceeds either uniquely or more from the form than from the subject. 4º Nor that the subject be, or be capable of being, a sustentative subject, or the material cause of the form, or at least of the union. This is so both because, from what has been said, the notion of a receptive or informable subject can be understood abstracting from material causality and from the potency to

it; and because, if the human union were created, matter would be a subject of information without materially causing either the form or the union. You will say that it would be so because, although it did not cause the union, it still could and connaturally ought to cause it.

17. But against this, 1º: if the informable potency can be exercised without the sustentative potency proper to a material cause being exercised, it is a sign that the one is formally distinct from the other and can be abstracted from it. Thus in man the intellective potency is abstracted from the volitional because a man can actually understand without actually willing. Thus also in matter the potency of receiving accidental dispositions is not formally the potency of receiving substantial form, because the latter can be exercised without the former, at least by Divine power. And generally, where there are exercises of a diverse line and really separable, such as the exercises of information and sustentation, they indicate formally distinct potencies. Against this, 2º: there is no reason why a composite should be impossible whose union, as well as its form, must be created, or connaturally sustained by the form.

18. Now, to return to prime matter, the common notion of "subject," both "of sustentation" and "of information," is contracted to it, omitting for the present the notion of a "subject of inherence," which also belongs to it with respect to accidents, by the notion of a "first subject," that is, one which presupposes no other and is not constituted from another. And, to answer the Doubt proposed at n. 6, I assert that "the notion of first subject of information in a substantial composite belongs to the metaphysical essence of prime matter as its primary and specific difference." Thus prime matter, at least sublunary matter, which in fact exists, is truly the subject of the generation of the composite insofar as it is the sustentative subject either of the form or at least of the union; it is likewise truly prior in time or nature, at least to the union, whenever the composite is generated; it is likewise a subject "of inherence" of accidents; it is also indifferent to various forms; finally, it is an entitatively more imperfect part, more capable of being perfected than of perfecting. But these belong only to the physical essence of matter as secondary predicates, or metaphysical properties. Its primary and specific difference, however, consists in the proposed notion of subject.

19. Concerning the other things now enumerated there is no doubt. Concerning the notion of a receptive subject and of a sustentative subject of substantial union, Fr. Peynado dissents from others here, disp. 2, sect. 2, and places in the latter the essential difference of matter from form. But against this our Assertion is proved: because the notion of a subject "of information" first distinguishes matter from form. For although matter be

abstracted from every other function or potency, it does not agree with form in being "informable." Next, it explains the immediate order to the composite, since it is most formally the same thing for matter "to be informed" and "to constitute" the composite. But this order is primary in matter, since matter exists wholly for intrinsically constituting the composite.

20. This is explained and pressed. In matter the informable potency can be abstracted from the sustentative potency of the union, as we have just seen, and as Fr. Peynado admits at n. 27; and the exercise of information can really be found without the exercise of sustentation, as Fr. Peynado grants in the case in which the human union were created. But in such a case, abstracting from the sustentative potency, matter truly differs from form by that exercise and by the potency for it, as seems evident; for however a subject "of information" is explained, in man only the body is informed and only the soul informs. Therefore the informable potency sufficiently distinguishes matter from form. Moreover, it is a more principal potency than the sustentative, since it more immediately regards the composite; and this composite can never be understood without it and its exercise, whereas it can sometimes be understood without the sustentative exercise, as in the stated case. Nothing, therefore, is lacking for it to be the primary and specific differential formality.

21. But Fr. Peynado objects: matter, according to Aristotle, is "the first subject from which something is made," namely, the composite. But the word "is made" does not precisely denote that matter is an intrinsic part of the composite, for this equally belongs to form. Therefore it denotes that the composite is generated from matter. But the composite is not perpetually generated from matter otherwise than by reason of the union, since matter itself is never generated, and form is not always generated, as is evident in man. Therefore matter is that from which the composite is made insofar as it is the subject from which the union is generated, or educed, and in which it is consequently received as in a subject of sustentation. Confirmation 1º: because Philosophers with Aristotle often call matter, as distinct from form, "the subject of the generation of the Whole," as though this were its best-known predicate. Confirmation 2º: because the words "subject" and "to be subjected," when applied to matter, signify passive and sustentative subjection; for Aristotle says, 2, *De generatione* text. 53, "To undergo and to be moved belong to matter."

22. I answer the objection: the word "is made" in the Aristotelian definition means the same as "is constituted" or "is composed." I indeed grant that this equally belongs to form; but I deny that by it the difference of

matter from form is explained. For this difference is denoted by the words "First subject," which otherwise would be superfluous if the notion of subject were expressed by the word "is made." The sense of the definition, therefore, is that matter is that "from which, as from a first subject, the composite is constituted." There remains a doubt concerning which notion of "being subjected" is in question; and we say it is the subject "of information," which Peynado does not attack.

23. To Confirmation 1º: I grant that this is the best-known predicate of matter with respect to us, who first know prime matter as though *a posteriori* from the natural transmutation of things. But this does not prove that it is its principal and primary predicate. For matter is also everywhere called by Philosophers a "Principle of corruption"; and Aristotle, in the description we gave at n. 4, says that matter is "the subject into which, if anything perishes, it ultimately passes." Indeed, this seems to be the best-known predicate of all; for we know nothing more about matter than that it is something remaining from the destruction and corruption of things. Yet no one will say that this is the primary and differential predicate of matter. To Confirmation 2º: those words can indeed signify passive and sustentative subjection, but not necessarily or primarily when applied to matter; for then, unless something else is established, the subjection of informability is to be preferred. It is also proper to matter "to undergo and to be moved" through generation; but this is not its specific difference.

Whether the Potency Immediately Receptive of Form Is Distinct from Prime Matter?

24. Whatever is properly a subject and the material part of a composite, by that very fact has a potency receptive of form; by this name I principally understand informable potency. Hence such a potency undoubtedly belongs to matter. But some Authors held that matter of itself is only a radical and remote potency, and requires and grounds another really distinct potency through which it receives forms. Nevertheless, that matter through itself is a potency immediately receptive of form is commonly asserted throughout the School. For although matter is made proximately capable of receiving form through accidental dispositions, and without these is said to be only remotely capable, nevertheless, because these dispositions are a mere condition and preparation without which reception cannot occur, and do not mediate after the manner of a potency or subject unible to form, they therefore do not remove from the entity of matter the immediacy of receptive potency. Thus fire is not said to be proximately capable of burning

wood unless it has local application; yet this application is not a potency or combustive power, but a mere condition.

25. The common opinion is therefore proved briefly: from act and potency there is made one essential unity, or a substantial composite, without another extreme being required, as all confess. But an essential unity is not made without the entities of form and matter, as is likewise certain. Therefore these entities through themselves are, the one act, the other potency; and just as form is an immediately informing act, as no one doubts, so matter is an immediately receptive and informable potency. Certainly, matter is no less defined through the notion of "potency," or, what is the same, "subject," than form through the notion of "act," and each is equally ordered to the other as incomplete in its genus. Why, then, should the notion of "act" be more identified with form than the notion of "potency" with matter?

26. Confirmation 1º: is the really superadded potency either received in matter or not? If the first, then matter through itself is already a potency immediately receptive of that superadded potency; once this is granted, no reason remains for denying that through itself it is immediately receptive of form. If the second, then such a superadded potency is in reality the first subject and prime matter. Confirmation 2º: the superadded potency cannot be a substance, both because otherwise it would be a substantial form, since it would be received in matter, or, if it were not received, it would be prime matter, as I have just said; and because, since it would be the immediate extreme of union with form, it would belong to the essence of the composite, which consequently, besides matter, form, and union, would include another substance. On the other hand, it cannot be an accident, because it would have to constitute a substantial composite, as I have just said; and "From non-substances a substance cannot be made," according to Aristotle, with whom all agree.

27. These proofs principally concern the informable potency, or that which is immediately unible with form. But who could doubt concerning the sustentative potency from which substantial forms are educed? Certainly this potency is not an accident, for it does not belong to an accident to sustain a substance, but conversely. But if it is said to be a substantial potency really distinct from matter, it will be some substantial form which matter receives and sustains; and why should matter not do the same with respect to the other forms? Or, if it is not received in matter, that potency will be "the first subject of the generation of the composite," which is the proper name of prime matter.

28. You will easily solve the objections usually made here if you note the following. 1º Although receptive potency implies an order, indeed is an order, to form, it is not therefore a predicamental relation but only a transcendental one; and this can be identified with an absolute thing, as is evident in form, which is also through itself ordered to matter. Likewise, not every potency belongs to the Predicament of quality, but only that which is otherwise known to be an accident and to be distinguished from quantity. 2º The potency of matter neither ceases nor varies when taken entitatively. For although matter, while it actually possesses a form, is no longer said to be "in potency" to it, because this expression connotes privation, it nevertheless undoubtedly retains the potency, just as one who is walking retains the potency of walking. Nor does matter lose the potency it had for forms that have been destroyed, even if they are naturally irreproducible, because that potency either regarded those forms only according to themselves or regarded them only under the condition that they had not been destroyed. Likewise, although matter is impeded by one form with respect to others, it is nevertheless truly capable of them in the divided sense; nor is it then called "remotely" capable through lack of immediate potency, but only through lack of dispositions, from n. 24.

29. 3º Although an active cause perhaps acts through accidental potencies distinct from itself, the same reasoning does not apply to the passive cause of substantial form, because the potency of this cause must sustain substance and constitute one substantial essential unity. Hence the disparity with the receptive potency of qualities is also evident, if matter does not receive them immediately but through quantity, as is commonly asserted.

Whether the Same Potency Also Belongs to the Metaphysical Quiddity of Prime Matter?

30. But you will further ask whether receptive, or informable, potency is not only really identified with matter but also belongs to its metaphysical essence. I affirm this with the common opinion of Our Authors and of the Thomists against the Scotists, whom Mastrius cites and follows here, disp. 2, q. 5, art. 5. Proof: the essential and metaphysical difference of prime matter consists in the notion of first subject as informable. This is evident both from the definition of prime matter and because there is no other primary predicate by which matter differs from form in every event and under whatever composite it is considered, as we saw from n. 18 to 20. But this notion of first subject is formally receptive, or informable, potency.

Therefore, etc. The minor is proved: because such a potency is nothing other than the aptitude of matter to be united to form as to the principal physical difference of the Whole; but this aptitude belongs to the most formal concept of a first subject "of information," as we saw above. The parallel with form also supports this, for the notion of act belongs to its essence.

31. You will say with Mastrius that matter sufficiently differs from form because they are "principles requiring an aptitude for constituting another thing, one after the manner of a potential part and the other of an actual part." But against this: according to Mastrius, substantial union is not between those formally superadded aptitudes, but immediately between the essences of matter and form. Therefore these essences through themselves are immediately unible, and consequently through themselves are immediately apt to be united. The consequence seems evident, for it is contradictory that something should be immediately united unless it is immediately unible, or immediately apt to be united, just as it is contradictory that something should be immediately seen if it is not immediately visible and apt to be seen. But such essences are not immediately united except after the manner of subject and form, as no one doubts. Therefore through themselves they possess the characteristic aptitudes of subject and form, which aptitudes we call "potency and act."

32. The point is pressed: according to all, the composite is essentially constituted from act and potency. But it is constituted only from the extremes of substantial union. Therefore act and potency are the extremes of such union. But such extremes are only the essences of form and matter, according to Mastrius. Therefore these essences are formally act and potency. Certainly no one says that the composite is made from "principles requiring" potency and act, but from "act and potency" themselves.

33. Mastrius raises two objections. 1º The essence of matter is something absolute, whereas potency is something respective. But the absolute is understood before the relative. Therefore matter must first be understood as constituted in itself through its essential predicates before it is understood as capable of receiving form. 2º Aptitude in general presupposes the thing whose aptitude it is as constituted in its quidditative being, and is said to flow and emanate from it. But both claims are challenged. 1º By immediate unibility, which likewise is something respective and a true aptitude, and yet is the very essence of matter. 2º By the concept of a partial entity, which formally includes a respect of aptitude to another co-part and to the Whole, and yet belongs to the quiddity of matter according to Mastrius. 3º By remote potency, or radical aptitude, requiring a proximate potency formally distinct from it; for the former too is receptive and is an aptitude. Mastrius

denies that it is a positive aptitude, because proximate potency is really the same as the essence of matter; but nothing is said to be in potency to itself or capable of itself. But this confuses the formal sense with the real sense. The essence of matter, according to Mastrius, is formally distinguished from proximate potency. Therefore such an essence can in this way be conceived positively as capable of proximate potency without being conceived as capable of itself. Likewise it is true that nothing is a remote and radical potency to itself, nor a principle requiring itself; and nevertheless Mastrius attributes these predicates to the quiddity of matter in relation to proximate potency. Nor can it be said that this remote potency is mere non-repugnance and precisive capacity, for "to ground," "to require," and "to render proximate potency due to itself" are in no way consistent with this; yet Mastrius grants these functions to remote potency.

34. Moreover, I answer objection 1º: both the essence of matter and its potency are something absolute insofar as absolute is opposed to modal and predicamental relative being; and at the same time each is transcendentally relative. Hence one need not presuppose the other. To objection 2º, the assertion is denied, because there are many things whose quidditative being consists in the aptitude itself, as is particularly evident in the examples adduced. It is replied: the absolute is formally relative to itself, whereas a relation, even a transcendental one, is a reference to another. But it is contradictory that the same thing formally be relative to itself and to another, because it would be relative to itself and not relative to itself, relative to another and not relative to another. Therefore, etc. But this proves a real distinction of matter from its potency, lest otherwise matter in the real sense be relative to itself and not relative to itself, relative to another and not relative to another. Next, the examples just adduced return.

35. Moreover, no created being is so absolute as to exclude a transcendental respect; for it must at least formally be a being "from another," and being-from-another is formally a respect to the first Cause. Therefore nothing is relative to itself by a self-reference excluding transcendental reference. Finally, matter is said to be relative to itself only 1º by a self-reference opposed to modality and predicamental respect; 2º by a self-reference of benefit, because through its reference to form it formally procures its own good; 3º by the self-reference of essential subsistence proper to substance, because it is a part of a composite subsisting essentially. But these self-references are formally included in the very transcendental order of the first subject to form and the composite, as will be evident to anyone who considers the matter.

36. Thus far concerning the potency of matter as informable. But concerning its sustentative potency both for accidents and for an educible substantial form, or for union, it must be said that these are indeed really identified with matter, but are metaphysical properties, or merely secondary predicates, not belonging to its specific quiddity. The reason is that, abstracting from these potencies, the proper quiddity of matter and its function as first subject distinguished from form can be understood, as we showed above, especially at n. 20.

Certain Other Attributes and Properties of Prime Matter.

37. From what has thus far been said it is gathered, 1º, that prime matter is a substance, and indeed not modal but absolute, for otherwise the same matter would not be indifferent to various forms. This follows both because it intrinsically constitutes a substantial composite and because, if it were an accident, it would be received in a subject and would not itself be the first subject. 2º That it is a simple substance, that is, not composed of form and subject; otherwise it would not be the first principle. This does not, however, prevent it from being integrally composed of particles continuously extended, or not penetrating one another in the same place, after the manner of the particles of this paper, in each of which the essence of matter can be preserved. 3º That it is an incomplete substance, that is, intrinsically ordered to constituting a Whole with another substantial co-part.

38. 4º That it is ingenerable and incorruptible, because generation is "the production of a thing from a presupposed subject," whereas corruption is "the cessation of a thing while its subject remains"; neither of which has place in a simple entity that is the first subject, as is evident of itself. Prime matter is therefore only creatable, or producible through creation by God alone. It was likewise created by God, not from eternity but in time, or at the beginning of time, as Faith teaches; and indeed from the origin of the World all the matter now existing in things was created, with the exception of that which is newly created for new generations from the corrupted Eucharistic species. Finally, it is annihilable, not indeed by created causes, which cannot annihilate anything, but by God alone suspending His creative concurrence. Yet according to ordinary Providence God destroys no substance except at the requirement of another thing; and no thing requires the absence of matter, since matter harms nothing but subjects itself to all things and is completed by all. Hence matter is regarded as naturally incapable of annihilation and everlasting with respect to the future.

39. 5º That it is a corporeal substance, because it is the first basis and foundation of the natural Body and cannot naturally be separated from quantity. 6º That it is "pure potency" in the physical line, because it identifies with itself no physically informing act; otherwise it would not differ from every form by its specific concept. But discussion of the celebrated attribute of "pure potency" will return below. 7º That it is a passive principle, that is, a subject "of inherence and sustentation"; these properties of matter, together with others, we indicated above at n. 18.

40. We now add that it is a passive principle in such a way that it is scarcely active. This is so both because the activity of natural things proceeds from forms, since it varies according to their variety, and because, if matter concurred actively in the operations of the composites which it successively enters, its activity would extend too far and would be greater than that of any form, which all regard as absurd. Nevertheless, according to a sufficiently probable opinion matter grounds quantity, as well as its own subsistence; it also causes its own location, and even duration if the latter consists in a superadded mode. But because causalities of this kind are called not so much actions as emanations or resultances, we therefore said that matter "is scarcely active."

41. 8º That it is a very imperfect substance. This is gathered both from its lack of activity and because the principal and nobler predicates of composites clearly proceed from forms, upon whose absence or variation they altogether cease or vary. Hence the ancients call matter "the dregs of substances, shadow, darkness, chaos, formlessness, non-being"; these and other expressions of this kind, however, must be understood hyperbolically, since from what has been said it is evident that matter is a positive substantial entity. St. Augustine speaks more cautiously when he often calls matter "almost nothing," while at the same time warning that it is "not altogether nothing."

42. Nor is it only something positive, but also something more perfect than any accident, at least any material accident. For it is in the genus of absolute substance, although perhaps in its lowest grade; hence it must surpass those things that belong to the accidental genus, as an inferior genus, according to the axiom: "The highest of the inferior does not attain the lowest of the superior." Nor does it prevent this that an accident is an "act" and matter is "pure potency"; for there the notion of "act" is lowered by the addition "accidental," while here the notion of "potency" is elevated by the addition "substantial," nor is matter devoid of all actuality, as we shall soon see. When St. Augustine, 12, *Confessiones* cap. 7, calls matter "almost nothing" and that "below which there is nothing," he is not speaking within

the genus of being as such, or within the genus of absolute substance. Whether matter is inferior in perfection to every substantial form we shall say below.

43. Finally, matter is commonly called "the single principle of change," or "of generation and corruption." By this nothing else is signified except that, among the constitutive parts of the composite, matter alone, because of its aptitude and indifference to various forms, spontaneously opens access to contrary dispositions, by which a new generation and the corruption of the previously possessed form are prepared. Hence it is sometimes called "the mother and common womb of forms," sometimes "stepmother and adulteress." From the attributes and properties thus far indicated it is evident how undeservedly the Cartesians and Atomists say that Peripatetic prime matter is a mere imaginary and fantastic specter, or something purely metaphysical and abstract, of which no physical explanation can be given.

44. Now, for the use of terms, note the following. 1º The matter of which we speak is called "permanent and intrinsic," in distinction from "transient and extrinsic" matter, by which name is understood a preexisting composite from whose destruction another is made, as fire from wood. 2º It is also called "prime" matter, in distinction from the matter of artifacts, which is called "secondary" matter. The whole composite is likewise called "secondary" matter with respect to accidents, especially if these are received in the whole composite. 3º Matter is called in one way that "from which," in another that "in which," and in another that "about which." This division does not so much denote several matters as several functions of the same matter; for in physical things the same matter is that "from which" the composite is made, "in which" the form is received, and "about which" natural agents operate.

Whether and to What Extent Prime Matter Is Knowable?

45. Knowability is the same as transcendental truth, which, since it is a property of being, cannot fail to belong to prime matter, since prime matter is a true entity. Hence matter is knowable quidditatively and intuitively by an Angel, and most of all by God, who could not create it unless He clearly and distinctly foreknew it. It is also knowable by us, indeed abstractively, but nevertheless directly, that is, by concepts terminating in matter itself as their proper and verifying object; for the concepts thus far enumerated concerning the essence and attributes of matter tend to nothing else. Nor

does it prevent this that in our present state it is known by us through species that are not proper but drawn from accidents which we sense. For the same occurs to us in the cognition of every substance, and proves only that the cognition is abstractive.

46. Nor does it prevent this that matter is essentially relative and therefore cannot be known except in relation to form. For it is one thing that a relative cannot be known without the term of the relation, and another that it cannot be truly and directly known. Indeed, it is then truly known as it is when it is known in order to its term. What, then, you ask, do Aristotle, St. Thomas, and others mean when they say that matter is not knowable by reason of itself, but only through form? Certainly St. Thomas, 1. p. q. 15, art. 3, ad 3, says: "Matter, according to itself, neither has being nor is knowable." There he also denies that matter has an idea in God distinct from the idea of the composite. And St. Augustine, 12, *Confessiones* cap. 5, advises that human thought endeavor either "to know matter by not knowing, or not to know it by knowing."

47. I answer: when matter is said to be unknowable according to itself or by reason of itself, the sense is exclusive, as though one said "by reason of itself alone" or "according to itself alone." For since its essence and metaphysical difference consists in a transcendental respect to form, as we showed above against the Scotists, it can never be known, even by an Angel or by God, while abstracting from such a respect and consequently without cognition of form as the term of the relation. I grant that the same must be said of form when it is known under the notion of "act"; but because form can also be known under the concept of the "first root" of the properties and operations of the composite, which concept is likewise proper to form and does not explain a respect to matter, there is greater reason for saying that matter is knowable only through form as through the term of a relation than conversely.

48. There is also another reason why matter is said to be unknowable by us except through form: because we cannot form a specific and distinctive concept of matter except by removing every form. For the concept of "first informable subject," or of "pure receptive potency," cannot otherwise be explained, as is evident from what has been said above. Form must therefore first be conceived in some way, so that matter may afterward be known through its removal. And this is what St. Augustine intends by the words cited, advising that matter be known "by not knowing," that is, by removing form in thought; and not known "by knowing," that is, that matter not be thought to be that object which is known to be form. Hence in the cited Book, cap. 6, he says: "True reason advised me to remove altogether every

vestige of form of whatever kind, if I wished to conceive what is wholly formless." And in *De natura boni* cap. 18, he says that "matter can scarcely be conceived through no species, but through privation of every species." St. Thomas does not deny an idea of matter, but holds that it is not distinct from the idea of the composite, because he thinks there is not one idea in God of the Whole and another of its parts when these cannot naturally exist separately. See St. Thomas, q. 3, *De veritate* ar. 5.

CHAPTER III.
Whether Prime Matter Has Its Own Existence?

1. Existence is called that reality through which any thing is formally and ultimately distinguished from nothing and from a merely possible thing; or, what comes to the same, through which it is formally placed outside its causes, through which it actually is in the nature of things, or through which it immediately and properly verifies the verb "is." Hence the "being" of a thing and the "existence" of a thing are taken for the same. That prime matter truly exists while it actually constitutes the composite is not in doubt. But whether it exists through a partial existence proper to itself and distinct from the existence of form is a famous question between the Thomists and the other Philosophers. For the Thomists contend that matter of itself has no existence, but exists in the composite through an existence borrowed from form, so that, although there are in the composite two essences or partial quiddities, one of matter and the other of form, nevertheless there is one single and simple existence, which, flowing from form, causes the entire composite to exist and at the same time renders matter and form existent. On the other hand, the Nominalists, Scotists, and Our Authors, with the Subtle and Excellent Doctors, to whom Aversa, Spinula, Murcia, and the others outside the Thomistic School adhere, defend that prime matter enjoys an existence proper to itself just as it enjoys an essence proper to itself. We willingly embrace this opinion.

§ 1. Certain Preliminary Points.

2. But before the proof, it must be noted, 1º, that no question at all remains at present if we choose to insist upon the absence of a real distinction between any essence and its existence, which Our Authors with the Scotists defend in Metaphysics. For if every essence, when actually produced, is its own existence by real identity, it evidently follows that matter, which according to all has its own essence, also has its own

existence. Nor should you be moved by what M. Manso here, q. 8, prolixly disputes to the contrary against the meaning of all, even the Thomists. For everything in his argument is founded upon the claim that the opinion identifying existence with the essence of things must be understood of actual essence, not potential essence, and consequently must not comprehend the essence of matter, which is only potential.

3. Do not, I say, be moved by this foundation. For the question concerning the identity of essence with existence undoubtedly speaks generally of any positive entity which is truly produced, truly brought forth by the power of causes, truly distinguished from nothing, and so placed among things that it is no longer in the state of mere possibility. All of these things most certainly belong to the essence of matter, however much it may be called "potential." Nor in that question do Authors, whether denying or affirming, understand anything else by the name "actual essence" than "an essence not merely possible." Hence they take "actuality" as opposed to "possibility," or "objective potency"; and in this sense the essence of matter is undoubtedly "actual." The things that Author objects, whether from reason or authority, will easily be dissolved from what will be said concerning the existence of matter.

4. Nevertheless, whatever may be true of this matter, at present we do not insist upon the general doctrine concerning the identity of essence with existence, since we have special arguments by which the proper existence of matter is proved while abstracting from its identity with essence, or even while allowing their distinction. And indeed that abstraction can be made, whatever Manso may say, q. 7, n. 22, is evident because nothing prevents the question from being framed in these terms: "Whether, abstracting from whether every essence is or is not its own existence, it can otherwise be proved that matter has an existence proper to itself?" But then, if I affirm it, you would ineptly object to me with arguments drawn from the distinction between essence and existence; for just as I waive my right of arguing from the identity, so it is fair that you waive whatever right you have from the distinction. But, that we may proceed more liberally, we freely allow or suppose for the present question a real distinction between essence and existence.

5. It must be noted, 2º, that there is a question among the Thomists whether prime matter has a metaphysical act. Some deny it, whom the Complutensian College, or M. Bayona, cites and follows, and to whom Manso and Aguilera also adhere; others affirm it, whom the Most Illustrious Palancus and Froylanus cite and follow. By the name "metaphysical act" not all understand the same thing; hence the dispute is in great part verbal, as

Bayona rightly notes. Commonly by this name is understood the essential difference by which a generic notion is contracted; because, just as genus in the metaphysical line is called "potency," so difference is called "act," at least if it is positive. In this sense there is no reason to deny matter a metaphysical act.

6. For the notion of an "incomplete substance," or the notion of a "part" and "intrinsic principle" of a natural Body, is a generic notion univocally common to matter and form, as will be evident to one who applies the conditions of Univocals taught in Logic. But it is contracted to matter by the notion of "first subject," which notion, although explained by us through negation of form, is certainly positive, since it consists in the physical aptitude to receive forms. Thus the difference "rational," by which the genus "animal" is contracted to Brute, is positive, although it is negatively signified. And it would be remarkable if a positive common notion were contracted by a pure negation, for it would then have to be really identified with it.

7. Nor does it prevent this that matter is "formlessness without any species," as St. Augustine says, and that "to lack every species is for it in place of species," as the Commentator says. For these statements are true of "species" taken for physical form, or for the species of complete Being; and that "lack" is taken fundamentally, namely, for the notion of "first subject," which grounds the absence of identity with every species, that is, every form. Nor does it prevent this that it is commonly said that species and metaphysical act are derived from physical form. For this has place in the species of composite and physically complete being. Likewise, it is commonly said that genus and metaphysical potency are taken from matter, and yet form does not lack generic predicates of incomplete being.

8. It must be noted, 3º, that the Thomists also disagree among themselves concerning the entitative act of matter. An entitative act, as Bayona explains, is that by which a thing which previously was nothing is now something; and such an act is twofold: one existential, namely, that by which a thing is placed outside its causes; the other essential, namely, that by which a thing, insofar as distinguished from existence, is actually a being, an actual reality, and an actual subject in which existence is received. Thus he speaks. But this difference between entitative acts, essential and existential, is not easy to grasp. For how can that act by which a thing is actually a being and an actual reality be other than the act by which a thing is placed outside its causes? The same difficulty arises if, with others, an entitative act is said to be that which answers to objective potency. Nevertheless, several Thomists cited by Bayona, while rejecting existential

act, grant an entitative act to matter; and the same seems to be the opinion of those who acknowledge a certain vital and initial being in matter prior to form, as we shall see later. Others, however, whom Bayona cites and follows, deny matter an entitative act. We need not treat this question separately, because it scarcely differs from the question concerning the existence of matter; once this is proved, no Thomist will doubt concerning its entitative act.

§ 2. The Proper Existence of Matter Is Proved from the Ground of Priority.

9. The first proof of our opinion is taken from the priority of nature by which matter truly precedes form, for example, the form of fire, as its true material cause, and is understood as unformed at the prior sign, as all agree. Hence the argument proceeds thus. Matter at the sign prior to form truly exists; but not through the existence of form. Therefore it exists through an existence proper to itself. The consequence is sound even among the Thomists; and the Minor is evident, because at that sign neither the existence of the previously possessed form, for example, the wooden form, nor the existence of the form to be produced at that instant, is understood as already possessed. Not the first, because the existences of the forms of wood and fire would be joined at the same instant, which is naturally impossible. Not the second, because the existence of a form cannot be understood at a sign at which the form itself is not yet understood; and otherwise matter would receive the existence of the form before the form itself, and the form would be the effect of its own existence.

10. The Major is therefore proved in several ways. 1º Matter precedes form as its true material cause. Therefore it precedes as existent. The consequence is proved: it belongs to the notion of a true physical cause, such as the material cause is, that the existence of the effect essentially depend upon and arise from it. But the existence of an effect cannot essentially arise from something which does not prepossess existence, as is evident from the example of the efficient cause. Therefore, etc. If you say with the Thomists that an efficient cause must preexist because it is destined to give "being" to its effect, but not so the material cause, which rather tends to receive "being," you will be attacked from Fr. Peynado, because material cause agrees univocally with efficient cause in the notion of cause defined by St. Thomas, as Lerma, Prado, Froylanus, and other Thomists maintain; nor does the Complutensian College dissent, q. 9, ar. 1, § 2, and q. 10, ar. 1, § 1,

establishing that the notion of cause at least truly and properly belongs to the material cause.

11. But it belongs to the notion of a cause properly so called to be destined to give "being" to its effect. This is proved from St. Thomas, both in 2, *Physica* lect. 10, where he says that a Cause is that "upon which the being of another follows," and in Opusc. 31, where he says: "Cause is said only of that principle from which the being of something posterior follows"; and immediately adds: "Hence it is said that a cause is that from whose being another follows." In the same place he teaches that when something is moved from whiteness to blackness, whiteness is a principle of that motion but is not a true cause, because "whiteness is not that from whose being the being of something posterior follows." He therefore plainly holds that every true cause is so destined to give "being" to its effect that this "being" is posterior and follows from the "being" of the cause. Therefore not only the efficient but also the material cause necessarily has "being" prior to the effect.

12. 2º Matter at the sign prior to form terminates the creative action of God. Therefore it exists. The consequence is proved both because "Every action of an active potency terminates in being," as St. Thomas teaches, q. 1, *De potentia* ar. 3, corp.; and because creation is the production of a thing from nothing. Therefore that which terminates creation has already receded from nothing, and consequently excludes its own "non-being"; but this is certainly excluded only through "being." It is also proved because every efficient cause communicates existence to its effects and therefore, according to all, must prepossess existence lest otherwise it give what it does not have. But through creative action God exercises the function of efficient cause with respect to matter. Therefore He communicates existence to matter through such an action. Finally, because that which actually terminates creation is actually produced and placed in the nature of things, and is no longer in objective potency, nor in the state of possibility, nor within the power of its cause. But who could conceive these things as verified of a thing not yet existing?

13. 3º Affirmative propositions with a third element of predication, importing a positive, contingent, physical, and inhering predicate, are verified of matter at the prior sign, for example: "Matter is actually produced, is proximately capable of receiving form, is locally applied to the extrinsic agent." But propositions of this kind require the existence of the subject, so that from them a proposition with a second element of predication is rightly inferred, for example, "Matter is proximately capable.

Therefore matter is," as all Logicians and Philosophers suppose. Therefore, etc.

14. 4º Matter at the prior sign desires form, requires and renders naturally due to itself the concurrence of God as Author of nature by which it receives the complement of form; it is also known by God through the science of vision. But these things cannot stand without actual existence. For natural appetite and requirement, to which the concurrence of God is due, do not belong to non-existent things, because what does not yet exist requires nothing. Likewise, the science of vision terminates only in the existence of things, in distinction from the science of simple intelligence, as is certain among Theologians. 5º Finally, the subject of accidents must preexist according to the Thomists. But matter at the sign prior to the form of fire is the subject of an accident. Therefore, etc. The Minor is proved: because matter at that prior sign receives, or is proximately capable of receiving, "passion," since this is the causality by which matter materially and passively causes form; but "passion" is an accident according to the Thomists.

15. The Thomists, whom the Complutensian Carmelites and M. Froylanus follow, commonly answer, 1º, that matter at the sign prior to form does not exist in completed being; nevertheless it exists in the process of becoming, while coming to be, and while entering into existence, because it is as though on the way and tending toward existence. And although it is outside the efficient cause, it is not yet outside all its causes, since it is not yet outside the formal cause, namely, form. Hence, according to this doctrine, matter at the prior sign is neither in a state of possibility nor yet in a state of existence, but in a certain middle state between something and nothing, by virtue of which it already begins to recede from nothing but has not yet arrived at something. Bayona and Palancus forcefully attack this answer. And if anyone considers the matter rightly, it is abundantly refuted by a repetition of our proofs, since all in fact prove existence properly so called, or completed existence.

16. Moreover, it is rejected, 1º, because matter at the sign prior to form not only inchoatively but altogether terminates creative action, which certainly does not terminate in material form, since the latter is generated, not created. Nor is God understood as inchoatively creating matter, but rather as fully exercising every active influence which can terminate in matter, since there remains only the generation or eduction of form, which does not terminate in matter. Matter, therefore, already has whatever an efficient and creating cause gives to its effects. But the function of an efficient cause, and especially of a creating cause, is to give existence to its

effects, as St. Thomas teaches everywhere and no one denies. Therefore, etc. But that matter at the prior sign is not outside its formal cause is gratuitously asserted. For matter does not properly have a formal cause in the physical line; otherwise it would consequently have a material cause and would be composed of matter and form. And whatever may be true of this, it is plainly contradictory that an efficient cause should have fulfilled its function concerning some entity and yet not have given it existence.

17. They say that the creation of matter at the sign prior to form is an incomplete and, as it were, suspended action until it is completed through the production of form and of its existence. But against this: either the creation of matter has another effect besides matter itself, or it does not. If the first, such effect will be the form or the existence of the form; hence one or both will be denominated "created," and since it is otherwise "educed," it will simultaneously be educed and created, and will simultaneously be produced from something and from nothing, which is absurd. If the second, then such creation fully obtains its entire effect at the prior sign. How, therefore, will it be a suspended and incomplete action? Otherwise: that creation terminates in some existence, unless St. Thomas falsely said that "Every action of an active potency terminates in being." But it does not terminate in the existence of the form unless the latter is absurdly said to be simultaneously educed and created. Therefore it terminates in the proper existence of matter.

18. It is rejected, 2º, because that inchoative and transitional "being" is already some actuality in the line of being, since by virtue of it matter is no longer in pure objective potency and this potency is already in some way reduced to act. But the Thomistic arguments drawn from the fact that matter is pure potency are equally applicable to an actuality of this kind. 3º Because no middle is given between contradictories; but "being and non-being, something and nothing" are contradictory from the very terms. St. Thomas also teaches this, 2, *Contra Gentiles* c. 19, n. 2, saying: "Between being and non-being, which are as the extremes of creation, there can be no middle." 4º Because a real "being" which has no contradictory is impossible. But such would be that intermediate "being," for neither nothing nor something would be its contradictory, because what is intermediate between two extremes is contradictorily opposed to neither. 5º Because that inchoative "being" is placed in matter at the sign prior to form so that form may not be said to be produced from nothing. But if that "being" is not nothing in such a way that it is not yet truly and properly something, form will be said just as truly not to be made from something as not to be made from nothing; consequently it will be neither educed nor created.

19. The College of St. Thomas, or M. Bayona, answers, 2º, that matter at the sign prior to form is understood to exist through the existence of the very form which it precedes, because it precedes it by a priority, not "in which," but "from which." Priority "in which," according to him, is an order between two things, one of which so implies the other that it can be understood without it. In this sense the Sun is prior to illumination because it can be understood without being understood as actually illuminating. Priority "from which" is an order between two things, one of which implies the other in such a way that it cannot be understood without it. In this way the Father in the Trinity is prior to the Son, without whom He cannot be understood at any sign; and the free act of God, as also the science of vision, is a cause prior to a created effect from which it cannot be abstracted. Matter therefore precedes form and its existence only by priority "from which," because it cannot be abstracted from the existence of form. Hence at the prior sign it is already understood with that existence and is rendered existent through it. Nor does it follow from this that the existence of form is the cause of form, because it is not understood at the sign of the cause as the formal reason of causing, for this reason is the entity of matter alone, but as a condition necessarily concomitant so that matter may be proximately capable of causing. Nor does it follow that existence precedes form, because it is a mere condition depending upon the form itself; and a condition dependent upon the effect, although understood at the sign of the cause, does not precede the effect.

20. This doctrine greatly displeases other Thomists and is therefore forcefully opposed by Froylanus and Palancus. For the present it will be sufficiently attacked thus. Matter at the prior sign is understood as abstracting from form and its existence. Therefore it precedes with priority "in which," as this is explained by Bayona. The antecedent is proved, 1º: "Unformed matter precedes form, not in duration but in nature," as St. Thomas often teaches, for example, 1, p. q. 66, ar. 4. Therefore matter at the prior sign is understood as "unformed." But it is contradictory that it be understood as "unformed" without being abstracted from form. Therefore, etc. Or otherwise: matter precedes "unformed"; but not with privative formlessness. Therefore with precisive formlessness. In this precisive sense St. Augustine, 12, *Confessiones*, often says that the World was formed from unformed matter; for example, cap. 15: "There was," he says, "unformed material, where, because of the absence of every form, there was no order"; and cap. 19: "It is true that everything which is formed from something unformed is first unformed and afterward formed."

21. The antecedent is proved, 2º: there is no less reason for matter to be abstracted from form than for the Sun from illumination. Proof: the more indifferent a cause is to its effect, the more it abstracts from the effect at the prior sign; hence where a cause is indifferent to various effects, it abstracts from them at the prior sign with complete precision, as is evident in the free potency of the Will. But matter is more indifferent to forms than the Sun to illumination; for the Sun is connected with a determinate species of illumination, whereas matter, although connected vaguely with some form, is altogether indifferent to various species of forms. Therefore, etc.

22. 3º At the origin of the World, the form of earth, for example, was educed from matter then first created, or at least could have been, as Bayona admits. But then matter at the sign prior to form and to all dispositions is understood as created by God and as not merely possible but existent; nor does it require at that sign this form rather than another, but only that the concurrence of God be due to it for vaguely receiving some form. Bayona grants all these things here, q. 3, ar. 5, n. 173, Edit. 2. Now thus: matter at that prior sign is not understood to exist through the existence of form. Therefore it exists through its own existence. The antecedent is proved: first, not through the existence of a determinate form; nor, moreover, through an indeterminate and vague existence. Therefore, etc. The Major is evident, because it is contradictory that matter be understood as indifferent to vaguely receiving some form at a sign at which it is already understood with the existence of a determinate form, as is clear of itself and in a thousand obvious examples, for example, at the sign of liberty toward love and hatred, or even in the examples produced by Bayona for his priority "from which." The Minor is then evident because it is equally contradictory that in reality and at a real sign there be a vague existence of form which is determinately neither this nor that, and is proper neither to earth nor to fire, etc.; for there would then be some vague individual in reality.

23. Therefore the examples alleged in the answer are of little relevance and, as Froylanus says, "do not bear upon the matter proposed." This is so both because the most difficult mysteries of Theology are ineptly invoked in order to explain the priority of matter, and because we have sufficiently proved that priority "in which" must be granted to matter. Moreover, the doctrine of the answer involves a contradiction in terms. For how can form, or its existence, be a condition required on the part of the cause so that that very form or existence may be caused, unless it is said to be the cause and effect of itself? You will say with Bayona that this is rightly reconciled through mutual priority in different genera; for existence is the effect of

form in the genus of formal cause and at the same time is a condition of concurrence in the genus of material cause so that the form may be caused.

24. But against this, 1º: therefore existence already precedes form, which Bayona denied above at n. 19. Against this, 2º: the form itself will likewise be a condition so that it itself may be caused, because according to the Adversary it is preceded by matter only with priority "from which"; and matter cannot be understood as existent at the prior sign unless it is understood as informed, lest otherwise it exist before being outside its formal cause and have ultimate act before first act, which the Thomists abhor. Indeed, it must be understood as informed before it is understood as existent, because existence, according to the Thomists, is not communicated to matter except through form. Therefore form is first understood as informing matter before it is caused by matter. But form as actually informing has already been educed. Therefore it is first understood as educed before being caused by matter, which is manifestly contrary to the concept of eduction. Certainly form is not efficiently caused before it is materially caused, because action and passion are really identified according to the common opinion of the Thomists. The same argument applies to the existence of form, which likewise will be a condition so that it itself may be caused by matter, and indeed in the same genus of material cause. Against this, 3º: existence, according to the Thomists, is caused by form in the genus of material cause, since it is received in form as in a sustentative subject. Therefore, if in the same genus it is a condition so that form may be caused, there is already mutual priority in the same genus of cause.

25. Palancus answers, 3º, that matter at the sign prior to form does not terminate creative action, because matter and form are not produced by diverse actions but by one action, which with respect to matter is creation and with respect to form and to the composite formally is, or can be, generation. "No action," he says, "is given terminating in matter which does not first and more immediately terminate in form." Hence matter at that prior sign does not exist, because it is not yet understood as produced and has nothing more than before its creation; it has only its quidditative predicates, like possible man, and is in a state of precision from being actually a being and being nothing, with indifference to either, without grounding any right or having any requirement for form, unless perhaps by reason of an existence preceding in time, if it had such an existence. In sum, at the sign prior to form matter is only in objective potency and merely possible, "merely" being taken precisively from being and non-being, from being produced and not being produced. These and other similar things Palancus teaches here in scattered places, quaest. 7.

26. But, besides departing from the common doctrine of the Thomists, this is attacked, 1º, because since matter is truly and properly the cause of form, and every true physical cause is that upon whose "being" the "being" of its effect follows, as St. Thomas taught us above, it is necessary that matter first have "being" before form. 2º Because matter precedes form with priority of nature, since this priority belongs to every real cause according to Palancus, Lib. 2, q. 2. Therefore matter so precedes that it is not in objective potency and in pure possibility or indifference as to whether it be produced or not. The consequence is proved both because priority of nature "is a real precedence in being," as Palancus says, lib. 2, q. 4, n. 6; but precedence in objective potency alone is not precedence in being. Therefore, etc. Also because "priority of nature, beyond the notion of principle, requires that the thing principled depend in being upon its principle," as the same Palancus says, cit. l. 2, q. 2, n. 8; but form does not depend in its being upon merely possible matter. Therefore, etc. Also because matter otherwise precedes form than form precedes itself; but form and every created entity precedes itself in objective potency and with indifference as to whether it be produced or not, without therefore preceding itself with priority of nature. Therefore, etc. Finally, because priority and posteriority of nature consist in one thing being produced in dependence upon another thing produced through another action, as we shall say in tract. 2.

27. It is attacked, 3º: if the production of matter and form is always one action, and this action terminates first and more immediately in form than in matter, it follows, 1º, that the material form is understood as produced before matter ceases to be nothing. Therefore in that priority the material form is understood as produced, not from something but from nothing, or at least from something abstracting from both. Therefore it is understood as created, or certainly not as educed, since eduction is from something presupposed. For clarity, let the discussion concern the production of a worm from corrupted Eucharistic species. Then matter is not presupposed as produced before form, either with priority of time or priority of nature, but waits in objective potency until its first production terminates first and more immediately in form. This production therefore renders form produced before it can be verified of matter that it is something presupposed. Therefore it is rather a creation of form than generation or eduction.

28. It follows, 2º, that the same action, if it is simultaneously the eduction of form and the creation of matter, simultaneously depends and does not really depend upon matter as a presupposed subject; and since it exercises the function of eduction with respect to form before the function

of creation with respect to matter, it will first be dependent and afterward independent. But this both involves a contradiction in terms and furnishes an occasion for saying that the rational soul really depends upon matter insofar as it is sensitive, although it does not depend upon matter insofar as it is intellective. It follows, 3º, that whenever a new form is produced there is a preservative creation of matter. Therefore creation is always intermixed with the works of nature, which is contrary to the express doctrine of St. Thomas, 1, p. q. 45, art. 8.

29. Finally, it is attacked from St. Augustine, lib. 12, *Confessiones*, where he teaches that matter at the sign prior to form is so unformed that nevertheless it is already not nothing. "Did You not, O Lord, teach me," he says, cap. 3, "that before You formed and distinguished this unformed matter, it was... not altogether nothing?" Explaining this more fully in cap. 6, he sets forth the imperfection of matter in that state or prior sign by this antithesis of words: "If it could be said, 'nothing is something and is not,' this is what I would call it." And immediately he adds: "And yet it already was somehow, so that it might receive these visible and composite species." He continues in the following cap. 7: "And whence was it somehow, unless it were from You, from whom are all things insofar as they are?" Matter, therefore, before it received form, already somehow was and was from God, from whom all things are. Therefore it terminated creation at the sign prior to form. Cap. 8 agrees, saying of matter: "It was almost nothing, because it was still altogether unformed; yet it already was that which could be formed." And cap. 15: "And yet this almost nothing, insofar as it was not altogether nothing, was surely from Him from whom is whatever is that is somehow something." Cap. 19 has the words related above at n. 20. Finally, cap. 29: "And certainly something unformed can exist; but what does not exist cannot be formed. Thus matter is prior to that which is made from it." Here is our argument expressly stated by Augustine: matter at the sign prior to form is proximately capable of being formed; but what does not exist cannot be formed. Therefore matter at that prior sign already is.

§ 3. Other Proofs of Our Opinion.

30. Let the first be this: prime matter is ingenerable and incorruptible, as no one denies. But it could be generated and corrupted if it existed through the existence of form. Therefore, etc. The Minor is proved: that whose existence is generated and corrupted is subject to generation and corruption. But the existence of matter is generated and corrupted if it is the very existence of material form, since this begins through generation and

ceases through corruption. Therefore, etc. The Thomists answer that the first existence of matter is produced through creation at the origin of the World; but afterward, although matter exists through a generated existence, it is not generated, because when, for example, a horse is generated, matter does not pass from non-being to being, as is required for generation, but only passes from one being to another, namely, from the existence of one form to the existence of another. They say the same of corruption, namely, that matter is not corrupted when the horse dies, because it does not pass from being to non-being, but to another being.

31. But against this, 1º: therefore, if the first existence of matter is generated, matter will properly be generated. But matter, if it exists through the existence of form, can receive its first existence through generation. Therefore it is properly generable. The Minor is proved both because at the origin of the World the forms of the Elements could have been educed, according to the common opinion of the Thomists, which Bayona and Froylanus hold; but then the existence of the form would have been generated and would have been the first existence of matter. It is also proved because in the production of a worm after the corruption of the Eucharistic species, matter is then first produced and begins to exist through the existence of the form of the worm. But this form with its existence is undoubtedly made through generation. Therefore matter already receives its first being by virtue of a generating secondary cause. Nor perhaps should you say, according to the opinion of Palancus, that the existence of form is not generable or producible by a created agent insofar as it is the existence of matter, but only insofar as it is the existence of form and of the composite formally. Do not, I say, say this, both because the generator gives matter form and causes matter to be in act and to be outside its formal cause, which is to give it existence according to Thomistic principles, and because it follows that a simple existence is simultaneously educed and created: educed insofar as it is of form, created insofar as it is of matter. It therefore simultaneously presupposes and does not really presuppose matter as its subject and cause.

32. Against this, 2º: therefore at least through generation matter receives from natural agents a continued series of existences by which it is preserved in the nature of things. Therefore natural agents properly preserve matter in the nature of things. For just as the cause that first communicates existence to a thing first produces it, so the cause or agent from which continued existence proceeds preserves the thing. But the absurdity of the consequence is evident, because it belongs to the same power to preserve as to produce in the first place, since preservation is continued production; and

the preservation of an ingenerable thing, just like its first production, is beyond the powers of natural agents, as is seen in the preservation of an Angel or a rational soul.

33. If, because of these arguments, it be said that for a thing properly to be generated it is not enough that it receive existence from the generator unless it also receive essence or quiddity, whereas the latter is given to matter not by the generator but by God through creation, against this, 1º: an ingenerable essence necessarily corresponds to an ingenerable existence, as is evident from the example of an Angel or rational soul. Against this, 2º: according to St. Thomas, q. 3, *De potentia* art. 5, ad 2, "By the very fact that being is bestowed upon a quiddity, not only being but the quiddity itself is said to be created." Therefore, if "being" is bestowed upon the quiddity of matter through generation, not only its "being" but the quiddity itself will be said to be generated. Against this, 3º: through the production of its essence alone matter is not ultimately determined to be, since it is still understood as in a transitional state and in becoming, as the Thomists say. Therefore the ultimate determinant by which matter truly is in the nature of things, for example, in the cases of n. 31, is the generated existence of form. Therefore matter is properly generated. This consequence is proved: man is properly generated, although neither matter nor soul is generated, precisely because the union is generated, which is the ultimate formal determinant by which man is in the nature of things. Therefore, if the ultimate determinant by which matter is is generated, matter too will properly be generated.

34. Let the second proof be this: if matter does not exist except through the existence of form, a case will be possible in which something is first created and begins to exist without any existence being newly produced; for example, if God forms a man from matter now first produced and from a soul created long before. For then matter would begin to exist through the existence of the soul, which was not newly produced. Likewise a case will be possible in which something is annihilated without any existence ceasing; for example, if God separates from matter all forms actually existing and preserves them separate, as He can according to the Thomists, while producing no other form. For then matter will be annihilated, since according to the Thomists it cannot even by Divine power be preserved without form, and yet no existence will cease from the nature of things. But each case is impossible. This is so both because for a thing first to exist is for it first to exclude its "non-being," that is, the absence of its own existence, which consequently is then first placed among things; and similarly for a thing to be annihilated is for it to be placed under the contradictory of its existence, which therefore must cease. It is also because existence is the

ultimate formal determination by which a thing is; and a determination of this kind cannot stand without the thing which it determines. Otherwise an action could stand without an agent, or a location without a body.

35. If you say that in these cases the union of matter with the existence of form ceases, I reply against you: either that union exists through the existence of form or through its own existence. If the first, the same argument presses in the union itself, which likewise will begin and cease to exist without any existence beginning or ceasing. If the second, besides the fact that union is not distinguished from the extremes according to the more common opinion of the Thomists, there will already be in the composite not one existence but several, which greatly displeases the Thomists.

36. Let the third proof be this: if matter exists through the existence of material form, matter will truly and properly be the cause of itself. But this is regarded by all as absurd. Therefore, etc. The Major is proved: that which is for itself the cause of being is the cause of itself. But matter, if it exists through the existence of material form, is truly and properly for itself the cause of being. Therefore, etc. The Minor is proved because it is truly and properly the cause of its own "being," or existence, through which it itself exists; for it causes the existence of the form in the same way in which it causes the form, and it truly and properly causes the latter. But what is truly the cause of its own "being" is truly for itself the cause of being. And indeed matter will be able to cause even its first "being," by which it begins to exist, namely, in the cases of n. 31. The fourth proof can be taken from the authority of St. Thomas; but we shall give it in the following chapter while solving the arguments.

CHAPTER IV.

Contrary Arguments Are Solved.

1. It is objected 1º: Prime matter is ″pure potency,″ as philosophers commonly say; but pure potency has no act. Therefore, since existence is act, prime matter has no existence of itself. The minor premise is proved. First, because if potency has an admixture of actuality, it is no longer ″pure.″ Second, because God, since He is ″pure act,″ has no potentiality; therefore likewise that which is ″pure potency″ has no act. Before giving the solution, an explanation must be given of the terms ″act″ and ″potency,″ than which nothing occurs more frequently in this question.

2. Potency, so far as concerns the present matter, is either active, objective, or passive, that is, receptive and informable. Active potency is the power of producing something; and this of itself does not imply

imperfection, and therefore is found supremely in God. Objective potency, otherwise called logical, is the non-repugnance of a thing to existing, which is also called ″intrinsic possibility.″ It is called ″objective″ either because it is the object of active potency, or because it is that which is set before the mind when we conceive that a non-existing thing can exist. Passive potency, that is, receptive and informable potency, is a capacity for receiving some complement under those conditions which we explained concerning the name ″subject,″ chap. 2, from n. 8. This is commonly called ″potentiality,″ and of itself implies imperfection.

3. Act is taken 1º for the ″determination″ by which any potency is exercised according to its function. And thus its own act corresponds to each potency; and while the potency is exercised and attains its term, it is said to be ″reduced to act″ and to be ″in second act,″ whereas prior to that it is said to be ″in first act.″ Therefore the act corresponding to objective potency is existence; to active potency, the effect or its production; to receptive potency, form as received, that is, as informing, or information, that is, reception. 2º ″Act″ is taken as equivalent to ″perfection.″ And in this sense, according to the doctrine of the Excellent Doctor, disp. 13. *Metaph.* sect. 5, n. 7, ″act″ is twofold: one relative, the other absolute. A ″relative″ act, which is also called actuating, formal, and perfective act, is one that regards some subject to be perfected; thus form is the act of matter. An ″absolute″ act is one that has its perfection in itself without being ordered to perfect any subject; thus God is called act.

4. Each of these acts is subdivided. For a ″relative″ act is either a physical act, namely a physical form, whether substantial or accidental; or a metaphysical act, under which name comes the essential difference of each thing, and also existence, because existence is either distinguished from the subject only by reason, or, if it adds something really distinct, its consideration belongs not properly to Physics but to Metaphysics. For since ″being is the actuality of all things,″ as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3 and q. 5, a. 1, corp., it extends no less widely than ″being,″ and therefore pertains to the consideration of that science to which being as such belongs. The same is commonly said of subsistence.

5. Likewise an ″absolute″ act is either called an act without qualification, namely one so perfect in the genus of substance that it neither involves a perfective physical act nor awaits one by which it may be actuated; and thus God and an Angel are such. The other is an act in a qualified respect, namely one which has some true actuality insofar as it is actually outside nothing, but nevertheless needs a relative physical act by which it may be completed in the genus of substance. In this sense prime matter is an act according to

our position, and also according to those Thomists who grant matter an entitative act.

6. I now answer the objection: prime matter is pure potency, not in every line, but only in the line of passive and receptive potency for a relative and physical substantial act, which henceforth for brevity I shall call the ″physical line,″ so that it may be distinguished from the metaphysical and objective, or logical, line. It is not, I say, pure potency in every line, because it is not pure objective potency; otherwise it would be merely possible, or sheer nothing. Therefore it has the act corresponding to objective potency, namely existence. It is therefore pure potency only in the physical line, because matter neither is a physical form nor includes one in its quiddity, but its whole essence, even metaphysically considered, consists in physically receptive, that is, informable potency, as we explained in chap. 2. Those Thomists too must use this distinction who grant matter a metaphysical or entitative act, or transitional being and being in becoming, which is some actuality, at least inchoate, as we noted in the preceding chapter, n. 18.

7. Accordingly, the Peripatetics call matter pure potency in order to exclude the errors of those who held the prime matter of generable things to be a complete substance, such as air, water, etc.; and also of those who said that all forms actually lie hidden within matter and are drawn out of it as from a case. These errors are sufficiently excluded by asserting that matter is ″pure″ receptive potency, that is, an incomplete substance, not mixed with any physical act, but ordered to it; although it is not so ″pure″ as not to possess those actualities of the metaphysical line which are necessary for sustaining the reality of receptive potency in the physical line, created by God and placed outside nothing. For, as they say, ″An exclusive expression does not remove concomitants.″

8. Nor does that comparison of pure potency with pure Act stand in the way. It holds insofar as, just as pure Act excludes every receptive potency, so pure potency excludes from its own identity every formal physical act. In other respects, even our adversaries must admit that the parity does not hold. First, because God is pure act in such a way that He requires no potentiality for Himself and admits none, but rather essentially excludes it, not only as identified with Him but even as united to Him. But the pure potency of matter does not stand in this way with respect to act, since it admits and requires union with form and its existence. Second, because God is pure Act in such a way that He lacks no perfection and goodness. But matter is not pure potency in such a way as to be devoid of all goodness and perfection; otherwise it would be devoid of all entity, since ″being and good″ are convertible. One may say: Pure potency is supremely distant from pure

Act. I distinguish: it is supremely distant by a negative distance, such as that between God and nothing, I deny; by a positive distance, that is, of being from being, I grant, so far as concerns God; for on the part of the created extreme, quantity, for example, is more distant from God than matter.

9. It is replied 1º: God is not called pure active potency, although He includes no second act of this potency; nor is form called pure act, although it includes no matter. Therefore the fact that matter includes no form is not sufficient for it to be called pure potency, unless it is also devoid of every actuality of every line. 2º Being is divided into act and potency; but the dividing members do not participate in one another; therefore that being which is potency, especially pure potency, participates in no act. 3º Prime matter, according to Aristotle, is potency in natural things just as bronze or wood is in artificial things; but bronze or wood is pure potency in such a way that of itself it has absolutely no act and no proper being in the artificial line. Therefore, etc.

10. I answer 1º: God is not called pure active potency because this would signify that no other perfection exists in God than that which is formally expressed by the concept of active potency; and this is false, for God is not only omnipotent but also infinitely actual, wise, etc. Conversely, since the whole essence of matter consists in the notion of a first subject and it has no other perfection than what is necessary for that function, it is rightly called pure receptive potency. Form can be called pure act in the physically informative substantial line, but it is not called absolutely and without qualification ″pure act,″ because by this name there is usually denoted a being most actual, lacking every potentiality and imperfection of every line, and this is God alone. We say the same of matter, namely that it is not pure potency by a potentiality excluding the actuality of every line, but only of the physical line.

11. To 2º: From the same premises one could equally conclude absurdly as follows: Therefore form, which is act, participates in no potency, neither active potency for operations nor receptive potency for them; therefore the rational soul is neither active nor receptive with respect to intellection. That division of being can therefore be understood 1º into purely actual being and somehow potential being, that is, into God and creature, which is always in some respect potential. 2º Into being actually existing and being merely possible, that is, in logical potency; in which sense matter already produced belongs to the first member. 3º Into act and potency corresponding to one another; in which sense potency of itself does not participate in the act, namely that act for which it is potency. And this is indeed verified in prime matter.

12. To the third reply: That comparison is appropriate, both to explain the indifference of prime matter to any natural form, and to establish that matter is in potency to physical forms in such a way as to possess none of them of itself. Nevertheless, it is evident that the parity does not hold in all respects. Otherwise, just as bronze or wood has of itself no artificial essence, terminates no action of the artisan, requires no artificial form, and can naturally lack all of them, so prime matter would have no natural essence, would terminate no action of the Creator, would desire or require no form, and could naturally be deprived of them all. Thomists certainly reject these consequences as absurd.

13. It is objected 2º: If matter has its own existence, matter and form will be two beings in act. But "from two beings in act there cannot be made one in itself," if the ancient axiom taken from Aristotle has any force. Therefore from matter and form there cannot be constituted a substantial composite, which is one in itself. For the solution, observe that something is called "one in itself" either because it is really simple and indivisible, for example the nature of an Angel; or, if it has parts, because none of them is altogether perfect and consummated in its genus or Predicament, but those parts are mutually ordered so that through a natural intimate union one completes and consummates the other in its genus. Thus a man and every substantial composite is said to be "one in itself" in the genus of substance. Thus also heat of eight degrees is said to be "one in itself" in the genus of quality, because the degrees of intensity, especially if they are heterogeneous, are mutually ordered so that through their natural union there results heat consummated in its genus. Conversely, when one thing is composed of parts of diverse genera or Predicaments, for example substance and accident; or of parts of the same genus, some or all of which are already complete in that genus from another source, for example a heap of stones; or even of parts which are not mutually ordered to natural union with one another, for example if a heap were made of the forms of a horse, lion, dog, etc., then it is called "accidentally one." See the Excellent Doctor, disp. 4, *Metaph.* sect. 3.

14. I now answer the objection: One in itself cannot be made from two beings in complete act, that is, each of which is consummated in some genus, for example in the genus of substance, as a man and a horse are; because that which supervenes after such consummation is said to supervene accidentally. It can and must, however, be made from two beings in incomplete act, namely each of which truly exists and is something actual in reality, yet in such a way that one needs the complement of the other for its perfection in the genus of substance. The reason is: First, because a positive one in itself cannot be constituted from nothing and a being in act,

nor from two beings in pure objective potency and not yet produced. Therefore it must be constituted from two beings already produced and truly placed in the act corresponding to objective potency. Second, because although existence is one, as the Thomists maintain, it nevertheless truly renders matter and form existing, and these are two beings. Therefore even on their account the composite is made from two beings truly existing and consequently in act.

15. Again, generally speaking, it is not contrary to the notion of "one in itself" that it result from several beings in act. For a continuous integral whole is one in itself, although each of its parts is in act. Likewise an intense, or even extended, quality is called "one in itself in the genus of quality," although it consists of parts each of which is an act, that is, a form. Finally, the objection is pressed against the entitative or metaphysical act which many Thomists acknowledge in matter. If they say that this act does not belong to the physical line, to which form belongs, we say the same.

16. Against this solution the Thomists, especially Bayona and Palancus, rise sharply. They reply 1º: If matter by reason of itself is a being in act, there is no reason why it should not be in complete act; therefore it cannot constitute one in itself with a supervening form. The antecedent is proved 1º because that is completely a being in act which lacks nothing in order absolutely to be a being in act. But matter, if it has its own existence, lacks nothing in order absolutely to be a being in act. 2º Because that is complete in the being of being which has the ultimate entitative act, by which name existence is signified. 3º Because a thing exists in the manner in which it is produced; but matter, if it is in act through its own existence, is completely produced; therefore it completely exists. The minor premise is proved because production is complete when nothing further remains to be produced in order that the effect may be absolutely in reality. But the production of matter, if it terminates at its existence, leaves nothing further to be produced in order that matter may be absolutely among things.

17. I answer by denying the antecedent. For something is not said to be in complete act without qualification and absolutely unless it has all the actualities and complements naturally due to it in its genus. But matter, although by reason of itself it truly exists, does not have all the complements due to it in the genus of substance until it has form. An example is found in the rational soul, which by reason of itself exists and is a being in act even while separated from the body, and yet is not in complete act because it does not have all its complements in the genus of substance. This example must be kept before one's eyes in order clearly to understand all the proofs of the argument. Nor should one say with Bayona that form does not exist "as that

which," but only "as that by which," that is, that it does not so much exist as it is that by which the composite exists. For I ask: What does it mean to exist "as that which"? If it signifies being that which is rendered truly and properly existing, then certainly the soul of St. Peter exists "as that which." But if it signifies being that which exists after the manner of a composite, I admit that the soul does not exist "as that which," because it is not a whole but a part. But what follows from this? Nor do we maintain that matter exists in this sense "as that which."

18. To the first proof: Matter lacks nothing in order to be a being in entitative act, that is, in the act corresponding to objective potency. Yet it lacks something in order to be a being in formal physical act, which corresponds to receptive potency in the physical line. Therefore it can be called a being in act absolutely, that is, truly and properly; but not absolutely in the sense of consummately. Let the rational soul, as just mentioned, be the example. To 2º: What has the ultimate entitative act is complete in the being of being insofar as this is distinguished from non-being, that is, from nothing; yet it is not thereby complete in the being of being insofar as possessing every perfection due to it in the genus of substance. In this sense prime matter is not complete of itself, just as neither is the separated rational soul.

19. Existence is called the ultimate entitative act because in it the objective potency of every entity, whether partial or total, is terminated; and because the essential differences of things, both lowest and subalternate, are in some manner entitative acts prior to existence, since they are verified of things in the state of possibility. In other respects, it is not existence but subsistence that is called the ultimate act in the substantial line. Existence, however, since it is a transcendental act, is rather the first act and more intimate to every being. "Being itself," says St. Thomas, q. 3, *De potentia*, a. 7, corp., "is the most common effect, the first and more intimate than all other effects." Hence in every actuatable subject, existence must be understood before any other substantial or accidental act.

20. To 3º, I distinguish the minor premise: it is completely produced by the complement of objective potency, I grant; by the complement of receptive physical potency, I deny the minor premise; and I likewise distinguish the consequence. To the proof of the minor premise: the production of matter leaves nothing further to be produced in order that matter may be in reality absolutely, that is, truly and properly according to its partial being. Yet it does require something further in order that matter may be in things absolutely, that is, consummately in the genus of substance. Thus the creation of matter is called an incomplete production

terminatively, not because it awaits another term besides the essence and existence of matter, for otherwise it would have form, or its existence, for its term, and this would be both created and educed; but because it produces a term incomplete in the genus of substance. In another sense, however, it can be called a complete production insofar as it is one in the notion of creation and perfectly fulfills its function by producing matter in the being of the first physically receptive subject. Finally, remember the example of the rational soul.

21. It is replied 2º: A being which comprises the whole line of being from the first subject to the ultimate act of that line is complete in the line of being; just as that is complete in the line of understanding which comprises this whole line from the first subject to the ultimate act. But matter, if it has its own existence, prior to form comprises the whole line of being from the first subject to the ultimate act; for it comprises its essence, which is the first subject, and further comprises existence, which is the ultimate act of the line of being, according to that saying of St. Thomas, q. un. *De anima*, a. 6, ad 2: ″Being itself is the ultimate act, which can be participated by all things, but itself participates in nothing.″ Therefore matter apart from form is a complete being and consequently will not make one in itself with form. Confirmation 1º: Matter exists equally prior to form and posterior to form, since it exists at no instant or sign except through its own existence. But posterior to form it exists completely. Therefore it does so also prior to form. Confirmation 2º: That which does not need form in order to exist is a complete being. But if matter exists prior to form, it does not need form in order to exist. Therefore, etc.

22. To the reply: The minor premise must be denied if it is taken of the line of being in its full breadth. For the line of being extends also to accidental acts, which certainly supervene after the existence of the substantial subject; likewise it extends to subsistence, which similarly supervenes upon existence. Therefore existence is not the ultimate act of the line of being taken generally. St. Thomas, however, in the cited place is not speaking of purely existential being, but of subsistent being proper to a complete substance, as is clear from the words immediately following: ″Hence, if there is something which is subsistent being itself, as we say of God, we say that it participates in nothing.″ Therefore existence is only the ultimate act of the metaphysical or transcendental line of being, or of the line of being insofar as distinguished from non-being, that is, from being in objective potency. See n. 19. Yet it is not the ultimate act of the physical and substantial line of being, in which line it leaves matter an incomplete being.

23. To confirmation 1º, I distinguish the major premise: it exists equally, etc., by an existence excluding the nothingness of matter, I grant, and in this sense the attached proof holds; by an existence excluding the physical incompletion of matter, I deny the major premise; and, having granted the minor premise, I deny the consequence. Here is a similar syllogism: A body exists equally prior to quantity and posterior to quantity, since it never exists except through its existence; but posterior to quantity it exists extended; therefore it does so also prior to quantity. To confirmation 2º, I distinguish the major premise: that which does not need form in order to exist in any way whatsoever, I deny; in order to exist with the whole perfection of its genus of which it is capable, I grant the major premise. The minor premise is to be similarly distinguished, and the consequence denied. And I press the example of the rational soul, which without matter is not a complete being, although it does not need matter in order to exist.

24. It is replied 3º: If matter is presupposed as a being in act, although it is called incomplete, it cannot be ordered to constitute one in itself with a supervening form. Therefore, etc. The antecedent is proved 1º because from a subject and whiteness there is not made one in itself, although the subject of itself is incomplete in accidental being, that is, in the being of white; nor from intellection and the substance of an Angel, although the latter is incomplete in the intellectual line. There is no other reason except that the subject is presupposed as a being in act. 2º Because neither can one in itself be made from two substantial forms, for example those of a lion and a horse, because each, although incomplete, is a being in act. 3º Because matter with the form of corporeity, however incomplete it may be said to be in the being of a living thing, cannot, according to the more common opinion, be ordered to the soul so as to make one in itself with it; and this precisely for the reason stated. Likewise the common elements, although incomplete in the species of mixed bodies, nevertheless, because through their proper forms they are beings in act, do not formally enter the mixed body so as to make one in itself with its form. 4º Because otherwise our solution could be used to defend the opinion of those who posit in matter as many subordinated substantial forms as there are metaphysical grades.

25. I answer the reply by distinguishing the antecedent: if it is presupposed in formal physical act, I admit; if only in metaphysical or entitative act, I deny the antecedent and consequence. To proof 1º: The reason for examples of this sort is not that the subject is supposed to be in act in any way whatsoever, but that it is supposed to be in formal physical act or in absolute act, by virtue of which it is no longer incomplete in the genus or substantial line, although it is incomplete in other lines. But matter

is presupposed in act in neither manner. To 2º: Incompletion is not sufficient unless there is added a mutual proportion between the two beings, either after the manner of act and potency or by some other natural title. Such a proportion does not exist between two substantial forms, but it does between matter and form. Thus, if celestial matter is specifically distinguished from sublunary matter, one in itself cannot be made from the form of earth and celestial matter, even though the latter be held to be pure potency in the Thomistic sense, for no other reason than because the proportion and mutual order are lacking.

26. To 3º: Whatever may be said of the form of corporeity, which will be treated in its proper place, the disparity with the act of existence is clear. First, because matter with the form of corporeity is no longer pure potency in the physical line, since it already has an act of that line. Second, because the form of corporeity is attacked for this reason: if it is truly a substantial form, it must be the primary and principal act in the composite, and therefore it does not leave room in it for another substantial form. But neither reason applies to the existence of matter. As to the elements, if they do not remain formally in the mixed body, as the objection supposes, they are falsely said to be incomplete in the species of mixed bodies, unless the statement concerns a merely negative incompletion, in which sense even a stone is incomplete in the species of man, since they are incapable of constituting such a species. Add that the elements are presupposed in act, not in just any act, but in formal physical act. To 4º: That opinion is rejected because it posits several subordinated acts in the composite, not just any acts, but physical acts, and all of them specific, since it is repugnant for an individual form to give a purely generic grade and not belong to a determinate species. But our solution does not assert acts of this sort.

The Mind of St. Thomas on This Controversy Is Explained.

27. It is replied 4º: According to the Philosopher, *Metaph*. VII, and St. Thomas there, lect. 13, litt. h, ″Two things which are in act are never one in act″; and a little below St. Thomas adds: ″It is clear that if a particular substance is one, it will not be composed of substances existing in it in act″; and, after a few intervening words: ″Two things existing in act never make one.″ Therefore, if matter is truly a being in act, although incompletely, it will never make one in itself with form. This is confirmed from other places of St. Thomas, where it is openly denied that matter exists or is in act otherwise than through form. For example, q. 4, *De potentia*, a. 1, corp.:

"Whatever is found in reality exists actually; and matter does not have this except through form, which is its act." Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 7, a. 2, ad 3: "Prime matter does not exist in reality through itself, since it is not a being in act but only potency." Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 4, a. 5, ad 2: "The being of form and matter is the same, and this same being is that of the composite." The Angelic Doctor teaches similar things elsewhere, and therefore the Thomists confidently cite him on their side.

28. But that St. Thomas acknowledges in matter a partial existence proportioned to a being supremely potential and imperfect in the genus of substance is proved 1º because Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 14, a. 11, ad 3, after objecting to himself that "matter, since it is a being only in potency, is altogether unlike God, who is pure act," he answers: "Although matter departs from the likeness of God according to its potentiality, nevertheless insofar as it has being even in this way, it retains a certain likeness to the divine being." This agrees with q. 3, *De veritate*, a. 5, ad 1, where he says: "Although prime matter is formless, there is nevertheless in it an imitation of the first form," namely God; "for however weak a being it has, that being is nevertheless an imitation of the first Being. And according to this it can have a likeness to God." See, therefore, how matter, according to St. Thomas, is potential in such a way that nevertheless "it has being even in this way," although this being is "weak," as proportioned to a weak, that is, highly imperfect essence. See likewise how matter departs from pure Act in such a way that nevertheless "there is in it an imitation of the first form," and indeed of the first form as existing, because "it retains a certain likeness of the divine being," and the very "being" of matter "is an imitation of the first Being." Add to these that statement of St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 53, n. 4: "The assimilation of every created substance to God is through being itself."

29. It is proved 2º: Matter, according to St. Thomas, has its own goodness; therefore it also has its own existence. The antecedent is taught by St. Thomas in various places, and most clearly q. 2, *De malo*, a. 2, corp., in these words: "It is clear that what is in potency, from the very fact that it is in potency, has the character of good. Therefore every subject, insofar as it is in potency with respect to any perfection, even prime matter, from the very fact that it is in potency, has the character of good." And lest anyone say that the character of good belongs to matter not through itself but through form, the Angelic Doctor adds there: "Prime matter has potency through itself; and since potency pertains to the character of good, it follows that good belongs to it through itself." The consequence, moreover, is shown no less clearly from St. Thomas, who often teaches that goodness is founded upon "being."

For example, q. 21, *De veritate*, a. 2, corp.; q. 6, *De potentia*, a. 6, corp.; likewise Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 5, a. 1, corp., where he speaks thus: ″The character of good consists in this, that something is desirable. But it is manifest that each thing is desirable insofar as it is perfect. And each thing is perfect insofar as it is in act. Hence it is manifest that something is good insofar as it is a being; for being is the actuality of every thing.″ This is confirmed: St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 7, n. 2, proves from this that no essence is evil but every essence is good, because ″Each thing according to its essence has being; but insofar as it has being, it has some good.″ Here is a general rule from which matter cannot be excepted unless its own essence is denied to it.

30. It is proved 3º: Prime matter, by the very fact that it is being in potency, somehow ″is,″ and so ″is″ in such a way that it is truly numbered among those things ″which are,″ and therefore is truly caused by God. But matter by reason of itself is being in potency and does not receive this from form. Therefore by reason of itself it ″is″ in such a way that it is truly numbered among those things ″which are,″ without receiving this from form. The major premise, which alone could be denied, is expressly taught by St. Thomas, *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 16, n. 11: ″Prime matter in some way is, because it is being in potency; but God is the cause of all things which are; therefore God is the cause of prime matter.″ Therefore he errs who conceives matter to be a ″being in potency″ in such a way that he conceives in it no ″being″ and no existence. For this is to confuse passive potency with objective potency, that is, with the possibility of a non-existing thing; yet St. Thomas clearly distinguishes these potencies, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 46, a. 1, ad 1.

31. The same point is pressed: To matter, insofar as it is being in potency, it belongs to have an efficient cause, namely God creating it, as St. Thomas teaches in the cited place, *Contra Gentiles* II, and often elsewhere. But ″To each thing it belongs to have an efficient cause insofar as it has being,″ as the Angelic Doctor says, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 44, a. 1, ad 3. Therefore matter has ″being″ insofar as it is being in potency. Add that St. Thomas, in the same question, a. 2, corp., acknowledges in composite things some ″being″ besides that which comes from substantial and accidental forms, and from this infers that prime matter is created by God, so that the whole ″being″ of things is caused by God. Hence ibid. ad 3 he says: ″It is necessary that even that which stands on the side of potency be created, if everything pertaining to its being is created.″

32. Accordingly, in St. Thomas the word ″being,″ or ″being in act,″ is not always taken in the same sense. Sometimes it is taken transcendentally, insofar as it belongs to every being precisely as being. To this pertains Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 5, a. 1, corp.: ″Being is the actuality of every thing″;

and there, a. 3, corp.: ″Every being, insofar as it is a being, is in act and in some manner perfect, because every act is a certain perfection.″ In this sense we say that matter by reason of itself is ″in act″ and has ″being″; and St. Thomas thinks the same, as we have shown. Nor can this be denied unless the true character of being is denied to matter.

33. Sometimes, however, it is taken for the existence of a *suppositum*, or for the subsistence proper to a complete substance, as is clear from q. un. *De spiritualibus creaturis*, a. 1, ad 8: ″Matter cannot properly be said to be that which is, since it is only in potency; but that which is is that which subsists in being, and this in corporeal substances is the composite itself of matter and form, while in incorporeal substances it is the simple form itself.″ In this sense we too, with St. Thomas, deny that matter ″is″ except through form. If one asks why form is not likewise said to ″be″ through matter, since through matter it too is rendered a complete substance, I answer that the reason is that form determines matter to a determinate species of complete being, not conversely; hence a body is said rather to be constituted in the ″being″ of man through the soul than conversely.

34. Sometimes, moreover, it is taken for ″act″ without qualification. Under this name falls either a physical relative act, because in it lies the principal perfection and actuality of a composite substance; or an absolute act simply such, as is an Angel, see above nn. 3, 4, and 5; but not an absolute act in a qualified respect, such as matter, because its actuality, since it is highly imperfect and purely potential in the physical line, is regarded as though it were nothing. Hence St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 5, a. 2, ad 2, speaking of prime matter, says that by ″non-existence″ there can be understood ″not those things without qualification which altogether are not, but those which are in potency and not in act.″ Matter, therefore, is called ″non-existing,″ not because it ″altogether is not,″ for it ″is in some way,″ as St. Thomas himself said above, n. 30, but because it ″is in potency and not in act″ without qualification, and therefore its existence is treated as almost nothing.

35. This is also supported by that passage of St. Thomas, Opusc. 31: ″Matter... of itself is incomplete; indeed it has no being, as the Commentator says in *De anima* II; hence, speaking without qualification, form gives being to matter.″ Here we see in what sense the ″incomplete being of matter″ is called ″no being,″ namely ″speaking without qualification.″ Likewise that statement of the same Holy Doctor in *Physics* I, lect. 15, litt. b: ″Matter is near to a thing, and is in some way, because it is in potency to the thing.″ And Opusc. 15, c. 7: ″Act is more perfect than potency and possesses more of the character of being; for we do not say without qualification that what is in

potency is, but only what is in act." Hence, according to St. Thomas, matter by reason of itself truly exists and is in the act of being, not "without qualification," but with the addition "in some manner," "in some way," because it has "incomplete and weak being."

36. Hence the testimonies objected in n. 27 are easily explained. In the cited place in *Metaphysics* VII, St. Thomas speaks of act taken as division, as will be evident to a reader; therefore he adds: "But two things which are in potency are one in act, as is clear in the parts of a continuum." Ask the Thomists whether they wish two things in potency, such as two prime matters, to be one in act. Moreover, both there and in the other places St. Thomas is readily explained as speaking of a "complete" act, or act without qualification, or of "existence" which is such without qualification and not with the addition "in some manner" or "in some way." The final testimony, however, takes "being" for the subsistence proper to a *suppositum*.

CHAPTER V.
The Solution of the Arguments Is Completed.

1. It is objected 3º: Several things can be called one insofar as they participate in something common to them which is one by identity; for if nothing is common, but each thing is proper to each, there will be no unity but plurality. Thus things which are one in cognition, place, or time are one because they are comprehended by one cognition, etc. Therefore, in order that matter and form truly constitute one existing thing in itself, there must be one actuality of existence common to both. Confirmation 1º: Two beings in act are without qualification several beings; therefore from them there cannot be constituted a being which is without qualification one.

2. Confirmation 2º: An active and a passive principle are actuated by the same act in the line of operating, namely by one operation which really is action and passion. Therefore likewise matter and form, which are passive and active principles in the line of being, must be actuated by the same act of being, namely by the same existence. The consequence is clear, because in each case both principles behave after the manner of one; indeed, the conjunction of form with matter is greater than that of the active principle with the passive. Confirmation 3º: The matter and form of a stone are extended by the same quantity and are rendered white by the same whiteness; therefore they exist by the same existence. Confirmation 4º: One in itself is said to be that which is one by unity of form, that is, of the formal notion. But the formal notion of being is "being." Therefore the composite of

matter and form cannot be called a being which is one in itself unless it has one ″being.″

3. I answer the objection: The doctrine of the antecedent, taken generally, is false unless it speaks of the union or bond which must be mutual and common to the parts joined into one. For what else common will you designate in the parts of one commonwealth governed democratically? Or in the parts of the corporeal world? Or, to come nearer to the matter, in a substantial composite taken essentially? Certainly matter and form make an essence which is one in itself, and indeed prior to existence according to the Thomists. In what one thing, then, except mutual union, do those several partial essences agree so that they are called one composite essence in itself? What you say of essences, take as said also of existences.

4. To confirmation 1º: In common usage things are not called without qualification several unless they are actually divided or joined by no natural bond. In this sense I deny the antecedent as understood of matter and form within the composite. But if you wish to call ″without qualification several″ those things which are truly distinct and existing, one thing can indeed be made from several; not in that respect in which they are several, namely in the notion of a part or incomplete being, but in another respect, namely in the notion of a complete being. You yourself must admit this in the one essence constituted from several. To 2º: The same reply concerning matter and form constituting one essence recurs. Furthermore, it follows only that, just as one operation is the exercise of both extrinsic principles, active and passive, so one union is the exercise of intrinsic principiation with respect to matter and form; and this we freely admit. Nor are matter and form principles in the line of being in any manner whatsoever, but in the line of complete being; in which sense the actuality of being is union itself. To 3º, I deny the consequence, because the same reason does not apply in each case.

5. To 4º: First, the major premise is obscure and absolutely false. For one in itself, when simple, is called one from the identity of predicates; when composite, it is called one from the union of parts of the same genus naturally capable of union, or also from the unity of physical form, as St. Thomas says, *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 58. Next, the minor premise is also false according to the Thomists if it speaks of being taken essentially. For if ″being,″ that is, existence, were the formal notion of essence, it would not be distinguished from essence itself. But if it speaks of being insofar as existing, then the formal notion will be existence, either simple or composite, according as the being itself is. But if by ″formal notion″ you understand the physical difference, then the formal notion of a composite being as completely existing will be only the ″being″ of form, without its following

that matter does not have its own ″being″; just as from the fact that the essence of form alone is in this sense the formal notion of the complete essence, it does not follow that matter does not have its own essence.

6. It is objected 4º: Substantial generation is distinguished from alteration in that generation gives being without qualification, whereas alteration gives being in a qualified respect. From this Aristotle and St. Thomas infer against the ancient philosophers that prime matter is not presupposed as being in act; for thus it would already possess being without qualification and would be the whole substance of things, according to that statement of St. Thomas, Opusc. 15, c. 7: ″Wherever matter is posited as being in act, it makes no difference to say matter or the substance of the thing.″ Hence every supervening form would be accidental, bringing only being in a qualified respect; and consequently every production would be alteration. But if matter has its own existence, it is presupposed as being in act and as having being without qualification. Therefore generation and substantial form are removed.

7. Confirmation: If matter is presupposed in act before form, there is no basis for refuting those who say that matter is the whole substance of the thing, so that every supervening form is accidental. For if you say that matter is presupposed in incomplete act in the genus of substance, awaiting a complement of the same genus, you beg the question, because this very thing is what the adversaries deny. If you say that matter is not presupposed as complete in the species of fire, stone, horse, etc., they will likewise say that it is not presupposed as complete in the species of an artifact, nor in the species of white, hot, etc., without these complements thereby being substantial. I omit other recourses which Palancus rejects at length. To these can be added, from Bayona, that there is no basis for proving that the form of fire, for example, is substantial. For first, it does not give the subject being without qualification, since through its own existence the subject is supposed absolutely and without qualification to be in reality, but only being with an addition, namely being fiery; and an accidental form likewise gives this, namely being white, hot, etc. Next, it does not give being to the subject according to itself, but only to the composite as such; and whiteness likewise does this with respect to the composite resulting from it and the subject. Finally, that it is naturally required by the subject proves nothing, for heat is likewise required by fire.

8. I answer the objection: In Aristotle and St. Thomas, by a ″being in act″ said absolutely, and one having ″being without qualification,″ there is commonly meant a being in physical act, or a being substantially complete and constituted in some physical species of the elements or mixed bodies.

Hence matter is not called absolutely a being in act, nor as having being without qualification, except through form. Hence also matter would be the whole substance of the thing if it were being in act, for it would thereby be a physically complete substance and consequently orderable only to accidental forms. It would follow that every new production was alteration, that is, accidental change, whereas there would be no generation, since generation must give being without qualification, that is, physically complete substantial being, and therefore does not presuppose this in matter. Sometimes, however, that is called a ″being without qualification″ which already has some ″being″ distinguished from nothing; and in this sense generation, which is the action of created agents, does not give being without qualification nor make a being without qualification, but ″this being,″ for example a man or stone, as St. Thomas expressly teaches, *Contra Gentiles* II, cc. 16 and 21.

9. To the confirmation: Ask the Thomists whence they prove a substantial form really distinct from matter against the Cartesians and Atomists. Is it because matter is pure potency having no ″being″? Yet this is precisely what those philosophers deny, contending that matter is the whole substance of the thing. They will further say that the Thomists argue in a vicious circle: for they prove that matter is not being in act because it makes one in itself with substantial form; and they prove that form is substantial because it supervenes upon matter as upon a being in potency and not in act. It must therefore be established that the proof of substantial form is to be sought elsewhere than from the Thomistic potentiality of matter, as even the Thomists themselves acknowledge when, in arguing against the corpuscular philosophers, they use very different arguments: for example, that the wolf and sheep differ substantially, as is clear from the diversity of their operations and accidental properties, which necessarily presupposes a diverse substantial root; but they do not differ in matter; therefore they differ in some substantial part superadded to matter and contracting it to a determinate species of complete substance. This part we call substantial form. From the positing of this form it correctly follows that matter of itself is not a complete substance but is ordered to constitute one with another co-part of the same genus. But this will be treated more fully in disp. 4.

10. We therefore do not beg the question when we call matter incomplete in act, but deduce this from its ordering, proved from elsewhere, to a complement of its own genus. Nor do we prove the substantial form of a stone or horse from the incompletion of matter; rather, conversely, because this form is proved from elsewhere to be substantial rather than the form of an artifact, or of the white, hot, etc., we therefore call matter substantially

incomplete. Furthermore, although matter has its own existence, it can receive being without qualification from the form of fire, from n. 8. This can also be called ″being with an addition,″ not an alienating addition but one contracting to a determinate species of complete substance. And although the subject does not receive its partial being from that form, it nevertheless receives physically complete being. For this is given by form simultaneously to the composite by identity and to the subject by union. In this respect the form of fire indeed agrees with whiteness, but differs from it in that the former gives substantial being whereas whiteness gives accidental being. It likewise differs from heat in that it is required by the subject as a complement of its own genus, whereas heat is required as a property of a diverse genus.

11. It is objected 5º: The proper existence of matter can neither be identified with matter nor be distinguished from it. It cannot be identified, because it is repugnant that matter itself be an entitative act: 1º because it would be no less actual than form, for an entitative act is no less an act than a formal act. 2º Because a created act to which no receptive potency corresponds is repugnant; but no receptive potency corresponds to matter, otherwise it would not be the first subject. Nor, secondly, can it be distinguished, because it would follow that matter prior to form is composed of subject and act, namely essence and existence. From this it follows 1º that matter is not compared to form as the first subject, but as something constituted from another subject. It follows 2º that form is not the first act of matter, since it supervenes after another act, namely after existence.

12. I answer: The existence of matter is not successfully attacked from either head. First, not from the head of identity. For matter would not thereby be as actual as form. Since actuality is the same as perfection, especially specificative and distinctive perfection, that is more actual which is more perfect and has a greater power of specifying and distinguishing. In this function formal act surpasses an entitative act identified with matter, because it specifies not only itself but also the whole composite. As to the claim that a created act to which no receptive potency corresponds is repugnant, this is true of a relative act, not of an absolute act, as is clear in the substance of an Angel. See the preceding chapter, nn. 3-5.

13. One may say: Such an absolute act will be pure act, as lacking all potentiality. But I ask why the substance of an Angel is not pure act, devoid of all potentiality. If you say that the substance of an Angel, although it does not imply an order to a receptive potency in which it is received, nevertheless identifies with itself a receptive potency for its properties and operations, understand the same as said here of matter, which likewise

identifies with itself the receptive potency for substantial and accidental forms. One may insist: Act and potency cannot be identified, since they are opposed differences of being. But how are they identified in an Angel? How also in a rational soul, which is at once the act of the body and the receptive potency for properties and spiritual acts? There is certainly no other reason than that act and potency are not with respect to the same term. The same is verified in matter, since it is not act with respect to the forms for which it is potency, but is act only insofar as in itself it is a certain perfection excluding its own nothingness.

14. Nor, secondly, is it successfully attacked from the head of distinction, which we presently permit. For if essence is distinguished from existence, the receptive subject of form is the essence of matter alone; and this is not constituted from another subject nor received in another, and therefore is the first subject. This essence indeed requires the act of existence in order to be constituted actually capable of receiving form. Yet existence is not the receptive potency of form, not even partially, but only a condition essentially required for the essence of matter to discharge the function of receptive potency. Thus, according to the Thomists, an efficient cause cannot be understood to be absolutely capable of acting without its own existence; yet this existence is not an operative power but a condition essentially required for the essence to operate. Likewise the will is not proximately capable of loving without cognition of the object; yet this cognition is not the power of loving but a condition.

15. Likewise, form is the first act of matter, not in the order of execution, but in the order of intention and dignity, because it is that act which nature primarily and principally intends, and for whose sake it executes the other acts. For nature principally intends the being of the composite, which comes from form; yet it first executes the act of existence of matter and also those accidental acts by which matter is ultimately disposed to substantial form. It is replied: The existence of matter is a substantial act. Therefore matter prior to form is composed of a subject and a substantial act. Therefore it is already a substantial composite. It would be surprising if Thomists objected in this way. For it could similarly be proved that an Angel is a substantial composite, namely one constituted from essence and existence as from subject and substantial form; or even that every natural body contains a twofold substantial composite, one from the essences of matter and form, the other from both essences as subject and from a superadded act of existence. All therefore must say that existence, if it is distinguished from essence, either is not a substantial act, or at least is not an act of the physical

line but of the metaphysical line, and therefore does not effect a physical composition.

16. It is objected 6º: If partial existences are given in the composite, from them there will result a composite existence which is one in itself. But this is impossible, because one in itself does not result except from act and potency, and one existence cannot be potency with respect to another. I answer: If existence is really identified with essence, the existence of matter can and must be potency with respect to the existence of form, not indeed so that through it matter is rendered existing in its partial entity, but so that it is rendered physically complete. But if existence is distinguished from essence, as we now permit, one might doubt the proportion of act and potency between the existences of matter and form, especially if they are not things but modes. Nevertheless, we admit that proportion from the doctrine which the Excellent Doctor teaches in a similar case, disp. 34. *Metaph.* sect. 5, from n. 22, and we say that the existence of matter is perfectible and actuatable by the existence of form, and that from both there is made a composite existence which is one in itself.

17. But the Thomists reply many things against this. 1º It is repugnant that one existence be rendered existing through another, either completely or incompletely; just as it is repugnant that one quantity or quality be rendered quantified or qualified through another, even with the addition "completely." I answer: The existence of matter through the existence of form is not rendered existing in its partial and incomplete species, but only in a complete physical species, for example the species of fire or stone. In this there is no greater repugnance than in one partial essence or substance being rendered as having essence or substance in a complete species through another. The example of quantity is irrelevant, because quantity is proved by no title to be apt for union with another quantity except in the integral or continuative line. But existence corresponds to essence; and therefore where essence is composite from two partial essences, existence must likewise be composite, because "Each thing according to its essence has being," as St. Thomas said, *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 7. The example of quality is turned back against them, for the intellective potency, which according to the Thomists is a quality, receives its acts and habits, which also belong to the genus of quality.

18. It is replied 2º: One physical form is not actuatable by another, nor is one metaphysical difference determinable by another. Therefore neither can one existence be actuated and perfected by another. I answer: The antecedent is false concerning accidental physical form, as is clear from the example of the intellective potency and also of quantity, which is actuated by

qualities. Those who defend the form of corporeity say the same of substantial form; and those who think otherwise are moved by the reason we indicated in the preceding chapter, n. 26, which does not apply to the existence of matter. The other example is plainly turned back against the objection, for subalternate metaphysical differences are determined by the lowest difference.

19. One insists: Existence must be compared to the ultimate difference, because it is second act in the line of being, and the second act of every line is ultimate in that line. Hence St. Thomas, q. 7, *De potentia*, a. 2, ad 9, says that to ″being″ nothing is added ″which is more formal than it, determining it as act determines potency.″ I answer: Existence is the second act of objective potency and is the ultimate act in the line of being, not however of being taken in every way, but of being as distinguished from nothing, according as the essence is partial or total. Therefore the existence of matter places its essence ultimately outside its own nothingness. Yet it coheres well with this that it is further actuatable in the line of physically complete being, just as the ultimate essential difference is further actuated in the individual line. St. Thomas there speaks of complete and subsistent being after the manner of a *suppositum*, as will be evident to an attentive reader.

20. It is replied 3º: Partial and potential existence is repugnant. This is proved 1º: Existence in common, since from its formal concept it is actuality, cannot be contracted by that which according to its ultimate difference lies outside the line of act. But potential existence lies outside the line of act according to its ultimate difference, which is potentiality. Therefore, etc. 2º The first in any genus is complete in that genus, because it is that from which other things are such and does not participate from others, for example relation in the line of referring, quantity in the line of extending, form in the line of giving species. But existence is the first principle in the genus of existing. Therefore an existence which is not complete is repugnant. 3º Existence does not itself have an existence, because it is the formal notion of existing, and a formal notion does not have another formal notion, otherwise there would be an action of action and a union of union. Therefore a partial existence which is potency to another existence is repugnant.

21. I answer by denying the assumption, notwithstanding the proofs. To 1º: The potentiality found in the existence of matter does not lie outside the line of metaphysical act, to which line the actuality of existence in common belongs, since it is a formality contracting existence as such. Therefore it lies outside only the line of physical act, in which line alone it is actuatable by the existence of form. For the latter is compared with the former not as

metaphysical or entitative act, but as physical act. To 2º: Much is asserted there gratuitously or confusedly. Are not both matter and form first principles in the genus of constituting a natural body? Is each of them therefore something complete in that genus? If perhaps you say that each is complete in its own partial genus, the one in the genus of first subject, the other in the genus of act, I shall likewise say that the existence of matter is complete in the genus of subjective existing, in which alone it will be the first principle, but not in every genus of existing. To 3º: In that sense in which existence is the formal notion of existing, it cannot be actuated by another existence. Hence, because the existence of matter is the formal notion of placing its essence outside nothing, in this sense it does not need another. But because it is not the formal notion of existing in a complete physical species, in this sense it can be actuated by the existence of form.

22. From what has been said you will easily solve other objections, such as that "being is for the sake of operation," according to the old adage, and prime matter has no operation of its own. Likewise, substantial form must give the subject its first "being": first because in this it differs from accidental form; second because a "being" which is not first is not foundational and underlying all things, and therefore is not substantial. These, I say, you will easily solve. The first, if you understand that "operation" either of an operation proper to that very "being," or of the composite constituted from such "being"; or if you say that "being" is for the sake of "operating" in active things, whereas in passive things it is for the sake of "undergoing." The second, if you say that the substantial "being" given by form is "first," that is, primary and principal, such as is not given by accidents; and likewise that it is foundational and underlies all things which supervene upon a physically complete being.

The Argument Drawn from the Permitted Distinction Between Essence and Existence Is Solved.

23. It is objected finally: If essence is distinguished from existence, as we presently permit, the principal foundation of our position collapses. For the essence of matter, as of any thing, is the material cause and sustaining subject of its existence, and therefore in a sign prior to existence is understood as produced, distinct from nothing, requiring and capable of receiving the act of existence; and yet it is not yet understood as existing, as is manifest. Therefore, although similar things are verified of matter prior to form, as our first proof emphasized, matter need not thereby be understood to exist before form.

24. I answer: It must altogether be denied that essence is the material cause of its own existence, although it is distinguished from existence. 1º Because it would follow that essence causes itself as regards its first "being," and would truly and properly be a cause of being for itself, and would owe existence to itself in a true and proper sense; for a material cause, according to the Thomists, is a true and proper cause. 2º Because a sustaining material cause is said to be that from which, as from a presupposed subject, some form is educed. But if existence were educed from the essence to which it belongs, it would follow that the existence of every creature was educed, and consequently that even the existence of the rational soul or of an Angel was educed. But this cannot be said unless one absurdly says that an Angel as an existing act is not created but generated.

25. Accordingly, if essence and existence are distinguished, both must be produced by the same action, so that a production terminating at essence without simultaneously terminating at existence is repugnant. First, because "The production of a thing terminates at the being of the thing," as St. Thomas says, q. 5, *De veritate*, a. 4, ad 6; and "Every action of an active potency terminates at being," as the same Angelic Doctor says, q. 1, *De potentia*, a. 3, corp. Second, because a quiddity is created in no other way except insofar as "being" is bestowed upon it through creation, as St. Thomas likewise teaches, q. 3, *De potentia*, a. 5, ad 2. Third, because the Prince of the Thomists, Capreolus, expressly teaches this in I, dist. 8, q. 1, according to the mind of St. Thomas, saying: "Being does not stand to essence as an accident to a subject; and therefore it is not necessary that essence be created before being, but essence is produced and being acquired by the same creation." The same author teaches there that, while essence terminates creation, existence is the formal notion of terminating and the formal term of creation.

26. Hence it must be denied that essence is understood as produced prior to existence. Rather, if it were possible, existence would have to be understood as produced prior to essence, since essence does not terminate production except by reason of existence. Certainly it is repugnant that something terminate an action while prescinding from the formal notion of terminating, just as it implies contradiction for a visible object to terminate vision while prescinding from color or light, which is the formal notion by which it is seen. It must likewise be denied that essence has any physical priority with respect to existence. First, because physical priority is founded upon the function of a cause, and essence cannot have this function with respect to existence, as we have seen. Second, because terms produced by

the same action must be understood in the same indivisible sign of nature, at least when one is for the other the formal reason why it is produced.

27. It must further be denied that essence with respect to existence is a ″sustaining subject,″ if this name is taken, as it commonly is, for a material cause or a subject from which, as presupposed, form is educed. But if, contrary to usage, it is taken for a subject without which a form cannot stand, although it is caused by that subject in no genus, let it pass that essence is called the sustaining subject of existence. Still, this kind of subject requires no physical priority. More properly, essence with respect to existence will be called a subject of ″adherence,″ as our authors commonly say of the substance of an Angel with respect to the mode of creation which it terminates. Or let it be called, if one prefers, a subject of ″pure information,″ in whose concept there is no priority, as we noted in chap. 2, n. 15. Therefore it is falsely said that essence prior to existence is understood as produced, distinct from nothing, and physically capable of receiving existence. For, as St. Thomas says, q. 3, *De potentia*, a. 5, ad 2: ″A quiddity, before it has being, is nothing except perhaps in the intellect of the creator, where it is not a creature but the creative essence.″ Therefore, when a quiddity is conceived before existence, it is conceived as capable only logically or objectively.

28. But if St. Thomas sometimes indicates that essence is presupposed to existence after the manner of a receptive subject, this must be understood either of logical priority or of connotative priority, that is, from our mode of conceiving, insofar as we conceive essence through species of a presupposed subject, as we conceive an Angel through the species of a youth. Here note that the existence of a substantial thing, although distinguished from essence, is not a physical accident but is reduced to the genus of substance according to the Thomists, especially Capreolus in the cited place. Therefore the existence of a substance produced by creation does not need a presupposed subject. The existence, however, of a generated or educed substance does indeed have a presupposed subject, but the very same one which its essence has.

29. Note further that essence, whether prior or concomitantly, cannot be conceived as actual or placed in act while prescinding from existence; but the latter may be conceived as prescinding from actual and possible, that is, from the states of possibility and existence. Therefore the proper potency of a ″subject of adherence or information,″ which essence has with respect to existence, cannot be understood as actual and physical except through existence itself, through which essence has, not that it is absolutely capable and apt to exist, but that it is capable in such a manner, namely actually and

physically. The College of St. Thomas, q. 7. *Physic.* a. 3, § 3, does not reason absurdly, except that it admits a priority which we deny.

30. From these things you have the sense in which the hypothesis concerning the distinction of essence from existence can be admitted. For we are not bound to admit it together with all those conditions which the Thomists may wish to establish, but only with those dictated by reason and the authority of St. Thomas and the great Thomists, and which involve no repugnance proper to the present controversy. Thus admitted, however, the hypothesis in no way weakens our arguments, as will be evident to one who considers them.

A Twofold Minor Question Is Decided from What Has Been Said.

31. From what has been said you will infer 1º what must be answered to the minor question commonly raised here, namely whether, supposing the distinction of essence from existence, matter and form can by divine power be deprived of their own partial existences and exist through the same existence, which would be one existence of the whole Composite. The answer must be affirmative, provided, however, that by one action matter and form are concomitantly created together with such an existence; or, if they are produced by distinct actions, each action is a creation and each terminates at that indivisible existence. The reason for affirming this is that in this event all the inconveniences mentioned above would miraculously cease, and from another source no contradiction appears.

32. You will infer 2º the decision of another minor question arising from this: namely whether, in that event, that total and indivisible existence would have to be called proper to matter rather than to form, or conversely. You will answer that it would belong equally and properly to both. For it would be an existence very different from those by which matter and form in fact and connaturally exist, namely one not precisely commensurate with the partial essence of form or matter, but destined of itself to render both existing together. Hence such an existence is not required by matter rather than by form, or conversely. For each naturally requires a partial existence commensurate with itself, and on the supposition that this is denied, each requires that total existence by reason of the right each has to exist. But an existence which is required in the same manner by matter and form, is produced for the sake of each, and is communicated to each in the same sign, has no reason to be called more proper to one than to the other.

DISPUTATION III.

THE REMAINING QUESTIONS CONCERNING PRIME MATTER ARE DISCUSSED.

CHAPTER I.

On the Appetite of Prime Matter for Forms.

1. Appetite is the inclination or propensity of a thing toward a good. One is ″elicited,″ another ″innate″ or ″natural.″ An ″elicited″ appetite, so called because it is elicited or produced by an appetitive potency as an act distinct from it, is an inclination toward a good previously known by the one desiring. It admits various divisions which do not belong here. For the present matter, its division into love in the strict sense, desire, and joy should be noted. Love in the strict sense is appetite for a good prescinding from its absence and presence, not procuring it, but simply loving its goodness. Desire is appetite for an absent good in such a way that it procures it and, so far as lies within itself, causes it or endeavors to cause it. Joy is the appetite by which one takes delight in a present good.

2. It is now common doctrine that desire does not require the good to be positively absent, that is, that there be a privation of the good at the instant of desire; rather, it suffices that it be absent precisively, that is, that in a sign prior to desire it is not known as present, but its absence or presence is prescinded from, although posteriorly such a good exists as the effect of desire. Thus, in the same instant in which a just man desires an increase of grace in order to be more closely united to God, he obtains grace as the reward of that very desire.

3. If one objects by parity with joy, which requires a positive presence of the good, at least apprehended, I answer that there is a broad difference from the concept and character of each appetite. For the character of joy is to tend toward a good not that it may be, but because it is; not by practically endeavoring to acquire it, but by approving it as already acquired, as it were reflexively. For this it is necessary to be convinced that the good is present. But the character of desire is to tend toward a good that it may be, that is, that it may be acquired. Hence it is a practical appetite procuring its own object. For this it suffices that the good not yet be known to be present, although it does not appear positively absent. If one again objects from the saying, ″Privation is the cause of appetite,″ namely of desire, which antonomastically is called ″appetite,″ I distinguish: it is the sole cause, I deny; a sufficient cause, I grant. Or otherwise: a privation which is not yet known to be excluded, I grant; a privation positively known to be present, I deny.

4. ″Innate″ appetite is called ″appetite″ improperly and metaphorically because of a certain proportion which it has with ″elicited″ appetite, just as the laughter of a meadow is compared with human laughter. Accordingly, ″innate appetite″ is the natural requirement which all things have for goods suitable to them, as when light things require to be carried upward and heavy things downward. ″All things,″ I say, for as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 26, a. 1, ad 3, a requirement or appetite of this sort ″is universally in all things.″ For it consists in, or is founded upon, connaturality; and ″each thing has connaturality toward that which is suitable to it according to its nature.″ Hence even supernatural things possess innate appetite: thus habitual Grace desires to be united with the rational soul, and the Light of glory to produce the Beatific Vision. And lest anyone think the metaphorical use of this term in inanimate things recent, let him read the elegant passage of the great Augustine, *De Civitate Dei* XI, c. 28.

5. A requirement or natural appetite of this sort consists in connaturality, as I just touched upon. Connaturality, however, is nothing other than the proportion and native ordering of a thing toward a good suitable to it according to its nature. This proportion and ordering is true and proper, although it is improperly signified by the name ″appetite,″ just as the pleasantness of meadows is proper although improperly signified by the name ″laughter.″ This connaturality commonly imports a connection or necessity of obtaining the term, and then it can be called an efficacious appetite; yet in such a way that the efficacy or connection admits various degrees. For sometimes it can be frustrated by a stronger natural agent,

sometimes by God alone, sometimes by no power as long as the thing remains, as in the connection of union with its extremes or of action with its term. Sometimes, however, this connaturality does not found a necessity but mere fittingness, and then it can be called an inefficacious appetite and can be separated from its effect without violence, for example the connaturality of air toward light.

6. From these things you will infer 1º that natural things innately desire only a good naturally possible of itself, because this alone can be "according to the nature" of such a thing. Nor is there in a natural thing a proportion and native ordering toward supernatural goods, much less a connection or efficacy for obtaining them. You will infer 2º that mere capacity to receive something does not suffice for innate appetite, as is clear in water with respect to heat, in an animal with respect to pain, or in a vessel with respect to liquid. Therefore the connaturality just explained is required. You will infer 3º that there is also in things innate hatred, flight, and aversion toward what is evil and contrary to their nature. This likewise is founded upon analogy with elicited hatred, etc.

7. Innate appetite differs from elicited appetite in many respects. 1º Because elicited appetite consists in an act distinct from the appetitive potency, whereas innate appetite is identified with the thing itself or potency which immediately desires. I say "immediately" because things often innately desire something through an accident which they root in or require, and then the proximate appetite is identified with such an accident. Thus a stone innately desires the center through gravity, and prime matter extension through quantity, or a fiery form in preference to others through heat. The appetite, however, by which a stone desires gravity itself, or matter quantity, is identified with the stone or matter. 2º And consequently, elicited appetite can vary while the same potency remains; whereas innate appetite is invariable unless the appetitive thing varies, since it is identified with it.

8. 3º Because elicited appetite is directed by a prior cognition of the one desiring; whereas innate appetite is directed only by the cognition of God as Author of nature, who wisely orders all things to their ends and connatural states. In this sense "the work of nature" is said to be "the work of intelligence," namely divine intelligence. 4º Because elicited appetite can be inordinate and superfluous, or can will useless things; whereas innate appetite, as implanted by God, is always most orderly and is borne only toward necessary things, or at least things truly useful. Hence Aristotle attributes prudence to innate appetite. From these things you will deduce that a complete likeness is not to be sought between innate and elicited appetite, just as none is sought between the laughter of a meadow and that

of a man. Keep before your eyes that we are dealing with a metaphor. But let us now come to the appetite of prime Matter, which can only be innate.

Prime Matter Efficaciously and Innately Desires Forms Taken Indeterminately.

9. The assertion is commonly received and scarcely needs proof. For first it is evident that matter is naturally ordered to form as to a connatural good by which it is perfected and substantially completed. But such an ordering is innate appetite, as we have seen. Next, it is evident that matter is naturally connected with form, as we shall prove with the common opinion in chap. 3. But this connection is the efficacy of appetite, from n. 5. Finally, it is evident that matter of itself is indifferent to any sublunary form, so that it is substantially completed by any of them and is content with it. For it does not desire to have several simultaneously, since these are naturally impossible. Nor does it desire several successively, because then it would be in a violent state under a more tenacious form, for example that of diamond; and because it would be perpetually restless, since as soon as it obtained one form it would long for another. For why more after a year than immediately from the first instant? Matter therefore desires some form taken indeterminately, just as one who desires some horse for riding or some food lest he perish from hunger.

10. But note that matter can be considered in a threefold sign. The first is the ″sign of remote potency,″ in which matter is understood according only to its own entity, prior not only to forms but also to all dispositions, and as indifferent to receiving any dispositions, whether of fire, stone, etc. The second is the ″sign of proximate potency,″ in which matter is indeed understood as prior to form but already with dispositions for it, and therefore no longer indifferent to diverse species of forms, but determinately connected with a form of one species, for example fire. The third is the ″sign of potency actually receiving″ form, in which sign matter is indifferent to no other form.

11. The proposed assertion therefore speaks of matter considered in the first sign, for thus its appetite ranges over all species of forms and dispositions. But if it is applied to the second sign, there is indeed an appetite determined as regards the species of forms, consisting not in the entity of matter alone but in the dispositions. Yet it is still indeterminate as regards the various individual forms of the same species, for God alone determines forms as regards the individual. Finally, that in the third sign

there is no indifference signifies nothing other than that one form is not indifferent to other forms.

12. Nevertheless, against the assertion it is objected 1º: Appetite follows upon form; but matter according to itself has no form; therefore it has no appetite. It is objected 2º: If the appetite of matter extends to all forms, it will always be in a violent state, since it can never attain all of them, as they are infinite. It is objected 3º: Either matter, while under one form, still desires others, or it does not. If it does, then 1º it will always be restless and weary of the present form; therefore 2º it will always desire the destruction of the composite which it constitutes, since it cannot obtain another form except by losing the one it has. If it does not, then it never desires absent forms, because it never exists except under a form. These objections, however, are easily dissolved.

13. To 1º, I distinguish the major premise: the appetite of a complete substance, I grant; of an incomplete substance, I deny the major premise; and, granting the minor premise, I deny the consequence. To 2º: This would be true if the appetite extended to all forms collectively or successively. But it extends to all only indeterminately, and an indeterminate appetite is satisfied if even one of several terms is granted, as commonly happens in elicited appetite. To 3º: I grant the first part and deny both consequences. For the appetite of matter, since it consists in its entity, perseveres identically unchanged under any present form; and since it is borne only indeterminately toward all forms, it is not restless while it obtains one, nor weary of it, nor desirous of its destruction, but is content with it while nevertheless being equally prepared to be content with any other if it should supervene. This is clear from the example of an elicited appetite desiring some horse for making a journey, which namely perseveres as the same act after it obtains horse A. It is one thing not to resist the destruction of the present composite; another thing to desire it.

14. It is replied 1º: The appetite of matter is identified with its determinate entity; therefore it is not indeterminate or vague. I distinguish the consequence: it is not indeterminate subjectively or entitatively, I grant; terminatively, I deny the consequence. For it is not connected with a determinate form, but with some one of several. The matter is clear and occurs in a thousand examples, both of elicited appetite and of natural connection, which is often vague terminatively, for example the connection of freedom with love or hatred.

15. It is replied 2º: Matter desires form in the manner in which form can exist; but form cannot exist unless determinate, for it is repugnant that anything exist in reality indeterminately and vaguely. Therefore matter

desires a determinate form. I distinguish the major premise: one form rather than others, I deny; one form from among many, which is individual and designable while it exists, I grant the major premise. Then I distinguish the minor premise: unless determinate, that is, one rather than others, I deny; unless determinate, that is, individual and designable, whichever it may be, I grant the minor premise; and I likewise distinguish the consequence. Accordingly, matter desires that there be given to it a form which, while it exists, is truly individual and designable, and therefore determinate. Yet since several determinate forms are possible, any of which suffices for matter, matter does not determine one rather than others, but leaves this determination to other causes, especially the First Cause. Examples and parallel cases are found in elicited appetite and in every vague connection with a term depending upon determination by another.

16. I warn, however, that indeterminate connection, and the same applies to appetite, must not be confused with conditional connection, as though it demanded one extreme only on condition that the other is not given. For they differ 1º because an indeterminate connection can efficaciously infer one of several terms, whereas a conditional connection absolutely infers nothing until the condition is posited, but meanwhile is, as it were, suspended. Nor must it infer the condition itself or its absence, otherwise it will already be an absolute connection. 2º Because where a properly conditional connection is present, the condition must be posited before the conditioned thing is posited. But an indeterminate connection is often borne toward extremes such that the exclusion of one is not prior but posterior to the positing of the other; and then one is improperly said to be required on condition that the other is not given. This happens in the present matter, for the exclusion of one form from matter does not precede but follows upon the introduction of another form.

17. 3º Because there is often a vague connection with immediately contradictory extremes, for example the connection of God with the world or with the absence of the world. But then conditional connection has no place. For one would ineptly say that the world is required on condition that the absence of the world is lacking, since it is formally the same thing for the absence of the world to be lacking as for the world to be given. One may say: When there is a vague connection inferring one of two things, we truly conclude that one is given if the other is not given. I admit this. But this mode of speaking is not properly conditional, but argumentative or inferential *a posteriori*. Thus this proposition, "If Peter speaks, he has a tongue," is not conditional as though Peter's speaking were the condition for his having a tongue; but it is argumentative and should be explained thus:

"Peter speaks, therefore he has a tongue." In the same way the following proposition in the present matter must be explained: "Matter, if it does not have this form, has another."

Prime Matter Equally Desires All Forms by an Efficacious Appetite; Yet by an Inefficacious Appetite It Desires More Perfect Forms More.

18. Thus I reconcile the contrary opinions of authors, some of whom absolutely maintain that matter desires more perfect forms more than less perfect ones, while most absolutely deny this. I call an efficacious appetite one which infers the positing of the term unless a stronger cause prevents it, that is, one which suffers violence if it is frustrated; and an inefficacious appetite one which can lack its effect without violence, after the manner of a simple velleity or elicited inclination. The first part is therefore proved 1º from the natural indifference to all sublunary forms which all acknowledge in matter. For such indifference cannot stand with an efficacious appetite for these species of forms rather than others, so that under some it is content and under others in a violent state. Thus a stone is not naturally indifferent to upward or downward motion.

19. The point is pressed: No one denies that any form whatsoever is a connatural good for matter. But it would not be so if matter efficaciously desired a vital form, for example, rather than a non-vital one. This is clear first by reason, because that cannot be a connatural good for matter which makes matter be in a violent state and deprives it of a good efficaciously desired, as a non-vital form existing in matter would do. It is also clear by example, for heat is not connatural to water precisely because it deprives water of cold, which water efficaciously desires, and thereby makes it be in a violent state.

20. 2º Because from the contrary opinion it would follow that all individual matters of the whole world are actually in a violent state except those which are informed by rational souls; indeed even these too would be in a violent state because they are deprived of other possible souls more perfect than those which in fact exist. But the consequence is absurd and appears to be admitted by no one. An efficacious appetite would have been given to matter in vain if by the direct intention of the Author of nature it were always violated. 3º Because an efficacious appetite for more perfect forms would be inordinate, both because it would be insatiable and because it would be contrary to the good of the whole Universe, which of itself requires variety and inequality of forms. But innate appetite cannot be inordinate, as we noted above. From these points you will infer that the

efficacious appetite of matter tends only toward forms under the generic notion of a substantial complement, which notion is equally verified in each.

21. The second part is proved. The equine form, for example, according to the specific perfection by which it exceeds the form of a stone, is a connatural good for matter. But innate appetite is founded upon or consists in connaturality, as was said above with St. Thomas. Therefore matter innately desires the equine form according to its excess of perfection over the form of a stone, and consequently by an appetite not common and indifferent to both but special and greater. The consequence appears legitimate, the minor premise indubitable, and the major premise sufficiently clear. For the specific perfection of the equine form undoubtedly perfects matter, and indeed connaturally, since it is of itself instituted to perfect it.

22. The point is pressed: The equine form naturally perfects matter more than the form of a stone. Therefore it is a naturally more useful and advantageous good for matter. But matter cannot fail to have a special innate inclination toward a good naturally more useful to it and harmful by no title. This is clear both from connaturality itself and by parity with elicited appetite, and indeed with a right and prudent appetite, after whose likeness we conceive innate appetite. One may say: Elicited appetite is said to distinguish by cognition between a greater and lesser good, whereas innate appetite does not. But on the contrary, innate appetite is directed by the cognition of the Author of nature, by virtue of which, just as He distinguishes between good and evil, that is, between advantageous and disadvantageous, He can also distinguish between greater and lesser good.

23. But against the first part one may object 1º from these very arguments which we gave for the second. I answer: These prove some innate appetite, but not an efficacious one. For a natural efficacious appetite is founded upon need, that is, the necessity of having a good without which the subject cannot be deprived without violence. But a more perfect form is a useful good in such a way that it is not necessary, but can be denied without violence; otherwise the appetite for it would already be inordinate, as we showed in the proof of the first part. Thus air innately desires light, but inefficaciously. Thus also the human intellect inefficaciously and innately desires to grow in knowledge; for if it efficaciously desired this, it would be in a violent state unless it perpetually grew in knowledge.

24. It is objected 2º: Elicited appetite can be efficacious concerning a more useful good even though it is not necessary. Therefore innate appetite can likewise be such. I deny the consequence, at least concerning the appetite of matter for a more perfect form, for it would be inordinate if it

were efficacious, and innate appetite does not imitate elicited appetite to the point of becoming inordinate. And indeed an efficacious elicited appetite would likewise be imprudent if it were contrary to the common good and exposed itself to perpetual frustration.

25. It is objected 3º: The ultimate disposition of matter for a rational soul efficaciously desires this rather than other forms. Therefore matter likewise desires it, since matter is more perfect than an accidental disposition. I deny the consequence, because the efficacy of innate appetite concerning the better term is not taken from the perfection of the desiring subject, but from other grounds, especially from need, at least when the appetite does not physically cause the term but begs it from another.

26. It is objected 4º: Matter efficaciously desires the form of a stone because it is perfected by it; but it is more perfected by the form of a horse. Therefore it desires the latter more efficaciously; for, as the proverb says, ″As the unqualified stands to the unqualified, so the greater to the greater.″ Confirmation: For the same reason matter more efficaciously desires a substantial form than an accidental form. I distinguish the major premise: because it is perfected in any way whatsoever, I deny; because it is perfected by a necessary perfection, that is, one which matter absolutely needs, I grant the major premise. Then I distinguish the minor premise: it is more perfected by a non-necessary perfection, I grant; by a necessary one, I deny the minor premise and consequence. The attached proverb holds unless the same motive increases. The confirmation asserts something false, because matter can no more exist without every accidental form than without every substantial form; or if it needs the latter more than the former, there is already a disparity with our case.

27. Against the second part it is objected 1º: ″Every appetite is because of need,″ as St. Thomas says, *Physics* I, lect. 15. But matter does not need a more perfect form as such. Therefore it does not desire it in any way. It is objected 2º: An appetite for a more perfect form, although inefficacious, will be insatiable, perpetually frustrated, and contrary to the good of the Universe, for the reason given above concerning efficacious appetite. Therefore it will be inordinate. It is objected 3º: Innate appetite is not precisive. Therefore it is repugnant that it tend toward the same form efficaciously under the generic notion of a substantial complement and inefficaciously under the specific notion. And indeed otherwise it would follow that an appetite entitatively one with respect to the same term would be efficacious and inefficacious.

28. I answer 1º: St. Thomas there speaks of efficacious appetite, which imports connection; for in general the Holy Doctor does not found innate

appetite upon need but upon connaturality, for example Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 26, a. 1, corp. To 2^{o}: An inefficacious appetite, just as it does not imply hunger, anxiety, or unrest from deprivation of the good, but only a slight inclination prepared gladly to receive the good if it is given, so it is not properly satiable or insatiable. Nor is it properly frustrated, because it does not imply an effort or striving which becomes vain. Nor, finally, is it contrary to the good of the Universe, since it causes nothing nor infers any disadvantage to the Universe. Indeed, it is advantageous to the Universe that whenever more perfect forms ought to exist, matter should receive them, as it were, gladly, even as regards the excess of perfection, as a good connatural to itself.

29. I answer 3^{o}: The contrary opinion itself supplies a manifest parallel. For if matter in no way desires the specific perfection of a vital form, for example, then the appetite of matter so prescinds in a vital form the generic notion from the specific that it is borne efficaciously toward the generic and in no way toward the specific; likewise it will simultaneously be and not be an appetite with respect to the same term. Therefore that appetite does not prescind, except at most fundamentally, insofar as it provides the foundation for us to prescind, but is such that it is truly said: Matter absolutely needs some form from among all forms, whichever it may be; nor does it need a nobler form more than an inferior one, although it would receive the former more gladly if it were given. Hence the same nobler form receives from the same appetite of matter the denominations ″efficaciously desired″ and ″inefficaciously desired″; but it receives the first denomination jointly with other inferior forms, with which it constitutes one vague subject, whereas it receives the second apart from inferior forms. Therefore there is no contradiction or opposition, because there is a real inadequate distinction on the part of the subjects.

30. But one may still object: If matter is more inclined toward some forms, it ought to prefer material forms to spiritual ones, since they are more akin to matter and in them matter exercises the function of material cause. I answer: This whole greater affinity and fittingness of causality does not prevent matter from being perfected more by a rational soul, and indeed by a connatural perfection. Therefore affinity and causality are not only compensated for, but are connaturally exchanged for something better and thus more worthy of the inclination of matter.

The Innate Appetite of Prime Matter Discussed
Thus Far Is an Appetite of Desire.

31. The assertion is common and is proved because the appetite of matter procures form and tends toward it that it may be, that is, that it may be acquired; and it moves God to bestow the form. All these are properties of desire as distinguished from other appetites, from what was said in nn. 1 and 3. Nor does matter desire at instant A, for example, only those forms which it does not possess; it also desires the form which it actually has, namely by the vague appetite discussed above. Nor does it desire it only for subsequent instants, as some maintain, but also for this same instant; it desires it, I say, in the sign prior to the form.

32. The reason is that in the prior sign matter is understood to desire by a vaguely procurative appetite which also infers that very form which posteriorly exists. For such a form exists at the requirement of the presupposed appetite, by which it is vaguely inferred and caused, either physically if the form is material, or morally if the form is spiritual. But an appetite of this sort is neither joy nor love in the strict sense. Therefore it is desire. Nor does it matter that in the prior sign there is no positive absence of the form existing posteriorly, for precisive absence suffices, from nn. 2 and 3. This must be admitted at least in innate appetite, whatever may be true of elicited appetite, since it is certain that prior to the form of fire, for example, there is in matter an appetite as it were practical and operative of such a form, not only in the first instant in which the form is acquired, but also in every instant in which it is conserved in matter.

33. One may nevertheless object: In the posterior sign there is in matter joy over the present form. Therefore in the prior sign there cannot be desire concerning the same form, lest otherwise there concur in the same instant and subject desire and joy concerning the same term, and consequently rest and unrest, thirst and satiety. I admit the antecedent and deny the consequence. For such concurrence of desire and joy is not repugnant even in elicited appetites. Suppose God were to reveal to me that He would give me Grace at the instant in which I desired it. Then at the same instant I could have desire and joy concerning the same Grace, as to be obtained and as obtained. Therefore positive thirst or unrest is not of the essence of desire, but at most precisive thirst or unrest, that is, prescission from the rest and satiety which supervenes posteriorly.

34. This is easily understood at least in innate desire. For the innate desire of matter is nothing other than the appetite procuring form; and innate joy, if there is such, is the same appetite insofar as already joined with form. But there is no greater difficulty in there being, for the same instant, in matter an appetite procuring form from which of itself it prescinds, and in the posterior sign being joined with form, than in matter for the same instant prescinding of itself from form and requiring it, and in the posterior sign possessing form; and all agree in this. But if St. Thomas sometimes denies that matter desires form "insofar as it is under that form," he is speaking of matter reduplicating the form itself as the reason for desiring, namely by an appetite of desire.

Prime Matter Also Has Innate Joy in a Present Form, Though Very Improperly.

35. This is proved because the appetite of matter insofar as it already possesses form is an appetite at rest and satiated and, as it were, content with possession. Therefore it has some likeness to delight or elicited joy. For, as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 31, a. 8, ad 2: "Delight stands in the affections of the soul as natural rest does in bodies, for it is in something fitting and as it were connatural. Sadness, however, stands as violent rest, etc." But this likeness suffices for the metaphorical name of joy, just as pleasantness in meadows suffices for the name "laughter."

36. This manner of speaking, however, is in the present matter "very improper" because of the immense dissimilarity between innate and elicited joy. For 1º elicited joy presupposes a possessed good, whereas innate joy is intrinsically constituted by possession itself. 2º Elicited joy is an act adequately distinct from desire for the same good, whereas innate joy is that very appetite of desire, with this difference alone, that innate appetite insofar as prescinding from form is desire, and insofar as implying possession of form is joy. 3º Elicited joy is adequately distinct from its term, whereas innate joy is not distinguished from the term except according to the direct aspect, namely according to the entity of matter. Therefore innate joy is not so much to be compared with formal elicited joy as with fundamental elicited joy, namely that foundation from which elicited joy commonly results; and that foundation is the very entity of the subject as possessing the good.

37. Hence the innate joy of matter involves the same constituents as the whole Composite, although it imports them differently. For the Composite directly imports both form and matter; joy, however, directly signifies matter

and indirectly form together with union. Hence matter alone receives the denomination of rejoicing, not form nor the whole composite, just as Peter's likeness to Paul denominates only Peter as like Paul, although it is constituted through Paul; and formal truth, although constituted from act and object, denominates only the act as true, for denomination falls upon the direct aspect. See what we said in Logic concerning predicamental Relation, where you will find solved whatever could be objected here.

There Is in Matter No Real Appetite for Forms after the Manner of Love in the Strict Sense.

38. The reason is that love in the strict sense, as it is commonly explained, tends toward a good according to itself in such a way that it cares nothing about its possession or acquisition. But in matter there is no appetite of this kind for forms, except insofar as they are a connatural good of matter, that is, naturally useful or necessary to it. Yet it is repugnant in terms that anyone should desire a good as naturally useful or necessary to himself and nevertheless care in no way about acquiring it. Therefore even that inefficacious appetite for a more perfect form which we acknowledged in matter is not love in the strict sense but inefficacious desire; because although it does not properly strive to acquire, its whole inclination is nevertheless toward acquisition.

39. It is objected 1º: According to St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 26, a. 1, corp., "In natural appetite... the connaturality of the one desiring to that toward which it tends can be called natural love, just as the connaturality of a heavy body to the middle place." Therefore the connaturality of matter to form can be called natural love. It is objected 2º: Love is the root of desire and of the other affections; but in matter there is innate desire. Therefore there is also innate love. It is objected 3º: Matter in the prior sign desires form while prescinding from its absence or presence. But an appetite prescinding from the presence or absence of the term is love in the strict sense. Therefore.

40. I answer 1º: St. Thomas speaks of love not insofar as it is a particular species diverse from desire, which is called "love in the strict sense," but insofar as it is a notion found in every appetite for good and consequently in desire, which truly is love. Or otherwise: he speaks not of love as it were speculative, such as love in the strict sense, but of practical love, that is, love procuring the good, which is desire. But if one wishes mentally to prescind in innate appetite the formality of love from its procurative force and so call it "love in the strict sense," I allow it. Yet such love in the strict sense, as a

species really distinct from desire, will not thereby exist. To 2º, I distinguish the major premise: if the discussion is of elicited affections, I grant; if of innate appetite, I deny the major premise; and, granting the minor premise, I deny the consequence concerning love in the strict sense.

41. To 3º, I distinguish the major premise: prescinding from its absence or presence and caring about neither, I deny; while caring about the presence of the good to be obtained posteriorly, I grant the major premise. Then I distinguish the minor premise: if the appetite so prescinds as not to infer the presence of the term, I grant; if it infers or procures it, I deny the minor premise and consequence. The prescission proper to love in the strict sense consists in the mode of tending of an appetite wholly unconcerned with possession. But such prescission does not exist in the appetite of matter. Therefore in the prior sign there is only the prescission proper to a cause in first act capable of causing; and this prescission contributes nothing to love in the strict sense.

Inferences from What Has Been Said.

42. 1º What we have said of the appetite of matter for substantial forms must be understood likewise of accidents which dispose it for those forms; for these accidents are desired by matter as means to an end. 2º The innate desire of matter in the remote sign, concerning which see above n. 40, is adequately identified with matter, in contrast with innate joy, which indirectly imports the united form. The reason is that if you consider matter alone according to itself, you will find a natural connection with form, which it requires and procures. But such a connection is innate desire. Nor should one object that innate desire is constituted through prescission from form. For this prescission, taken really, is nothing other than matter's being really distinct from form and indifferent to the various species of forms as their cause; and all this consists in matter alone.

43. 3º This same innate desire is never intrinsically varied, nor does it change its mode of tending, but of itself always tends indeterminately toward all forms; and while it possesses the form of fire, for example, it actually desires all the others, without thereby being in a violent state, for the reason given in n. 13. There is, however, this difference between the form actually possessed and the other absent forms: matter desires the latter by the appetite of desire alone, but the former by the appetite of both desire and joy; by desire in the prior sign, by joy in the posterior sign. This difference does not imply variety in the appetite of matter taken specifically, but consists in an adventitious denomination constituted through actual

possession of the form, which joy indirectly imports. 4º Matter also innately hates and shuns what is evil for it, namely deprivation of all forms and its own annihilation.

CHAPTER II.

Whether First Matter Desires Corrupted Forms.

1. For the proposed question, which is more difficult than the preceding ones, to have a place, it must be supposed with the common opinion (which we shall discuss more conveniently in the treatise *De ortu et interitu*) that forms once corrupted, or destroyed, cannot naturally be reproduced. For if they were naturally reproducible, there would be no reason why they should not terminate the appetite of matter. This being posited, the negative opinion is sufficiently common among the Thomists, just as the affirmative is among our authors. But it must be noted that a corrupted form can be considered in two ways: 1º specifically, or according to itself, that is, according to its intrinsic predicates, prescinding from the state of corruption; 2º reduplicatively, "as corrupted."

2. In the first sense even the Thomists are accustomed to grant that a corrupted form is desired by matter with a certain speculative appetite after the manner of love strictly so called; yet they deny a practical, or procurative, appetite. In the second sense our authors also are accustomed to deny it if corruption is reduplicated as an objective circumstance, as though the appetite of matter had to be explained thus: "Let form A be given to me, although it is corrupted," or thus: "Would that a corrupted form were reproduced in me!" The reason for denying this is that it would be to desire an impossible thing as such. If, however, corruption is reduplicated only as a subjective circumstance, insofar as the desiring subject, even while it exists in the circumstances of the corruption of the form, still desires that form taken specifically, in this sense our authors commonly grant a procurative appetite of matter for the form "as corrupted"; namely, that same vague appetite by which matter tended toward the same form before its corruption.

3. Let our conclusion be: "Matter desires a corrupted form after corruption just as before, and consequently with an appetite of innate desire." For clarity, suppose that only two forms, A and B, are possible. Before they are first produced, matter desires them with a vague, procurative, or exigent appetite that one of them, either A or B, be given to it; and this appetite is innate desire, as we showed in the preceding chapter. Then suppose that form A alone has been corrupted. Even on this

supposition, matter continues vaguely to desire forms A and B, demanding that one of them be given to it, so that the state of corruption of form A neither extinguishes nor changes the appetite of matter.

4. The proof is as follows. The innate appetite of a natural thing tends toward a good which of itself belongs to the order of nature and is connatural to the desiring thing, prescinding from circumstances by which it can accidentally be rendered naturally impossible. But form A, of itself and from itself, is a good of the order of nature and connatural to matter, and is rendered accidentally impossible only by the circumstance of corruption. Therefore the innate appetite of matter tends toward form A, prescinding from that circumstance. Therefore, whether that circumstance is present or not, the appetite of matter tends toward that form in the same manner. Both consequences are correct, and the minor premise is evident, because the natural impossibility of a corrupted form arises from the circumstance of having passed away, or from the fact that the form existed previously and has now ceased to exist. But this circumstance is extrinsic and accidental with respect to the form, which has the same essence and nature whether it has already existed or not. Consequently, considered in itself and intrinsically, even after corruption it is undoubtedly an entity of the order of nature and, if it were again given to matter, would be a good connatural to it.

5. The major premise, therefore, which contains a general doctrine very useful for many other matters, is proved first of all by the example of other things. The soul of one blind from birth innately desires sight, for every soul innately desires to have its natural faculties ready for operation; indeed, universally, every cause innately desires to exercise its natural power. Similarly, the intellect of one who is mentally deficient from his original bodily organization innately desires the use of reason in the body. Yet both sight and the use of reason are goods naturally impossible in those circumstances. Why, then, are they innately desired unless because they are goods of the order of nature and connatural to the desiring subject, rendered impossible only by an accidental impediment from which innate appetite prescinds?

6. If it is said that in these cases there is a speculative appetite, but not a practical appetite after the manner of desire, the contrary is shown by the fact that the appetite in these cases is explained by the name "exigency"; for it is commonly said that every cause demands to exercise its native power, and "exigency" is innate desire. The contrary is likewise shown by the fact that the soul and intellect of the blind person are of the same species as the souls and intellects of other men. But the souls and intellects of others identify with themselves an appetite for sight and the use of reason by way

of exigency and conatus. Therefore the same must be said here. Finally, the contrary is shown by the fact that such a soul or intellect suffers violence through blindness or mental deficiency. But there is no violence where there is no conatus and exigency toward the contrary.

7. One may add the example of a robust young man who, wounded mortally or seized by a violent disease naturally incurable, innately desires to preserve his life; for he does not perish without violence and resistance. Similarly, a drop of water cast into a furnace resists the heat for some time and suffers violence from the fire. Therefore it strives to ward off the heat from itself and desires to retain its own coldness. The reason in these cases is that both the life of the young man and the repulsion of heat are naturally impossible only because of accidental circumstances, and the appetite prescinds from these. The example of the rational soul is also relevant here: when separated from the body it innately desires to be united to the body, just as a light body desires its proper place while separated from it, as St. Thomas teaches, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 1, ad 6. Again, *Summa Theologiae* I-II^{a}, q. 85, a. 2, ad 3, he says "that even in the damned the natural inclination toward virtue remains, just as in a blind man the aptitude for seeing also remains."

8. Next, that major premise is proved in first matter itself. For in the remote sign of potency it equally and indeterminately desires the forms of fire and water for this instant. Consider matter at the beginning of the world and suppose that the elemental forms were then educed, which the Thomists grant could have occurred. And yet in the subsequent sign of the same instant, when the ultimate disposition toward fire has been posited, the form of water is already rendered naturally impossible in such matter for that instant, since it is certain that the form of water naturally cannot be in a subject having the ultimate disposition toward fire. The example is pressed and applied to the present matter. In the case proposed, matter desires the form of water, impossible for this instant, because the impossibility, insofar as it arises from the impediment of the contrary disposition, is intrinsic to the form of water, while matter, on the other hand, prescinds from such a disposition in the remote sign. But likewise the impossibility of a destroyed form, insofar as it arises from the circumstance of having passed away, is extrinsic to the form, while matter, on the other hand, prescinds from such previous existence. This last point is proved as follows. The sign of remote potency is the sign of matter according to itself insofar as it is a remote cause of the form. Hence in it one prescinds from everything that does not constitute matter in the being of a remote cause; and for this reason one prescinds from every disposition and from its absence. But the previous

existence of the form does not constitute matter in the being of a remote cause with respect to that form. Therefore, etc.

9. It may be said that innate appetite cannot prescind from the natural possibility of its term, but must rather presuppose it and exclude its absence. But I ask: how does it prescind from an ultimate contrary disposition, which in fact is the natural impossibility of the form here and now? How does it not presuppose that disposition to be excluded? It must therefore be said that innate appetite does not prescind from the intrinsic and essential natural possibility of the term, but does prescind from an extrinsic and accidental impossibility.

10. It may further be said that the impediment of a contrary disposition can naturally be removed, whereas the impediment of previous existence or destruction cannot. I answer to the contrary: the ultimate disposition toward fire also cannot be removed in this instant while the proximate efficient cause is fully ready, as I suppose. And yet the form of water in the remote sign of matter is desired for this instant. Furthermore, that disposition is removable insofar as, considering the condition of matter, it could have failed to be in this instant, although on the supposition that it is present it can no longer fail to be present in this instant. Similarly, the corruption of the form could naturally have failed to be at this time, although it can no longer fail to have occurred on the supposition that it did occur.

11. What has been said thus far is confirmed. Matter can innately desire a form when a circumstance is present which, in the composite sense, renders the form metaphysically impossible. Therefore, *a fortiori*, it can desire a form when there is a circumstance rendering it naturally impossible. The antecedent is proved. Let God determine by an irrevocable decree never to produce form A, which is in itself naturally possible and has never yet been produced. In the composite sense of that decree, form A is metaphysically impossible. And yet it is desired by matter with the vague appetite of desire together with the other possible forms, as the adversaries grant and as cannot reasonably be denied. Therefore, etc. From this it becomes clear what I said in n. 2 about an "objective and subjective circumstance." The circumstance of the divine decree is not on the side of the object in such a way that the appetite tends thus: "Let form A be given to me, although God has decreed never to give it," for that would be to desire an extraordinary chimera. Nevertheless it is on the side of the desiring subject, so that this subject continues to desire when the decree exists just as if it did not exist.

12. The adversaries say that matter prescinds from that decree and desires the form, not as to be possessed in the composite sense of the

decree, but as antecedently possible. But why does matter not similarly desire the corrupted form, not as to be possessed in the composite sense of corruption, but as possible according to itself? There is certainly no less reason for matter to prescind from the circumstance of destruction than from the circumstance of the decree. For if destruction is a naturally contingent impediment, so also is the decree; it is neither supernatural nor contrary to any natural exigency, since there is no natural exigency that form A determinately be produced, and matter is satisfied by any other form, since it desires only some form vaguely. Otherwise God, as Author of nature, would be bound to produce all possible forms. Moreover, if the decree is an extrinsic impossibility which could have failed to exist, so also is destruction. If the decree leaves the form possible according to itself and antecedently, so too does destruction, because it is no less true that the form is contained in the power of natural causes antecedently to its destruction and prescinding from it than antecedently to the decree and prescinding from that decree.

13. Finally, the reason *a priori* is that innate appetite does not cease so long as proportion and connaturality remain. But these remain the same in matter with respect to form A after its corruption as before. First, because that proportion is adequately identified with matter and with the quiddity of the form according to itself, for it consists in the intrinsic adaptation of each to the other. Second, because if form A were again given to matter after corruption, it would complete matter just as well, just as fittingly, and just as connaturally as before.

14. To this pertains the syllogism of St. Thomas, *Physica* I, lect. 15: "Natural appetite is nothing other than the ordering of certain things according to their proper nature toward their end. . . . But form is the end of matter. Therefore, for matter to desire form is nothing other than for matter to be ordered toward form as potency toward act." Hence I argue thus. After destruction, form does not cease to be the end and act of matter. Therefore matter does not cease, according to its proper nature, to be ordered toward it, and consequently does not cease to desire it. The antecedent is proved because, if the destroyed form were miraculously reproduced, matter would be just as truly actuated by it as before destruction and would fully attain its end; otherwise it would be in a violent state, as being frustrated of what is its own, which no one would say.

Contrary Arguments.

15. All the arguments are reduced to this one, which is customarily pressed in various ways. A destroyed form is naturally impossible, as we suppose. But natural appetite does not tend toward a naturally impossible good. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved. Natural appetite, since it is directed by the Author of nature, cannot be disordered, imprudent, and useless. But it would be so if it desired a naturally impossible good. This is proved, 1º by comparison with elicited appetite, which cannot tend toward a good known as impossible except imprudently; hence Aristotle says, "Only fools will impossible things"; 2º because a natural appetite is utterly useless if it must necessarily be frustrated by the law of nature. Yet this argument is first of all countered by the appetite of matter for a form which God has decreed never to produce; for, once this decree is posited, that form is far more impossible than a destroyed form.

16. Next I distinguish the major premise. It is naturally impossible essentially and intrinsically: I deny this. It is accidentally and extrinsically impossible: I grant the major premise. Likewise I distinguish the minor premise. Natural appetite does not tend toward a good naturally impossible essentially and intrinsically, such as supernatural entities: I grant this. It does not tend toward a good naturally impossible accidentally and extrinsically: I distinguish. It does not tend toward it as to be possessed in the composite sense of such impossibility: I grant this. It does not tend toward it prescinding from such impossibility: I deny the minor premise and the consequence. The adversaries themselves must say exactly this in the case of the divine decree just mentioned. I deny, however, that an appetite tending in this manner toward an impossible good is disordered.

17. Nor do the proofs stand. Not the first, because when a good is known as impossible, impossibility is already proposed as an objective circumstance and therefore renders the appetite imprudent. Yet if the good is known as possible according to itself, prescinding from circumstances by which it may happen to be rendered impossible, it can prudently be desired, and usually is. For we often prudently desire and ask of God goods which God has decreed never to give and which therefore are now impossible, because we prescind from such a decree.

18. Not the second, because it is true only if it speaks of the law of nature antecedent to accidentally contingent suppositions. In this sense we deny that in our case the appetite must be frustrated by the law of nature. But if it

speaks of the law of nature consequent upon accidental suppositions, such as the law not to produce form A on the supposition that it has been corrupted, it is false that an appetite frustrated by such a law is useless. For it serves to manifest the intrinsic and invariable character and nature both of the desiring subject and of the term, together with the connaturality obtaining between them, as may be seen in the soul of a blind person and in the intellect of one mentally deficient. Indeed, otherwise the appetite in the case of the divine decree would be far more useless, since it must be frustrated by metaphysical necessity.

19. A first reply may be urged: a natural appetite to which no natural agent can give satisfaction, not even God as Author of nature, is repugnant; but such would be an appetite for a destroyed form. A second reply: innate appetite presupposes in matter a natural passive potency, and to this there must correspond a natural active potency. But there is no natural active potency for a corrupted form. Therefore, etc. A third reply: if matter desires the form after corruption just as before, it desires it by an efficacious desire, or true exigency, implying a connection with the form. But from this it follows, 1º that matter efficaciously opposes the exigency of the whole universe demanding that a corrupted form not be produced; 2º that the same form is naturally due and naturally not due: due because of the exigency of matter, not due because of the exigency of the universe; 3º that matter after corruption desires the means necessary to obtain the form, for such is the character of efficacious appetite. But after corruption, in order to obtain the form, a supernatural decree of God and a reproduction of the form are necessary. Therefore these means are desired by matter.

20. To all these, besides the manifest counterexample from the case of the divine decree discussed above, an easy answer can be given from what has been said. To the first: it is sufficient for natural appetite that a natural agent be able to satisfy it in the sense in which the appetite itself regards the term, although it cannot do so in another sense. But the appetite of matter regards the destroyed form only taken specifically, prescinding from the state of destruction. In this sense that form is truly contained in the power of natural agents just as it was contained before destruction, for that power remains intrinsically unchanged and is merely extrinsically bound and impeded by the circumstance of the form's destruction. It is true that a natural agent cannot produce the form on the supposition of this circumstance. But the appetite does not tend under such a supposition on the side of the object; rather, it prescinds from it.

21. We therefore say the same about natural active power as about the appetite of matter, namely, that in the composite sense of the destruction of

the form it truly can produce that form, but it cannot produce the form in the composite sense of destruction. That is, the power itself is compatible with destruction, but it is not a power for making the form compatible with a preceding destruction, just as the power of speaking is compatible with silence, but cannot make speech compatible with silence. Hence, to the second: there truly remains in matter a natural passive potency for the form after its destruction just as before, and to it there truly corresponds a natural active potency in the sense just explained.

22. To the third: the appetite of which we speak is indeed efficacious and implies a connection with the destroyed form, but only vaguely with that form and with others not destroyed, as we have often remarked. Hence it does not oppose the exigency of the universe, first because it can be satisfied without violence or complaint by another form not corrupted; second because the exigency of the universe excludes only the form as to be produced on the supposition of corruption, whereas the appetite does not demand it in that sense. Nor is a destroyed form naturally due and not due in the same sense, but at most in different senses, according to what has been said. Indeed, because of the exigency of matter it is due only in a very improper sense even when taken specifically, since it is due merely indeterminately together with infinitely many other forms not yet produced, any one of which satisfies that exigency. Finally, that appetite does not demand a supernatural decree or reproduction as such, because these are means only to the form as possessed in the composite sense of prior destruction, under which aspect the form is not desired.

23. I say "reproduction as such," because if reproduction is not an action different in substance from first production, it too can be desired according to itself by matter, though not reduplicatively as reproduction, because as such it presupposes prior destruction. Thus a form destroyed yesterday could originally have been produced today by an entirely natural decree and natural action, for that form is not essentially tied to a determinate time. Therefore a natural decree and a natural action rendering that form existent today are possible, if not on the supposition of destruction, at least prescinding from it and considering the intrinsic merits of the form. This decree and this action, therefore, are the means through which the destroyed form is desired, not other means which presuppose destruction.

24. To forestall other objections, observe 1º that a corrupted form is rendered naturally impossible for no other reason than that natural agents always demand to propagate their species and to exercise their power through new effects. This the universe also demands for the sake of its greater beauty, which results from such variety and novelty. Hence it is not

rendered impossible because of any defect of power in the agents, as though it could no longer be contained in the causes once it had been placed outside the causes, as some philosophize rather feebly. For to be placed outside the causes is not to be drawn out of them like a coin from a chest, but to pass from non-being to being through an action essentially dependent upon the power of the causes, without any need for this power to lose any part of itself. Therefore this power remains as entire after the existence and corruption of the effect as before, as is evident in the divine omnipotence.

25. Observe 2º that a destroyed form is not absolutely naturally impossible, because "absolutely" means the same as "essentially" and "antecedently" to every accidental supposition. It is therefore naturally impossible only with the qualification "accidentally," "extrinsically," or "on the supposition"; and this impossibility does not impede innate appetite, as we have shown. Observe 3º that the formal specifying and motive object of innate appetite does not fail because the natural possibility of the term fails through an accidental circumstance. For the motive of natural appetite is only a good which of itself and from itself belongs to the order of nature and is connatural to the desiring subject. Observe 4º that matter A likewise innately desires forms possessed by other matters. For although they are no longer naturally possible for this matter, since they cannot migrate from one subject to another, this impossibility is accidental.

26. Observe 5º that when we say that the appetite of matter prescinds from the accidental impossibility of the form, we are not speaking of a mental precision, but, so to speak, of an omissive precision, insofar as the appetite of matter in regarding the form behaves as though it did not care about or attend to circumstances by which the form may perhaps accidentally be rendered impossible. In this manner also, according to the adversaries, it prescinds from the divine decree not to produce the form. The reason that this appetite takes no account of such circumstances is that they do not remove the proportion of matter to such a form and, moreover, allow the appetite to be satisfied by infinitely many others. Yet if no form remained except those destroyed, then matter would recoil from and, with a certain innate hatred, reject the circumstance of the forms' destruction, just as the soul recoils from blindness or mental deficiency.

27. Finally, nothing turns for us on whether there can or cannot be a conditional innate appetite, namely one demanding a term only on condition that this or that circumstance be present, such as perhaps the appetite of fire for burning wood on condition of proximity. Whatever be said of this, the appetite of matter for forms, although vague, is not conditional, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Moreover, if matter desired none of the forms except

on condition that it had not been destroyed, it would follow that matter of itself would be prepared to demand no form but to rest in the privation of all forms if it happened that all had been destroyed. Although this hypothesis is repugnant because of the infinitude of forms, it involves nothing contrary to the essence of matter and is undoubtedly useful for examining its character. The consequence, however, will be absurd even to the adversaries, as will appear from the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.

Whether First Matter Can Naturally Be Deprived of Every Form.

1. It is now asked how efficacious the appetite of matter is, and whether matter can, without a miracle, be deprived of every form. Some of the ancients cited by the Excellent Doctor, disp. 15, *Metaphysica*, sect. 8, affirm this, and some more recent authors follow them, at least if only the exigency of matter is considered, although perhaps this cannot occur given the constitution of natural agents. The true opinion, however, and by far the most common throughout every school, holds the connection of matter with form to be so great that it cannot be violated without a miracle; or, what is the same, that matter cannot by the action of any natural agent be deprived of every form. Of physical connections, some can be violated by a stronger action of natural causes, such as the connection of water with cold or of the soul with the faculty of sight; others are essentially indefectible, such as the connection of union with its extremes; others are indefectible without a miracle, that is, incapable of being frustrated by any natural cause or in any natural event, such as the connection of the sun with brightness or of fire with heat. We compare the connection of matter with form, at the very least, to these last.

2. The true opinion can therefore be shown thus from the Excellent Doctor, loc. cit. There is no repugnance in matter's standing in such need of the complement of form that without it matter cannot naturally exist. Therefore the matter which actually exists is such. The antecedent is evident, because such need and dependence is so far from involving a contradiction that it is rather highly consonant with the imperfection, incompletion, and potentiality of matter. The consequence is established as follows. The matter which actually exists has every title of exigency and natural need that can be conceived in any other possible matter. For the Peripatetics suppose it to be the most imperfect substance and almost nothing, incomplete, empty, wholly ordered toward form and awaiting it as the complement of its own genus, incapable of compensating for the lack of

form by any other good, and finally placed in the nature of things for the end of constituting a substantial composite with form. But if these titles do not ground a need and exigency naturally inseparable from form, what other titles will there be under which a first subject could be conceived as more dependent upon form?

3. Confirmation 1º: matter cannot naturally exist without quantity, as all suppose. Therefore neither can it exist without substantial form. The consequence is proved because there seems to be a stronger reason for matter to demand substantial form than to demand quantity. For form is the complement of its own genus, namely the substantial; quantity is a complement of a different genus, namely the accidental. Matter is ordered primarily and more principally to form, secondarily to quantity. Matter regards form as an end, quantity as a means. Finally, in possessing form it exercises its most eminent potency and is rendered more useful to the universe than by possessing quantity. Confirmation 2º: the same is shown by comparison with any substance that cannot naturally exist without its own properties, such as the sun without light or fire without heat; for no stronger title of connection appears in fire than in matter.

4. It may be said that fire is so strongly connected with heat because heat is its connatural property, produced by emanation, just as quantity is with respect to matter. But I ask: what does the title of property or emanation contribute to the connatural state of a thing? Is it that a property pertains to the connatural state of a thing? But union with form also undoubtedly constitutes matter in its connatural state. Is it that emanation is a certain necessary result? But why must the result of heat be more necessary with respect to fire than union with form with respect to matter? Add that there can be a naturally indefectible connection with a posterior term without any emanation. For fire applied to a combustible subject is necessarily connected with combustion, which is neither an emanation nor arises through emanation.

5. Confirmation 3º: when some term is always and everywhere granted to a potency, it must be regarded as naturally necessary, at least when there is otherwise the strongest congruity on the side of that potency, as there is on the side of matter by reason of its imperfection and potentiality. Thus, because the sun is always joined with light, fire with heat, and snow with cold, we believe these things to be naturally necessary. But substantial form is always and everywhere granted to matter, and no one has ever seen or experienced matter deprived of every form. Therefore, etc. This proof is customarily attacked in many ways.

6. It may be said, 1º that no one has traversed all lands or had a revelation that matter has never or nowhere existed without form. But this is frivolous, for on the same ground one could rightly say that it is uncertain whether somewhere among the nations fire is cold or snow is hot. It may be said, 2º that many things are naturally possible which nevertheless will never occur. Perhaps natural agents more powerful than those present are also possible, and by their action the exigency of matter could be violated. But one sees that by this same route it could be denied that fire necessarily becomes hot or that the sun necessarily shines. We learn physical connections from effect and experience, for we cannot behold the intimate essences of things in themselves. Tell me why fire is more closely connected with heat than water with cold, which is also a property produced by water through emanation. Either, therefore, every naturally indefectible physical connection must be denied, or our proof must stand.

7. Accordingly, whatever may be true of other things that will never occur, certainly when there is question of the term of some potency, whether active or passive, if nature always grants the term because of the need or exigency of such a potency, this sufficiently proves a naturally indefectible connection. But the alleged natural possibility of stronger agents capable of violating such a connection is uncertain, nor can recourse to it be admitted in questions of this kind when there is no positive foundation in the things known to us; otherwise a large part of Physics would have to be abolished. It is therefore enough that it be established that, in the present constitution of things, a certain connection cannot be violated without a miracle for it to be asserted absolutely to be naturally inviolable.

8. It may be said, 3º that it may arise from the exigency of the natural agents always surrounding matter that matter never loses one form without receiving another, and consequently this need not arise from an exigency of matter. But if natural agents so greatly demand to produce a form in matter in order to exercise their power or propagate their species, much more will that exigency be fitting to matter, whose chief interest it is to possess form. Nor is it unfitting that with respect to the same term there be a twofold determination or exigency, one on the side of the agent, another on the side of the subject, as all admit occurs at least when matter is ultimately disposed.

9. It may be said, 4º that matter once existed without form, namely at the beginning of the world, according to Gen.: "But the earth was empty and void," which is equivalent to "Matter was without form," as some Fathers seem to suggest. But this interpretation is both incredible and forced, as Fathers Cornelius a Lapide and Pereira show. Sts. Basil and Augustine are

customarily cited for it without justification. For Basil, hom. 2, *Hexaemeron*, calls it a perversion and corruption of the text, while Augustine in several places cited by Fr. Suárez, loc. cit., n. 14, says that matter did not precede form by any duration or interval. The sense of the text, therefore, is that in the beginning the earth was empty of the beauty of flowers and the adornment of plants.

10. Finally, it may be said that when a man dies from a sudden wound, matter remains for a time without form, because a cause sufficient to expel the soul is present but no cause sufficient to produce a new form so suddenly. This difficulty will be explained below in disp. 4, where we treat the form of corporeity in living things; for the form of a corpse is customarily attacked under this head, namely because of the defect of a productive cause in sudden death. For now it is enough to say that no author dares assert that matter in the death of living things commonly remains without any substantial form, for that would be absurd and paradoxical in Philosophy, as the Excellent Doctor says. Therefore those who deny that a new form of the corpse is introduced simultaneously assert that the form of corporeity remains in matter. The perpetual experience discussed in n. 5 is therefore not weakened on this ground.

Contrary Arguments Are Solved.

11. Objection 1º: matter is produced by an action independent of form and is partially subsistent. Therefore it will be able naturally to exist without form. The consequence is proved by comparison with the rational soul, which, because it is produced by a creative action independent of matter and is partially subsistent, can naturally exist without matter despite its incompletion and intrinsic order toward matter. I answer: the creative action of matter, like matter itself, is indeed independent of form *a priori*, that is, as of a cause; nevertheless it depends upon form *a posteriori*, that is, as upon a naturally due complement. Thus matter depends upon quantity, fire upon heat, and the soul upon its potencies. Nor is it relevant that matter is partially subsistent, because this does not remove its need of a connatural complement. There is no parity with the rational soul, because the argument proceeds from the greater to the lesser as though it said: the soul, being spiritual and highly perfect, does not depend upon matter; therefore matter, although most imperfect and existing wholly for the sake of constituting a composite with form, does not depend upon form. That inference is inept.

12. The soul, therefore, can naturally be separated from matter, not precisely because it is created and subsists, but because it is a spiritual

intellectual substance and can exercise its most noble operations better outside the body than within it. For within the body it cannot know substantial and spiritual things quidditatively and intuitively, indeed not even itself; but it can do so outside the body. Therefore the detriment of incompletion which it suffers from separation from the body is abundantly compensated by so great a gain in intellectual power. But what good does matter have without form except sheer nakedness and emptiness? Add that experience alone suffices for the disparity between matter and the rational soul, just as experience alone is given as the reason when one asks why fire is more closely connected with heat than water with cold.

13. Other examples of incomplete things which can exist without their complements are customarily objected to us here. But we do not argue from just any incompletion, but from one which is the poorest in its own substantial genus, implies the emptiness of that perfection to which alone it is destined by nature, and cannot compensate for its lack by any other good. Such an incompletion, joined to the perpetual experience of the conjunction of matter with form, is for us a most efficacious argument, incapable of being weakened by any example, and no stronger one will be found for the connection of fire with heat or for any other physical connection.

14. Objection 2º: matter cannot depend upon form *a posteriori*. Therefore, since it does not depend upon it *a priori*, it does not depend upon it in any way. The antecedent is proved, 1º: whatever depends *a posteriori* upon some term thereby has the power to produce such a term by emanation, as is evident in fire with respect to heat and from constant induction. But matter does not produce form by emanation. Therefore, etc. Certainly it is fitting that each thing should of itself have sufficient power to acquire terms upon which it necessarily depends; otherwise it will depend simultaneously upon extrinsic agents from which it must receive the terms due to it. 2º: to depend *a posteriori* is to depend as upon an effect. But not every form is an effect of matter, even as a material cause, as is seen in the rational soul. 3º: if form is naturally due to matter, it follows that a more perfect thing is due to a less perfect one and exists for its sake, which is absurd.

15. I answer by denying the antecedent. To the first proof I deny the major premise. For there is often dependence *a posteriori* where there is not, nor can there be, emanation. This is evident in the ultimate disposition toward any form, especially toward the rational soul, for that disposition necessarily depends *a posteriori* upon the form without being able to produce the form by emanation. Nor does emanation suffice for an indefectible dependence, as is evident in water with respect to cold. Since, therefore, an

indefectible dependence can exist without emanation and conversely, the title grounding such dependence must be sought elsewhere. The doctrine added is false, as again appears in an ultimate disposition toward form, which does not by itself possess the power to acquire the form with which it is necessarily connected. It is also evident in the light of glory, which is not adequately productive of the vision of God and nevertheless renders that vision due to itself. There is therefore nothing absurd in matter's depending upon some natural agent productive of the form by a dependence which is not immediate but only mediate, insofar as matter depends upon form and the form upon the agents.

16. To the second proof: any dependence which is not *a priori* is customarily called dependence *a posteriori*, whether it is dependence upon a concomitant, upon an effect, or upon a complement or term produced in response to a presupposed exigency of the thing; and this exigency, although it does not exert a physical influence, is customarily called a moral cause. In this manner matter depends upon the rational soul, and likewise the ultimate disposition of the body upon the soul. To the third proof: I grant the consequence. That it is not absurd is evident in an ultimate disposition, to which substantial form is due; in an action, to which its more perfect term is due; and in the light of glory, to which a vision more excellent than the light itself is due. Thus it is not unfitting for a more perfect thing to be produced at the exigency of a less perfect one, at least if it is not produced solely for the sake of the less perfect thing, but also for another more noble end, as happens in the production of form, whose end is not precisely that matter be satisfied, but principally that the composite result.

17. Objection 3º: if a material form were created, it would not depend upon matter. Therefore, since matter is created, it will not depend upon form. I deny the antecedent, because although it would not depend upon matter as upon a cause, it would nevertheless depend upon it as upon a naturally due complement. The same applies to accidents produced by a creative action. Thus, according to many, habitual grace is not educed but created, and yet it cannot naturally exist without a subject.

18. Objection 4º: when the natural minimum, as they call that little body into which the rational soul is first introduced within the maternal womb, is disposed for the soul, its parts nearer to the agent acquire the ultimate disposition sooner than the more remote parts. But those parts of matter which are disposed sooner lose the form of the embryo, which is necessarily expelled when the ultimate disposition for the soul is present; and on the other hand they do not yet have the soul, because it does not arrive until all the matter of the minimum has been disposed. Therefore those parts of

matter exist without any substantial form. I answer: first, the objection collapses if the form of corporeity is admitted. Second, Fr. Oviedo, to whom the argument belongs, *Controv.* 2, *Physica*, punct. 7, n. 20, solves it in *Controv.* 1, *De generatione*, punct. 4, by denying that the form of the embryo is expelled because of the lack of dispositions until the soul arrives. Finally, let it be said that the parts nearer to the agent are indeed disposed earlier as regards several dispositions, but not as regards the ultimate disposition, because the ultimate disposition for the soul as such implies extension throughout all the parts of the natural minimum.

19. Final objection: the terms "to depend" and "*a posteriori*" are repugnant. For if a thing is presupposed as existing, it is already presupposed to have its whole being without the intervention of the subsequent term; therefore it already possesses beforehand whatever is necessary for it to exist. How, then, does it depend upon the posterior term, since to depend is the same as to receive one's being from another or to be unable to exist without another? Add that St. Thomas says that when the composite has been corrupted there remains in matter what existed before the form, "because when the posterior is removed, the prior still remains." Hence it follows that what is prior does not depend upon form. I answer: if to depend means to receive one's being from another, dependence *a posteriori* is indeed repugnant. But if dependence is taken, as it commonly is, for an indefectible connection with a term of which a thing stands in need, or which it demands in order to be in the state due and connatural to it, dependence *a posteriori* cannot be denied without abandoning common Philosophy. For in this manner matter undoubtedly depends upon quantity, the ultimate disposition upon form, the sun upon light, fire upon heat, etc.

20. Therefore a dependent thing can be presupposed as existing before the term of dependence, not by any duration or priority of time, but solely by priority of nature, which means only that the term is not the cause of that thing but rather an effect or quasi-effect naturally demanded for the same moment and consequently belonging to the connatural and necessary state of the thing. Accordingly, when it is inferred, "Therefore for the prior instant the thing already possesses whatever is necessary for it to exist," I distinguish: whatever is necessary for it to exist in the state naturally due to it, I deny this; whatever is necessary for it to exist without its already being understood as placed in that state, I subdistinguish: to exist by an existence naturally connected with the term belonging to that state, I grant this; by an existence not so connected, I deny it. Likewise, without the intervention of the subsequent term the thing is presupposed to possess its whole being, but

not in the state naturally due to it, nor in such a way that this being is unconnected with that term.

21. To the appended doctrine of St. Thomas we say that, when one composite is corrupted, what existed before form remains in matter because matter receives a new form and a new composite and consequently does not remain without the term of the connection; for it is not connected with a determinate form but with some form vaguely. It is true in general that when the posterior is removed the prior still remains, if the prior is not connected with it; or even if it is not connected metaphysically but only physically, or naturally. For then, when the posterior is miraculously removed, the prior can still remain, preserved by natural action. See what will be said below, chapter 5.

CHAPTER IV.

Whether First Matter Can Be Preserved by God Without Form.

1. We have seen that it cannot naturally occur that matter exists deprived of every form. We now ask whether this can occur at least by the absolute power of God. The Scotists affirm it with the Subtle Doctor, and our authors with the Excellent Doctor. Nearly all the Thomists deny it, and in this matter St. Thomas favors them considerably. Nevertheless Master Soto, commenting on *Physica* I, q. 6, a. 2, concl. 2, teaches us reverently to depart from St. Thomas, defending the affirmative opinion although he admits that it is contrary to St. Thomas, "because," he says, "the matter is not of such great importance."

§ 1. First Proof of Our Opinion from the Failure to Show Repugnance. Whether a Proof of This Kind Is Efficacious.

2. The affirmative opinion, which is ours, is proved, 1º, thus. That in which no repugnance or contradiction is shown is possible to divine omnipotence. But in the preservation of matter without form no contradiction is shown, as will appear from the solution of the arguments. Therefore such preservation is possible by God. This manner of arguing, very frequent in questions about possibility, raises another question, as it were reflexively: whether the mere failure to show repugnance resulting from the solution of arguments, although there is no other positive proof, is a sufficient foundation for asserting the opposite possibility. We shall decide this question briefly here, lest the foregoing argument, which will often have to be repeated in the course of this work, remain of doubtful force.

3. The negative side is defended by ingenious recent authors in manuscript, whose precursor was Fr. Antonio Pérez, disp. 7, *De justificatione*, and Cardinal Sforza Pallavicino, I-II, disp. 6, q. 2, a. 1. They are moved, 1º because between an affirmative and a negative judgment concerning the possibility of a thing there is a middle state, namely doubt or suspension of judgment. Therefore, although there is no sufficient foundation for a negative judgment, there is not on that account one for an affirmative judgment. Thus although there is no convincing reason that the stars are even in number, we do not therefore affirm that they are odd. But the solution of the arguments, or the failure to show repugnance, at most establishes that there is no sufficient foundation for denying the possibility of the thing. Therefore on that account alone there is not a sufficient foundation for affirming the possibility. The reason *a priori* is that although no repugnance appears to me, perhaps there is one in the thing.

4. They are moved, 2º because otherwise nothing could be called impossible unless its repugnance were evidently demonstrated. But from this it would follow that questions about possibility are useless, for if a demonstration is brought forward there is no remaining question. They are moved, 3º because probable arguments for impossibility, although solved, still remain probable, at least if they are not evidently solved. Therefore there still remain positive reasons for impossibility, and these must prevail when no other positive reasons for possibility are present.

5. They are moved, 4º because just as impossibility is not sufficiently apparent whenever its proofs are solved, so possibility is not sufficiently apparent whenever its positive proofs are solved. Therefore *a fortiori* possibility is not sufficiently apparent when no positive reason for it is given beyond the solution of objections, either solved or unsolved. Finally, they are moved because when a lot is drawn from an urn in which there are one hundred black lots and only one white lot, in doubt the presumption favors black because of the greater number. But in our intellect the number of chimeras is greater than that of possible concepts, as is evident from innumerable false opinions concerning the essences of things. Therefore in doubt about the quality of a concept one must presume it to be chimerical.

6. Nevertheless the affirmative side is embraced, and is not so much proved as supposed whenever a question concerning possibility in relation to God's absolute power occurs, not only by almost all our authors, whom Fr. Compton cites and follows, disp. 27, *Physica*, sects. 1, 2, and 3, but also commonly by theologians and philosophers of every school. With them, therefore, let our conclusion be: whenever arguments of repugnance, discussed by a wise and diligent examination, are sufficiently solved, there is

by that very fact a positive foundation, without another special direct proof, for prudently judging the thing possible, unless it is very remote from our cognition.

7. The proof is as follows. Once the arguments to the contrary are solved, there results at least a doubt concerning the possibility of the thing, as the adversaries grant and as is evident of itself. But by that very fact, from reflexive principles, there is a valid and positive reason for possibility. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved. When the possibility of a thing is doubted, this reflexive principle has place: "In doubt the condition of the possessor is the better." This principle, very well known in both laws, is nowhere more fittingly adduced than where there is question of restricting the sphere of divine omnipotence. For omnipotence, by reason of its infinite and incomprehensible power, especially after so many miracles by which it has proved itself capable of things beyond human comprehension, undoubtedly possesses the right that the presumption should favor it whenever nothing to the contrary is convincing. But wherever this principle applies, there is by that very fact a foundation for prudently asserting the side which it favors. Therefore, etc.

8. Confirmation 1º: whenever it is doubtful whether something commanded by a superior is lawful, by reason of the aforesaid reflexive principle the subject is bound to obey and consequently prudently judges the thing lawful and capable of being commanded by the superior. Therefore the same holds in our case, for it is no less true to say, "God can do whatever is not shown to be repugnant," than, "A superior can command whatever is not shown to be unlawful." Confirmation 2º: when there is doubt concerning a crime of an upright man, the mere failure to prove the crime is sufficient for a prudent judgment of his innocence, because the habit of acting well grounds a presumption that the crime was not committed. Therefore likewise in God the custom of performing wonders ought to ground a presumption in favor of omnipotence wherever the impossibility of the thing is not established. Certainly, He who could bring it about that there existed "a virgin mother, a God-man, one immortal who died," etc., and, to speak with St. Augustine, *De civitate Dei* XXI, c. 7, "who could create so many things which, if they were not shown or were not told by witnesses worthy even today of belief, would certainly be thought impossible," what will He not be able to do?

9. Confirmation 3º: no one will deny that this maxim, "Nothing is to be denied to omnipotence without necessity," is as true as that other maxim common in the Schools, "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity." But because of the second, whenever there is question of

admitting a new entity, all philosophers are content, in order to reject it and positively assert its absence, to solve the arguments to the contrary. Therefore because of the first, the solution of the arguments ought to suffice for possibility to be positively attributed to omnipotence. The reason is the same in each case. For one who says that a thing is impossible and one who multiplies new entities are to be regarded as plaintiffs and accusers, upon whom it lies to prove and establish their case. One who takes the opposite side is to be regarded as defendant and denier, who, provided he plausibly answers the objections, is judged by this alone positively to strengthen his case. See Caramuel, *Metalogica*, l. 8, *De principiis per se notis*, princ. 18, where he adduces excellent and beautiful remarks on this same point concerning the celebrated axiom, "Entities are not to be multiplied without necessity," which they call "Ockham's Razor."

10. Finally, the opinion is confirmed because nothing is to be denied to God without an urgent foundation; rather, whatever can enlarge His supreme dominion is to be attributed to Him, just as whatever commends His goodness, wisdom, or other perfections is not to be denied. But the preservation of matter without form, for example, by the very terms enlarges God's supreme dominion. Therefore, when the opposite arguments do not compel, such preservation is to be asserted possible to God. It may be said: therefore a positive proof of possibility already arises from the solution of objections; consequently we destroy the sense of the question, which asks whether the solution of objections without positive proof suffices. I answer: the sense of the question is whether the solution of objections suffices for asserting the possibility of a thing without other direct proofs of that particular possibility. Positive reflexive and general arguments resulting from the solution of objections are not thereby excluded.

11. Hence the arguments for the negative side are easily answered. To the first, I admit that in general the mere failure to establish one extreme does not suffice for the opposite to remain thereby proved, but that judgment ordinarily ought to be suspended. It does suffice, however, when a presumption or possession favors the other extreme, as is seen in the examples adduced and also in the question of the existence of a law or precept, where the very failure to prove its existence is a positive reason for its absence because of the possession of liberty. Hence the disparity with the example of the stars is evident, since no presumption favors either an even or an odd number. The appended reason has no force, for even when a particular positive proof of possibility is present we can often fear that perhaps some repugnance lies hidden, and nevertheless possibility is then prudently asserted according to the adversaries. It must therefore be said

that when a matter has been maturely discussed and no repugnance occurs which is not easily solved, then, although in fact there may be one, possibility can nevertheless prudently be asserted, as is evident in the examples of our proof.

12. To the second, I grant that nothing can rightly be called impossible unless it is demonstrated, or nearly demonstrated, to be so. "Nothing is to be denied to God," says Soto, loc. cit. above n. 1, "except where the contradiction is most manifest." Yet this does not make questions about possibility useless. First, because our opinion is not approved by all. Second, because authors often wish to produce particular positive arguments besides the solution of objections and test their force. Third, because arguments which appear demonstrative to some often appear weak and scarcely probable to others. Hence at least it is necessary to examine whether arguments of repugnance are demonstrative or admit a solution, and likewise whether the solutions possess slight, great, or no probability, so that it may be determined with greater confidence what is to be held.

13. To the third: if arguments of repugnance are evidently solved, they do not remain probable. If they are solved only probably, although they remain probable in themselves and considered separately, they do not remain so when compared with the reflexive principle of possession; or at least they remain less probable than the reflexive arguments for possibility, because the presumption and possession of omnipotence is always a stronger reason outweighing arguments to the contrary which do not convince. To the fourth, I grant that possibility is not sufficiently apparent from the mere solution of a contrary proof if one stops precisely at the particular and direct arguments. It is sufficiently apparent, however, if that solution is joined to the general reflexive principle concerning the privilege of possession. Hence it is false that there is then no other positive reason, either solved or unsolved. For although no direct and particular reason is present, a reflexive and general one is. Nor should it be said that this reflexive reason is also solved by the adversaries, for we contend that it is not well solved.

14. The final argument is turned back against them. For if one lot is drawn from an urn in which the black lots are more numerous than the white, and when carefully examined in the light it shows no sign of blackness, no Areopagite, no Aeacus, no Rhadamanthus will presume the lot to be black or condemn the accused. Therefore likewise, if some concept, carefully examined in the light of wisdom, shows no indication of repugnance, it cannot be presumed chimerical. The presumption spoken of in the argument can therefore have place at most when the concept is not

examined or cannot be examined, but not when it is exactly discussed; and it is in this latter sense that we speak.

15. For this reason we deliberately said in the conclusion, "unless the thing is very remote from our cognition." For if the objective concept is so perplexed and obscure that it cannot be inspected and examined, then either its possibility or its impossibility will be asserted rashly, and judgment must therefore be suspended. The reason is, 1º because then there presses the greater fecundity of our intellect, or at least no lesser fecundity, toward chimerical concepts than toward possible ones, together with the example of the drawing of lots. For a lot drawn from an urn containing equal numbers of black and white lots, if it cannot be inspected even by a weak light, can only rashly be called white or black. 2º because then it is truly unknown what is under discussion, and consequently the reflexive reason of presumption or possession cannot be applied. The predicates of the object, at least the principal ones, must therefore be distinctly known in our manner, as in the question of the preservation of matter without form the predicates of matter, etc., are known by us.

§ 2. Other Positive Proofs.

16. We now return to the principal conclusion, which is proved, 2º, by comparison with an accident and a material form. For an accident can be preserved by God without a subject, as the miracle of the Eucharist teaches us. Likewise a material substantial form, for example the soul of a horse, can by God exist outside matter, as even the Thomists commonly grant. Therefore matter likewise can be preserved by God without form. The consequence is proved because, if an accidental form and the soul of a horse are absolute entities endowed with their own existence, the same is true of matter. Moreover, they depend upon a subject more than matter depends upon form, for they depend *a priori* upon it as upon a true material and sustaining cause, whereas matter does not depend *a priori* upon form in that genus of physical cause, while final causality is irrelevant here because the end is rather physically posterior. Matter depends upon form only *a posteriori*, as upon a naturally due complement.

17. But because the Thomists make matter depend upon form as upon a formal cause, it must be proved that this is both false and useless. First of all, it is entirely certain that form is not the formal cause intrinsically constituting and distinguishing matter, in the way that whiteness is the formal cause of the white thing, the human soul of man, and grace of the holy person. Otherwise matter would be the whole composite and would not

possess an entity adequately distinct from form. Next, if form is called the formal cause of matter not constitutively but as adequately distinct from the effect, in the way in which form is compared with certain secondary effects which it is said to cause in the genus of formal cause because it induces them by informing the subject, and thus the form of fire causes the expulsion of the form of wood, heat the expulsion of cold, and sin the expulsion of grace, this, I say, is false according to our principles concerning the existence of matter, and moreover does not help the adversaries in the present question. For a secondary formal effect, or one adequately distinct from form, can be caused by God without form. God can bring it about that cold is expelled from a subject without heat, and by absolute power He can likewise remove grace without prior sin.

18. Moreover, it is just as truly said that God cannot supply the office of a material cause as that He cannot supply the office of a formal cause. Yet this is understood of a constitutive material cause, not of one adequately distinct from the effect; for God in the genus of efficient cause supplies the office of a material cause with respect to Eucharistic quantity. Why, then, should not the same be said of the office of a non-constitutive formal cause? Certainly it is commonly said that God by Himself can supply the influx of any created cause with respect to effects adequately distinct from the cause and from the influx itself. It may be said that matter does not exist except through the existence of form, which existence cannot be supplied without form. But this is both false, as we saw in its place, and moreover insufficient, as I now show.

19. Accordingly our conclusion is proved, 3º, thus. Even if it is admitted that matter lacks its own existence and connaturally exists through the existence of form, it must still be granted from the principles of the adversaries that matter can be preserved by God without form. The proof is this. The first matter of Christ the Lord does not in fact exist through the existence of form according to the Thomists, but through the existence of the Word supplying created existence. Therefore matter does not so depend upon the existence of form that the latter cannot be supplied by God. Just as matter together with form in fact exists through the existence of the Word, so matter can by God exist through the same existence of the Word separately from form, namely if it remained united to the Word without any form, as according to some in fact occurred during the three days of the Lord's death. At least there is no reason to deny that during that time God could have given no other form to the matter in place of the soul.

20. Add that according to the common opinion among the Thomists with Cajetan and Bañez, existence is not a mode but an absolute entity.

Hence the existence of form does not have a modal attachment to form. It can therefore be separated by God from the essence of form and render matter separately existent. This is pressed further. Nothing is more frequent and solemn among the Thomists than the doctrine that existence belongs not so much to form as to the composite, which alone they say properly exists and exists "as that which." Then I argue thus. The existence of form, although principally instituted for the composite as its proper act, can nevertheless be separated from the composite, as in fact it is separated together with the rational soul and could by God be separated together with the soul of a horse. Therefore the same existence, although it belongs more to form than to matter, can be separated from form and communicated to matter without form.

21. The Thomists answer that form is essentially required in order that existence be communicated to matter, not because the existence of form cannot be supplied, for it is supplied in Christ the Lord, but because matter without form is not intrinsically and immediately capable of existence. Hence they say that form is in every event prerequired before any existence, so that it may render matter fit and constitute it capable of existing. From this they derive the disparity with material forms: in these there is an immediate capacity for existence because they are acts by reason of themselves, whereas in matter, as pure potency, there is no capacity for existence except by reason of form.

22. This doctrine, however, can be attacked as follows. Matter immediately, by reason of itself, and insofar as it is distinct from form, is capable of existence. Therefore, whatever be said of whether form gives existence to matter, it at least does not give the capacity for existence. The antecedent is proved. Matter immediately and by reason of itself is possible. But in the same way in which it is possible, it is capable of existence. Therefore immediately and by reason of itself it is capable of existence. The consequence is legitimate and the minor premise evident, for these terms are synonymous: "possible," "able to exist," "apt to exist." Finally, the major premise appears no less certain, for matter immediately and by reason of itself is a real being, is not a chimera, and involves no contradiction. Therefore immediately and by reason of itself it is possible, for whatever is a real being and involves no contradiction is undoubtedly possible. Likewise matter immediately and by reason of itself can be produced by God; but possible and producible are the same. Again, matter immediately and by reason of itself terminates its creation, for creation does not terminate in form. But creation gives existence to its term, as was established from St. Thomas in the preceding disputation. Therefore *a fortiori* it gives the

capacity for existence. Yet it does not give form, since form is ordinarily given by eduction. Therefore matter's capacity for existence is not constituted by form.

§ 3. Contrary Arguments Are Solved.

23. Objection 1º: if matter existed without form, it would be a being in act without act. "For the term of creation," says St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 66, a. 1, "is a being in act; but that which is act is form." Therefore to say that matter precedes without form is to say "a being in act without act," which involves a contradiction. I answer: matter existing without form would not be a being in act without the same act, but without a different act. It would be a being in entitative act, which is existence, without physical formal act, and there is no contradiction in this since those acts are really distinct from one another.

24. The mind of St. Thomas is doubtful to many. For he seems to speak not only of physical substantial form, but generally of form insofar as it comprehends substantial and accidental, physical and metaphysical or entitative form. Otherwise he would not say generally, "That which is act is form," because it is certain that there are many acts which are not physical substantial forms. Nor would he say without distinction that "the term of creation is a being in act," because the term of the creation of matter, at least after the beginning of the world, is not form. It is, however, most true that it involves a contradiction for matter to exist without every act, or form taken generally, and in this sense to endure "formless"; because at least it must possess the metaphysical acts of essential difference, existence, and subsistence, as well as the accidental acts of location and duration. But if this interpretation does not satisfy the Thomists, say that with Master Soto you modestly depart from St. Thomas in the present matter.

25. It is replied: if matter is without substantial form, it is also without the act of existence. This is proved because form is first act and existence is second act, while second act without first act is repugnant. Therefore, just as vital act, or life in second act, essentially presupposes life in first act, or a vital principle, so existence essentially presupposes form. For the same reason it is repugnant for someone to understand without an intellect, because intellect is first act and intellection second act. Similarly it is repugnant for a cause to act without active power, because the latter is first act and action second act. Add that existence is the ultimate act and ultimate complement in the line of being. Therefore it must presuppose the first act and first complement, which is form.

26. I answer by denying the assumption. To the proof: if matter enjoys its own existence, we have already said in the preceding disputation in what sense existence is called second act, namely either with respect to objective potency, or second in the order of intention and not in the order of execution. Hence it need not presuppose form. If, however, it is admitted that matter exists through the existence of form, either say that existence is naturally, but not essentially, a second act, and that the order can be reversed by God, just as the order by which matter ought naturally to receive heat before the form of fire can be reversed; or rather say that the connatural existence by which matter actually exists is indeed a second act presupposing form, whereas another miraculous existence which God can give to matter, for example the existence of the Word or another existence, is not. Thus according to the adversaries the existence of accidents connaturally presupposes their *inesse* in a subject, and nevertheless accidents can exist separated from the subject.

27. There is no parity in vital act. For vital act is either a mode of the vital principle, as many hold, and thus it is no wonder that it is essentially bound to the vital principle; or, if it is not a mode but an absolute quality, it can by God be separated from the vital principle. Therefore the same must be said of matter and its existence, since existence is not a mode of form. Indeed the very existence of form is not a mode of form according to most Thomists, and consequently it can be separated from form and render matter existent while form perishes. Thus there is now preserved in the soul of St. Peter that existence through which previously the composite and its matter existed, although they do not now exist through it. It is preserved, I say, when the composite perishes, even though according to the adversaries it belonged more properly to the composite than to the soul. Add that the thing can be composed without the form perishing, if, namely, the existence of the form were bilocated here and at Rome, and here rendered matter existent without form while at Rome it rendered the form existent without matter. Finally, recourse remains to the existence of the Word or to a miraculous created existence.

28. The appended examples are true not because intellect or active power is simply first act, but because it is first act by way of potency and capacity for understanding or acting. Therefore it is repugnant to understand without intellect and to act without active power, for this would be to understand without the capacity of understanding and to act without the potency of acting; and in this there is a manifest contradiction, since the consequence from act to potency is valid. Therefore that first act which consists in a capacity for a second act insofar as it denominates a subject is

essentially prerequired. But such an act does not fail in matter existing without form, since matter has by reason of itself the capacity for existing. Finally, in what sense existence is called the ultimate act or ultimate complement in the line of being we explained in disp. 2, c. 4, nn. 19 and 22. The solution we have just given concerning the name "second act" can also be applied.

29. Objection 2º: accidental being without accidental form is repugnant. Therefore substantial being without substantial form is also repugnant. I deny the consequence. For every accidental being involves an accident, and every accident is a form, because "the being of an accident is *inesse*," that is, being in a subject. But not every substance is a form. Consequently there can be a substantial being which is neither a form nor includes form. The objection is also countered thus: an accidental essence adequately distinct from accidental form is repugnant. Therefore a substantial essence adequately distinct from substantial form is also repugnant. Therefore the essence of matter would involve a contradiction.

30. Objection 3º: matter cannot exist without every accidental form, since it must at least possess location and duration. Therefore neither can it exist without every substantial form. The consequence is proved, 1º because matter stands in greater need of substantial form than of accidental form, since it is more perfected by substantial form and is more ordered toward it. 2º because things which approach more closely to unity are more inseparable. But matter with substantial form approaches unity more closely than with accidental form. For with the latter it makes "one accidentally," but with the former "one essentially," which is especially "one."

31. I deny the consequence. Its first proof is countered by Eucharistic accidents, which cannot exist without location and duration, and yet can exist without a subject, by which they are more perfected and toward which they are more ordered. It is also countered by substantial form, which is more perfected by fellowship with matter than by those modes and is more ordered toward matter, yet does not therefore stand in greater need of fellowship with matter. It is also countered by matter itself, which is more perfected by quantity, heat, and other absolute accidents, and also by a determinate substantial form, for example a soul, than by the aforesaid modes, with which it is nevertheless more closely connected. Therefore essential connection or need with respect to those modes is not derived from the perfectibility of matter or from its order of incompletion, but from another title which does not apply to substantial form, namely that it is repugnant for a thing truly to exist without existing somewhere and at some time, and consequently without possessing location and duration. For by the

very terms it seems repugnant that a thing truly exist and yet exist never and nowhere, and not be contained within God's immensity and eternity.

32. The second proof is likewise evidently countered. For matter makes "one essentially" with a determinate substantial form, for example with the human soul, and nevertheless is not more inseparable from it than from location; indeed it is more easily separated from it than from quantity and other accidents, even absolute and determinate ones. The principle, therefore, "Things which approach more closely to unity are more inseparable," is true of unity of identity, for things formally identified are more inseparable in reason than things merely really identical. But it is false of unity of composition. For the physical union of body with soul is undoubtedly greater than an artificial union or one of mere aggregation, and yet a man dies more easily than a solid building or a heap of large stones is dissolved. Likewise the souls of all living things are equally united with matter, and yet some living things perish less easily than others. The same is evident by comparing a diamond with an apple.

33. Objection 4º: matter is indifferent and contractible through form to various species of being. Therefore, if it existed without form, it would belong to no species of being, which is no less repugnant than for animal to exist in reality without being rational or irrational through lack of a contracting difference. I distinguish the antecedent: matter is contractible to various species of complete being, I grant this; of incomplete being, I deny it. I distinguish the consequence in the same way. Accordingly, sublunary matter existing without form would belong to no species of complete being, such as fire, tree, man, etc.; nevertheless it would be an incomplete entity and substance specifically different from every form and also, according to many, from celestial matter. Nor does it matter that "species is taken from form," as the proverb says. This is true of the species of complete being. It is also true of incomplete being if one speaks of metaphysical form, which is essential difference, for from this is taken the incomplete species of matter and of every being.

34. The example of an animal existing without a difference is irrelevant. First, because by the same example it would be proved that form cannot exist without matter, just as a difference cannot exist without a genus. Second, because such an animal would lack a metaphysical species, or essential difference, whereas matter without form would not. Third, because the contractibility of matter through forms is not a merely logical indifference presupposing real identity with the differences, such as is found in animal as such, but a physical indifference of a determinate and singular thing toward various complements really distinct from it.

35. Objection 5º: because God is supremely perfect, He is essentially actually whole. Therefore matter, because it is supremely imperfect, is essentially actually a part. Therefore it essentially requires fellowship with another co-part, namely form. Confirmation 1º: God, because of supreme perfection, stands in need of nothing whatsoever. Therefore matter, because of supreme imperfection, stands in supreme need. Therefore it essentially needs the complement of form. Confirmation 2º: a potency supremely productive cannot fail to be actually producing, as is evident in God's power, which is always producing *ad intra*. Therefore a supreme receptive potency, such as matter, cannot fail to be actually receiving. Confirmation 3º: the modes of location and *inesse*, for example, because they are of the least entity in the genus of accidents, cannot exist separately. But matter is of the least entity in the genus of substance, since it is almost nothing. Therefore neither can it exist separately.

36. I answer: matter is not supremely imperfect in the manner in which God is supremely perfect. For God's supreme perfection essentially excludes every imperfection, whether identified with Him or united to Him. But the supreme imperfection of matter does not essentially exclude every perfection, either identified with it, since it is a true positive and substantial entity, or united with it, since it can be perfected through union with innumerable forms. The imperfection of matter, therefore, is called supreme only in the genus of absolute substance, and with this it is quite compatible that matter presuppose some true perfection, indeed a greater perfection than that of many accidents and substantial modes. Hence, to the objection, I deny the consequence, for by the same right it could be inferred that matter is pure nothing. Matter, therefore, is essentially only an aptitudinal part with respect to the composite, just as form is. But if it is referred to the whole "subsistent" or "located thing," it will also be essentially an actual part requiring fellowship with subsistence and location.

37. To confirmation 1º, I likewise deny the consequence, unless the need of matter is referred to God's concurrence or to location, which is a need common to every creature. The reason for denying is the disparity just explained between the imperfection of matter and the perfection of God. To the second, there is a counterexample in God's omnipotence, which is supremely productive *ad extra* without always having to produce actually. Production *ad intra*, however, is identified with God Himself; what wonder, then, that it is necessary? Actual reception is certainly not thus identified with matter. Add that matter is always actually receiving location.

38. To the third: first, I deny the causal force of the major premise. Cognition and love, according to the opinion of many, have a modal

attachment to their potencies, and yet they are not of the least entity in the genus of accidents. Likewise the union of grace with the soul is more perfect than blackness, for example, and nevertheless cannot exist separately. The true reason for the inseparability of modes is therefore derived from their essence, which consists in actual exercise and ultimate determination. Second, granting the major premise, I deny the minor, because matter is not of the least entity in the genus of substance as such, since it exceeds several substantial modes, but only in the genus of absolute substance. It is called "almost nothing" when compared with substantial forms.

CHAPTER V.
By What Action Matter Deprived by God of Every Form Would Be Preserved.

1. It is disputed among our authors whether the action by which God would preserve matter without form would be intrinsically natural and the same as that which now exists, or intrinsically supernatural and consequently different, just as the action preserving accidents without a subject differs from that by which they are preserved in a subject. It is presupposed, however, that matter has its own existence. For if it exists through another's existence and nevertheless is preserved without form, which we said in the preceding chapter is possible from the principles of the Thomists, a different action will undoubtedly be necessary, terminating either in an adventitious existence or in its union with matter, both of which would pertain to the preservation of matter. Namely, if the existence is divine, a new unitive action is required. If it is created, then either it is miraculous in itself and consequently cannot be produced by a natural action, or it is the very existence of form torn away from form, and thus it will not be produced by eduction as now, but by creation.

2. Therefore the opinion that the preservation of matter in the case of privation of all forms would not have to be intrinsically changed is held, and rightly, by most of our authors with the Excellent Doctor, disp. 15, *Metaphysica*, sect. 9, n. 7, against a few others. The proof is as follows. An action need not be changed where neither the term nor any cause or principle exercising influx is changed or fails, both because action is specified by and depends upon these alone, and because the preservation of an accident outside a subject is changed, as the preservation of the form of a stone outside matter would likewise be changed, for no other reason than because the concurrence of some cause, namely the material cause, fails and is supplied. But in the case under discussion neither the term of the action

nor any cause or influencing principle is changed or fails. Therefore the action need not be changed. The minor premise is proved because, first, the whole partial being of matter, which is the sole term of its creation, perseveres unchanged; for this creation terminates neither in the composite nor in form. Second, that creation has no other physical principle or cause besides the efficient cause, who is God, and God certainly remains the same, is supremely present, and is supposed to will the preservation of matter.

3. Nor does recourse to a variation in the end help. For an external action, since it is for an end not properly but denominatively, can remain the same although by the intention of the agent it is ordered to various ends. Therefore, although the preservation of matter without form is not posited as before for the end of constituting a composite, but for another end, for example the manifestation of divine omnipotence, it need not therefore be intrinsically changed. Thus the external giving of alms can be the same whether it is done for a natural end or for the supernatural end of pleasing God or redeeming sins. The reason is that a physical action is not specified by the end of its term, or by an end which it does not immediately attain, but only by the immediately produced term, which can be called the intrinsic end of the action.

4. Nor does recourse to a contrary exigency help. For, 1º it is highly probable that in the case under discussion there is no natural exigency resisting the preservation of matter or demanding its annihilation. Such an exigency would belong either to matter itself, to natural agents, or to the whole universe. But matter itself indeed desires form and resists privation, yet there is no reason why it should desire its own cessation, since this is good for it under no aspect even when it is deprived of every form; on this point again in solving the objections. The preservation of matter in no way harms natural agents. For although they suffer violence in that they are not allowed to propagate their species in it, this violence does not arise from matter, which rather abhors the same thing, but from the divine decree withholding concurrence for the production of form in this matter. Finally, the universe contains nothing besides active and passive causes, in which there is no such exigency, as we have seen; moreover, it ought rather to demand the preservation of matter lest there be a vacuum.

5. 2º Even if a natural exigency demanding the cessation of matter is admitted, it does not follow that, if God wills not to attend to this exigency, a different action intrinsically and supernaturally, or, as they say, supernaturally in substance, is required. Thus when sight is miraculously restored to a blind man contrary to the exigency of a contrary disposition, there is no need for an action supernatural in substance or different from

that by which sight is naturally preserved. Likewise resurrection, which can occur only by miracle, does not require an action intrinsically different from first generation, as Fr. Suárez proves, vol. 2, In III, disp. 44, sect. 5. Likewise no different action is required for God to preserve cold in a subject against the exigency of stronger heat, nor to preserve in matter the form of wood against the exigency of a form of fire newly introduced.

6. Fr. Arriaga may be seen, disp. 3, *Physica*, sect. 7, where he establishes and defends generally this conclusion: "Whenever in some miraculous action God does not supply the defect of some created cause, there is no need for a stronger influx and, as it is customarily called, one supernatural in substance, but only that He preserve and give that influx when natural causes demanded that it not exist but rather that its absence exist." Arriaga says that all philosophers whom he has seen agree in this conclusion, with one recent author excepted, against whom he argues; likewise the theologians. The reason *a priori* is that a contrary natural exigency opposes the production or preservation of a thing, for example matter in our case, only insofar as it asks and, as it were, entreats God to suspend such an action or cease from it. Therefore precisely because God wills not to attend to that petition, the same action will remain notwithstanding the contrary exigency. But God can will thus; otherwise that exigency would no longer be merely physical and natural, as is supposed, but essential and metaphysical. Therefore the whole matter is accomplished solely by the divine will's refusal, without a new action.

7. It may be said: God then preserves matter as supernatural Author. Therefore He preserves it by a supernatural action. I distinguish the consequence: by an action supernatural in substance, I deny it; supernatural in mode, I grant it. God operates as supernatural Author in two ways. 1º by producing an intrinsically supernatural effect, such as grace or the hypostatic union, and then He operates by an action supernatural in substance. 2º by violating or frustrating the natural exigencies of things, and then an action supernatural in substance is not always required, as is evident from nn. 5 and 6. Nevertheless the action is denominated "supernatural in mode" from the divine volition which it presupposes here and now, namely the volition to frustrate the exigencies of things. This volition is called supernatural because it is above the exigency of all nature, although it causes nothing intrinsically supernatural *ad extra*. Thus the volition to annihilate an angel, or to deny concurrence to fire applied for burning, causes nothing supernatural in substance, and nevertheless is judged supernatural.

8. It may again be said that the preservation of matter against natural exigency exceeds the power of God as Author of nature. I distinguish: the

preservation considered essentially and intrinsically, I deny this; accidentally and as existing in these circumstances, I subdistinguish: it exceeds the power of the Author of nature taken specifically, I deny this; taken reduplicatively insofar as fulfilling the office of Author of nature, I grant it. God does not have one power as Author of nature and another as supernatural Author, but one most simple omnipotence, even without a distinction of reason, at least with respect to effects not intrinsically supernatural. This power is said to act as proper to the Author of nature when it acts from a decree of God willing to operate according to the exigencies of things. But when it acts from another decree, although both the power and action are the same, it is not said to act as proper to the Author of nature.

9. It may be said, 3º that the preservation of matter without form exceeds the active and exigent powers of all nature, which is the characteristic of a supernatural being. I distinguish: it exceeds them essentially, I deny this; accidentally, or because of the extrinsic and accidental circumstances of privation of all forms, I grant this. The characteristic of supernatural being is essentially and intrinsically to exceed those powers in such a way that it can never exist by the power or exigency of nature. But if a thing has this not from itself and essentially, but from an accidental circumstance, as in our case, it does not cease to be intrinsically natural. Otherwise this argument would prove not only the action but the very entity of matter to be intrinsically supernatural, because the entity itself as existing in these circumstances exceeds the active and exigent powers of all nature.

10. Finally, our opinion is confirmed by comparison with the Babylonian fire, which, while miraculously prohibited from burning the three youths, was preserved by the same action by which it would have been preserved if it had burned. The same would occur in a soul if it were deprived by God of naturally due potencies, and in any other substance preserved without its properties. These examples are true for no other reason than because combustion, potencies, or properties, although naturally due terms, in no way exercise influx upon the aforesaid substances but presuppose them as previously produced and existent. The same is true of form with respect to matter. These examples, by which the contrary arguments are plainly countered, do not seem to be denied by the adversaries, nor can they rightly be denied. For who would believe that the Babylonian fire existed through a supernatural action for as long as it ceased from burning? Otherwise it would likewise have to be said that the substance of water, while deprived of cold, or the rational soul, while separated from the body which it innately

desires, is preserved by a different and stronger action, at least within the natural order. Yet no one has said this.

Objections Are Solved.

11. Objection 1º: if the preservation of matter were a natural action, matter would naturally exist without form, contrary to the common opinion which we defended above. I answer: for a thing to be said absolutely not to occur or exist naturally, a supernatural existence or action in substance is not required, that is, one which entitatively exceeds in every event the active and exigent powers of all nature. It is sufficient that the existence or action be supernatural in mode, that is, that although it entitatively belongs to the natural order, it nevertheless exists here and now in undue and miraculous circumstances presupposing a supernatural decree of God, according to what was said in n. 7, as is evident from the examples in nn. 5 and 10. The preservation of matter without form is thus an action natural in substance while simultaneously supernatural in mode, insofar as it is posited in the circumstance of privation of all forms. This privation, since it is contrary to the naturally invincible exigency of matter, presupposes a supernatural decree of God. Therefore the proposition of the argument is to be denied absolutely, just as it is absolutely denied that sight is naturally restored to one blind from birth, that Lazarus naturally rose, or that the Babylonian fire naturally existed without burning.

12. Alternatively: this concept, "Matter exists naturally without form," says two things, one positive and the other negative. The positive is the existence and preservation of matter. The negative is privation of every form. If "naturally" is referred only to the positive, the proposition is true; but it is false if "naturally" is referred to the negative, because that privation does not occur naturally but is supernatural, at least presuppositively from God's decree. For clarity, therefore, the proposition can be distinguished under these terms. It is better, however, to deny it absolutely, either because "naturally" excludes supernaturalness in mode, or because in common usage it is referred to the negative. Thus this proposition is absolutely denied: "The Babylonian fire naturally exists without burning"; and likewise this: "Water connaturally exists without cold." Conversely, this other proposition is absolutely granted: "Water exists violently without cold," because "violently" is referred to the negative. For if it were referred to the positive, the proposition would undoubtedly be false.

13. Objection 2º: if matter were deprived by God of every form, it would have naturally to cease. Therefore its preservation would not be a natural

action, since it would be contrary to a natural due state and exigency. The antecedent is proved, 1º because the natural order of things demands that nothing exist wholly idle and useless, whereas matter without form would be entirely useless and idle. 2º because matter itself would innately desire not to be rather than to remain in a violent state with the misery, poverty, nakedness, and emptiness of a perfection naturally due to it. For according to the Philosopher, what is innately desired is that which could be the object of a prudent elicited appetite. But it is not foreign to prudence to wish rather not to exist than to exist badly and miserably; this can be supported from Matt. 26, v. 24, and Job 3, v. 11; 10, v. 18.

14. 3º because privation of every form will be physically connected with the cessation of matter. The proof is as follows. When A is physically connected with B, the absence of B is also physically connected with the absence of A, as is evident from metaphysical connection. Thus, because an action is metaphysically connected with its term, absence of the term is metaphysically connected with absence of the action. But matter is physically connected with form. Therefore privation, or absence, of every form is reciprocally physically connected with the absence of matter. Or in other terms: from this antecedent, "Matter exists," there follows with physical necessity, "Therefore matter has some form." But from the opposite of the consequent the opposite of the antecedent follows. Therefore from this other proposition, "Matter has no form," there likewise follows with physical necessity, "Therefore matter does not exist."

15. Confirmation: matter demands not to be decreed by God except in order to the end toward which it is naturally ordered and which it efficaciously demands. Therefore it demands not to be decreed except by a decree simultaneously willing the existence of the composite, which is the end of matter. But if matter existed without form there would be no such decree, but another decree willing matter without the composite. Therefore matter would then be decreed and exist contrary to its own exigency. Add that a decree willing matter without the composite would be supernatural. Therefore an action depending upon such a decree would not be natural.

16. I answer, 1º: I admit the antecedent of the objection and deny the consequence; or I distinguish the consequence: it would not be an action natural in mode, I grant this; natural in substance, I deny the consequence. Although matter in the case under discussion would naturally have to cease, whether because of its own exigency or because of another physical connection, it would not therefore be necessary to have a new action in order to preserve it. It would suffice that God say to those exigencies asking Him to cease preserving matter, "I will not cease." Reconsider what was said

from n. 5 to n. 10. In the confirmation I likewise admit that matter without form would be decreed and exist contrary to its own exigency. Nevertheless an intrinsically different action would not be necessary. That action would indeed depend here and now upon a supernatural decree, but it would depend upon it not essentially but accidentally, and consequently would be supernatural not in substance but in mode. Thus the external action of giving alms, although it sometimes depends upon a supernatural volition, is not therefore intrinsically supernatural or different from that which depends upon a natural volition, because of itself it does not necessarily presuppose a supernatural act of the will, although here and now it accidentally depends upon one.

17. It may be said that a greater influx is necessary to preserve a thing in a violent state than in a connatural state; for this reason greater effort is needed to suspend a stone in the air than to place it at the center. I answer: first, a counterexample is found in boiling water, whose preservation is not changed because it is in a violent state. Second, the example of the stone is turned back. For God can suspend a stone in the air without a new positive influx, namely if He wills not to concur with the gravity of the stone toward downward motion. A creature cannot do this only because a created cause cannot resist the gravity of the stone except through a positive effort. Finally, when a violent state does not bring with it the absence of some co-principle whose causality must be supplied, it is false in general that a greater positive influx of God is required by reason of the violent state, as is evident from the examples in n. 10.

18. I know that recent authors do not admit that, in the case under discussion, the cessation of matter is demanded by matter itself or by another natural thing, but wish the whole miracle to consist in the denial of form and by no means in the preservation of matter or in the decree on which that preservation depends, even supposing privation of every form. But the Excellent Doctor, vol. 3, In III, disp. 50, sect. 6, teaches that in the Eucharist, by virtue of the separating action, not only the form but the matter of bread naturally ceases. "For," he says, "matter so demands the natural mode of existing with quantity and form that, if it is wholly deprived of these, natural preservation under another mode of existence is not due to it; just as the soul can be said naturally to be unable to exist without intellect and will, so that if it were deprived of them it would naturally demand also to be deprived of its being and of preservation in the nature of things." The same Excellent Doctor agrees, cited disp. 15, *Metaphysica*, sect. 9, n. 7, where, after denying the necessity of a new action for preserving matter without form, he adds: "The miracle would consist solely in God's continuing the

preservative action of matter in that state in which being would not be due to it." That divine will to continue the preservation of matter would therefore be undue and miraculous.

19. Similarly, Fr. Vázquez, vol. 3, In III, disp. 181, cc. 9 and 13, concludes from this the cessation of the substance of bread in the Eucharist, because to preserve the substance of bread while the accidents are separated would be "beyond nature and a new miracle." Cardinal de Lugo teaches the same more explicitly, disp. 7, *De Eucharistia*, n. 114, where he says that the preservation of matter without form would be miraculous in mode even for the sign prior to the privation of form, because in order to be natural it would have to presuppose a divine decree preserving matter in order to constitute the composite, which is the end of matter. But then the preservation of matter, although natural in substance, would not presuppose such a decree but another decree preserving matter for an instant or time in which it would not possess form, and this decree is not one of God as Author of nature. Fr. Arriaga embraces the same doctrine, disp. 2, *Physica*, sect. 6, subsect. 4.

20. I answer, 2º, according to the mind of the recent authors, by denying the antecedent of the objection in n. 13, because there would be no natural exigency demanding the cessation of matter. The Eucharistic conversion inducing the cessation of the whole substance of bread can probably be explained in other ways, as may be seen among theologians. To the first proof: matter without form would not be useless and idle essentially and considering the natural order, but only accidentally and from the miraculous circumstance of privation of form. The natural order of things, although it demands that this circumstance be removed, does not demand that innocent matter perish, since matter innately hates that very idleness.

21. To the second: I deny such an appetite in matter. First, because the natural hope of escaping from the miserable state has not been lost, since attainment of form truly remains naturally possible. For supernatural decrees denying a naturally due term do not remove but presuppose the natural possibility of the term. Hence, if matter, which is ignorant of such decrees, desired not to be, this appetite would be an irrational despair. Second, because privation of form is a purely negative evil with respect to matter, involving no torment or positive misery, but consisting precisely in non-attainment of a good due to it. If matter because of this evil cast away its being, it would act as foolishly as one who threw the hundred silver pieces he possesses into the sea for no other reason than because he does not obtain a thousand gold pieces due to him. From this the disparity is

evident with men who desire death in order to avoid sin, which is a positive evil in the moral order, or because of immense torments of mind or body.

22. To the third: I deny the assumption. To the proof I deny the major premise if it is taken without distinction. For given such a physical connection, it can happen that absence of B is not only not physically connected with absence of A, but is even metaphysically connected with the presence of A. Thus this objective truth, "An accident exists," is physically connected with this other, "An accident does not exist outside a subject"; yet the absence of the latter, namely, "An accident exists outside a subject," is metaphysically connected with the presence of the former, "An accident exists." Similarly quantity A is physically connected with the absence of its bilocation or of its penetration with another quantity; nevertheless the absence of this absence, namely bilocation or penetration, is metaphysically connected with the existence of that same quantity. Nothing similar will be found in metaphysical connection. Therefore the parity is denied.

23. The rule, however, "From the opposite of the consequent, etc.," is true when there is a metaphysical connection of antecedent with consequent, but not always when the connection is merely physical, as we already noted in the *Summulae*. Consider these physical consequences: "Quantity A exists, therefore it is not bilocated, therefore it is not penetrated with another quantity, therefore it does not exist outside a subject"; likewise, "The sun exists, therefore it does not exist without light"; "Fire is preserved, therefore it is not preserved without combustion," or "without heat." Suppose by divine power the opposite of any of these consequents is given and see whether the opposite of the antecedent follows with physical necessity.

24. To the confirmation: matter does not demand to be decreed by a decree simultaneously willing the existence of form or the composite, except at most negatively or inefficaciously. Rather, it is connatural that matter and form be decreed by a twofold decree formally or virtually distinct, with a certain order of prior and posterior. This may be established because the very natural order of things demands that prior things be decreed earlier and posterior things later, so that the order of decrees may correspond to the order of things. Thus substance is decreed prior to an accidental property, fire prior to combustion, etc. Since matter is prior in nature to form, it must be decreed first and consequently by a distinct decree. Certainly God does not decree together with matter either a determinate form or some form vaguely. Not a determinate form, for otherwise the decree concerning matter would vary as often as a new form is introduced, which is incredible. Not some vague form, for if God afterwards needs another decree to determine

the form, what purpose would that first efficacious volition of some form taken vaguely serve?

25. Moreover, form is produced at the exigency of matter. Therefore it is decreed at the exigency of matter, for God as Author of nature decrees things under the same title under which He produces them. But matter before it exists does not demand form. Therefore it must first be foreseen as existing by virtue of its own decree, so that form may be decreed at its exigency. Finally, matter and form are produced by very different actions: matter by a creative action depending upon God alone; material form by an eductive action depending also upon a created agent. It is fitting that this diversity of actions presuppose a diversity of decrees.

26. Hence God as Author of nature and as willing according to the exigency of matter need not by the first decree will matter positively in order to its end, but only negatively, insofar as He must will nothing contrary to that end. In this manner He would truly act in the case under discussion, for He would not exclude that end through the decree preserving matter, but through another subsequent supernatural decree denying form. It can further be granted that when God decrees matter He wills its end, though not altogether absolutely and indefectibly, but rather in the manner in which matter renders that end due to itself. Hence, since matter renders form due to itself only naturally, without taking away from God liberty to deny form by absolute power, so God by virtue of the decree productive of matter only wills form to be naturally due, and does not take from Himself liberty to decree the contrary.

27. Therefore that decree does not regard the existence of form except under a condition, at least tacit or implicit, that God for the posterior sign does not will to act contrary to the exigency of matter. It can therefore be explained thus: "I will absolutely that matter exist, and at the same time I will it to possess form if the natural order is observed," or "unless I decree otherwise by absolute power." This decree can undoubtedly remain even though God for the posterior sign denies form. The solution will become clear from the examples given above, for example fire, whose natural end is the operation of burning, according to the maxim "Being is for the sake of operation"; and nevertheless the decree terminating in fire does not will combustion so absolutely that it cannot be joined with its absence.

28. From what has been said in this second answer one may infer, 1º that the miracle of preserving matter without form belongs only to the negative "without form," and not to the positive preservation of matter. That is, it consists in God's willing, once the existence of matter is presupposed, to deny it every form; not in God's willing, once such denial is posited, to

continue preserving matter, because both this preservation and the volition of it are natural and the same as that by which He preserves matter under form. This, however, does not prevent the absolute denial that matter can naturally exist without form, according to what was said in n. 12. One may infer, 2º that matter existing without form suffers violence, not insofar as it exists and is preserved, for it desires this even then, but precisely insofar as it does not possess form. Therefore, if it is said, "Matter does not demand to exist in a violent state," I distinguish: it does not demand violence once existence is presupposed, I grant this; it does not demand existence once violence is presupposed, I deny it. If it is pressed, "For matter to be preserved without form is a miracle; but matter does not demand a miracle; therefore," I distinguish the major premise: it is a miracle consisting precisely in the denial of form once the existence of matter is presupposed, I grant this; consisting in the preservation of matter once denial of form is presupposed, I deny the major premise; and granting the minor premise, I deny the consequence.

CHAPTER VI.
On the Unity and Distinction of First Matter.

1. It is asked, 1º whether all sublunary matters in fact belong to the same species. It is certain that first matter is not numerically one in all composites, whatever Averroes may have said. For the same individual matter cannot naturally receive simultaneously so many forms and opposed dispositions, nor exist simultaneously in so many distant places. Hence the controversy concerns only the specific unity of sublunary matter. I have judged it better to defer the question of celestial matter to the books *De caelo*.

2. The common opinion rightly affirms this. For species are not to be multiplied without a foundation, and there is no sufficient foundation for a specific diversity among sublunary matters. First, they all agree in the character of an incomplete corporeal substance, first subject, and pure physical potency. Next, they all imply an order toward the same forms, for the perpetual transmutation of things sufficiently shows that any matter is capable of any form. Nor is there any sublunary form, even that of diamond, which cannot be corrupted by some force and leave its matter to another form. Finally, of themselves they root the same operations or properties, namely quantity, location, and duration, nor can they exercise influx upon any others, as we saw above. There is therefore no basis upon which they could differ in species.

3. It may be said, 1º that matters are distinguished through their order toward forms, but forms differ in species. Therefore matters also differ in species. I answer: if one matter implies an order to certain forms and another an order to different forms, the matters will differ in species. But if both one and the other imply an order to the same forms, which among themselves differ in species, they cannot be distinguished by this order, since rather they agree in it. And this is in fact how all sublunary matters are constituted. It may be said, 2º that forms differ from one another in species although they imply an order toward the same matter. Therefore matters too can differ from one another although they imply an order toward the same forms. I deny the consequence, because forms possess another source from which they differ, namely by reason of rooting different properties and operations. But one matter roots nothing of itself that is not common to the others.

4. It may be said, 3º: therefore lion and horse do not differ adequately in species, since they agree specifically in matter. I grant the consequence. Nevertheless they differ absolutely in species because specific distinction absolutely is taken from form, which in the physical line corresponds to difference in the metaphysical line; and in that line lion and horse differ simply, although they agree in the formality of animal. If it is inferred, "Therefore the forms themselves of lion and horse, considered separately, differ more from one another than the whole composites do," I likewise grant the consequence, because although the composites include the whole difference of the forms, they include not that alone but something further in which they specifically agree. This again is evident from the example of the metaphysical line.

5. It is asked, 2º whether the specific unity of sublunary matter is positive. Most Thomists deny this, saying that matters belong to the same species only negatively. For since of themselves they have no act, not even a metaphysical act, they are not by reason of themselves positively constituted in any species, which is always taken from act. Yet because neither do they have an act in which they differ, they are therefore not positively diverse in species, and consequently are of the same species negatively. They say the same of numerical unity, namely that matter by reason of itself has neither unity nor numerical multiplicity, that is, is neither one nor many individuals except negatively.

6. Our authors and the Scotists nevertheless affirm this, indeed all who grant matter its own existence or at least its own metaphysical act, such as among the Thomists Palanco here q. 5 and Froyllán here q. 2, a. 5, although the latter agrees with his school regarding numerical unity. This opinion is

easily proved because positive species is found wherever there is a positive difference contracting the generic notion and ultimately distinguishing the thing from other species. But such a difference certainly exists in first matter, as we showed in disp. 2, c. 3, n. 5 sqq. Certainly the order of first subject toward all sublunary forms is positive, as Bayona grants here, q. 3, nn. 329 and 346, ed. 2. But through that order sublunary matter is ultimately distinguished from every form and likewise from celestial matter according to the Thomists. Therefore it differs positively, or in something positive. But according to the Thomists it does not differ generically from celestial matter, nor merely numerically. Therefore it differs from it specifically in a positive formality or reality. Therefore there is between celestial and sublunary matter a positive specific difference. Likewise the matter of a lion and the matter of a horse agree with one another positively, namely by reason of the positive order toward the same forms which they identify with themselves. But this agreement is not generic or numerical, but specific, as the Thomists admit. Therefore between those matters there is by reason of themselves a positive agreement or specific unity.

7. The reason *a priori* is that matter is a positive being, as no one doubts. But it is repugnant that a positive being produced in reality should not be distinguished from every non-self both specifically and numerically through some positive difference and thisness. Otherwise one positive being would be distinguished from others through a pure negation, or through non-being, and consequently would be in species and individual a being-non-being. Add that if matter uniquely receives its species and positive individuation from form, as the Thomists hold, then whenever matter changes form it will also change its positive species and individuation and will be another matter, numerically and specifically different. The Thomists grant this, as may be seen in Bayona, loc. cit., nn. 350 and 409.

8. But from this follows, 1º, contrary to the Philosopher and common Philosophy, that substantial changes and the opposition of form and privation are not exercised about the same subject, but about subjects numerically and specifically distinct. It may be said that the subject is negatively the same. But to the contrary: first, the subject is no more negatively the same than negatively distinct. For just as it is negatively the same because by reason of itself it has no principle of positive distinction, so it will be negatively distinct because by reason of itself it has no principle of positive unity. Second, because positive diversity is properly and simply diversity, whereas purely negative unity is improper. Therefore, speaking properly and absolutely, that doctrine of the philosophers will be false.

9. It follows, 2º, contrary to the opinion of all the Schools, discussed in Logic, that there is a real distinction between metaphysical grades, or between superior and inferior predicates. For in matter the notion of incomplete substance, first material principle, and potential part is really distinct from form, from which formally and constitutively proceeds the individual and specific grade of the same matter, that is, its specific difference and singularity or thisness. It follows, 3º, that the entity of matter, insofar as really distinct from form, will be a certain universal in reality, since it is an entity of itself neither one nor many in species or individual, but really indifferent to various species and thisnesses. It follows, 4º, that it will not be lawful to venerate the ashes of saints as their proper relics, since the matter will already be simply another matter numerically and specifically. Likewise, if on the day of Judgment the matter of Peter's corpse were united to Paul's soul and conversely, both Peter and Paul would rise in the same individual body in which each lived, since any matter, by the very fact that it is united to the same soul, becomes the same in the individual.

10. The arguments of the Thomists are founded upon matter's being pure potency and consequently possessing no act, just as God possesses no potentiality because He is pure act. But we sufficiently solved this foundation with others similar to it in the preceding disputation, c. 3 sqq. Certainly some likeness and imitation of God belongs to matter, as St. Thomas, cited there, c. 4, n. 28, expressly taught us. But matter does not imitate God in potentiality, which does not exist in God. Therefore it imitates Him in some actuality. I merely note here that when matter is said to be specified by form, and generally any potency by its act or object, the discussion concerns an extrinsic specifying principle; for the intrinsic specifying principle is the order itself toward the act or object, and that order is identified with the potency.

11. But it may still be objected: first matter of itself is not one by unity of composition, since it is not composed of act and potency; nor is it one by unity of simplicity, since it is divisible into integral parts. Therefore by reason of itself it is in no way one. Confirmation: matter which is now divided into several numerically distinct portions can become one matter, namely if it is placed under one continuous quantity. Therefore matter of itself is neither one nor many. The objection is evidently countered by material form, for example the form of a stone, as will be manifest to one applying it. Moreover, matter is one by unity of simplicity, not integral but essential, consisting in this: that the essence of matter is not physically constituted from act and potency, or from parts whose separation formally destroys the essence. This simplicity is not opposed by integral or

continuous composition. For although any matter can be divided into several particles, in each particle the essence of matter is preserved, just as when water is divided into several drops. To the confirmation I admit that matter of itself is indifferent "in the being of a continuum," an indifference which likewise belongs to all homogeneous composites, such as water, fire, stone, etc., and also to their forms considered according to themselves. But just as one would wrongly infer from this that specific and numerical entitative unity, of which we speak, does not belong to such forms and composites by reason of themselves, consisting in this, that each designable particle of them, whether continuously united with others or separated, is determinately this and not another, so the same is to be judged of matter.

12. It is asked, 3º whether there can be a specific latitude under matter; that is, whether matter specifically different from the sublunary matter which actually exists is possible. The affirmative opinion is sufficiently common in our School with the Excellent Doctor, disp. 13, *Metaphysica*, sect. 11, from n. 8. This opinion can be defended in two ways. 1º by positing two matters, one of which is receptive only of an incorruptible form and consequently demands to be informed indefectibly, while the other is receptive of any corruptible or losable form. 2º by holding that each matter can receive losable forms, but one is restricted to certain species of forms and another to different species, or indiscriminately to all. In the first sense the affirmative opinion also pleases the Thomists, among whom for this reason celestial matter differs in species from sublunary matter; but it displeases the Scotists with Scotus, according to Mastrius here, disp. 2, n. 64. In the second sense the Excellent Doctor doubts, cited disp., sect. 12, n. 6. Our recent authors commonly affirm it, and Bayona here, q. 3, n. 355, and Mastrius loc. cit., agree with them. Fr. John Baptist de Benedictis denies it in both senses, l. 1, *Physica*, c. 5. To me the affirmative side appears more probable in both senses.

13. The proof is, 1º because, as will appear from the solution of objections, no sufficient repugnance is shown in the concept of matter which of itself is limited either to one species of indefectible form or to four or five species of losable form. Such a limitation would undoubtedly render the matter specifically different from the sublunary matter now existing. 2º because in matter so limited the metaphysical essence of first matter which we explained in disp. 2, cc. 2 and 3 would be preserved. In active potencies, from the power to produce some effects there does not follow a power toward various other effects even of equal or lesser perfection; thus the visual potency does not have power for acts of hearing or smelling. Therefore likewise in passive potency a capacity for some forms can stand

without a capacity for all. Hence the unlimited capacity of matter actually existing is not proved from its capacity for some forms, but from the varied transmutation of things, which sufficiently shows that any matter is capable of any form.

14. Objection 1º: pure act cannot be multiplied specifically. Therefore neither can pure potency. I deny the consequence, and counter it with numerical multiplication, which pure act does not admit but pure potency does. Accordingly pure act, namely God, since He is simply infinite in every genus of perfection, essentially excludes multiplication. But the finitude and imperfection of matter do not exclude multiplication but rather ground it. It is replied: matter is the most imperfect entity, since it is almost nothing. Therefore in it there cannot be a greater and lesser perfection. Therefore neither can there be a specific latitude, which requires inequality of perfection. I answer: this last point is uncertain. But setting it aside, I distinguish the antecedent: it is the most imperfect entity in its genus, let this pass; in species or individual, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Just as an angel, whom Augustine calls "near God" just as he calls matter "near nothing," is the most perfect created substance in its genus and nevertheless admits a specific inequality of perfection, so matter, although perhaps the most imperfect in its genus, can admit species unequal in perfection.

15. Objection 2º: therefore matter intrinsically limited to only one species of corruptible form will be possible. I deny the consequence, because such a form would be corruptible, as is supposed, and on the other hand would not be corruptible, since it could neither be expelled by another form nor leave matter deprived of every form. For our opinion it is enough that limitation of matter not be repugnant in the manner explained in n. 12. Others grant the consequence, because although that form could not accidentally be corrupted on the supposition of union with such matter, it would nevertheless be corruptible of itself, because it could first be received in common matter, in which it would exercise its corruptibility. Nor does it follow from this that matter capable of only one individual form would also be possible. For just as an active cause can be limited to a single species of effects, but not to a single individual, because if it can produce one there is no reason why it cannot produce others of entirely the same character, so also a passive cause, or the capacity of matter.

16. Objection 3º, from Fr. John Baptist de Benedictis: matter limited to one species of indefectible form, such as many in fact believe the matter of the sun to be, would not be a subjective part but an integral nature not needing substantial form. Therefore it would not be first matter. The

antecedent is proved, 1º because such matter would be the first principle not only passive but also active, that is, the first exigent principle and first root of the potencies and operations of the sun, for example. For in reality it would first ground and demand determinate solar potencies and operations. 2º because the form of the sun, since it would be due to determinate matter and rooted in it, would be a property and accident of such matter just like quantity. 3º because matter of this kind would constitute the sun in the being of such, would first distinguish it from everything not the sun, and would be that from which the other things would be proved *a priori*. For the very form of the sun would be proved from matter as from a presupposed principle. Therefore such matter would be the whole nature or essence of the sun.

17. Confirmation from the same author: the potency of matter cannot be limited under any aspect. First, not insofar as "sustaining," because matter does not labor more in sustaining a more perfect form than a less perfect one, but sustains any form by the same power. Therefore, just as powers capable of sustaining a weight of four, for example, cannot be limited to a leaden weight rather than a wooden one, so the sustaining power of matter cannot be limited to a form of one species rather than others. Next, not insofar as "receptive," because matter's capacity for receiving form is founded upon emptiness and absence, and these must necessarily belong to every matter with respect to every form. For this reason quantity capable of only one shape, place receptive of only one body, and a vessel receptive of only one liquid are repugnant. Confirmation again: whenever passive potencies differ in species, they are not purely passive but also active, as is evident in the intellectual, volitional, visual, and other potencies. But first matter cannot be active.

18. The argument is weighty, but does not sufficiently convince in the present question, where there is discussion of God's absolute power. Therefore to the objection I deny the antecedent. To the first proof: such matter would indeed immediately demand the potencies and operations of the sun, but would not therefore be their "active principle" or "first root." For not every exigency suffices for this, but only one founded in perfection and fecundity, such as is found in the form of the sun and not in its matter, whose whole exigency would be founded in imperfection and pure need, although ordered of itself toward those potencies and operations rather than others. Thus the ultimate disposition of the body for the rational soul demands this determinate soul without therefore being the active principle or root of the soul. Likewise sublunary matter vaguely demands some

substantial form and nevertheless is called by no one the first active principle or first root of form taken vaguely.

19. To the second proof I deny the consequence, because a greater perfection and fecundity is customarily granted to matter with respect to quantity, which therefore is due to matter from fecundity. The form of the sun is not due in this way, for it would be due only from need. To the third proof: such matter would constitute the sun in the being of such, not fully but inchoatively. For the sun would not be understood as fully constituted in its species until it possessed the first root of its properties and operations, which is form. Likewise it would first distinguish the sun from everything not the sun, but not as the principal difference, rather as a less principal one. See what was said in disp. 2, c. 2, nn. 10 and 13. Finally, I deny that the form of the sun would be proved *a priori* from such matter, because it would not be proved from it as from an active principle or second root. If, however, any proof made from something presupposed and determinately connected is called a proof *a priori*, nothing follows against us, for in this sense even the rational soul can be proved *a priori* from the ultimate disposition without therefore ceasing to be a form belonging to the essence of man.

20. To the confirmation: I admit that there is no place for a limitation of potency when there is discussion of terms of the same species and entirely the same character. The examples objected to hold thus far. For weight consists in gravity, which is of the same character in lead and wood. Similarly bodies occupy place, and liquids fill a vessel, by reason of extension, which likewise is of the same character in any body or liquid of equal magnitude. The example of quantity in relation to shapes is perhaps not certain. But let it pass. Every shape is of the same character physically, although mathematically it admits diverse species. For there is no physical diversity in the fact that the extremities of quantity are located or continuously united in this or that line, in this or that order.

21. But when there is discussion of terms specifically diverse, a potency, whether sustaining or receptive, can certainly be limited, as is evident in active potencies; for then entirely the same reason no longer applies. To which potency limitation or extension belongs cannot be proved except from a sign or experience, for there is no reason *a priori* concerning the essences of things. Thus there is no reason why the visual potency cannot hear except that experience shows it to be of its own nature destined for seeing and not for hearing. Nor is it relevant that the sustaining power seems to labor no more in one case than in another, for it can be transcendentally ordered to one and not to another. Nor is the capacity of matter founded upon emptiness and absence simply as such, but upon an

absence which is privation and upon an emptiness which has an order toward form. For even in a stone there is an emptiness and absence of intellectual perfection, without there therefore being a capacity for it.

22. Finally, observe that an order toward form under the generic aspect of substantial complement does not belong to the concept of first matter as such. For although it is found in the sublunary matter now existing, nothing prevents another matter from being possible whose order tends only under the aspect of elemental form, or under the aspect of the form of an inanimate mixed body.

DISPUTATION IV.
ON SUBSTANTIAL FORM.

Form is spoken of in many ways. For an exemplar, according to the likeness of which something is formed, is called an "extrinsic form." An angel, because of his actuality and because he needs no substantial complement, is called a "separate and subsistent form"; in this sense God also is sometimes called the "first form." That which, without intrinsic union, is locally present in order to impel another thing or assist it toward motion is called an "assisting form"; for example, omnipotence assisting a secondary cause in acting, an angel moving a heaven, or a demon moving the body of one possessed. Finally, to omit other acceptations, that which by its own nature is destined intrinsically to perfect and actuate some subject is called an "informing form." A form of this kind is either substantial, as the soul of man, or accidental, as whiteness. Here we are discussing only substantial form, which is the other intrinsic principle of a natural body. Nor is there any doubt whether such a form exists in things, since no philosopher today denies that natural bodies, at least those called "mixed," are substances constituted of matter and form.

The only question is what this form is, or in what it consists. For the Peripatetics maintain that it is a true absolute entity and a true incomplete substance, which is superadded to matter whenever a new body is generated. By contrast, the more recent philosophers called "Corpuscularians," such as Cartesians and Atomists, hold that no entity whatever is superadded to matter when it assumes a new form, except only in the case of the rational

soul; and in general, in place of form they recognize only new modes by which the corpuscles of matter are joined and connected in one way or another, yet in such a way that by these modes nothing entitatively distinct from matter is implied. They commonly say that an example of this doctrine is found in artifacts, for they think that natural and artificial bodies are distinguished only in that natural bodies are fitted together in a more marvelous manner and one more hidden from our senses. We explained this Corpuscular Physics more distinctly, and rejected it, in the Preliminary Dissertation. Now we shall only indicate briefly the chief arguments, or sources of arguments, by which Peripatetic substantial form is ordinarily demonstrated, and we shall resolve whatever of any weight is objected against it.

CHAPTER I.

The Peripatetic Substantial Form Is Proved.

1. Argument 1º. Man, besides matter, is constituted by a rational soul, which is a substantial form really distinct from matter, as has been defined by Faith and for ages held as known by the light of nature. Therefore other living things also, for example dogs, consist of a substantial form really distinct from matter. The consequence is proved, 1º, because matter is of the same nature in a dog and in a man, as the Adversaries do not deny. Therefore, just as all the matter of a man is an incomplete substance awaiting a really superadded substantial form, so the same must be judged of all the matter of a dog. I ask whether the matter of a man is of itself a complete substance. If it is affirmed, then it will not be able to constitute with the soul a unity through itself, just as for the same reason the soul cannot be united to an angel to constitute a unity through itself. If it is denied, then neither will the matter of a dog be a complete substance, since it is of the same species. Therefore it must either be completed by a new superadded substance, or there will be no complete substance in a dog, or in any other substantial composite besides man, which is utterly absurd. Nor should recourse be had to a modal form, for this is likewise found in the matter of a man, which nevertheless remains incomplete.

2. Hence, 2º, the same consequence is proved because all the matter of a man, although more perfectly organized than canine matter, is incapable of acts of sensation apart from a really superadded form, as is evident in the death of a man, especially one who has been suffocated, where the organization is scarcely damaged. Therefore likewise all the matter of a dog will be incapable, etc. 3º, because no lesser change is observed in the death

of a dog than in the death of a man. Therefore, just as the death of a man physically demonstrates that a part of the living man, nobler than matter, has been lost, so does the death of a dog, etc. I know what the Atomists answer to these points, but we sufficiently refuted them in the Preliminary Dissertation.

3. But if a Peripatetic substantial form is admitted in brute animals, it must necessarily be admitted in the other composites. First, because by this very fact all the foundations of the Adversaries for denying a material form collapse. Second, because an equal or greater change appears when wood is burned than when a dog dies. Therefore, if in the death of a dog something substantial perishes while matter remains, the same must occur in the burning of wood. Finally, because in every composite there is found a peculiar collection of accidents and operations which demands a substantial root distinct from matter, as I shall shortly say.

4. Argument 2º, from the generation and corruption of things. When a tree arises from the earth, something substantial is newly produced; and when wood is burned, something substantial perishes. But prime matter is neither newly produced nor perishes, as the Adversaries admit. Therefore a substantial form distinct from matter is produced and perishes. The Atomists say that only the composite is produced and perishes, without any entity belonging to it being produced or perishing, precisely because a new modal combination of atoms begins and ceases. But against this: that combination either is some true entity distinct from matter, or it is not. If the first is said, the opponent is entirely disarmed, for whatever is objected against the Peripatetic form applies equally to that entity. If the second, then the composite, when produced and destroyed, acquires or loses nothing of its own entity. Therefore its whole entity and substance is presupposed before generation and remains wholly after corruption. Therefore the composite is generated and made from its whole self, and is resolved wholly into itself, which is ridiculous and unheard of in Physics. Nor will escape be found by multiplying expressions and saying that the entity of the composite is produced and destroyed, not according to itself, but "as under such a state, under such a combination, under such a harmony," etc. For I shall always ask whether by these expressions some true entity is implied distinct from the whole matter according to itself, and the argument will return whatever answer is given.

5. Argument 3º. Natural bodies differ from one another in substantial species, for example a magnet and gold, a mouse and an apple. The Adversaries concede this, and, as Maignan says, "no one of sound mind" will deny it. But this difference cannot stand unless there is a substantial form

really distinct from matter. It is proved: natural bodies, in the first place, do not differ substantially in matter. For according to the Cartesians and most Atomists, whom Tosca follows in *Physica Generalis*, l. 1, prop. 25, all the corpuscles or atoms of matter are "of the same substantial and specific nature." Even Maignan, who acknowledges atoms substantially diverse, does not deny that many mixed bodies which differ in species consist of the same elements, or of the same species of atoms, for example those of which some are nourished from others, such as the wolf and the sheep, the stork and the snake. But in these there is no specific diversity on the part of matter. For a different proportion of elements, for example that in one mixed body there is a greater portion of earth than of fire and in another the reverse, does not establish a difference according to species, but only according to more and less in the quantity or multitude of atoms of the same nature.

6. Next, natural bodies do not differ substantially in the figure, position, and arrangement of their corpuscles. For figure, and the same should be thought of position and arrangement, either is nothing distinct from matter prior to the operation of the mind, according to Maignan, or it is an accidental mode and therefore insufficient for substantial difference, unless it is maintained that the same wax, when it changes figure, is substantially changed. Therefore there is nothing by which the wolf and sheep differ substantially unless a form entitatively distinct is superadded to the whole matter together with its figure and arrangement. If it is said with Tosca that the figure, position, and connection by which atoms are intertwined are substantial modes, whose diversity therefore renders bodies substantially different, against this, 1º: why are they substantial modes? Is it because they modify substance? Then every figure is a substantial mode, since there is none that does not immediately modify substance, at least on principles which reject every entitative, or absolute, accident. Therefore in general a diversity of figure will be a substantial diversity, for example between round and angular wax, between a bent and an extended hand, between a sitting and a standing man. Is it because it constitutes a unity through itself, for example an apple? But this is precisely what is being asked: why does the figure of the corpuscles of an apple, rather than the figure of the fingers of a clenched hand, constitute a unity through itself, since both are of the same nature and accordingly both accidental?

7. Against this, 2º: the atoms which are the first matter of corporeal things "are variously figured" from the beginning, as Tosca says in the cited l. 1, prop. 23; but "all atoms are of the same nature substantially and specifically," as the same Tosca says ibid., prop. 25. Therefore diversity of figure does not destroy identity in substantial species. Therefore, although

gold and an apple consist of atoms variously figured, they will be of the same nature substantially and specifically. Against this, 3º: figure and the other modes, according to Tosca, add no true entity above matter. Therefore they add no true substantiality, for true substantiality without true entity is a contradiction in terms. Therefore for an apple and gold to differ in the figure of their atoms is not for them to differ in any true substantiality, and consequently it is not truly to differ substantially. I ask whether an apple and gold, which I suppose equal in the number of atoms, differ entitatively. If it is affirmed, then, since they differ only in modification, that modification will already be something entitative, which the opponent abhors. If it is denied, then it is a contradiction in terms that they differ substantially.

8. Argument 4º, from the peculiar properties and operations belonging to each composite, so that those proper to an apple do not belong to gold, and likewise in the others. For these there must be assigned in the nature of the composite some substantial root which demands these rather than others and which is the reason *a priori* why gold and an apple do not have the same properties. A "substantial root," I say, for regarding any accident whatsoever it can equally be asked why it belongs to gold rather than to an apple. But to have recourse to the will of the First Cause, which without any foundation in the natures of things arbitrarily attributed to each certain properties and operations, is indeed a shortcut, but by no means philosophical, nor approved by any physicist. For in that manner the whole of Physics would be completed in one word.

9. Moreover, that the nature of things intrinsically roots their properties is evident from the fact that, if something suffers harm from a contrary agent, it endeavors by its own power to remove the violent state and restore the connatural one. Thus hot water, left to itself, casts off heat and recovers its native coldness. Thus molten metal, once the fire is removed, solidifies and returns to its former hardness. Thus a horse or dog often restores to health its own body when injured by disease or a wound. This whole doctrine pleases the Atomists also, who consequently admit that each composite has its own nature in being, insofar as nature is defined by Aristotle as "the principle and cause of the motion and rest of that in which it is primarily, through itself, and not accidentally."

10. Then thus: but the aforesaid root or nature does not consist in matter, nor in the figure and arrangement of atoms. Therefore it consists in a really superadded substantial form. The subsumed minor premise is proved because matter, since it is of the same nature in a wolf and a sheep, for example, as we saw in Argument 4º, cannot be the root of the properties of a wolf rather than of a sheep. Likewise figure and arrangement, or other

similar modifications of matter, cannot be the aforesaid root. First, because they are accidental modes, as we showed. Second, because according to the Adversaries they imply no true entity, and consequently no true substantiality. Third, because figure and every other purely local modification is not active, nor has any function or essence except ultimately to determine a thing to be in such a place, with these or those terminations. Hence, although figure often contributes to an operation or motion, as in the wheels of a clock and in other automata, it contributes not as a motive power but as a mere condition for another natural power to cause the motion. For the figure of the wheels would contribute nothing to a clock unless there were present the native force of the weight or the native elasticity of the steel spring which produces the motion.

11. From this it may be gathered why the Peripatetics acknowledge in substantial form not only a true entity distinct from matter on the part of the thing, but also an "absolute" entity, that is, not modal, but one capable of being separated from matter at least by divine power. For the reason is that so great a force and activity as belongs to the specific nature and first root of the properties and operations of the composite cannot be attributed to mere modifications of matter alone. Modes are very slight entities, instituted only to terminate or determine some indifference ultimately. Likewise, a mode of matter alone cannot be nobler than matter itself, as substantial form must be by reason of its being the first root and active nature. Hence, although by a modal form the specific difference of natural bodies might in some manner be preserved, as it is preserved in artifacts, in which nevertheless the difference on the part of form is not substantial, provided that such a form were some true entity and true substance, though slight, nevertheless without an absolute form their activity and the specific nobility of their nature cannot be preserved.

12. It may be said: if there were a substantial form demanding and rooting the properties of things, it would follow, 1º, that the form itself would often be a facilitating cause of its own destruction; for it is a property of oil, for example, readily to catch fire, by which the form of the oil perishes. It would follow, 2º, that the rational soul also would root the properties of man; hence, since the properties of men are very diverse, one being intelligent, another dull, one naturally gentle, another harsh, etc., not all would have souls of the same species. But this objection presses us no more than the Atomists. For they themselves do not deny that oil, and every other natural body, from its own specific nature demands certain properties rather than others. Oil therefore will demand a facility for combustion by which it perishes in the being of the composite. Likewise, according to all, the

rational soul demands in the body a human rather than a brutish temperament. Therefore a diversity of human temperament will infer a diversity of souls. Man too will naturally demand to die more easily than an ox if man demands a temperament exposed to more diseases.

13. Therefore neither man, nor oil, nor any other easily corruptible thing is a facilitating cause of its own destruction except, at most, as it were permissively or indirectly, insofar as it demands a temperament of qualities that offers little resistance to a contrary agent, not with the intention of readily perishing, but because of other advantages of its proper nature arising from those qualities. Rational souls, however, of themselves demand a uniform temperament of body. Nevertheless, diversity can accidentally arise in this from extrinsic causes prevailing against the demand of the souls, which nevertheless do not depart so long as the temperament remains simply human.

14. Argument 5º, from the fact that, if the Peripatetic form is denied, physical activity is withdrawn from created causes. But this and other arguments, or absurdities, deduced from the doctrine of the Atomists may be seen in the Preliminary Dissertation. What has been said is sufficient for the present place. We shall also add other arguments while resolving the contrary ones.

CHAPTER II.

The First Objection from Authority Is Solved and Retorted.

1. Objection 1º, from Thomas Vincent Tosca, *Physica Generalis*, l. 1. He adduces several texts of Aristotle in which Aristotle expressly teaches that form is not "made" or "generated," and that everything which "is made" is always a composite. The doctrine of St. Thomas agrees with this, for he often says that form is not "generated" nor "made except accidentally," nor "properly has being." Both of them teach this generally of form, whether substantial or accidental. But if form is a true entity superadded to matter, it cannot be denied that it is properly made, generated, and has being. Therefore the form which we maintain is foreign to the mind of Aristotle and St. Thomas. Confirmation from other passages of Aristotle in which form is called "the account of essence," or "of quiddity," and is said to be "one, as order or music"; and, as in *Physica* II, text 28, it is "the account of the very what-it-was-to-be, as of that which is the octave, two to one, and universally number and the parts that are in the definition." But by these names a respective form is plainly signified, consisting in a relation and proportion of the parts of matter, such as the Atomistic form is. Hence

Aristotle everywhere compares natural form with artificial form, which certainly is a mere modification.

2. I answer: it is remarkable that the Atomistic form should seek patronage in Aristotle and St. Thomas, since both reject it and either assert or presuppose in innumerable places a form entitatively distinct from matter. I shall touch upon some passages by way of example. To understand their force, keep before your eyes that the Atomistic form is nothing other than a manifold modification by virtue of which variously figured atoms are combined and connected in many ways. But this modification, according to the Atomists, is not a true entity or substance, but a mere relation by which nothing entitative is added to matter, that is, to the atoms. Hence matter is the whole entity and substance of things, whose generation and corruption are accomplished by the aggregation and segregation of atoms. See Tosca, cited *Physica Generalis*, l. 1.

3. Aristotle, therefore, throughout *Physica* I is engaged in refuting the opinions of the ancients, particularly Democritus and Empedocles, who asserted that all things are made from pre-existing atoms or elements without any other form than aggregation and segregation or diversity of figure and position. Against them he teaches that besides matter another substance must be admitted, which is the form of things. "Substance," I say, because "it cannot be that a substance consists of non-substances," as he himself says, c. 6, text 52. See St. Thomas there, lect. 2, where he says: "Democritus held indivisible bodies, which are called atoms, to be the principles of all things. But he held all bodies of this sort to be of one genus according to nature, although they differed according to figure, etc." Then he adds: "The ancient physicists knew only the material cause, and touched little upon the others. They held natural forms to be accidents, just as artificial forms are. Therefore, just as the whole substance of artifacts is their matter, so according to them it followed that the whole substance of natural things was their matter." Later, lect. 9, after recounting the same opinions of the ancients, he adds: "And all these were deceived because they did not know how to distinguish between potency and act, etc."

4. Aristotle likewise rejects the opinion of Democritus in *Metaphysica* VIII, c. 2, because it does not assign a substantial form that is the cause of figure, position, mixture, etc. "If substance," he says, "is the cause that each thing is, one must seek in these what the cause is by which each of these things is. Substance, therefore, is none of these, etc." St. Thomas there, lect. 2: "Democritus held that the principles of material things were indivisible bodies which, since they are of the same nature, agree with one another; but they constitute the diversity of things because of difference of position,

figure, and order." Is this not Tosca's opinion? But St. Thomas teaches in the same place that besides these and other similar differences another "formal cause of being," or "formal substance," must be assigned, because, he says, "None of the aforesaid differences is substance, nor anything akin to substance, as though pertaining to the genus of substance."

5. But nowhere does Aristotle refute the whole doctrine of the Atomists concerning principles and elements, matter and form, generation and corruption, alteration and mixture more extensively and expressly than in the books *De generatione et corruptione*. Whoever reads them will be greatly astonished that Tosca, or any other Atomist, dares to cite the Philosopher in his favor. And as regards St. Thomas, one will be still more astonished who has even hastily surveyed his commentaries on those books. Let the Holy Doctor be heard by way of example in *De generatione et corruptione* I, lect. 5, where, after recounting the doctrine of the Atomists concerning generation, corruption, and alteration, he continues: "For they believed that this occurs in natural things as it occurs in a house or a ship and things of this sort, whose form consists in composition or order. For they are made only by aggregation of parts, and are corrupted only by segregation. Whatever other transmutation occurs besides dissolution of the continuum is alteration. This, therefore, is the source from which the whole fallacy proceeds."

6. "For," he adds, "there is generation in natural things, whose form is not position and order, not indeed through aggregation and segregation, but because a transmutation occurs from this whole, that is, one not dissolved into parts, into this whole, as though not aggregated from certain parts. But the ancient philosophers thought that every such transmutation which takes place while some whole remains intact was alteration. This, however, is not true, for sometimes there can be simple generation, and sometimes alteration. Therefore, when there is a transmutation according to matter and form, namely so that matter receives another substantial form, there will be simple generation and corruption; but when there is a transmutation according to accident and affection, there will be alteration."

7. There is scarcely any lesson in these commentaries of St. Thomas in which something is not said against the system of the Atomists. Thus in *De generatione et corruptione* I, lect. 10: "When matter receives another substantial form . . . without any segregation or aggregation intervening, as Democritus held, such a transmutation is the generation of one thing and the corruption of another." And in lect. 22, he says that the Atomists can assign no cause of action and passion: "Because figure is neither active nor passive, etc." And in lect. 23, he says that the doctrine of the Atomists, which he there explains exactly as Tosca does, destroys alteration and increase, and

that everywhere "alteration takes place without division of the continuous body itself, without any other composition, without inversion of its parts, and without a different contact in the order of the component parts . . . and without any indivisible bodies entering beneath"; and without the "parts" of the altered body "changing their order or position."

8. Likewise, from the lessons on *De generatione et corruptione* II many things may be drawn, especially against mixture, or the generation of mixed bodies, as it is explained by the Atomists. For example, lect. 7: "If bone and flesh," says St. Thomas, "are composed by a certain accumulation of suitable elements, then nothing is generated, but in the things that are generated there is only some account or relation." Behold how, according to St. Thomas, a "respective form" destroys generation. "What, therefore, is the cause of these things, that from a man a man is generated, and similarly from wheat wheat, and not an olive?" He adds that the cause of these things can be neither the elements themselves nor strife and friendship, as Empedocles maintained and Maignan also maintains under the name of the sympathy and antipathy of atoms.

9. "For friendship," St. Thomas adds, "is the cause only of aggregation, while strife is the cause only of segregation. But the necessary cause of these is the form of the thing, which makes man to be man and flesh to be flesh. Form, however, is the substance of each thing; and therefore there is in the thing not only mixture, that is, a composition of things aggregated, and their separation, as Empedocles says, but there is also form . . . since nature, which is form, is the cause of beings. . . . But concerning this form or nature Empedocles says nothing," although he certainly did say something about respective form and the harmony of the elements; "although nature itself, which is called form, is the good and the best of each thing, good indeed in itself and best in relation to the order of the Universe. But Empedocles praises only mixture, which in truth is not mixture, but only a certain composition."

10. From these things, I think, it is most evidently clear that Aristotle and St. Thomas acknowledged in natural things another form besides the figure, position, combination, and arrangement of corpuscles. And indeed a form which is not only a being, but "more a being" than matter; not only a substance, but "more a substance" than matter itself, as Aristotle expressly teaches in *Metaphysica* VII, c. 3, and St. Thomas there, lect. 2; and not only nature, but "more nature" than matter, according to Aristotle, *Physica* II, text 12, and St. Thomas there, lect. 2. Likewise a form which is not merely a true entity, but is "something divine, best, and desirable," as Aristotle says both in *De generatione et corruptione* II, text 41, and especially in *Physica* I, text 81;

on which passage St. Thomas, lect. 15, greatly commends the perfection of form. He should also be consulted in *De caelo* III, lect. 2.

11. Do these things fit a modal form which adds nothing entitative above matter? Tosca denies in the cited book, props. 35 and 36, that form is a substance. But how often does Aristotle flatly affirm the opposite? How often does he divide substance into matter, form, and composite, particularly in *Metaphysica* VII and VIII and *De anima* II? How often do both he and St. Thomas attribute the notion of substance more to form than to matter? See St. Thomas, *In Metaphysicam* VII, lect. 2; VIII, lect. 1; IX, lect. 8, where he adds that "by the name substance form is customarily signified"; likewise *In De anima* II, lect. 1.

12. Tosca asserts a thousand times that there is no difference between artificial and natural things except that the latter are made in a more marvelous manner and one more hidden from our senses; and he is bound to admit that every artifact is truly a substantial composite, since he says that a natural composite is substantial for no other reason than that it arises from atoms, which are substances. But Aristotle distinguishes artificial and natural things a thousand times on other grounds. For example, in *De anima* II, c. 1, he distinguishes them because natural form is a substance and is an intrinsic principle of motion and rest. Hear St. Thomas there, lect. 1: "The form introduced by art is an accidental form, such as figure or something of this sort. Hence artificial bodies are not in the genus of substance by their form, but only by their matter, which is natural. . . . Hence natural bodies are more substances than artificial bodies, for they are substances not only on the part of matter, but also on the part of form." See also St. Thomas, *In Physicam* II, lect. 1, together with Aristotle there.

13. It seemed good to transcribe and note these things at greater length, lest henceforth the Atomists continue to say that the modern Peripatetics have departed from the genuine mind of Aristotle, namely by following the ravings of the Arabian interpreters. Nor perhaps should it be said that the statements of Aristotle and St. Thomas can agree with the "special form" which Tosca posits in most composites, especially living ones, and which is a subtler and more agile portion of matter. Against this, 1º, Aristotle and St. Thomas plainly speak of a form superadded to the whole matter. 2º, Tosca himself attempts to draw whatever Aristotle taught concerning form, and likewise the doctrine of St. Thomas, to the respective and modal form which he calls the "general form," and which he wishes to suffice for the constitution of a substantial composite and for its generation, corruption, and activity.

14. Nor are the objections stated above of any weight. For the point concerning "being made and generated" consists more in words and a manner of speaking than in the thing itself, as Fr. Suárez well observes, *Metaphysica*, disp. 15, sect. 2. "Generation" among the ancients did not signify every truly entitative production, but only the production of a being subsisting through itself, namely the whole composite or *suppositum*, as St. Thomas often notes. Likewise "making," or "to be made," is properly said only of the production of a subsisting thing, or one capable of existing independently of another substantial co-part; and this thing alone is properly said "to be," or "to have being," in the phrase of St. Thomas. See, for example, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 12. Hence form is not properly said "to be" or "to be made," but "to be made together," or "to be made accidentally," that is, not "through itself," insofar as "to be made through itself" signifies being made in the manner of something subsistent. But neither Aristotle nor St. Thomas denies that form is truly "produced." Indeed St. Thomas often speaks in this way, for example *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 8, ad 10, saying: "The whole form pre-exists in potency and afterwards is wholly produced in act." Certainly Aristotle and St. Thomas acknowledge form to be a true entity and a true substance, as is evident from what has been said. Therefore, when a form is educed, a true entity and true substance newly begins to be. Provided this is clear, whether such eduction or beginning is called "making" or "generation," properly or improperly, is irrelevant, as the Atomists themselves do not doubt.

15. But Tosca presses the point: if a material form is truly produced, it is produced either by creation, which we deny, or by generation, which is contrary to Aristotle and St. Thomas, who deny that form is generated. I answer: it is produced by generation, for the same action which is the generation of the composite is the eduction of the form, and therefore "form comes into being through generation," as St. Thomas says, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 9, corp. Yet this action does not denominate the form "generated," but "educed," because the denomination "generated" or "begotten" is properly reserved for the composite. Why? Because such is the usage of the ancients. If Tosca is asked why artifacts are not said to be "generated," nor their production called "generation," although the same rationale applies to them as to stones, metals, etc., which he says "are nothing but certain natural artifacts," he will give no reason except common usage of speech, as may be seen in his *Metaphysica*, l. 4, prop. 35, where he also notes that "generation" is especially said of the production of living things. If the same author is again asked why the modifications of the parts of a horse rather than those of the parts of a clock are called "substantial modes," although the nature of both

is the same, I think he will give no reason except the choice and usage of the Atomists. Why, then, does he bring so great a dispute against us concerning the name "making" or "generation"?

16. Add that, according to St. Thomas, *In Metaphysicam* VII, lect. 6, we use the name "making" "more properly" in artificial things than in natural ones. Will artificial form on that account contain more entity than natural form? Add again that neither matter is properly said to be made nor properly to be created, according to St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 1, ad 12; and nevertheless it is a true entity, a true substance, and truly produced by creation, as no one doubts. Add further that, as Aristotle teaches in *De caelo* I, text 113, and St. Thomas there, lect. 24, the name "generated" can be extended universally to everything that begins to be, even if it is purely modal, such as contact, motion, and generation itself. Therefore it can all the more be extended to substantial form. And thus usage now bears it that whatever true entity begins to be by virtue of a created cause is commonly said "to be made and generated," without thereby ignoring that these words belong more properly to composites.

17. To the confirmation. "Form," says St. Thomas in *In Metaphysicam* VIII, lect. 1, "is called an account because from it the account of the species is taken." For when it is asked why this body is in the species of stone and not of gold, the form is given as the reason. But the expression, "one, as order or music," which Aristotle adduces in *Physica* I, text 67, and that concerning consonance which is an "octave, etc.," are said according to the custom of philosophers, who everywhere explain substantial form by the example of accidental and artificial form, such as order in the parts of a house, music in a musician, and in the consonance of an octave the double proportion, which is that of two to one and consists in a certain number, as St. Thomas explains in *In Physicam* II, lect. 5. But examples of this sort are not identical; they imply only a certain analogical similarity.

18. Why Aristotle so often uses these examples is explained by St. Thomas in *In De anima* II, lect. 2, in these words: "Because artificial forms are accidents, which are more known to us than substantial forms, as being nearer to sense, he therefore appropriately manifests the nature of the soul, which is a substantial form, by comparison with accidental forms." And below: "Because substantial forms, such as the forms of natural bodies, are hidden, Aristotle manifests this through artificial forms, which are accidental."

CHAPTER III.
Other Objections Are Repelled.

1. Objection 2º, from the same Tosca. The forms which we posit are altogether useless. It is proved, 1º, because they are of no use in Philosophy, for no experiment and no phenomenon of nature is explained by their aid. 2º, because their powers are hidden and it cannot be explained how they operate. 3º, because the power attributed to these forms could more easily be attributed to the atoms themselves, without multiplying entities in vain. 4º, because, given a corporeal mass composed of atoms variously figured and artfully interwoven, namely fiery, aerial, aqueous, and terrestrial atoms, without any other substantial form, everything required for a natural body is preserved. For, in the first place, that body is a substantial composite, since it coalesces from parts which are substances. Next, it is a "mixed body," since it coalesces from the elements. Furthermore, it truly differs from every other body composed of elements mixed in a different proportion and texture, just as artifacts truly differ among themselves solely through a diversity of proportion, order, and texture of parts. Finally, through that harmony of atoms any natural effects whatsoever can be explained.

2. I answer by denying the assumption. For the arguments of Chapter I demonstrate that forms are not only useful but necessary in Philosophy. Likewise the arguments from St. Thomas which we gave in Chapter II. To these may be added two others which St. Thomas weighs with Aristotle in *In De anima* II, lect. 8. The first is that if forms are removed there will be no cause of the firmness and consistency of things. For if in a horse, for example, there is nothing besides elements variously conjoined, why do these remain coherent for so long, since of themselves they are agitated by diverse and contrary motions? Why do they not quickly fly apart and, the structure of the machine being broken, disperse? Therefore they can be kept in their office only by the power of a form or soul. The other is that there will likewise be no physical cause fixing for living things a limit of magnitude and smallness. For since the elements of themselves can concur, be mixed, and be joined in any quantity whatever, why does nature's ingenuity not fashion "a horse the size of a mountain," as once did the Greeks "by the art of divine Pallas"? Or why does an elephant the size of a mouse, or a mouse the size of an elephant, not commonly occur? See St. Thomas, l.c.

3. To proof 1º. On the contrary, if the form which we posit is removed, the use of Philosophy and natural Philosophy itself is removed. For its

object, which is natural body, is removed, since the "nature" through which a body is "natural" is removed. For, as St. Thomas says in *In De caelo* I, lect. 3, "natural bodies are those which have nature," that is, "a principle of motion in those things in which it is." See Chapter I, n. 9 sqq. Therefore no phenomenon of nature is explained philosophically unless one reaches its first root, which is the specific nature of things. But this nature is inexplicable if substantial form is denied.

4. The Corpuscular physicists are indeed to be praised for carefully examining and setting forth the texture and anatomy of various bodies, for example plants. But apart from the fact that they conjecture many things in explaining the organization, nutrition, and growth of a plant, in reality they explain effects without a cause. For they give no adequate cause why the body of a plant is organized in so varied, subtle, and orderly a manner; why some particles are formed into wood, others into bark, others into fibers, others into leaves; why sap ascends so opportunely, is so aptly distributed, and moves in a circuit. Read Tosca, tr. 9, l. 2, and nothing will be found besides anatomical descriptions of these effects, without the appearance of a sufficient cause for so many motions and combinations as are required. One or another extrinsic cause is assigned by conjecture, for example air or subterranean fire, prop. 12; but an intrinsic cause deserving the name of "nature," none at all. Nor indeed could one be assigned on this author's principles, since he denies to atoms an intrinsic power for motion and teaches that no body can be moved unless either by a spiritual mover or by another body which was previously moved by a spirit. From this it follows that every body behaves merely passively toward motion and action, and consequently that no corporeal cause truly acts. Therefore it may rightly be said of these philosophers what Lucretius, though himself shamefully mistaken, sang of others:

> *"Although discovering many things well, and almost divinely,*
> *Yet in the principles of things they brought ruin."*

5. To 2º. The powers of substantial forms are hidden insofar as they do not immediately fall under sense through themselves: "Because no substantial form is perceptible by sense, but only by intellect," as St. Thomas often notes, for example *In De generatione et corruptione* I, lect. 7. Nevertheless they are manifested through sensible effects. Thus the power and perfection of the form of fire becomes known to us through heat, and that of the form of earth through cold, as St. Thomas teaches and explains there. The manner of operating, however, is by emanation or the proper action of an efficient cause, concerning which in Treatise II.

6. To 3º. Atoms, according to Tosca, have no active power of themselves, not even for local motion, since they must receive it from a spiritual mover. Furthermore, since according to him they are of the same substantial nature, how can there be ascribed to atoms the variety of powers which we experience in things? Nor does Maignan's opinion help, positing heterogeneous atoms endowed with an intrinsic motive force. For since he restricts all the power of atoms to local motion, which he denies to be distinct on the part of the thing from body and place, in reality he gives atoms a power for nothing, or a power that is no power.

7. To 4º. The assumption is false and is badly proved. For in the first place that mass would be no more a substantial composite than a heap of stones or any artifact, since the figure and texture of atoms are mere accidents. Nor does it matter that the parts from which it coalesces as from matter are substances, unless in addition the formal part also is a substance, or at least a substantial mode; otherwise there would be no accidental composite in the world. Next, it would be a "mixed body" in the vulgar sense, as a mass made from flour, cheese, and sugar; not, however, in the philosophical sense, in which a "mixed body" is a composite resulting from the matter of the elements and a nobler form. Furthermore, neither would it differ in substantial species from other bodies differing only in figure, proportion, and arrangement, just as artifacts constituted of similar stones or metals differ among themselves only accidentally.

8. Finally, by the harmony of atoms alone no effects can be explained in a physical manner, for a true cause and root of them will always be lacking. This is also clear in artifacts, which would produce no motion by the power of harmony alone unless at the same time they possessed some natural power, as we noted in Chapter I and as St. Thomas noted in *In Physicam* II, lect. 1, saying that artificial things "have in themselves no principle of any change except accidentally, namely insofar as the matter and substance of artificial bodies are natural things. Thus, insofar as it happens to artifacts to be earthen or stony, they have some principle of motion in themselves, but not insofar as they are artifacts. For a knife has in itself a principle of downward motion not insofar as it is a knife, but insofar as it is iron." The same is to be thought of clocks and other automata.

9. Objection 3º. The form of a stone, for example, which we maintain, is a corporeal substance. Therefore it is matter. The consequence is proved, first because just as every incorporeal substance is spirit, so every corporeal substance must be matter. Second, because there is no middle between matter and spirit, just as none between substance and accident. Therefore, since a corporeal substance is not spirit, it remains that it is matter.

Confirmation 1º. That form, if it is a corporeal substance, will be quantified, or impenetrably extended. Therefore, 1º, it will not be able to interpenetrate with matter unless two bodies are in the same place. Therefore, 2º, it will properly be a body. For what else is a body but an impenetrably extended substance? But if it is a body, how can it be distinguished from the whole matter?

10. Confirmation 2º. The aforesaid form is at once both a substance and not a substance. It is a substance, as we assert. But on the other hand it is not. This is clear, 1º, because an incomplete substance is contradictory. For if the definition of substance does not belong to it, it will in no way be a substance. But if it does belong, it cannot fail to have the essence of substance fully, or completely, just as one is fully a man to whom the definition of man belongs. It is clear, 2º, because a material form cannot naturally exist except in a subject and dependently on a subject. Therefore it is not a "being through itself," which is the definition of substance, but a "being in another," which is the definition of accident. The objection is urged: whiteness is an accident because by its own nature it *inesse*s and inheres in a subject, according to the saying, "The being of an accident is *inesse*." But the form of a stone, no less than whiteness, is incapable of existing without being in and inhering in a subject. Therefore, etc. The objection is urged again: it belongs to the notion of substance "to stand under" all things and not to be sustained by another. But this does not belong to form, which needs to be sustained by underlying matter.

11. I answer the objection by denying the consequence, if matter is properly taken for the first subject of corporeal things. To the proof, I deny the first parity. For since "spirit" is defined by Tosca as "an intellective substance," and every incorporeal substance, I mean an absolute and not a modal substance, is intellective, hence every incorporeal substance is a spirit. Yet there is an incorporeal being which is not a spirit according to the definition just given, namely intellection, love, Grace, glory, etc. But "corporeal" is said of whatever is quantified, or whatever is physically and perpetually connected with quantity. Yet there can be a substance thus connected with quantity without being the first subject, and therefore without being matter. At least this very point is in question, and the Adversaries may not assume as certain what must be proved. Likewise, the Adversaries assert but do not prove that there is no middle between matter and spirit, or that every being must be either spirit or matter. For, to omit Grace and the other spiritual accidents just mentioned, there is no reason why there should be repugnance in an entity or substance which is distinct

from matter and nevertheless naturally depends on it. Such a substance is neither spirit nor matter, but is material.

12. It may be objected: why is the form of a stone called material? Is it because it is naturally united to matter? Then the human soul also could be called material, or matter could be called spiritual because it is united to a soul. Is it because it cannot naturally exist without matter? Then matter ought to be called formal, because it cannot naturally exist without form, or even accidental, since it is incapable of existing without accidents. I answer: for the concept of a material being, union with matter does not suffice; either identity or natural dependence in being produced and conserved is required. This dependence distinguishes a material being from a spiritual one, whose concept includes the opposite independence. But neither the soul of man depends upon matter in this way, nor matter upon the soul. The reason why matter is not called "formal" or "accidental" arises from the proper signification of these words. For a formal being signifies one which performs the function of form, and an accidental being one which is an accident or includes an accident; neither of which is verified of matter. Ask the Adversaries why matter is not called "modal," since according to them it cannot exist without some mode, at least without figure, although modes are called "material" because they cannot exist without matter.

13. It may again be objected with Tosca: the form of a stone is material in the same manner in which it is substantial; but it is substantial in such a way as to be a substance. Therefore it is material in such a way as to be matter. I answer: behold another entirely similar syllogism. The Atomistic form is material in the same manner in which it is modal; but it is modal in such a way as to be a mode. Therefore it is material in such a way as to be matter. Behold another besides: intellection or love is spiritual in the same manner in which it is vital; but it is vital in such a way as to be life. Therefore it is spiritual in such a way as to be a spirit, and consequently it will be an intellective substance. Anyone can form many other entirely similar and no less sophistical arguments. Therefore the major premise must be denied. For the form of a stone is substantial in such a way that it has in itself the quiddity of substantively named substance, but it is not material in such a way as to have in itself the quiddity of matter. The Adversaries must say something similar in the examples just proposed.

14. Now to Confirmation 1º, I distinguish the antecedent: it will be quantified by a quantity common to itself and matter, I grant; by a quantity proper to itself alone, I deny the antecedent. I also deny both consequences. The first, because quantity does not render a corporeal substance impenetrable except with respect to another substance endowed with a

distinct quantity. Matter and form, however, in one composite demand one quantity common to both. This also is the reason why corporeal qualities interpenetrate matter and form and one another. "Nor because of this does it follow," says St. Thomas in *In De generatione et corruptione* I, lect. 15, "that two bodies are in the same place, because place is due to form and species only by reason of matter, in which it is founded, and which is properly the subject of dimensional quantity." I deny the second consequence because a body properly and simply so called is a complete substance demanding quantity. Hence matter and form taken separately, although they are corporeal substances, are not absolutely bodies. Matter, however, rather than even a material form, is sometimes called an incomplete body, either because quantity is more proper to matter than to form, or because such is usage.

15. To Confirmation 2°, I deny the assumption. Its first proof plainly fails in the rational soul, which without doubt is a substance although it is incomplete. Otherwise it would not be the form of the body nor could it make with it one unity through itself; or, if it can do this without being an incomplete substance, any angel also could be the form of a body. "The soul," says St. Thomas, *De potentia*, q. 3, a. 10, c., "does not have the perfection of its nature outside the body, since it is not through itself the complete species of some nature but is a part of human nature; otherwise it would be necessary that from soul and body there be made one only accidentally."

16. Therefore the definition of substance taken predicamentally does not belong to a material form, in which sense it signifies a complete substance. Nevertheless the definition of substance taken as it were transcendentally does belong to it, insofar as it signifies a "being through itself," with a through-itself-ness opposed to accident, concerning which immediately below. In this sense the notion of substance abstracts from incomplete and complete, that is, from what is of itself ordered or not ordered to the constitution of another. Hence that form is fully a substance with the fullness of distinction from accident, but not with physical fullness, or in the sense of needing no substantial complement. This diversity of acceptations does not fall within the notion of man unless man is taken integrally. But it does fall within the notion of an artificial being, to use the Adversaries' example; for that notion can abstract from a complete and incomplete artifact. A wall, window, or roof is truly an artificial being without being complete.

17. In the second proof the difficulty concerning the distinction of substance from accident is touched upon, which belongs elsewhere. For now

it suffices to say that, according to all, every entity is a substance which either is a *suppositum* or pertains to the intrinsic constitution of a *suppositum*, for to this most properly belongs the character of a "being through itself." Let the Adversaries define *suppositum* as they please. For us it now suffices that no one denies that every natural body fully verifying the name of some total species is truly numbered among *supposita*, such as "man, lion, plant, stone," and similar names. Since therefore a *suppositum* is a substance according to all its constitutive principles, it follows that whatever is constitutive of a *suppositum* is substance, even though it cannot naturally exist without a subject. Therefore the material form which in Chapter I we showed to pertain to the constitution of a corporeal *suppositum* is a being "through itself" by the through-itself-ness of a *suppositum*, or of inclusion in a *suppositum*; the definition of substance denotes no other through-itself-ness. At the same time it is a being "in another" by the otherness of a subject pertaining to the same *suppositum*, though not by the otherness proper to accident. For an accident naturally requires being "in another" by the otherness of *suppositum*, that is, by the otherness of a subject properly so called which is otherwise constituted, or to be constituted, in the being of a *suppositum*.

18. From this it is evident how *inesse* and inhering are not of the same nature in whiteness and in the form of a stone. It is also evident that being sustained by another is not contrary to the notion of substance unless that other is another by the otherness of *suppositum*. Substance, however, is named from "standing under," not all things, but accidents, which is verified even of the form of a stone, although matter stands under it. Finally, this difficulty presses the Adversaries equally. For the modes by which atoms are formed into a stone are substantial according to Tosca, although they *inesse* and inhere in a subject, not merely contingently but essentially. It may be said that modes are not properly entities. Let them not be; but why are their improper entities called substantial rather than accidental, since the character of accidents is "to *inesse*, to inhere, to be sustained," which, as is said, is altogether repugnant to the concept of substance?

19. Objection 4º: the whole corporeal Universe is nothing other than various parts locally ordered. Therefore every body is nothing other than various particles connected by a local bond. I deny the consequence, which can be proved by no reason. For the arguments proving substantial form in individual bodies do not apply to the Universe. Hence that argument is similar to this: a commonwealth is nothing other than many men associated by a certain moral order. Therefore each man is nothing other than parts morally conjoined.

20. Objection 5º: each thing is composed of those things into which it is resolved, or which remain in its resolution. But every natural body is resolved into elements, whether vulgar or chemical. Therefore it is composed of these alone, without another substantial form of which no trace is seen in the analysis or chemical resolution of bodies. This objection, although not contemptible when it is asked whether the elements remain formally in a mixed body, has no weight in the present question. 1º, because if a man is resolved by fire, nothing residual will be seen besides the chemical elements. Will it therefore be inferred that man is composed of these without another form? 2º, because after the resolution of a dog or other animal in an alembic, neither is that portion of subtle matter seen to remain which the Atomists wish to be the soul of the brute, for it imperceptibly flies off and is dispersed. 3º, because neither does the modal and respective form remain, which nevertheless the Atomists say belongs to the essence of a natural body. Therefore, even granting that each thing is composed of those things which remain in its analysis, it must be denied that it is composed of those alone. For it can additionally include another part which necessarily must perish when the composite perishes.

21. Objection 6º: if once an absolute and substantial entity is posited which by its own nature must perish solely through separation from matter, the immortality of the rational soul will be difficult to prove. Tosca says, cited l. 1, prop. 35, that this was his strongest reason for asserting that material forms consist in a modal arrangement. But this author was moved by this reason without cause. For the rational soul is not proved immortal precisely because it is an absolute and substantial entity, but because it is independent of matter in its being. This independence is gathered from independence in operating, or from the nobility of intellection which transcends all matter, concerning which more fully in Animastics. Certainly this difficulty presses Corpuscular philosophy much more, especially insofar as it holds the souls of brutes to be indistinct from corpuscles and their arrangement. See the Preliminary Dissertation, especially n. 29.

22. We now add that it seems very easy for those once imbued by Tosca with the principle, "Between matter and spirit there is no middle, but every true entity is either matter or spirit," to infer from it that the soul of a brute is a spirit. First, because they will very reluctantly believe that matter alone, which is of the same substantial species as the matter of a stone, however artfully organized, suffices for all the operations of brutes. Second, because all are persuaded that the soul of a brute, which Tosca does not deny to be an absolute and substantial entity, since he identifies it with a portion of subtler matter, truly perishes when the brute dies; and since it is certain

from the agreement of all philosophers that matter does not perish, it will be easy to infer that the soul of a brute is an entity distinct from matter and consequently a spirit. But once it is established that the soul of a brute is a spirit, since nevertheless no one believes it to be immortal, it will follow that the immortality of the rational soul is denied.

23. It may be said that those who hold the principle, "Every true entity is either matter or spirit," at the same time teach that the soul of a brute is not distinct from matter. They indeed teach this, but they will persuade few of it against the resistance of reason, experience, and the agreement of almost the whole human race. But that principle, "Every true entity," etc., will seem probable and easy to believe to many. Many therefore, especially those of moderate learning, will embrace it without assenting to the accompanying doctrine concerning the soul of a brute. Hence a sufficiently broad road to Atheism seems to be opened.

CHAPTER IV.
The Final Objection Is Solved, and the Eduction of Forms Is Explained.

1. The chief argument of the Corpuscularians is that, according to all, a material form is not created but educed. For it receives being from created causes, which can create nothing, or produce nothing from nothing, according to the axiom, "From nothing, nothing is made," which, except in the case of the First Cause, holds of the others. But if a material form is a true entity, it will truly be produced from nothing and therefore will be created. It is proved because the form of a stone, for example, will be produced in such a way that nothing of it pre-exists. For the matter which alone pre-exists is nothing of the form, since it is neither the form nor a part of the form. Therefore, just as the rational soul is truly produced from nothing although matter precedes, so is the form of a stone, etc. Consequently there will be no difference between eduction and creation. Confirmation: likewise a material form will truly be annihilated in the corruption of things, for it will truly cease into nothing in such a way that not even the least particle of it survives. But annihilation likewise surpasses the powers of a created cause, according to the saying, "Nothing passes into nothing."

2. I answer: this objection must equally be solved by the Adversaries. For the combination and whole modal form by which atoms are arranged into a stone is a true reality. First, because through it the stone is really and not imaginatively a stone and is not gold or a lion. Second, because through the

same the stone really differs from a non-stone, namely the heap of all its atoms, which heap, when the modal arrangement is removed, is not a stone but is a non-stone. Third, because a stone and any other body, according to the Adversaries, is properly generated and newly produced by secondary causes. But how will that properly be produced anew of which no reality begins to be, or which pre-exists according to the whole of its reality? Yet the same argument drawn from creation and annihilation applies to this reality. It likewise applies to the acts by which our soul or an angel understands and loves. For they are true realities, unless it is desired that the Vision and love in which beatitude consists be a mere illusion, and nevertheless by virtue of a created cause they begin and cease to be in such a way that nothing of themselves precedes or remains.

3. Therefore the notion of eduction which the Excellent Doctor gives and explains in *Metaphysica*, disp. 15, sect. 2, must be embraced. Eduction is, namely, "the production of a form essentially depending upon a presupposed subject, that is, one produced by another action, and in some respect incomplete, upon which it causes both the produced form actually to depend and to be sustained." This explanation belongs to every and only eduction, whether of a substantial or accidental form, absolute or modal, even one indistinct from its own eduction, as will be clear to one who considers it. Nor does it differ in sense from other explanations of others by which eduction is defined as "an action essentially united to a presupposed subject," or "an action essentially affixing its term to a presupposed subject." For if production essentially depends upon a presupposed subject, it consequently is united to that subject and affixes its term to it. Hence, although perhaps not every action making a composite from a presupposed subject is an eduction, as some hold, nevertheless every eduction is an action making a composite resulting from such a subject and form, because it is either the formal union of the form with the subject or at least an act of uniting, concerning which elsewhere. Nevertheless it is called "eduction" only with respect to the form. With respect to the composite, especially a substantial composite, it is called "making" or "generation."

4. Hence it will be gathered, 1º, what the difference is between eduction and creation. Both are productions from nothing of their immediate term, but both do not produce it from nothing of a presupposed sustaining subject. Absolutely "to be produced from nothing" denies two things: both the pre-existence of the term, or of a part of it, and the precedence of a subject upon which, as upon a foundation, the existence of the new term rests. Creation requires both negations, but eduction only the first. Therefore creation alone is absolutely called "production from nothing."

Hence the excellence of creation above eduction consists in this, that it is an action of such power that without a support or sustaining foundation otherwise produced, it maintains its term in being through itself. Eduction cannot reach this, nor can the power of a created cause, whose limitation sufficiently appears from the fact that it can produce only effects of such weakness that they cannot be sustained without a subject otherwise produced. If some craftsman could fabricate a column not resting upon the ground but standing in the air, his art and operation would doubtless be more excellent than that of one who builds upon the ground. Therefore a creative cause has a similar excellence over secondary causes.

5. It will be gathered, 2°, why the rational soul is not educed but created. It is because it is produced by an action not essentially dependent upon a presupposed subject. For just as the rational soul does not depend upon a subject in being, since it naturally exists outside the subject after the death of man, so neither ought it to depend upon one in being produced. Hence, although disposed matter must precede as a certain occasion demanding the creation of the rational soul, it nevertheless does not precede in the manner of a material cause, that is, in the manner of a subject upon which both the action essentially depends and the soul itself is sustained. Conversely, just as a material form cannot exist without a subject, so it is produced dependently upon a subject. Hence matter exercises toward the educed form the function of a material cause, not intrinsic or constitutive, such as matter is with respect to the composite, but extrinsic, that is, adequately distinct, although intimately united.

6. It may be said: Aristotle did not recognize this kind of extrinsic material cause, since he says that nothing is made from matter except as from an "intrinsic" subject, that is, one remaining within the constitution of the effect. I answer: Aristotle explained matter by that function which is principal in it, namely the function of an intrinsic cause of the composite. Nevertheless he did not exclude but presupposed the function of an extrinsic cause with respect to the form, or at least to the union, since this function is naturally inseparable from the other and in exercise is, as it were, prior to it. Here it should be noted that matter with respect to a created form is not a subject "from which," but purely "in which," nor does it properly "undergo" such a form or "passively cause" it. But with respect to an educed form it is truly a subject not only "in which" but "from which," because the particle "from" sometimes denotes the function of an intrinsic cause, and at other times that of an extrinsic material cause, or its passive causality toward form.

7. It may further be said that the function of an extrinsic material cause differs in nothing from the function of an efficient cause. This is denied. For that material cause is the cause upon which, as presupposed, the action essentially depends precisely under the title of a support on which it rests and leans. The efficient cause, however, is that upon which the action essentially depends as physically pre-existing under the title of a perfection physically communicable to the effect. Hence a material cause as such does not act but undergoes, nor is its potency called active but passive, because it contributes nothing else toward the effect except to receive it from the active power, undergoing that it be affixed to itself and that the efficient cause use its own presupposed being as the sustaining support of its action.

8. It will be gathered, 3º, in what sense a material form is said to be "drawn out" or "educed" from the potency of matter, which certain ancients, understanding it crudely and otherwise wishing to avoid production "from nothing," imagined in various ways. For some believed that all forms lay hidden in the bosom of matter and were not so much newly produced by agents as drawn out into the light and placed before view. But this abounds in absurdities. For, to omit others, it follows, 1º, that infinitely many forms actually exist within matter, since forms without end can be educed from matter. It follows, 2º, that opposite forms cohere together in friendly alliance in the same matter. It follows, 3º, that every composite is all composites, since in its own matter it actually contains all forms.

9. Others said that not entire forms, but certain beginnings and, as it were, seeds of forms pre-existed in matter, from which forms were made, and thus were not made from nothing according to the whole of their entity. But this opinion is truly exposed to the same absurdities, for infinitely many entities, and indeed opposite ones, will pre-exist in matter, since they are beginnings and seeds of opposite forms. Nor does it solve the difficulty of production "from nothing," for that part or completion of the form which is superadded to the seed or beginning by the created cause will truly be produced from nothing of itself, since it is something distinct from the pre-existing beginning, given that the beginning is not the whole form.

10. Others had recourse to certain possibilities of forms pre-existing in matter, from which forms were made and consequently not from nothing. But if by the name "possibility" mere non-repugnance is understood, form on this account will be made from nothing no less than an angel, whose non-repugnance certainly precedes its creation. But if by that name something actually existing, distinct from matter and lurking in matter, is understood, the absurdities of the preceding opinions follow. Others asserted that forms pre-exist in matter according to a generic degree and are newly produced

according to a specific degree. But, to omit that it is contradictory that the generic degree of the same thing could exist without the specific degree, this specific degree will be produced from nothing of itself, although the form adequately taken is produced from something, namely from the generic degree. Others finally, finding nothing by which production from nothing by created causes could be avoided, judged that substantial forms are created by God alone. But consequently the productive power of a created agent even for an accidental form will have to be denied, since the same difficulty concerning production from nothing exists in it. From this it follows that created causes can do nothing and are not causes.

11. Forms therefore precede in matter in no other way than in passive potency, insofar as a capacity precedes in matter for sustaining forms, and consequently assisting in their production in the manner of a material cause. Hence for a form to be "drawn out" or "educed" from the potency of matter is for it to be placed outside the passive potency of matter, not in such a way that it is separated from matter, since rather it intrinsically inheres in it; nor in such a way that it was hidden within matter actually existing; but in such a way that it actually receives being through an action depending on matter in the manner explained, by virtue of which action the passive potency of matter is reduced to act, or to exercise. Thus an effect is said to be placed outside the efficient cause, not because the entity of the effect or a part of it pre-existed within that cause, but because it is produced by an action through which the active potency of the efficient cause is reduced to act.

12. From what has been said, the solution is clear to the argument of the Atomists proposed in n. 1. Those sayings, "From nothing, nothing is made" and "Nothing passes into nothing," are wholly false when referred to the power of God. They are likewise false when referred to created causes if they speak of nothing of any entity whatever, even a partial one. For, as the Atomists concede, something real is truly produced anew by those causes when a horse, for example, is generated. Likewise something truly ceases to be when a horse dies. Therefore some reality begins to be which previously was not, and consequently was nothing; and some reality which previously was now is not, and consequently is nothing. Therefore that reality, whatever it may be, at least partial or modal, is produced by created causes from nothing of itself and ceases into nothing of itself. When our will first elicits love of God, does it not produce something which was nothing? And when it ceases from such love, does it not cause it to pass into nothing?

13. Therefore the sayings just mentioned, when referred to created causes, are absolutely true of composites. For these cannot be made except from something of themselves, namely from matter, which must be

presupposed as created by God. Neither can they cease except into something of themselves, namely into matter, which always remains after the composite is corrupted. But in forms, both substantial and accidental, they are not true of the "nothing" of the produced term, but only of the "nothing" of a subject upon which, as presupposed, the action essentially depends. Nor do the Atomists prove, or ever will prove, the opposite.

14. For when they insist, 1º: a material form perishes according to its whole being. Therefore it is properly annihilated. I distinguish the antecedent: while the subject by which it was sustained remains, I grant; with such a subject not remaining, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. For as long as such a subject survives, the form in a certain manner remains, not in itself or in any part of itself, but in the potency of the matter which was its foundation. Lest this be thought a recently invented evasion, hear St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 104, a. 4, where in objection 3º he objects to himself thus: "Forms and accidents do not have matter as a part of themselves; but sometimes they cease to be. Therefore they are reduced to nothing." He answers in these words: "Forms and accidents are not complete beings, since they do not subsist, but each of them is something of a being. . . . And nevertheless, in the manner in which they are, they are not altogether reduced to nothing; not because any part of them remains, but because they remain in the potency of matter or of the subject." Add that even without the permanence of the subject annihilation can be avoided by the conversion of the perishing thing into another which succeeds it in the same function. Thus in the Eucharist the substance of bread, although it perishes according to its whole being, is nevertheless not properly annihilated, as the theologians everywhere teach with St. Thomas. Therefore the form of wood, when it perishes through combustion, is not annihilated under a twofold title: both because it remains in the potency of the subject and because it is converted into the form of fire.

15. When they insist, 2º: if the rational soul perished according to its whole being, it would properly be annihilated even though its subject remained. I distinguish this last clause: although its sustaining subject remained, I deny the supposition, for the rational soul has no such subject; although its merely informable subject remained, I grant, unless conversion intervened. When they insist, 3º: the reason a composite is not annihilated is that something of it remains. Therefore, conversely, if nothing of the form remains, it is truly annihilated. I distinguish the antecedent: this is so as arising from the proper nature of composite being, I grant; as arising from a general reason applying to every entity, even simple or partial, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. A composite, since it is not capable of a

sustaining subject adequately distinct from itself, cannot avoid annihilation unless something of it remains. But the case is not so with a form. I omit recourse to the conversion of the whole substance of one composite into another.

16. When they insist, 4º: it is inept to say that something is "educed" which is wholly induced, or produced, by an extrinsic agent. I distinguish: if "educed" is taken in the vulgar sense, let it pass; if in the philosophical sense, I deny it. The Atomistic modification or modal form is also said by its defenders to be "educed," although in its case the use of the verb "to educe," which in common speech denotes drawing a pre-existing thing out of some place, appears no less inept. For that modification certainly did not exist or lie hidden in the parts of matter except purely in potency. But now the whole of it begins to be by virtue of an extrinsic agent, by which therefore it is more induced than educed. Philosophical usage, therefore, which can no more justly be denied authority over words than common usage, has brought it about that "to be educed" properly signifies being produced dependently upon a non-constitutive material cause. Thus the same usage has brought it about that "to produce" properly signifies to give being, although among the common people it signifies otherwise, as when someone is said to produce witnesses or troops. Likewise it has brought it about that "to create" properly means to make from nothing, although in common speech someone is said to be created a bishop, cardinal, etc. Indeed the verb "to create" once had an entirely contrary signification, for, as St. Augustine, cited by St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 45, a. 1, init., said, "To create is to constitute something by drawing it out from that which already was." Therefore form is said to be "educed" in order to indicate dependence upon a subject, and at the same time is said to be "induced" in order to denote the procession from an extrinsic agent.

17. When they insist, 5º: if to be educed from matter is nothing other than for an action to depend upon matter, why is form not said to be educed from itself, since the action essentially depends upon the form itself? Why at least is it not said to be educed from the efficient cause, upon which the action likewise depends, especially since the form is pre-contained more in the potency of that cause than in the potency of matter, in which it is pre-contained neither formally, equivalently, nor eminently? I answer: because the verb "to be educed" with the particle "from" denotes the relation of a material cause, or of a presupposed sustaining subject. An educed form is produced and conserved only within matter. Hence we apprehend matter after the likeness of a mother from whose womb the form is, as it were, drawn forth into the state of existence and in whose bosom it remains

immersed. But we commonly speak as we apprehend. Therefore an essential dependence of the action does not suffice unless it is upon a presupposed subject. In this manner the action does not depend upon the efficient cause as such, nor upon the produced form itself, upon which it depends only as upon a term. Hence, if God produced matter and form by the same action, that action would not be an eduction even though it depended essentially upon matter, because it would depend upon it as a partial term and not as a presupposed subject. To the point concerning the "pre-containment" of form, we say that eduction requires formal or eminent pre-containment in the potency "from which" the action proceeds, not in the potency "out of which" it is educed, that is, in active potency, not in the purely passive potency. For in the latter only aptitude for sustaining the action and the term is required.

18. When they insist, 6º: the subject does not co-efficiently cause the form, nor increase the powers of the efficient cause. Therefore no less power is required to produce the form in and from a subject than outside a subject; and consequently no less power is required to educe than to create. Indeed greater power is required to educe, because the educing cause not only produces the form but unites it to the subject. But to produce the form and at the same time unite it is something greater than to produce the form alone in the manner of a creating cause. I answer: although the subject does not co-efficiently cause nor increase the agent's powers within the same genus of cause, it nevertheless truly assists in the genus of a necessarily presupposed foundation, without which the powers of a created cause would be useless, just as the powers and knowledge of an architect would be useless unless he had a foundation upon which to build a house, or matter into which he could introduce the form of a house. But creative power does not need such a foundation.

19. Nor does it matter that the educing power simultaneously produces union, because this union either is indistinct from the eduction itself or is a certain appendage of the form, which naturally demands to be produced and conserved in the being of an actual part. But the creation of the form alone, even if it did not have union as its term, would exceed eduction for other reasons, both by reason of independence and because it would be undue and above the deserts of a material form, which it would render in a certain way incorruptible. "The quantity of an agent's power," says St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 65, a. 3, ad 3, "is measured not only according to the thing made, but also according to the manner of making, because one and the same thing is made differently by a greater and by a lesser power. But to

produce something finite in such a manner that nothing is presupposed belongs to infinite power. Hence it cannot belong to any creature."

20. When they insist finally: if a new entity and substance can be produced by created causes provided that it is produced by an action dependent upon a presupposed subject, there is no reason why an angel could not produce a rational soul by an action thus dependent upon matter. First, not by reason of production, which would be eduction and therefore not repugnant to a created cause; next, not by reason of the substantiality of the produced term, since it belongs to created causes to produce true substance; finally, not by reason of the spirituality of the soul, for since an angel is spiritual, he pre-contains this perfection. I answer: an angel is prevented by the fact that the soul is a spiritual substance, which would not be such if by its nature it could depend upon matter; and since it otherwise says no relation to any spiritual subject, it is by its nature independent of a subject or material cause and consequently incapable of being produced except by creation. But creation is repugnant to every created cause, as we now suppose with the Adversaries and shall show elsewhere.

Which Forms Are Educed?

21. From what has been said it is easily gathered to which forms eduction belongs. Those forms are naturally educed which presuppose a subject produced by another action and which, moreover, naturally cannot exist without a subject. The reason is that forms which depend in being upon a presupposed subject must depend upon it in their mode of production, for the latter must connaturally correspond to the mode of being. They therefore depend upon the presupposed subject by virtue of the action by which they are produced, which is to be educed. I said "a subject produced by another action," in order now to omit and remit elsewhere the question concerning the form of the heaven and the forms of the elements at the beginning of the world, which some say must be produced by the same action as their subject and therefore are not educed.

22. Hence it will be inferred, 1º, that all the other substantial forms besides the rational soul are educed, because they presuppose matter and experience shows that they are so immersed in matter that without it they cannot exist nor operate outside it. Nevertheless they can be created by divine power, because they depend upon matter no more than accidents do, and accidents can miraculously be created, as is evident from the mystery of the Eucharist. It will be inferred, 2º, that absolute material accidents also are educed, such as light, heat, cold, etc. First, because experience likewise

establishes their natural and perpetual dependence upon a subject. Second, because they are produced by created causes, which produce nothing except by educing. Nor does it matter that light is produced without alteration or without a change of the subject corruptive of a contrary quality. For the concept of eduction does not essentially require a corruptive change, indeed not even a change from privation to form, as we showed in disp. 1. If St. Thomas sometimes requires a transmutation of the subject for eduction, he is speaking according to what commonly happens in most forms.

23. It will be inferred, 3º, that all modes which have a presupposed subject, such as union, location, and eduction itself, though not creation, are also educed insofar as they are called produced beings. For they essentially depend upon a subject, and consequently more so than absolute forms. They are also produced by created causes, which do nothing from nothing. It will be inferred, 4º, that spiritual accidents, both natural and supernatural, such as habits and acts of the Intellect and Will, must connaturally be educed. There is no doubt concerning natural ones, since forms of this kind are both produced by the soul and sustained in it as in a subject. Nor is there doubt concerning supernatural ones if they are vital acts, for they are not created but produced by the soul or by an angel. But if they are Grace, Faith, Charity, and other forms produced by God alone, the inference is proved because these forms truly depend upon a presupposed subject in their being and consequently in their production. This dependence is sufficiently gathered from the fact that they are never produced except in a presupposed subject, nor do they exist or operate outside a subject.

24. Nor does it matter, 1º, that these accidents are not contained in the natural potency of the subject. It suffices that they are contained in obediential passive potency, which containment is nothing other than a capacity to obey God alone in sustaining a supernatural action. Nor does it matter, 2º, that these forms are called "infused." For this indicates only that they are efficiently produced by God alone, in distinction from those habits which the soul acquires by its own power. Hence this infusion does not remove dependence upon a subject, but in this respect is to be considered like the infusion of light into the air. Nor does it matter, 3º, that Grace is often called "created." For it is so called because an action efficiently proceeding from God alone is customarily called creation in a broad sense, although it depends upon a material cause.

25. The doctrine of the aforesaid inferences is more fully handed down and explained by the Excellent Doctor, *Metaphysica*, disp. 15, sect. 13, and disp. 16, sect. 2, where he also treats the eduction of artificial form and of others which are said to be produced by resultance or emanation.

CHAPTER V.
Substantial Form Is Defined. Whether It Is the Whole Quiddity of a Natural Body.

1. Substantial form can be defined as "a simple and absolute substance, of itself ordered to constitute with matter a natural body as its chief physical difference." This definition plainly distinguishes substantial form from accidents, modes, the composite, matter, and an angel, and otherwise belongs to every substantial form. It is also according to the mind of Aristotle, for whom form is called the "account of the quiddity," namely of a natural body. For if form is the physical difference of each body, or substantial composite, by that very fact it is that which is given as the reason why each composite has such a specific quiddity, why it is constituted in the species of lion and not horse, of gold and not stone, and so of the others. For just as metaphysical difference is the reason of each metaphysical species because it determines a genus, of itself indeterminate and common, to a certain species, so physical difference, because it likewise determines the indifference of matter, is the reason of specific quiddity considered in the physical line.

2. Hence form is called a "term," because it fixes matter, of itself indeterminate, in a certain species of complete being and in a certain magnitude. It is called a "character," because through form each thing is distinguished from the others. It is called a "species," because from it proceeds the natural beauty of each body. It is called "form and act," because it refines and perfects matter, which of itself is rude and formless. It is called by Aristotle "divine, beautiful, best," because the whole variety and beauty of the corporeal world descends from form or consists in it. Finally, it is called an "end," either because accidents exist for its sake, or because the intention of the generating cause is directed toward uniting it to matter.

3. Substantial form is also customarily defined according to the mind of Aristotle as "the first act of a physical body." Here "physical body" can be taken either incompletely, for matter, which in the order of nature is presupposed as affected by quantity, or completely, for the whole composite, as the Excellent Doctor notes, *Metaphysica*, disp. 15, sect. 5. For form is called the "act" both of matter and of the composite: of matter, indeed, the "informing act"; of the composite, the "constitutive act." Yet the functions of "informing" and "constituting" are not two but one in the thing, as the same Excellent Doctor notes, ibid., disp., sect. 7, n. 5, since it is the same

thing for form to inform matter and to constitute the composite. Substantial form is called "first act," that is, primary and principal, or "first" not in the order of execution but in the order of intention and dignity, whereby it is distinguished from the metaphysical or entitative act of matter and also from accidental acts. The sense of this definition, however, is sufficiently expressed in ours by the words "as its chief physical difference."

4. Substantial form is likewise customarily defined as the "first root of the properties," or "of the proper accidents of each species of natural body." For all accidents which perpetually accompany not merely one or another individual but the whole species proceed from form either efficiently or finally, that is, they either flow from a pre-existing form or anticipate matter for the sake of the form, as occurs in the organization of the human body. But this formality of a "first root" also is sufficiently expressed or included in our definition when form is called the "chief physical difference" of each composite in its proper species. From this it is also inferred that an order toward matter as an informable subject, which is at the same time an order toward the composite, belongs to the metaphysical essence of substantial form. Re-read what was said in disp. 2, c. 2, from n. 10. Nor does form need a superadded informing potency in order to inform matter, which is gathered all the more from what was said there from n. 24.

5. Now, because Aristotle greatly extols the perfection of form, Question 1º: whether form is more perfect than the composite? Some ancients cited by Fr. Suárez, cited sect. 7, n. 6, affirm it. They are moved, 1º, because form is a cause of the composite, and a cause ought to be nobler than its effect. 2º, because Aristotle, *Metaphysica* VII, texts 7 and 8, seems to prefer form to the composite. But this must be denied altogether, because that which contains the whole perfection of form and in addition another perfection contains more perfection than form alone, as is clear from the terms themselves and from the common saying, "The finite added to the finite makes a greater thing." But the composite, besides form, contains matter, which, as a true entity and reality, is a true perfection. Nor do the contrary motives stand. Not 1º, because not every cause must be nobler than its effect, especially if it causes only partially, as happens in every intrinsic cause, such as form. For it causes insofar as it is a part of the composite, but the part is less than the whole. Add that the argument applies equally to matter. Not 2º, because Aristotle in that passage rather prefers the composite to form, and the Adversaries were deceived by a certain unfaithful translation, as Fr. Suárez shows, l.c., n. 9.

6. Question 2º. Whether every substantial form is more perfect than prime matter? The affirmative answer is commonly presupposed, because

substantial form is constituted in a nobler grade of substance and has the perfection of first act and first root, which is judged absolutely incapable of being compensated by any perfection remaining within the limits of pure potency. Nor does it matter that matter is created and incorruptible. For often a thing absolutely more perfect is exceeded by a less perfect thing in some predicate. Thus man, more perfect than the heaven, is exceeded by the heaven in incorruptibility; thus a rational soul, nobler than a stone, is exceeded by a stone under the title of complete substance. Therefore, although matter exceeds a material form in those predicates, nevertheless, because it is greatly depressed under the title of pure and merely passive potency, it comes about that, all things considered, form is judged absolutely more perfect.

7. It may be said: if matter were given a choice, it would prudently prefer to be matter rather than the form of ashes, so that it could enjoy association with a rational soul. I distinguish: if it attended precisely to physical and identical perfection, I deny it; if it attended to other advantages extrinsically accruing, let it pass. For in this way we often prefer things which are known to be physically less perfect than others. For, as St. Augustine says, *De civitate Dei* XI, c. 16, "Who would not rather have bread in his house than mice, coins than fleas?" and shortly afterward: "Frequently a horse is bought for more than a slave, a jewel than a maidservant."

8. Question 3º, and chiefly: whether form is the whole quiddity of the composite? Some ancients cited by the Excellent Doctor, *Metaphysica*, disp. 36, sect. 2, affirm it, relying on certain passages of Aristotle which the Excellent Doctor cites there, in which form is called the "what-it-was-to-be of a thing," and also the "account," that is, the quiddity and substance of the thing. As regards man, the Platonists also affirmed this, saying that man is the rational soul alone. Descartes held, or seems to have held, the same concerning man, whom the Most Illustrious Palanco cites and attacks, *Contra Novatores Philosophos*, dialogs 2 and 4. But the contrary opinion, namely that the essence of the composite consists not in form alone but in form and matter, is most true and beyond doubt throughout the Schools. 1º, because the quiddity of a composite is a physically complete substance; but form is only an incomplete substance, otherwise it could not be united to matter as its complement, just as an angel cannot. 2º, because otherwise the composite would both be and not be a composite. It would be, as is supposed and as the very name declares; it would not be, because its quiddity would consist in the simple form alone. 3º, because from act and potency there is constituted one unity through itself, according to Aristotle and all. Therefore from matter and form there now coalesces one quiddity

through itself, which certainly belongs properly to no being except that which we call a "composite."

9. 4º, because the essence of man does not consist in the soul alone. Therefore neither does the essence of the other composites consist in form alone. The antecedent is proved against Plato by St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 75, a. 4, and elsewhere, *Contra Gentiles* II, c. 57. It is now briefly proved: first, because otherwise man would be absolutely immortal and incorporeal, since the human soul considered through itself has these properties. Second, because man could not have a father or mother. Third, from the agreement of the whole human race, since there is no one who does not regard his own body as a part of himself. Finally, because according to the Athanasian Creed, "The rational soul and flesh are one man." Nor does Aristotle intend by the words cited above anything other than that form is the principal and nobler part of the quiddity of the composite, which therefore by antonomasia can be called the "account" and the "quiddity." Otherwise the Philosopher expressly teaches that matter and form are the intrinsic and constitutive principles of a natural body; he divides substance into matter, form, and composite; he notes that not form but the composite is properly generated; and he has other teachings which allow no doubt concerning his mind.

10. But Objection 1º: composites have quiddities diverse in species, while forms alone differ in species. I answer: we said above that for composites to be simply diverse in species it suffices that they differ in species in their principal part, which is as it were the character of the essence, although they agree in another part. This is evidently clear in the metaphysical line, where agreement in genus does not destroy specific diversity. Objection 2º: if matter pertains to the essence of the composite, every part of matter will be essential. But it is clear that this is false, for in man, for example, the matter of the hand pertains not to the essence but to integrity. I answer: the same difficulty exists in a divisible form. For not every part of the form of a snake or tree is essential, but many are integral. Therefore those parts, whether of matter or form, are called essential in any living thing without which the existence of such a composite cannot be preserved, at least in the first animation; the others are called integral.

11. Objection 3º: one being has one essence. Therefore, since the composite is one being, it must consist of one essence, not a double one, one of matter and another of form. I answer: the composite is not one by a unity of simplicity, but by a unity of composition. Hence it necessarily contains several partial essences, not indeed several in that respect in which the composite is one, for example, if the composite is one lion it must not

contain several lions, but several in the notion of parts. Objection 4º: in artificial composites form alone is the whole essence. Therefore likewise in natural composites. I deny the antecedent, whatever some may say. For who would believe that the whole essence of a house consists in modal disposition alone and is in no way constituted of stones, beams, etc.? The same should be thought of accidental composites, such as "white," "musical," etc., when taken concretely, but otherwise when they are taken "for the form," as they very often are.

12. It may be said: the matter of a house according to itself is not even partially an artificial being, since it in no way proceeds from Art. I distinguish: it is not even partially an artificial being in the manner of form or act, I grant; in the manner of potency or subject, I deny. Nor is it necessary for this that it proceed from Art. It suffices that of itself it be capable of receiving artificial form from Art. This is explained in these concrete expressions, "adoptive son of God, friend of God, seeing God," which are certain accidental and supernatural composites in whose essence a rational creature is undoubtedly included in the manner of a subject. For who conceives an adoptive son of God adequately distinct from a rational subject? Yet this subject according to itself is not even partially an accidental or supernatural being. How, then, is it part of an accidental and supernatural composite? It must be said, as just above, that the subject has partiality in both lines, not the partiality of form but of pure potency, at least obediential potency, which signifies nothing other than the aptitude of the subject to receive from God an accidental and supernatural form.

13. Objection 5º, and more difficult: if matter pertains to the essence of a composite, the essence of man will vary in the course of life. For matter is changed by the action of natural heat or by the reaction of the qualities of food, by virtue of which pre-existing matter is gradually lost and new matter acquired through nutrition. From this, however, it follows, 1º, that an old man is not numerically the same as himself when young. 2º, that at the end of the world the same man will not rise again. Suppose that the same matter in succession of time belonged to two men, as can happen especially among barbarous peoples who feed on human flesh. To which of them will that matter be restored in the resurrection? And whichever receives it, the other to whom it is not restored will not rise as the same man who lived.

14. The first solution of this difficulty, attributed to Durandus, says that the same individual man remains although matter varies, because it does not belong to the essence of this individual man that he have this matter rather than another, but some matter indeterminately, namely that which this determinate soul shall have informed. This solution is commonly rejected.

1º, because with equal license it could be said that a determinate soul does not belong to the essence of a determinate man. 2º, because matter of a determinate species belongs to the essence of man in species. Therefore individually determinate matter belongs to the essence of an individual man. Or otherwise: if man consisted of matter diverse in species, he would be a composite of a diverse species, at least inadequately. Therefore he will be a composite numerically diverse if he consists of matter numerically distinct. 3º, because the difficulty concerning the resurrection remains unsolved. For although the same man is said to rise, he will not rise with the same body, as Faith requires.

15. Nevertheless the opinion of Durandus, as reported by the Excellent Doctor, t. 2, on *Summa Theologiae* III, disp. 44, sect. 2, seems to have another sense. It relies, namely, on the Thomistic doctrine that matter has positive unity, both specific and numerical, not from itself but from form. Hence matter is positively this individual matter precisely insofar as it is united to this form. Consequently, although preceding matter is lost and new matter succeeds it, it is not positively other than the preceding matter, but always remains numerically the same as long as it is united to the same form. From this doctrine it seems to follow that an old man, although he has lost all the matter which he had as a boy and acquired new matter, nevertheless still consists of the same individual matter. Likewise, in the resurrection, although all the matter of Paul's corpse were given to the soul of Peter and conversely, nevertheless each would rise with the same individual body in which he lived. How this mode of reasoning is to be rejected by the Thomists, they themselves may judge. On this ground we rejected the Thomistic doctrine, disp. 3, c. 6.

16. The second solution, which many hold with the Master of the Sentences, *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 30, particularly Fathers Quirós, Peynado, and Ulloa, establishes that only that portion of matter which the soul first informs in the fetus in the maternal womb, this portion customarily being called "primordial matter and the natural minimum," belongs to the essence of man. But the matter subsequently acquired through nutrition pertains only to integrity. Variation occurs only in this integral matter, not in the primordial matter, which is not lost during the course of life.

17. The reason for this doctrine is, 1º, because when man begins to be nourished he is already presupposed as essentially constituted. For only a living man is nourished. Therefore he is already presupposed as consisting of soul and essential matter. But no matter other than the primordial matter, or certainly this matter before other portions, is then present. Therefore this is the essential matter of each man. The matter acquired through nutrition,

however, because it presupposes an already constituted essence, cannot be essential. Indeed not even all the matter of the embryo is essential, but only that small portion which is first animated, for from it and the rational soul there immediately results a composite essentially constituted. 2º, because some matter is essentially the matter of this man. But it is certainly not all the matter to which his soul is united, nor likewise some portion taken indeterminately, for otherwise a determinate man would not have a determinate essence but would be an indeterminate individual, at least in part. Therefore it is some determinate portion. But no portion of matter has so great a claim to this function as that which is first animated, namely a particle of the brain or heart, according to the various opinions of anatomists. That this particle is never lost while the man lives is argued with some force by Fathers Quirós here, disp. 47, sect. 2, and Peynado here, disp. 5, sect. 2.

18. From this doctrine it is inferred, 1º, that the same man, whether old or a boy, remains the same as regards essentials, though not as regards integrals, because he always retains the essential matter which he had as a boy. It is inferred, 2º, that each man must receive in the resurrection his own primordial matter, so that it may be verified that each rises with his own essential body, although perhaps in some cases some variation or exchange may occur concerning purely integral matter. Nor need it be feared that perhaps the same matter is the primordial matter of two men. For if one feeds on another's flesh, he is already presupposed to possess his own primordial matter. And that after various transmutations one man's primordial matter, which is either a point or "little exceeds the size of an ant," as St. Thomas says from Aristotle, *In III Sententiarum*, dist. 3, q. 5, a. 2, ad 3, should be subjected to the first animation of another is extremely difficult and altogether improbable. Moreover, it pertains to divine providence to prevent this, without any need of a miracle, since such an event would rather require so many combinations that it seems very like a miracle. Fr. John Ulloa may be consulted, *Physica Speculativa*, disp. 1, nn. 231-242, where more distinctly than others he explains and defends this doctrine as highly probable and expedient.

19. Nevertheless it always appears difficult that primordial matter should remain unharmed throughout the whole course of life. For, as St. Thomas argues both in *In II Sententiarum*, dist. 30, q. 2, a. 1, and *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 119, a. 1, that matter is mixed with the matter of food as wine with water, for this is the force of nutrition, and both matters, thus intermixed, remain uniformly disposed. How, then, will the activity of heat distinguish the particles of that matter so as to spare them and rage against the others?

Nevertheless it can be said that this portion of matter, while man is nourished, does not change place, nor is it made discontinuous or mixed with other matter, because it is not the whole mass of the embryo, of which alone St. Thomas speaks, but some particle known to God alone which always remains in the midst of the heart or brain. Nor does nutrition properly so called begin immediately from its animation. Rather, the elaboration of the members of the small human body continues, to which the union of the soul is gradually extended until, when the structure is complete, the work of nutrition begins. But that particle, under the title of the first seat of the soul, more tenaciously retains the due temperament, which is not altogether uniform in the remaining matter.

20. The third solution, and by far the most common, says that an old man, although some physical part of him has been wholly or in great part changed, is not only numerically the same as the boy he was in a wholly physical way as regards the soul, but also absolutely can and ought to be called numerically the same as regards the body. This is because the change of matter occurs gradually and imperceptibly, under an entirely similar organization, under the same rational soul, and in such a way that whenever new matter is added it is physically continuous with the greater part of the preceding matter. These circumstances bring it about that, according to the human manner of speaking and judging, the body of the old man is no other than that of the boy. Thus a house, although gradually repaired by the subtraction and addition of many parts, is judged always to remain the same. Thus also a fire to which fuel is gradually added "always remains numerically the same fire," as St. Thomas says. And nevertheless in these examples there is a greater change, namely not only of matter but also of form. See St. Thomas in the places cited above at n. 19, and Fr. Suárez, *Metaphysica*, disp. 36, sect. 2, and t. 2, on *Summa Theologiae* III, disp. 44, sect. 2.

21. It may be said: this identity of body is not physical but moral. I answer: it can be called physical identity by reason of the physical continuity just mentioned. Strictly, however, if all the matter of the boy's body has been lost, it is only moral identity, although in the moral line, which admits various degrees, it is of the strictest kind, as being founded upon so many physical grounds. But the difficulty concerning the resurrection is learnedly explained by Fr. Suárez in the cited place on *Summa Theologiae* III, together with SS. Augustine and Thomas. Certainly, since a man converts scarcely a hundredth part of food into himself, as physicians assert, it is exceedingly difficult for all the matter of one man, or even the greater part, to become the matter proper to another man. It pertains to divine providence so to preserve to each his own matter that no confusion repugnant to revealed

truth occurs. Nor is a miracle necessary for this, since rather the opposite seems of itself morally impossible. Therefore matter which each resurrected person had will be given to him, in such a way that if two men shared some part of matter, that part will be supplied in one of them from matter which he lost during the course of life.

22. Nor should it be omitted that this whole argument is of no benefit to those who place the quiddity of the composite in form alone. For, first, the point concerning the identity of the old man and the boy presses equally in a divisible soul, for example that of a snake or a tree. For that soul together with matter is gradually changed during the course of life. Therefore an old snake will not be the same as itself when young. Next, as regards the resurrection, whether matter pertains or does not pertain to the essential constitution of man, we shall all rise in our own body, according to Job 19: "Again I shall be clothed with my skin, and in my flesh I shall see God, etc." Furthermore, if man were nothing but the soul alone, neither would man truly die nor truly rise again; for nothing rises unless it has fallen.

DISPUTATION V.

ON THE MULTIPLICITY OF FORMS IN THE SAME MATTER.

Among substantial forms some are called ″subordinate,″ namely, those of which one serves another within the same composite and, as it were, prepares the matter to receive the other. Others are called ″non-subordinate,″ or ″disparate,″ namely, those each of which constitutes its own composite wholly, so that two or more cannot concur in constituting one. Such are the forms of gold, magnet, diamond, etc.

CHAPTER I.

Are There Subordinate Substantial Forms?

1. Concerning subordinate forms, setting aside for now the opinion of those who place the forms of the elements in mixtures, which will be discussed in its proper place, there is a fourfold opinion among the ancients, according to Fr. Suárez, disp. 13, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, sect. 3, and disp. 15, sect. 10. The first multiplies forms in every composite according to the number of essential predicates, so that a horse, for example, is substance by one form, body by another, living by another, etc. But from this opinion, besides the other absurdities it contains, it follows that even in an Angel, in a rational soul, in accidental forms, in matter itself, indeed in each of those substantial forms, there are likewise entities really distinct according to the number of higher and lower predicates that can be considered in them; and consequently that there is no really simple entity in the nature of things.

2. It may be said: Aristotle, 7, *Metaphysica* cap. 10, teaches that parts of the thing correspond to the parts of a definition. I answer: Aristotle is speaking of a physical definition, as when man is defined as ″a composite of body and rational soul″; or, if he is speaking of a metaphysical definition, he intends only that parts of the thing distinct by reason alone correspond to the formal definition. It may again be said: the same Aristotle, 2, *Metaphysica* cap. 2, proves that there are not infinitely many forms in a composite because there are not infinitely many essential predicates. He therefore thinks that the number of forms is to be gathered from the number of predicates. I answer by denying the consequence: for from the fact that the predicates are not infinite, it follows well that the forms are not infinite, because at least every form would have to introduce a new predicate. But it does not follow that the predicates are no more numerous than the forms, because for other reasons they can be multiplied by reason. Thus it is well proved that there are not infinitely many cities from the fact that there are not infinitely many citizens; but will one therefore infer that there are as many cities as citizens?

3. The second opinion multiplies souls in living things according to the grades of life, namely vegetative, sensitive, and rational life; and thus it places three souls in man, two in a brute beast, and one in a tree. This opinion, however, as regards man, accords poorly with the principles of Faith and Catholic doctrine, as the Eximious Doctor effectively shows. Moreover, without foundation it imagines man to be essentially constituted of a certain brute beast and a certain tree. For the fact that there are very diverse operations in man proves nothing, since it is certain that a great variety of operations can proceed from one simple root in the same *suppositum*, just as love and hatred proceed from the same will, and apprehension, judgment, and reasoning from the same intellect. But this will be treated more fully in the treatise on the soul. Meanwhile see Fr. Suárez, cited disp. 15, sect. 10.

4. The third opinion was Avicenna′s, who posited a certain form of corporeity, coeval with matter and incorruptible, which always accompanies matter and passes with it to various specific forms, serving to confer upon the composite the grade or generic predicate of body. But this opinion also has become obsolete together with the preceding ones, and deservedly so. First, because no indication establishes such a form, either from operations or from substantial changes, which are very well understood through the passage of matter alone from one form to another. Second, because the character of body, if taken for an extended, impenetrable substance, proceeds from quantity or from determination to it; and this determination consists either in matter alone or in the whole composite of matter and

specific form. But if it is taken for a physical predicamental body, it signifies a physically complete material substance and therefore is preserved in every composite of matter and one form, at least a material one, for example, a stony form. Finally, because no real possible form exists that is corporeity as such, or the generic character of body, belonging to no species.

5. The fourth opinion, and a celebrated one, is that of Scotus, the Subtle Doctor, whom his entire School follows. It teaches that in living things, besides the soul, there is a certain substantial form which he calls the "form of mixture and corporeity," whose office is to constitute matter in the being of a physical organic body, which is proper to living things, so that, thus constituted, it is ordered as something ultimately completable by the soul, through which it is constituted in the species of living body. This form gives the substantial being of flesh, bone, nerve, etc.; it precedes in the matter of the embryo while the latter is being disposed for the soul, thereafter perseveres with the soul, and remains after death in the corpse until it is resolved into worms or ashes. Henry, who also patronizes this form, recognizes it only in men; others, only in sensitive beings; Scotus and his followers, in all living things. Most teach that this form of corporeity consists of heterogeneous parts, so that the form of bone differs substantially from the form of flesh, and the latter from the form of nerve, etc.

6. Among our authors, Fathers Conink, Tanner, Dandinus, and others follow Scotus, and distinguished modern authors in M.S. join them. Against this opinion stand all Thomists with St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* I, q. 76, a. 4, and often elsewhere; likewise most, or almost all, of our authors with the Eximious Doctor, cited disp. 15, sect. 10. It is nevertheless without doubt very probable and supported by weighty foundations, although perhaps not so solid that they cannot be answered more probably, as I shall now show.

Arguments Proposed for the Form of Corporeity, and Solved.

7. For the Scotist form of corporeity, argument 1º: man is constituted of an organic body as a part really distinct from the soul. But an organic body is neither matter alone, nor matter with accidental organization alone, nor matter with the soul. Therefore it is matter with the Scotist form of corporeity, which is substantial organization, that is, a heterogeneous substance requiring and rooting all that equipment of various accidents which we observe in flesh, bones, fibers, veins, nerves, and the other organs fitted for vital functions. The minor premise is proved as to the 1º part. First,

because a stone consists of matter and does not consist of an organic body. Second, because when a corpse has been reduced to ashes, matter remains but the organic body does not. The minor premise is likewise proved as to the 2º part: because it would follow that man is essentially constituted of accidents, since he is constituted of an organic body. Finally, as to the 3º part: because matter with the soul is not a part really distinct from the soul.

8. I answer: the name ″body″ is taken 1º mathematically, for a quantity having three dimensions, namely length, breadth, and depth. 2º It is taken physically, for a substance naturally inseparable from quantity. If this substance is complete, it is called a ″physical body″ simply, and the character of ″predicamental body″ belongs to it, namely, that which is directly placed in the category of substance. If it is incomplete, it is called a ″body″ with the addition ″incomplete.″ In this sense, although both a material form and matter could be called a ″body,″ matter alone is customarily so called, perhaps because it alone immediately roots quantity as its own property. In this physical sense every substantial composite is a body and consists of body.

9. 3º It is taken for an organic body, that is, for a physical body furnished with that equipment of accidents mentioned in n. 7. Hence an organic body, as authors commonly note when explaining Aristotle′s definition of the soul, especially Fr. Suárez, lib. 1, *De anima* cap. 2, can also be taken in two ways: 1º completely, for the whole composite affected by those accidents, for example, a dog or a tree; 2º incompletely, for organized matter alone, namely, signifying matter directly and organization obliquely. In this 2º sense it is taken whenever it is signified as a physical part of a living thing.

10. With these points established, to the argument I grant the major premise absolutely and deny the minor premise as to its 2º part, without its following that man is constituted of accidents. For in order that the organic body be truly said to constitute man, it is sufficient that it constitute him as regards what is directly signified, especially if what is obliquely signified is required for this as a necessary condition. Thus it is truly said without qualification: ″A diamond consists of hard matter, iron of dense matter, flame of light matter, and every composite of quantified matter,″ although hardness does not constitute the diamond, nor density the iron, etc. Thus it is also truly said that ″disposed matter regards form,″ although the disposition is not a partial recipient. The objection is pressed 1º: an organic body, as organic, is a part of man. I distinguish: if organization is taken reduplicatively as the subject of that predicate, ″part of man,″ I deny it; if it is taken reduplicatively only as a condition on the side of the subject conducive

thereto, I grant it. In this sense we truly say: fire, as applied, burns; matter, as disposed, receives form.

11. The objection is pressed 2º: when the soul is defined from Aristotle, 2, *De anima*, as ″the first act of a physical organic body,″ it is defined through order to its proper subject. But it is not defined through order to first matter alone, because this is no more the proper subject of the soul than of another form; nor through order to accidents, because these are not the subject of the soul. Therefore it is defined through order to matter with the form of corporeity. I distinguish the minor premise: it is not defined through order to first matter ″alone,″ if ″alone″ excludes accidents from the office of a necessarily required condition, I grant it; if ″alone″ excludes accidents from the office of subject, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. First matter ″alone,″ that is, without the partnership of another partial subject, is the subject of the soul and of every form; but ″alone″ it does not possess what suffices for it to be called the ″proper″ subject of the soul. For a subject ″proper″ in second act is constituted by actual union, whereas a subject ″proper″ in first act and by exigency is constituted by organic accidents, just as matter is constituted the ″proper″ subject of the form of fire by heat in the highest degree. Hence the soul cannot be defined through order to a proper subject unless it is defined through order to matter together with accidents, as can be seen in every other form. For forms do not determine for themselves a subject substantially proper to them; otherwise there would be as many matters specifically diverse as there are forms.

12. That definition of the soul, therefore, is to be explained thus: ″the first act of a physical body, requiring that body to be organic.″ Consequently, the term ″organic″ does not denote the substantial character of the subject, but indicates the character of the form, which does not actuate the subject except by requiring accidental organization in it. This is signified obliquely as a connotate or as the term of the form′s exigency, just as sensation is in this definition of animal: ″the principle of sensing.″ In the same sense the form of flame could be defined thus: ″the first act of matter that is light, hot, fluid, and translucent.″ Hence one will infer that in living things there is no other ″radical organization″—by this name I mean the root or exigency of accidental organization—besides the soul as united to matter, because it alone is the substance requiring organic accidents in matter. Hence only an organic body taken completely can be called ″radically organic″; not when taken incompletely, for then its whole substance is matter, and this of itself roots such accidents no more than others. It can therefore be called only the ″substance″ of the organic body.

13. The objection is pressed 3º: ″body,″ when taken for a part of a living thing, is a substantive noun, as is also the name ″flesh,″ by which the whole body is sometimes signified, according to the Athanasian Creed: ″Just as a rational soul and flesh are one man,″ etc. Therefore it directly signifies all its constituents, just as the name ″man″ does. If, therefore, it is constituted of matter and organization, it must signify both directly. I answer: both names, although grammatically substantives, are physically adjectival; that is, they signify matter with organization added, just as the name ″craftsman,″ or ″soldier,″ or ″father,″ or ″mother,″ however much it is called a substantive, signifies a man with skill in an art, or the profession of military service, or paternity, or maternity added obliquely. Conversely, ″rational″ is grammatically adjectival, and yet metaphysically substantive, and the whole is predicated directly when man is called a rational animal.

14. The objection is pressed 4º: in the Eucharist, by virtue of the words, the organic body of Christ is placed under the species of bread. But first matter alone is not placed there, since by itself it does not merit the name of human body. Nor are accidents otherwise placed there by virtue of the words, lest that marvelous conversion should have to be called ″transaccidentation″ no less than ″transubstantiation.″ Nor is the soul placed there by virtue of the words, since it is present only by concomitance, according to the Council of Trent. It remains, therefore, that matter with the form of corporeity is placed there. This objection, in which the modern authors place the greatest confidence, is solved in various ways by theologians in the treatise *De Eucharistia*, as may be seen in Fathers Suárez, Vázquez, and Cardinal de Lugo. We must now follow the way which Fr. Arriaga, above others, explains and defends both here and disp. 36, *De Eucharistia*, sect. 3, subsect. 4, because it is shorter and more expeditious and, if not more probable theologically, is at least truly probable; which is sufficient for present purposes.

15. I say, therefore, that in the Eucharist, by virtue of the words, the body of Christ taken incompletely is placed there, and consequently first matter with accidental organization, in such a way, however, that matter is placed primarily and organization secondarily, insofar as they are signified by the name ″body,″ the former directly, the latter obliquely. Fr. Vázquez, tom. 3, in 3, p. d. 187, c. 4, also holds that quantity and organic accidents are placed there by virtue of the words. Nor does Fr. Suárez, tom. 3, in 3, p. d. 51, s. 5, seem to disagree in reality, since he grants that accidents belong ″to the notion of the organic body, as organic,″ and that ″quantity follows upon the action of the words from the intrinsic nature and necessity of the human body as such.″ Hence, he says, accidents, ″although properly they are not

said here to be present by virtue of the words, can nevertheless be said to follow by a certain necessity from the truth and propriety of such words." Therefore each recognizes that accidents belong to the notion of the human body. But their disagreement clearly seems to lie in this: according to Vázquez, whatever belongs to the notion of the object signified is said to be placed there by virtue of the words; according to Suárez, however, following St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* III, q. 76, a. 4, only that which is signified principally and directly. Lugo also intends this latter view, disp. 8, *De Eucharistia*, n. 97, who at the same time, ead. disp. sect. 4, teaches that the name "body" in the form of consecration can be verified of matter with accidental organization alone.

16. Now, that this marvelous conversion is not only of substance into substance, but also secondarily and less principally of substance into accidents, Fr. Vázquez, loc. cit., does not regard as absurd. He says that when the Council of Trent taught that the substance of bread is converted "into the substance" of Christ's body, it expressed what is principal in the term of the conversion, but did not deny the other things required on the side of that term. Better, however, with Lugo and Arriaga, locis cit., one should deny that accidents are the term of the conversion, although they are placed there by virtue of the words. This is either because, as Lugo says, only that is the term of a conversion which succeeds another in the same office, and only the substance of Christ's body, not its organization, succeeds the substance of bread in the office of underlying the species of bread; or because, as Arriaga says, only that which has repugnance with the term from which is the term of conversion, and organization does not have this repugnance, but only the substance of the body of the Lord. Hence in the Eucharist there is no conversion of bread into accidents, and consequently no "transaccidentation," because it is not the same thing for accidents to be placed there by virtue of the words and for them to be the term of conversion.

17. This, however, does not prevent it from being verified without qualification that bread is converted into the body of Christ. For from what was said in n. 10, it is sufficient for this that the body as regards its substance, which alone is signified directly, be the term of conversion; while accidents are a condition without which the substance of the body would not terminate the conversion, because it would not be signified by the words of consecration. The words of the Council of Trent, sess. 13, cap. 4, are to be noted, declaring that "the conversion is made of the whole substance of bread into the substance of Christ's body, and of the whole substance of wine into the substance of his blood." In the term from which it says "of the whole substance"; but in the term to which it says only "into the substance,"

not ″into the whole,″ nor ″into all that belongs to the notion of body″ or ″blood.″ This was so that it would not signify that body or blood—if perhaps blood is animated—taken completely, is the term of conversion, nor include under such a term also the accidents which belong to the notion of body.

18. Finally, observe that this objection is of no advantage to the Scotists. For according to them, as may be seen in Fr. Suárez, tom. cit. d. 50, s. 4, the converting action in the Eucharist is an adductive action and has as its formal term the presence of Christ′s body, which is an accidental mode. Let them therefore explain how that conversion is not ″transmodation and transaccidentation,″ especially since in the term from which the presence of the bread also perishes.

19. Argument 2º, from the Scotists. Man is essentially a body, or has the grade of body in the Category of Substance; and this predicate or grade must come to him from a substantial form, just as it comes to a stone and other inanimate composites. But it does not come to man from the rational soul, since this is not a corporeal but a spiritual form. Therefore it comes from a material form of corporeity. I answer: first of all, this argument proves nothing in other living things besides man, since their souls are corporeal forms and consequently are capable of conferring corporeal being without another form of corporeity. Mastrius replies that the corporeal being which belongs to brutes and plants cannot come from their soul, because it is organic and dissimilar, or heterogeneous, whereas the soul of a brute and of a plant is not heterogeneous.

20. But against this: corporeal being is called substantially heterogeneous insofar as it is a material substance requiring heterogeneous accidents. But a horse can be constituted through its soul as a material substance requiring heterogeneous accidents. This is clear, because it is no more difficult to require heterogeneous accidents than to require heterogeneous parts of a form of corporeity; and by your account the soul of a horse requires these. Again against this: the soul of a horse, since it is material, gives true corporeal being, as is certain from the example of the form of a stone and other material forms. But it does not give only corporeal being ″as such,″ indifferent to living and non-living, or to lion and horse, as is also certain. Therefore it gives corporeal being proper to the equine species.

21. Moreover, the argument has no force even in man. For man is indeed essentially corporeal, or a body according to the second sense given above in n. 8. But he has this predicate from the rational soul together with matter, and the soul itself can be called a ″form of corporeity,″ as the Eximious Doctor says, disp. 15, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, sect. 10, n. 27, if by this name nothing else is understood than a form giving the composite

substantial corporeal being. For man has corporeal being from that form by which he is constituted in the being of a complete substance inseparable from quantity and requiring determinate extension. But man is constituted a complete substance by the soul, and without doubt has from the soul the requirement of determinate quantity. For the soul cannot complete matter unless it intrinsically presupposes or entails determinate quantity in matter. For the same reason, the soul constitutes man in the being of a complete body, not of just any body, but one radically organic and proper to the human species, because it constitutes him in the being of a complete substance requiring a certain quantity together with the organic accidents proper to man. For who could doubt that by reason of the soul man requires all the accidents necessary for exercising vital and human operations?

22. Accordingly, the rational soul in itself, intransitively and ″as that which,″ is spiritual, immaterial, incorporeal, because it is independent of matter and quantity and can naturally exist without them. Yet it is corporeal transitively, constitutively, and ″as that by which,″ because it is that by which matter, or man, is constituted a complete substance requiring a certain quantity and other specific corporeal accidents. It may be said: corporeal and incorporeal are no less opposed than white and black. Therefore, just as black cannot be a formal effect of whiteness, or conversely, so corporeal cannot be a formal effect of an incorporeal form; or, if it can, incorporeal will also be able to be a formal effect of a corporeal form.

23. I press the point plainly: whiteness cannot require blackness in its proper subject, nor exist and be united with it at the same time. Therefore an incorporeal form cannot require the Scotist form of corporeity in its proper subject, nor be naturally joined with it. Or thus: whiteness cannot inform a black subject as black; therefore an incorporeal form cannot inform a corporeal subject, or body, as such. I distinguish the antecedent: corporeal and incorporeal are no less opposed as regards verification of wholly the same subject, I grant it; as regards the offices of whole and part, or cause and effect, I deny the antecedent and consequence. For no one can deny that an incorporeal form is destined to be a part of man, who is simply a corporeal being; and likewise that it is destined to cause, that is, to entail and require in its proper subject corporeal accidents, or even the form of corporeity itself according to the Scotists. Yet whiteness cannot be a part of blackness, nor a root or exigency of blackness in its subject.

24. It is nothing new for a form to confer upon a subject or composite a denomination of which the form itself is incapable, indeed of whose opposite it possesses. Thus precisive cognition, which in itself is singular and incapable of being predicated of many, constitutes an object that is

universal and predicable of many. Grace, which is not God's friend or daughter, confers these denominations upon man and Angel. The rational soul, which in itself is incapable of nutrition, constitutes man as capable of being nourished. Nor does it follow from this that the incorporeal can also be a formal effect of a corporeal form. For there is a manifest contradiction in the terms: the incorporeal denies all corporeity, since it means the same as depending in no respect upon quantity in its being; but the formal effect of a corporeal form, since it includes that very form in its being, already has corporeity in some respect and dependence upon quantity. But the corporeal can stand without being devoid of every incorporeal reality. For man, according to all, is simply corporeal, or a body, although constituted by an incorporeal soul.

25. If it is asked why man is not denominated a spirit from the spiritual soul, let the Scotists also answer, since for them the spiritual soul certainly constitutes man, and indeed as his principal form. Why, then, is man not called a spirit from the soul, although he is called a body from the form of corporeity? Let there therefore be, as it were, a general rule for transferring denominations of parts to the whole. When, with attention to the definition or meaning of the denominations themselves, nothing is found in them repugnant to the nature and character of the composite, then they are transferred in part to the whole; but they are not transferred when a meaning incongruous with the composite is found. By this rule, man, for example, is called a substance from matter and form, but from neither is he called a partial substance, a first act, or a first subject. He is called generated from a generated union, but is not called created from a created soul. He is called intellective from an intellective soul, but is not called immortal from an immortal soul. Now the denomination "spirit" signifies independence from matter and quantity, which certainly does not belong to man.

26. It should be noted here that the rational soul is "formally" corporeal "as that by which," and "formally" contains corporeal being, if "formally" signifies nothing other than "in the genus of formal cause." For the soul is without doubt "formally" that "by which," as "formal cause," man is constituted in the being of man. But this being of man, since it is naturally inseparable from quantity, is not spiritual but corporeal. Yet because the rational soul grounds this connection with quantity, in which corporeity consists, not for itself but for man—not so that the soul itself needs quantity in its being, but only so that it needs quantity in causing its formal effect, in which it differs greatly from material forms, which are also inseparable from quantity in their being and therefore are corporeal in their being—therefore, whenever the rational soul is called corporeal "as that by which," or formally

containing corporeal being, one must add ″with independence in its being″ from its formal effect or from quantity. The Scotists must reason similarly concerning vegetative being, which the rational soul ″formally″ contains, although in itself it cannot vegetate as the soul of a plant does.

27. If it is asked whether the rational soul can be called the ″corporeity″ of man, first, it is not that corporeity which is placed in the Predicamental Tree, where substance is divided into incorporeal and corporeal, because that is physically complete corporeity, although signified after the manner of an abstract or a metaphysical difference. Second, it is not total physical corporeity, because this is constituted also of matter; indeed, according to the Scotists, it is distinct from matter and form taken together. Finally, it can be called ″corporeity after the manner of a formal principle,″ but with the addition ″with independence in its being,″ etc., as I just warned.

28. Argument 3º: in the matter of the embryo, that is, in that mass of paternal and maternal seed or blood from which an animable little body is organized in the mother's womb, there is a substantial form which is not expelled when the soul arrives. Therefore such a form is joined with the soul to constitute a living body, which is the office of the form of corporeity. The antecedent is proved 1º: because the form of the embryo is a disposition to the soul, since it is introduced precisely to prepare matter for the soul. Therefore it is not expelled by the soul, both because no form excludes its own dispositions, and because otherwise the form of the embryo would dispose to its own destruction. Indeed, even if it is expelled, a form of this kind still shows that there is no repugnance in a substantial form being produced and existing not for its own sake but as a disposition to another, nobler form; yet it is on precisely this ground that the form of corporeity is commonly attacked. 2º Because, when the soul arrives, no disposition to the form of the embryo ceases, since rather its dispositions are then perfected. But no substantial form is expelled when no disposition belonging to it perishes. Add that substantial forms are not contrary except by reason of accidental dispositions; but the dispositions to the soul and those to the form of the embryo are not contrary. 3º Because it would follow that the form of the embryo is destroyed by the same agents by which it is produced.

29. I answer by denying the antecedent insofar as it says that the form of the embryo is not expelled by the coming of the soul. To the 1º proof, I deny the antecedent unless the name ″disposition″ is taken broadly and improperly for a form which by order of nature must precede the soul in matter, just as the form of fire necessarily precedes the form of charcoal or ash, the form of wine the form of vinegar, the form of an egg the form of a chick, and the form of food the form of the living thing in matter acquired

through nutrition. A disposition properly so called is one which of itself is intrinsically ordered to a form and requires the coming of that form. But this does not belong to the form of the embryo, which neither requires the coming of the soul, nor is ordered to it of itself, nor is introduced in order to prepare matter for the soul, but only in order that by completing matter it may constitute its own composite and serve the variety of the Universe, like many other composites whose proper operations we do not know. The matter of the embryo is indeed gradually prepared for the soul, but it is not prepared by the form of the embryo, but by the power of the seed and other causes cooperating toward the generation of the living thing, just as the form of wine does not prepare matter for vinegar, but other extrinsic causes bring about that preparation.

30. Hence the form of the embryo exists and is produced for its own sake, insofar as it is produced in order to rule and preside in its own composite, not in order to serve another form within it. Yet this does not prevent that form from being produced by agents with the intention that, after some time has passed, it should yield place to another form. For in this sense there is no sublunary form that is not intended for the sake of another. For since natural agents require the exercise of their power in new effects, and the variety of the Universe itself demands frequent transmutations of matter, no sublunary form is produced in order to endure perpetually, but in order to yield place to another after some time.

31. This is especially clear in the forms of foods, which are produced by nature so that living things can be nourished. The same is clear in the forms of seeds falling from herbs and plants. First, their form is distinct from the vegetative soul, unless one wishes that this soul endure for whole years in a granary without food. Second, it is ordered to a new soul, or to propagation of the species, as is evident. Finally, it does not persevere with the soul, as is clear from the corruption of the seed with an immense alteration of accidents. But this is most clearly seen in the form of an egg, which certainly is ordered to propagation of the bird; and yet it is expelled by the soul of the chick and cannot be called the form of corporeity of the chick persevering with its soul. First, because otherwise in an egg not yet corrupted there would already formally be the flesh of a chick, and consequently it would not be lawful to eat an egg on a day when the eating of meat is forbidden. Second, because the form of the egg would be the one form persevering in the corpse of the chick, and it would be lawful to eat a dead chick on Friday. Finally, because an immense diversity of accidents appears between an egg and the flesh or bones of the chick.

32. It must therefore be said that an order of one form to another of this kind, which is signified by the phrase ″for the sake of,″ is not intrinsic but extrinsic, consisting in the exigency not of the form which is ordered, but of the natural agents which demand the succession of forms. Or rather let it be called an ″order of succession,″ which does not prejudice the substantiality of forms, and not an ″order of conjunction″ within the same composite, which alone is repugnant to a substantial form.

33. To the 2º proof: it is falsely asserted that when the soul arrives no disposition to the form of the embryo perishes. For at least the temperament of qualities perishes which that form requires in a lower intensity than the soul does. Hence, just as the soul is expelled from the body when one of the humors excessively abounds, because by that very fact the proportion and temperament of the humors which the soul requires perishes, so the form of the embryo must be expelled when the temperament of qualities exceeds the measure due to it. Accidents belonging to the organic structure of the body are indeed perfected for the coming of the soul. But these accidents are not dispositions to the form of the embryo and are not required by it; rather, they are caused by agents altering matter and disposing it for the soul, almost in the way in which accidents gradually prepare the matter of wine for vinegar. Hence it is also false that the dispositions of the two forms are not contrary. For if one requires, for example, six degrees of cold and only two of heat, and the other six of heat and only two of cold, they certainly demand contrary dispositions.

34. To the 3º proof: I admit the consequence, which is in no way absurd when the dispositions of matter now stand differently and require the perfection of another form. Thus the same hen both produces the form of an egg and afterward expels it when the chick is hatched. Thus also in the work of nutrition the same causes which introduce the form of chyle into the matter of food expel it in order to induce the form of blood, and expel the latter again in order to introduce the soul.

35. Argument 4º: bone and flesh in man differ substantially. But they do not differ by reason of matter, as is clear, nor by reason of the soul, which is the same in both. Therefore they differ by reason of a heterogeneous form of corporeity. The major premise is proved from the diversity of sensible accidents, which is no less in flesh and bone than in gold and silver. But in gold and silver, and in other composites, from a diverse collection of accidents we prove a diverse substantial root. Therefore likewise in flesh and bone, etc. I answer: first, the argument does not press in other living things besides man. For since their soul is divisible, it may be asserted that it consists of heterogeneous parts, so that the fleshy part differs from the bony

part. Although Mastrius here, disp. 2, n. 74, inconsiderately calls this a "fiction" and a "new invention hitherto dreamed of by no one," in the treatise on the soul we shall show how probable it is. Meanwhile let Mastrius explain to us, or anyone imbued with his disposition, what absurdity he finds in a horse's soul consisting of heterogeneous parts which is not equally found in an equine form of corporeity, which he himself posits as consisting of heterogeneous parts and nevertheless as belonging to the essence of one horse, indeed as constituting one thing in itself prior to the soul.

36. Nor, secondly, does the argument press in man. For it is plainly countered, 1º by the diversity of vital operations which man exercises in the head and feet, in the eyes and ears, etc. Certainly the substantial diversity of composites is inferred and proved no less, indeed more, from diversity of operations than from other accidents. If, therefore, the argument is valid, the soul of the head in man will differ from the soul of the feet, and the ocular soul from the aural soul, etc. Nor can the diversity of operations in these parts be attributed to the form of corporeity as root or principle; otherwise this form would be confused with the soul, as being the true root of vital operations. That it should be attributed to it as a disposition matters little, both because in this sense it is attributed also to accidental organization, and because the adversaries wish by their argument to prove a diverse substantial root, and this is proved more strongly from operations. It is countered 2º from the very parts of the form of corporeity, the collection of which is required and rooted for the soul and differs according to the diversity of souls. Therefore, according to the adversaries, the form of swine flesh, for example, differs from the form of ass flesh. Standing by the objection made, therefore, the soul of flesh in man will differ from the soul of bone according to the diversity of the form of corporeity.

37. Moreover, I answer 1º by denying the major premise. To the proof I distinguish the minor premise: when a diverse collection of accidents is observed in distinct *suppositum*s, I grant it; when it is observed in parts of the same *suppositum*, I further distinguish: if it is otherwise certain that those parts are informed by a divisible form, I grant it, or let it pass; if this is not certain, I deny the minor premise and the consequence. For it is certain that an indivisible form, such as the rational soul, can require and root—either after the manner of an efficient cause or after the manner of an end—diverse collections of accidents in distinct parts of its own matter. First, because according to the adversaries it thus roots diverse parts of the form of corporeity, which is more difficult. Second, because since it requires the exercise, for example, of the operations of seeing and hearing, it cannot fail to require the accidents without which it can neither see nor hear, namely all

those by which the organs of sight and hearing are prepared in distinct parts of matter. For the form of corporeity is of little use if the proper figure and temperament of qualities are lacking in those organs. Finally, because when the heterogeneity of accidents is removed or gravely injured, the rational soul immediately departs from the body although nothing of the form of corporeity has perished. Therefore the rational soul alone can accomplish, as regards the rooting of various accidents, what a divisible form would accomplish through several heterogeneous parts. Hence it is also commonly said to be equivalently or eminently heterogeneous, namely as regards an effect of this kind.

38. I answer 2º by granting the major and minor premises and denying the consequence, because bone and flesh in man can differ substantially by reason of their union with the soul, which union is divisible and, according to a very probable opinion, consists of heterogeneous parts. For since the rational soul is equivalently or eminently multiple and heterogeneous, and does not exercise every grade of life in each part of matter, but in some, for example in the nails, manifests itself only as vegetative, in others as sensitive through touch, in others as visual, in others as imaginative, etc., it is very fitting that it require diverse partial modes of union distributed through the parts of matter, just as it requires diverse accidents or diverse partial forms of corporeity. There will therefore be a diverse substantial root in flesh and bone, because although union is not the principal root of accidents, it can nevertheless be called a less principal root, not active but purely exigitive. For it is in reality a certain substance to which the organic accidents of the subject are due, so much so that it cannot naturally exist without them. Fr. Suárez proves this opinion from St. Thomas, lib. 1, *De anima* cap. 2. Nor is there any reason for it to displease the Scotists, since they say that the soul is united not only with matter but also with the form of corporeity, which differs in flesh and bone. Therefore the union of the soul with flesh has an extreme specifically diverse from the extreme of the union with bone; and diversity of extremes cannot fail to redound into diversity of the unions themselves.

39. Argument 5º: when a man or any other living thing dies, some substantial form informs the matter of the corpse. But it is not a cadaveric form newly introduced. Therefore it is the form of corporeity which had already been in the man. The minor premise is proved 1º: because there is no indication of a new form when a man suddenly dies; for almost the same accidents of the body remain which inhered in the living man. 2º Because often there is no cause productive of a new form, for example when a man is suddenly slaughtered. Moreover, introduction of a new form requires a

preceding successive alteration and consequently cannot occur in an instant. 3º Because cadaveric forms in human bodies can neither be of the same species nor of diverse species. Not of the same species, because since there are so many and such diverse causes of death, and one man everywhere dies by steel, another by hanging, another by heat, another by cold, etc., who could believe that all these causes produce a form of the same character? Not diverse, because from whatever cause a man dies, we observe almost the same accidents rooted in the corpse. 4º Because it is disorderly that the marvelous structure of the human body should be due to a cadaveric form, especially since so many organs are wholly useless to a form which neither sees in the eyes, nor hears in the ears, nor thinks in the brain, etc. And here the adversaries pursue this form with insults and call it ″stinking, horrible,″ etc.

40. Confirmation from Theology: because if the body of Christ the Lord during the three days of death underwent a cadaveric form, it follows 1º that Christ′s body was truly corrupted, contrary to the testimony of Sacred Scripture, for example Acts 2: ″Nor did his flesh see corruption.″ It does not suffice that it did not putrefy, for corruption properly so called is a passage to a new substantial form; and this passage, once a cadaveric form is admitted, would exist as truly in Christ′s body as if it had passed into worms. It follows 2º that the cadaveric form during those three days was assumed by the Word, lest otherwise that sacred corpse have had a double subsistence, one uncreated and united to matter, the other created and proper to the cadaveric form. But that form cannot be said to have been assumed. First, because the Word ″never relinquished what he once assumed,″ according to a theological axiom; but that form would have been relinquished in the Lord′s resurrection. Second, because the Word assumed no irrational nature which is not a part of humanity. It follows 3º, contrary to the holy Fathers, that Christ′s body, since it was constituted by a new form, was not the same dead body as the living body, nor was that which was in the tomb the same as that which had been in the Virgin′s womb.

41. I answer 1º: standing by the doctrine of the Scotists, I deny the major premise. For why, when a man has died, could matter—which according to the Scotists certainly has its own existence—not remain without a substantial form until it is gradually disposed for the form of a worm or another form? Is it because it is a substantially incomplete subject? But even after it has a form of corporeity, it is a substantially incomplete subject, ordered to a new substantial form, requiring and awaiting it; and nevertheless it can naturally exist with the form of corporeity alone, as you say. Is it because the accidents of the dead body must be rooted by some

form? But often accidents, although rooted by no form, endure for some time until they are gradually expelled by contraries, for example heat in iron or water after it has been removed from fire, or even in a corpse a mark externally impressed upon the living body. Add the saying of Horace: ″A jar will long retain the odor with which, when new, it was once imbued.″ Add also the form of corporeity itself, which, although produced for the sake of the soul and rooted by it, does not immediately perish when the soul departs. There is therefore no ground on which the Scotists can reject the existence of matter without form.

42. I answer 2º by denying the minor premise. To the 1º proof: in a corpse there is an indication of a new form which in other composites is commonly judged sufficient. First, there is the expulsion of a substantial form, namely the soul; and the general law of nature is that corruption of one thing never occurs without generation of another. Aristotle recognized this law, and it is not reasonable that it should be abrogated for the sake of the form of corporeity. Second, there are certain peculiar accidents intrinsically rooted, namely pallor, cold, rigidity or inflexibility, and also a certain stench and deformity. That these are intrinsically rooted is established by the fact that, although a corpse is warmed afterward by an extrinsic agent, when it is then left to itself and the contrary is removed, it recovers cold, or quickly acquires it if it did not have it from the moment of death. By this experience it is commonly proved that cold is intrinsically rooted in water.

43. Now if even one new accident is present after the manner of a permanent property and is known to be intrinsically rooted, whereas previously it was not rooted, it must necessarily presuppose a new root and therefore a new substantial form. Hence, although just any alteration of accidents is not sufficient, some notable alteration that is permanent and intrinsically induced is sufficient. Nor does it matter that the corpse and the living body agree in many other accidents. For vinegar also agrees with the preceding wine in quantity, figure, weight, color, and humidity; yet because it permanently roots some new accidents, for example taste and odor, it is judged to have a new substantial form. Certainly no lesser sensible change is ordinarily apparent in a corpse than in vinegar.

44. To the 2º proof: the instruments of death do not produce the form of the corpse. Rather, its exigitive cause, or even its instrumentally productive cause, is the temperament of the organic body deprived of the proportion required for retaining the soul; while the principal cause is the First Cause, upon whom it falls to complete disposed matter when an adequate second cause is lacking. Recourse to the First Cause for principal influx is frequent

in similar cases, as when animals are generated from putrefaction and, according to many, when the human body is organized and united to the soul. What is added concerning successive alteration proves that an animal cannot die suddenly, because corruption also presupposes alteration. Add that gunpowder catches fire in an instant and the flame of a candle is suddenly extinguished by blowing, the form of vapor or cinder succeeding it. A preceding alteration, therefore, although it occurs in a moral instant, never occurs in a physical instant, or one physically indivisible, because some succession of time always intervenes, although unperceived by the senses, just as we never perceive a point of matter so small that it is not physically divisible.

45. To the 3º proof: we say of the cadaveric form what the adversaries say of the form of corporeity, namely, that in each body it consists of heterogeneous parts according to the diversity of flesh, bone, nerve, etc., and that otherwise it is always of the same character in corpses of animals of the same species. Nor does the variety of causes of death stand in the way, because these do not produce the form of the corpse, but are only occasional causes, or causes removing an impediment. For they remove the disposition required for the soul; once this is removed, nothing prevents the introduction of the form of the corpse by its own proper cause. Thus the form of charcoal, ash, or cinder is of the same species whether the fire is extinguished by water, wine, milk, earth, or anything else.

46. Here it should be noted that the ultimate disposition to the form of a corpse consists precisely in the accidents of the organic body insofar as they are deprived of the proportion required for retaining the soul, so that this deprivation is the condition ultimately determining those accidents to require the cadaveric form effectively, just as removal of an opaque body is the condition determining a luminous body to illuminate a farther space. For certain forms are instituted by nature to succeed others of a determinate genus, such as the forms of charcoal, ash, vinegar, and corpse; and these require no other ultimate disposition than the defect of the temperament or proportion due to the preceding forms. Hence, from whatever source that proportion perishes, they are immediately introduced. Thus even when a man dies from excessive heat the form of the corpse is induced, because although cold is a property required by the corpse and therefore is afterwards rooted by it, it is not necessarily presupposed as an ultimate preceding disposition. Thus vinegar, although of its own nature cold, is often generated from wine corrupted by heat.

47. To the 4º proof: there is an evident counterexample in the form of corporeity, which certainly neither sees in the eyes nor hears in the ears, etc.;

and yet, even after death, according to the adversaries it roots the structure of the human body, certainly not in order to the soul, which can no longer naturally return. All must therefore admit that the organization of the human body—at least as regards the accidents of flesh and bones and others which do not consist in figure, or a certain position of parts—although principally fashioned for the sake of the soul and due to it alone in the perfect and primary state in which it is proximately fitted for vital functions, can nevertheless be due to a non-vital form in an imperfect and secondary state, in which it has already lost the proportion required for the soul without natural hope of recovery. For human organization, as thus taken, is no longer ordered to vital operations and cannot serve the soul. As regards the insults, since a cadaveric form is nothing other than a substantial form existing in a corpse, the patrons of the form of corporeity themselves are bound to call it a ″cadaveric form,″ and consequently ″stinking and horrible.″ Indeed, because it is older, it will accordingly be more worm-eaten or more putrid.

48. To the confirmation: first, a cadaveric form can be denied during the three days of the Lord′s death, both from what was said concerning man in n. 41 and because, although a miracle would then have been needed for matter to exist without form, this would be one among thousands worked in the life and death of Christ the Lord. Second, a cadaveric form is commonly admitted during those three days. Nor does it follow from this that Christ′s body was corrupted by the corruption of putrefaction, which alone Sacred Scripture denies, as interpreters commonly note both on Ps. 15 and on Acts c. 2 and 13. Philosophical corruption, however, consists formally not in acquisition of a new form but in separation of the previously possessed form, or in cessation of the pre-existing composite. Thus a stone would most truly be corrupted if its stony form perished, even if no other form succeeded in its matter; and conversely, although a new form entered, if the previously possessed form were not expelled, the stone would remain incorrupt. Since, therefore, according to the Faith Christ′s body truly died and the rational soul was truly separated from it, it cannot be doubted that philosophical corruption occurred in it, whatever may be the case concerning the cadaveric form.

49. To the 2º consequence, both the assumption and non-assumption of the cadaveric form can probably be defended; on this matter the Eximious Doctor may be seen, tom. 2 in 3, p. disp. 38, sect. 3. More commonly, however, its assumption and its relinquishment at the resurrection are asserted. But the saying, ″What he once assumed, he never relinquished,″ is understood of the parts of humanity, or of those things which the Word

assumed by primary intention, not of those which he assumed secondarily and transiently in order to preserve the order fitting to things at the time of death. Let the same also be said concerning the non-assumption of an irrational nature. To the 3º consequence: although Christ's body, taken completely, was not the same in the tomb as regards form, it was nevertheless the same when taken—as it is taken by the Fathers—for the physical part of man. In this sense it signifies only matter and organization, from what was said in n. 9, and both remained the same.

50. Argument 6º: a substantial form subordinate to another involves no repugnance. Therefore it must in fact be admitted in living things to constitute the organic body, since so many arguments favor it. The antecedent is proved 1º: because subsistence, since according to the common opinion it consists in something positive, is a certain substantial form supervening upon a nature essentially constituted and, together with it, constituting something one in itself. Therefore every substantial form constitutive of a nature is in reality subordinated to subsistence as to the ultimate substantial form. 2º Because in the metaphysical line there are subordinate forms, namely subaltern differences, which in relation to the ultimate difference behave as matter, although they are forms in relation to a higher genus; for example, in man the differences "corporeal, animate, sensitive," which are ultimately completed by the difference "rational." Therefore one may reason similarly in the physical line. 3º From the parity of accidental forms, some of which are related to others as perfectible subjects; in this way quantity is related to qualities, and a potency of the soul to vital acts.

51. I answer by denying the antecedent, because the notion of a substantial form includes the character of "first act and first root," and this character is immediately destroyed by subordination no less than the rationality of man by asinine nature. To the 1º proof: subsistence, if it is posited as something positive—which the Scotists deny—is not an absolute but a modal substance, and consequently is not properly and simply a form but an appendix and modification of form. Add that the office of root, which is proper to form, is not attributed to subsistence. Hence, just as no one says that there is a double substantial form in every composite, although besides the absolute form there is a union, which is a substantial mode and in some sense informs both extremes, so one must philosophize concerning subsistence. But if there are any who wish subsistence to be an absolute form, let them see for themselves what they should answer. Certainly this is not the common opinion.

52. To the 2º proof: if the example of the metaphysical line is valid, there will be no composite that does not consist of several subordinate forms, just as there is none to which several subaltern differences do not belong. Likewise every subordinate form will be indifferent to various species of ultimate form, just as every subaltern difference is indifferent to various ultimate differences. The disparity therefore lies in this: a metaphysical form is defined by the office of contracting some higher character, and this office abstracts from whether the contraction is ultimate or non-ultimate. But a physical form is defined by the concept of a ″first root,″ or ″first act,″ or ″principal physical difference,″ and this concept is incompatible with the supposed subordination. To the 3º proof, the disparity is the same, for subordination in no respect conflicts with the concept of an accidental form.

53. Finally, it must be observed that by the name ″flesh″ the whole organic body is often understood, not in just any way but completely, that is, the whole living thing, the whole man, or the whole corpse. When it is so taken, either ″flesh″ or ″body″ is said equivocally of the living and the dead, according to Aristotle, who will be cited in the following chapter, because at death it changes substantial species. In this sense also there is in such a body not only accidental but substantial organization, that is, substantial heterogeneity, to which the organic accidents are due. There is such heterogeneity, I say, either by reason of diverse parts of a divisible form, or at least by reason of union, from n. 38. But if one wishes that neither form nor union be formally heterogeneous, then substantial organization in a complete body is not to be granted except with the addition ″radically″ or ″virtually,″ insofar as the soul roots heterogeneity in accidents—as, according to the adversaries, it does in the form of corporeity—although it does not formally possess it in its own substance. But if ″flesh″ or ″organic body″ is taken incompletely for the physical part of the composite, in this sense it is said univocally of the living and dead body as long as the same matter remains with the same accidental organization; nor in this sense is substantial organization or radical heterogeneity to be admitted in it, as we noted in n. 12.

54. It may be said: therefore the flesh of a lamb recently killed will not substantially be lamb′s flesh. Therefore, since on the other hand it is not the flesh of another animal, it will be lawful to eat it on Friday just as a fish or an apple. The 1º consequence is proved: because neither is the cadaveric form anything of the lamb′s substance, nor is matter of itself substantially determined to be of a lamb rather than of an apple. I distinguish the 1º consequence: substantially, that is, with substantial determination, I grant it; substantially, that is, as regards the substance affected by the same

accidents, I deny the 1º and 2º consequences. For the same first matter remains, and under the same accidents, which was the whole substance of the lamb's flesh insofar as it was distinguished from the soul. Nor does the precept of abstinence abstract from accidents, but without doubt regards them, since taste and facility of nutrition proceed from them. Hence, if in the corpse of the lamb a form of fish were placed instead of a form of corporeity, under the same accidents of flesh, it would still be regarded as and would be prohibited flesh. Add that by the name "lamb's flesh" which is prohibited there is not signified a substance which had wholly belonged to the lamb, but a substance which immediately succeeds the soul of the lamb while sustaining the same accidents. Hence the form of the corpse is also included, and in this sense is substantially lamb's flesh.

CHAPTER II.

Arguments Against the Form of Corporeity.

1. Argument 1º: the form of corporeity is necessary in no respect. Therefore it is to be rejected, because "entities are not to be multiplied without necessity," as all agree. The antecedent remains proved from the preceding chapter, and now, by briefly collecting what we gave there in scattered form, it is proved again. First, the form of corporeity is not necessary in order to constitute man in the being of a body in the Category of Substance. This is proved because the rational soul suffices for this. First, because a predicamental body is nothing other than a complete substance naturally connected with quantity. But the rational soul both constitutes man a complete substance and renders him so connected with quantity that without quantity man can neither naturally exist nor be constituted by the soul.

2. Second, because the soul constitutes man in the being of substance, in the being of a living thing, in the being of animal, and in the being of man. Therefore it also constitutes him in the being of body. The consequence is clear, because since the grade of body is placed between the grade of substance and the grade of living thing, it would be remarkable if the physical form, while conferring predicamental grades upon the composite, were to pass as by a leap from the grade of substance to the grade of living thing without touching the intermediate grade. Nor would this merely be remarkable, but contrary to reason, because the grade of substance cannot descend to the grade of living thing except through the intermediate grade of body, just as the grade of living thing cannot descend to the grade of man except through the intermediate grade of animal. Otherwise, what fruit will

the Predicamental Tree, planted by all, bear? Or how will there not be a real distinction among metaphysical grades if the grades of living thing and substance are constituted by something by which the grade of body is not really constituted? It is therefore contradictory for a physical form conferring the highest and lowest predicamental grades upon a composite not to confer all the intermediate ones.

3. Next, neither is the form of corporeity necessary for constituting the organic body in living things. For a body of this kind, if considered as substantially or radically organized, is nothing other than matter with a form rooting the heterogeneous accidents necessary for vital functions. But the soul as united to matter roots these accidents. Therefore there is no need of another form of corporeity. The minor premise is proved: every substantial form roots and requires in matter the dispositions and accidents which it needs for operation. But the soul needs those heterogeneous accidents for the operations of vegetating and sensing. Therefore it roots and requires all of them in matter. The minor premise and consequence are certain, and the major premise is also clear. For since every form requires operation, it cannot fail to require the instruments without which it cannot operate. Surely, if the form of fire through itself immediately roots its proper accidents of heat and dryness, why should the soul not root the organic accidents which it needs no less for operating and for existing connaturally in its subject?

4. If it is said that the human soul, because it is spiritual, cannot immediately root material accidents: against this 1º, the form of corporeity is wholly material, and yet by your account it is immediately required and rooted by the spiritual soul. Against this 2º, if material operations of the senses can immediately arise from the spiritual soul, why cannot material accidents also be immediately rooted by it? Against this 3º, vital heat, although wholly material, is undoubtedly immediately rooted by the soul. For if it were rooted by the form of corporeity, it would remain longer in the corpse, just as the accidents of flesh and bone remain.

5. It may be said: why, then, does the soul of a blind man not recover sight, just as water recovers cold that it has lost? I ask in return: why does the soul of the blind man not recover the ocular form of corporeity, of which it is the root? Again, why does the form of corporeity itself, which remains intact in eyes blinded by a clouding or an obstruction of the optic nerve, not then restore the due temperament, of which by your account it is the immediate root? Therefore all must reduce this either to the tenacity of the contrary humor or to the subtlety of the ocular organization, which, once lost, cannot naturally be repaired.

6. It may again be said: therefore the rational soul roots the heaviness of the human body. I answer: it roots it not for itself, but for the body or whole composite, just as it roots or requires quantity for the same composite. What then? It follows, you say, that the soul often causes the death of man, because it will cause, at least mediately, the downward motion through which a man's death often results when he falls from a height. But I ask how the form of corporeity roots heaviness, since it is no less repugnant to that form than to the soul to cause the death of man? The causation of that motion and death, therefore, is not only very remote but also accidental and beyond intention. For the soul does not root heaviness for that end; rather, it tries to restrain it from such motion, which it suffers unwillingly when, once a fall has occurred, it cannot prevent it.

7. From these points it is easy to infer that a form of corporeity subordinate to the soul is not necessary for constituting the organic body of the embryo and corpse. For this form would be idle throughout the whole time of life, since the soul alone then suffices for the office of rooting organic accidents. Therefore it is superfluously posited together with the soul. Consequently, if it precedes in the embryo, it is expelled by the soul; and if it exists in the corpse, it is introduced at the time of death. But if this happens, it will no longer be the subordinate form of which we are speaking. Add that there is a greater diversity of sensible accidents between the embryo and the corpse than between flesh and nerve. If, therefore, the form of flesh and nerve is not the same for this reason, as you maintain, why will the form of the embryo and corpse be the same? What we noted above is also relevant here: no lesser alteration of accidents is observed when a living body passes into a corpse than when wine passes into vinegar. Why, then, will there not be an introduction of a new form in both cases?

8. Finally, neither is the form of corporeity necessary in order that there be a substantial diversity in man between flesh and bones. For this diversity should be inferred more from diversity of operations than from diversity of other accidents. If, therefore, the diversity which we observe between operations of the head and feet, or of the eyes and ears, does not prove in man a substance formally diverse, but only equivalently or virtually diverse, namely one form which in power is equivalent to many diverse forms, why should the same not be said of the diversity of flesh and bones existing in man? If it is asked whence it comes that the accidents of flesh are determinately applied to part A of matter and the accidents of bone to part B, and not conversely, I shall say that it comes from the same source from which, by your account, the determinate distribution of the forms of

corporeity, fleshy and bony, proceeds, namely either from the First Cause, or from seminal power, or from any other cause.

9. Argument 2º: every substantial form is the first act of matter, not indeed first in execution, for this belongs rather to quantity, but first in nobility and intention, insofar as it is the principal and primary act for whose sake all the others exist in the composite. But this does not belong to the form of corporeity, which exists in the composite for the sake of another and as a disposition to another, nobler form. Therefore such a form is not substantial. The major premise, since the rest is certain, is proved from the common judgment of all Peripatetics, who place the difference between substantial and accidental acts in this: that a substantial act is primary and intended for its own sake, whereas an accidental act is secondary and intended for the sake of another. The Scotists themselves approve this distinction with Scotus, as may be seen in Mastrius, disp. 2, *Physica*, n. 24, who after other things concludes in these words: ″Hence the precise reason why a substantial form is a substance, constitutes something one in itself with matter, and differs from an accidental form, is that it is the primary act of matter, whereas an accident is secondary.″

10. The objection is pressed 1º: a substantial form is the first root of the properties and operations of the composite; for all prove a Peripatetic substantial form from the fact that some first and specific root of accidents must be assigned in composites. But a form which exists for the sake of another, in which it is rooted, is not the first root in the composite, as is evident from the terms, just as that is not a first subject which is received in another subject. Therefore, etc. The objection is pressed 2º: the concept of a substantial form includes that it be the principal physical difference of the composite, or the specific character by which each composite is distinguished from others specifically diverse. In this sense it is called by Aristotle the ″account of essence″ or ″quiddity,″ as all explain and approve. But this in no way fits the form of corporeity, for in man, for example, not this form but the rational soul is the principal physical difference, specific character, and account of quiddity.

11. The objection is pressed 3º: a form of this kind is in no respect distinguished from an accidental form. Therefore it is not substantial. The antecedent is proved: first, it is not distinguished by being a physical act of matter and first in execution, for this belongs equally or more to accidental dispositions for the soul. Second, not by being the root of several accidents, for the four first qualities, tempered in mixtures, also root several secondary qualities. Finally, not by constituting something one in itself with matter, for this is precisely what we ask: why does it constitute something one in itself

and not one accidentally? Since it is not a primary act, and elsewhere, according to Mastrius, ″the precise reason why a substantial form constitutes something one in itself with matter is that it is the primary act.″

12. The objection is pressed finally: if the form of corporeity is substantial, the soul will be an accidental form. This is proved because the soul will come to matter insofar as matter is already informed by a substantial physical act. Therefore it will come to complete matter, or to a being simply in act, as already constituted in a substantial physical species. But a form coming to a complete being, or to a being simply in act in the physical line, is accidental, as the Peripatetics commonly teach according to Aristotle, who continually says that something one in itself is made only when form comes to a being in potency.

13. Mastrius says here, disp. 2, n. 79, that matter with the form of corporeity alone, in the manner in which it exists in a corpse, is only an incompletely actual being, or merely ″an incomplete individual in the incomplete species of a mixture.″ But first, this is to posit, against the common understanding, a substantial form which is not the substantial complement of matter. Second, who could believe that wood—which is the corpse of a tree after it has entirely lost its vegetative soul—is a less complete individual than paper? Or how could a being incompletely in act, or an incomplete individual of an incomplete species, naturally endure in this state for whole centuries, as cedar wood does?

14. Argument 3º: the form of corporeity is contrary to Aristotle′s doctrine. Therefore it should be rejected by the Scotists, who confess themselves Peripatetics. The antecedent is proved 1º: because Aristotle teaches that there is never generation without corruption, nor conversely corruption without generation. He often inculcates this in 1, *De generatione et corruptione*, for example text 17, 18, 20, where he speaks thus: ″In substances the generation of one is always the corruption of another, and the corruption of one the generation of another.″ But if the form of corporeity is admitted, in the death of living things there commonly occurs corruption without generation, and in their conception generation without corruption of the preceding form. Nor should it be said that Aristotle is speaking of complete generation and corruption, not partial generation and corruption such as occurs in the conception and death of living things. For this distinction between complete and partial corruption or generation is contrary to Aristotle, who nowhere mentions it, although it would be most worthy of note and of great importance to physical science.

15. 2º Because the same Philosopher in 1, *Physica*, posits only two principles, or only two parts in general, for a body already constituted. But if

a form of corporeity existed, he should have excepted living bodies, yet he nowhere makes this exception. 3º Because the same Philosopher, 2, *De generatione animalium* cap. 1, says: ″There is no face unless it has a soul, nor flesh; but once corrupted it is equivocally called face or flesh, just as if it had become stone or wood.″ But once the form of corporeity is posited, human flesh, for example, insofar as it signifies a substantial form, belongs to the same lowest substantial species and is entirely univocal whether it has a soul or not.

16. 4º, to omit other things, the Philosopher, 7, *Metaphysica* text 39, explaining the physical quiddity of animal, says: ″It is manifest that the soul is the first substance, the body matter, while man or animal is that which is from both.″ See how by the name ″body,″ insofar as it is distinguished from the soul, he understands matter alone. Nor should it be said that by the name ″matter″ he signifies here not first matter but second matter, namely matter constituted by another form and related to the soul as matter. For Aristotle, eod. lib. 7, text 35, recognizes no substantial form besides the soul in the organic body: ″The soul,″ he says, ″is the form and essence of such a body.″

CHAPTER III.

Another Opinion Concerning Subordinate Forms Is Examined.

1. Fr. John Ulloa, disp. 1, *Physica Speculativa*, from n. 149 to n. 161, recognizes in most mixtures, or in all those known to us, but especially in living things, several substantial forms subordinate to one principal form. This is not so that they perform the office of subject in relation to the principal form, but so that they are, as it were, a condition and preceding preparation for the principal form to inform that same matter connaturally and operate in it. Nor again is it so that the subordinate forms essentially constitute the composite which is constituted by the principal form, but so that they are only integral parts of it. For example, man, besides the rational soul, which is his principal and specific form, includes substantial forms of flesh, bone, nerve, etc. Although these forms belong to the integrity of man, they do not constitute him essentially, because the essence of man is preserved in matter and soul alone united. Nor are they the subject of the soul; rather, they are only presupposed in matter so that it can connaturally be informed by the soul.

2. As regards living things, he proves this opinion by almost the same arguments which we examined above for the Scotist form of corporeity. He differs from the Scotists only in this, that he does not wish the form of flesh,

bone, etc., to be the subject of the soul or an essential part of a living thing, but only an integral part. In general, however, he also proves it for inanimate composites from the analysis or resolution of mixtures which is commonly performed by an alembic and other instruments of the chemical art. For we see, for example, smoke, salt, oil, an aqueous liquid, ash, and other things commonly extracted from wood chemically resolved. The substantial forms of all these are not then produced anew, because neither is fire proved in any way productive of them, nor is another suitable cause readily available. Recourse to the First Cause, however, has place only when disposed matter precedes; but what cause at that time would be disposing matter for so many and such diverse forms?

3. Therefore those forms pre-existed in the wood together with its principal form, namely the wooden form, which presupposed on the side of the subject all those natural entities glued into one mass by a certain viscous sap. And because a mass of this kind is dissolved by the action of fire, the form of wood perishes, while those bodies remain separately with their own forms alone. It is no different from the matter of a house upon which an artificial form is superinduced: it is an aggregate of many natural entities, namely earth, bricks, stones, timbers, nails, etc.; and when this aggregate is dissolved, the artificial form of the house perishes, while all those entities remain in the proper being of each.

4. Against this opinion he objects to himself 1º that the animal form suffices to actuate matter and constitute a substantial composite; therefore the other forms are superfluous. 2º That if the soul presupposes other substantial forms, it presupposes matter already actual and complete; therefore the soul will be an accidental form, since it comes to a being in act. 3º That the soul will not be the first act or the first root of the properties of the animal, since it presupposes another first act and another root, which roots not only the accidents of flesh, for example, but also the soul itself, since it is presupposed to the soul and connected with it. 4º That those subordinate forms would be dispositions to the soul and intended for the sake of the soul; therefore they would not be substantial, because the concept of substance includes being intended for its own sake and not for the sake of another. 5º That the form of flesh, for example, would leave matter to be further substantially actuated; therefore it would not be a substantial complement of matter. 6º That no adequate whole is by its own nature ordered to compose another whole with another superadded form, for this is by the very terms contrary to the notion of "adequate and full." But the whole resulting from matter and the form of flesh is adequate and

substantially complete, since according to this opinion it can exist without the animal form. Therefore, etc.

5. He answers to 1º by distinguishing the antecedent: it suffices to actuate matter with the actualization of a sensitive living thing and to constitute a composite which is a sensitive living thing, I grant it; it suffices to actuate it with the actualization of flesh, bone, etc., I deny the antecedent and the consequence. For since the actualization of flesh and bone remains the same when the soul departs, it follows that it does not proceed from the soul while present, and consequently that the soul does not suffice for it. To 2º he similarly distinguishes the antecedent: it presupposes matter already actuated and completed with the actualization and completion of flesh, bone, etc., I grant it; with the actualization and completion of a living thing, I deny the antecedent and consequence. The added reason, that a form coming to a being in act is accidental, is true only when the form supervenes in order to constitute a composite in which that being in act is included after the manner of a subject. It is otherwise when it supervenes in order to constitute a composite of a diverse character, in relation to which that being in act, insofar as such, that is, according to its form, is not a subject but an integral part.

6. To 3º, I deny the consequence, because although from flesh and soul one composite results with integral unity, there are nevertheless there two composites essentially taken, one ″flesh,″ the other ″living thing″ or ″animal,″ which are identified only inadequately, namely as regards matter. In each composite so taken there is only one substantial form, which therefore alone reigns there as first act and first root of the properties and operations of that composite essence. Thus, if God joined in the same matter two disparate forms, for example the form of stone and of gold, two inadequately distinct composites would result, and in each its own form would be first act and first root. The only difference is that in our case the form of flesh would be an integral part of the composite constituted by the soul. But this does not remove the essential distinction of the two composites. Nor can the form of flesh be called the root of the soul, because it is connected with the soul not by reason of fecundity but by reason of a certain need, like an accidental disposition of matter; and moreover it remains outside the essence of the composite resulting from the soul.

7. To 4º: those forms would not be pure dispositions, but would at the same time be intended for their own sake within the composite which they essentially constitute and which is called ″flesh,″ or ″bone,″ etc.; for within its essence there is nothing for the sake of which they are intended. That a composite of this kind should in turn be ordered to the integrity of another

is not absurd or contrary to the concept of substance, as is seen in the foot or tail of a lizard, for example. To 5º I distinguish the antecedent: matter would be further actuated in order to this composite "animal," I grant it; in order to this composite "flesh," I deny the antecedent. And I distinguish the consequence: it would not be a substantial complement in every line, or in relation to every composite, I grant it; in relation to some composite, I deny the consequence.

8. To 6º: it is contrary to the notion of "adequate and full" only that a whole should be ordered to composing another whole of the same specific character in which it is full and adequate; not if the whole to which it is ordered is of another specific character. Finally, if it is objected that according to Aristotle the generation of one thing is the corruption of another, and conversely, he answers that this is to be understood of generation and corruption occurring between opposed or disparate forms. These are approximately Fr. Ulloa's arguments for his opinion. Although reported summarily, they have been explained somewhat by me.

9. It can moreover be added that in animate beings there is a series of several subordinate forms. For not only is the form of flesh, for example, subordinated to the soul, but other forms are subordinated to the form of flesh itself. For flesh chemically resolved terminates in heterogeneous bodies much more numerous than those remaining from other mixtures. Indeed, since the bodies themselves extracted from any mixture by a first analysis, for example salt and oil, can be further resolved into other heterogeneous portions, as modern chemists experience, it follows that several forms are involved in every sensible mixture, some subordinated by degrees to others, nor can it be known or designated by us—although it can by an Angel—which is the first form that actuates bare matter. At any rate, it follows from this opinion that such a thing is not repugnant on account of subordination. Whether it is repugnant on some other ground we shall discuss elsewhere.

10. In confirmation of the same opinion I add the example of blood, which, like the other humors of the human body, the more common doctrine holds not to be animated. For blood, although in itself a substantial composite endowed with its own form distinct from the soul, nevertheless belongs to the integrity of man and is a true integral part of the human composite. Likewise the form of blood is truly a disposition to the soul, serves it, and is mutually connected with it, so that neither can long be preserved without the other in its own matter. Yet the form of blood does not therefore cease to be substantial or lose the prerogatives of "first act, first root, and being intended for its own sake," namely in relation to its own composite, which it essentially constitutes and which is called "blood."

11. Hence in this form of blood the principal difficulties objected above against the form of flesh can be pressed and explained. Indeed, it seems easier that a form agreeing with the soul in the same subject should be an integral part of man than a form existing in other matter. It may be said: matter cannot naturally receive at the same time two substantial complements, even if they are of diverse species. I distinguish: if the complements themselves conflict with each other by reason of their properties or operations, I grant it; if they do not so conflict but rather mutually assist one another, I deny it. Matter of itself effectively desires only one form, and therefore can exist for a long time with any one form without miracle or violence. But it has a natural capacity—which is not identified with need or with effective appetite—for many forms at once, provided that the forms themselves can enter into a friendly alliance with each other.

12. This opinion, thus explained and confirmed, first avoids the principal difficulty against the Scotist form of corporeity, taken from the proper concept of a substantial form, because it admits a subordinate form in such a way that it constitutes a composite essentially different from the living thing. Second, no less than the Scotist opinion, it is useful for theological questions concerning the body of Christ the Lord, both in the Eucharist and during the three days of his death. Finally, in physical matters it satisfies sense and experience both in living things and in other mixtures. Hence, although it cannot be demonstrated metaphysically, it may appear physically more probable. It also disarms the Corpuscular Physicists, who commonly arm themselves with chemical furnaces and are accustomed to criticize Peripatetic doctrine because, wholly supported by metaphysical speculations, it neglects experience, which is the mother of natural philosophy.

13. And in truth it seems hardly credible that in the corpses of living things and in chemical analysis so many entirely new forms are suddenly produced when no cause appears. Certainly the common apprehension of men seems to be that something is indeed lost there, but nothing new is substituted; only those things remain which inhered in the composite that has perished. Thus in a raisin, a dried rose, or cedar wood, no one conceives a new substance, but only the lost power of vegetating; and the very odor of rose or cedar which perseveres for a very long time seems quite foreign to the form of a corpse. Hence also, according to the diversity of mixtures resolved, different salts, different oil, and different spirits are expected, because they are believed to lie hidden within them. If it is said that they indeed lie hidden, but not in the matter informed by the form of the mixture, rather as adventitious corpuscles introduced through pores, or at most as integral parts having different matter, like blood in man, I answer:

what becomes of the proper matter of the mixture in chemical analysis? Where has it gone? What new form has it put on?

14. Yet, lest I conceal anything, I shall propose some difficulties which occur to me. 1º Human flesh, for example, will not be animated, contrary to everyone's judgment: first, because according to its form it is not informed by the soul; second, because it is a composite essentially diverse from the animated composite. Thus, if God joined a soul and a stony form in the same matter, the composite "stone" would not be animated. But if flesh is not animated, how does it vegetate and grow by intussusception? 2º If the forms of flesh, bone, etc., are purely integral parts of man, an organic body taken substantially will not belong to the essence of man. How, then, will the saying of the Athanasian Creed be verified: "A rational soul and flesh are one man"? How is "flesh" taken in Sacred Scripture by synecdoche for the whole man, as when the Word is said to have been made flesh? How is man physically defined by body and soul, or the soul itself through order to an organic body?

15. 3º The soul truly roots in its proper subject the organic accidents of flesh, bones, eyes, ears, etc., as we showed in the preceding chapter. If therefore the same accidents are rooted by other substantial forms, they will simultaneously have two or more adequate first roots, and thus the same effect will proceed simultaneously from two total causes, which is naturally repugnant. 4º The argument drawn from chemical analysis also applies to the elements as they exist among us, for many heterogeneous bodies are likewise extracted by an alembic from earth or water. Ulloa admits this, cited disp. n. 148 and 149, admitting only one substantial form in pure elements, which he denies exist below the Moon.

16. From this I argue thus: the form of salt, for example, extracted from water, is not subordinate to the form of water. Therefore it does not exist in the matter of the water, but in another distinct matter, although intermixed with it. Therefore the same must be said of salt extracted from wood or another mixture. The antecedent is proved: the form of salt is the form of a mixture, since salt is not an element, as is clear. But the form of a mixture cannot be subordinate to the form of water. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved: the form of water, even as water exists among us, is an elemental form. For although water among us is not a pure element, no one denies that an elemental form prevails and predominates in it. But every form of a mixture is judged nobler than an elemental form, since it requires the temperament of several qualities and demands, as it were, a tribute of its proper quality from all the elements. Therefore it cannot be subordinated to an elemental form. Indeed, if subordination is admitted, it seems that it

should rather be granted to the elements in relation to mixtures than conversely, because the very order of nature begins from the elements and proceeds from them to mixtures, as is clear in the first formation of the World.

17. 5º The chemical experiments can be satisfied without positing several forms in the same matter or new productions without a cause, if it is said that the heterogeneous bodies extracted by chemical analysis belonged partly to the natural integrity of the mixture in the way in which blood and other humors belong to the integrity of man although they have distinct matter, and partly were adventitious corpuscles imperceptibly introduced through pores, which, when the mixture is dissolved, are gathered together and perceived by sense. When it is asked where the proper matter of the mixture went, or what form it put on, I answer that, once all integral and adventitious bodies are separated, this matter is a very small portion and passes off into smoke or exhalation. Its new form can easily be produced by the fire placed beneath, together with other heterogeneous bodies which are always intermixed with ordinary fire.

18. Nevertheless these difficulties can in some manner be solved. To 1º: for flesh to be said absolutely to be animated, it suffices that it be animated ″formally″ as regards the subject—for the same matter of the flesh is informed by the soul—and ″effectively″ as regards the form. For the form of flesh grows through nutrition, not by its own power but by the power of the soul received in the same matter, which cannot increase matter for itself without simultaneously increasing the dispositions presupposed by it, and consequently without simultaneously increasing the form of flesh, just as it increases accidental organization. Hence the effect of animation truly extends to the form of flesh, and consequently it can be called ″effectively″ animated. Nor is flesh as regards its form animated in any other way in the opinion of those who constitute the organic body through matter alone with accidental organization. The effect of animation would not extend in this way to the stony form in the hypothesis objected, and therefore the stone would in no sense be animated.

19. To 2º: there is a counterexample in the opinion of those who constitute the organic body through matter and accidents, for thus the organic body as such, or as regards form, certainly does not enter the essence of man. Likewise, according to the very widely received opinion which says that only primordial matter, or matter first animated, is essential to man, the particle of the brain which is believed to be first animated is neither flesh nor an organic body in the ordinary sense. Therefore the organic body as regards matter is an essential part of man; as regards form,

however, it is an integral part, not merely of the foot or hand but of the whole man. This suffices for it to be called absolutely and simply a part of man, and for flesh to be taken by synecdoche for the whole man, because common usage does not distinguish essential parts from integral ones. Thus, although blood is not animated and is not an essential part, it is sometimes taken in Sacred Scripture for the whole man, as Fr. Suárez observes, tom. 1, in 3, p. dist. 15, s. 6. When "body" is named in the definition of man, either a metonymy of container for contained is used, namely body for matter, or the form of the body is posited not as part of the essence but as a connotate or term of natural exigency; and it is also posited in the definition of the soul in this latter way.

20. To 3º: either it may be said that those accidents are rooted by the soul in the genus of final cause and by the other forms in the genus of efficient cause; or that they are rooted immediately by the other forms and only mediately by the soul, insofar as the soul roots the subordinate forms; or rather it may be said that this rooting, at least on the part of the soul, does not occur through physical influx but through mere natural exigency. And when the same accidents serve two composites or two forms without one impeding the other, there is no inconvenience in their being simultaneously due to a double exigency or to a double adequate exigitive principle.

21. To 4º, omitting the fact that the doctrine of the four common Elements in their relation to Mixtures, as it is commonly taught, perhaps requires much correction, it can be said that the Elements, even as they exist among us, are not properly and philosophically mixtures, nor do they subordinate to themselves the forms of those bodies which are extracted by analysis; rather those bodies are purely adventitious and introduced through pores, as was said in the 5º difficulty. The reason this should be said in the elements rather than in wood, for example, is that when water or earth is resolved by fire, a greater portion of earthy or aqueous matter is observed to remain—unless the latter passes into sensible vapors—than of salt or other bodies. Hence there is no need to ask where the proper matter of the element went, nor to invent production of a new form. And it is easily understood why the elemental form prevailed in denominating all the preceding matter, namely because it occupied a greater part of it and rendered it more sensible. None of these things can be said in the resolution of mixtures, for no wooden part, etc., is observed to remain.

22. To 5º: I admit that one who answers in this way cannot easily be refuted by a metaphysical reason. Yet if the matter is considered physically, that solution will have little credibility except in the common elements, as we have just seen. For it is difficult to believe that only a very small portion

of the matter included in wood receives the form of wood. Why, then, is that whole mass called "wood," and not rather "sulfur," or "salt," or another of the bodies extracted from it? Why must only the portion of matter belonging to wood or another resolved mixture, but not the merely integral or adventitious matter, pass into smoke? Why into smoke rather than into anything else? Is smoke perhaps the corpse of every mixture chemically resolved? Add the old axiom: "Each thing is composed of those things into which it is resolved." This must be understood at least of the portion of matter sensibly remaining. And thus far concerning subordinate forms, which one may either admit or reject, as far as I am concerned.

CHAPTER IV.
Whether Several Non-Subordinate Forms Can Be Joined in the Same Matter.

1. We are now speaking of forms mutually unconnected and disparate, of which one does not require the companionship of another in the same subject, such as the forms of stone, gold, iron, and wood. We ask whether, although they do not require mutual companionship, they nevertheless patiently tolerate it, or can tolerate it. We are speaking, however, of a wholly identical subject, or of the same part of matter. For experience establishes that several forms of this kind can exist in diverse parts of one continuous matter, as when we see one part of the same trunk ignited and another still wooden. But there is then continuity only between the parts of matter; between the forms there is only contiguity.

They Cannot Be United Naturally.

2. This is the common opinion and that of almost all. Its proof is taken from experience, by which we continually see that of forms of this kind one is never introduced without another being expelled. From this we infer that they are naturally incompatible in the same subject, just as from similar experience it is inferred that two quantities cannot naturally be joined in the same place. Otherwise natural agents, when introducing a new form and expelling the old, would tend toward pure evil, contrary to the axiom, "No agent acts intending evil." For they would cause evil to the old form not as conducive to the good of the new—since the two forms could be joined in a friendly bond—but for the sake of the evil itself, not without the vice of a certain natural envy.

3. Therefore this incompatibility must be attributed to the very nature of the forms, which has become known to us through experience, just as in the example of quantities just given. It is not to be attributed to the incapacity of first matter, because although first matter effectively desires only one form vaguely and is naturally content with possession of any form, since with any one it constitutes a physically complete being, there is nevertheless no ground for proving it incapable of several forms with which it simultaneously constitutes several complete beings if the forms themselves do not conflict. Nor is this incompatibility always to be attributed to contrariety of accidental dispositions. Although there is clear contrariety among the dispositions of some forms, for example fire and water, it is not equally clear in all.

4. Add that on account of dispositions several forms of one species could be joined in the same matter, which no one admits; for they do not require contrary dispositions, indeed the dispositions of one could serve several in the same office. It may be said that forms of the same species are therefore not joined because ″like does not act upon like.″ But this could occur without like acting upon like, namely if a double form of fire, for example, were simultaneously introduced into the matter of wood by two agents simultaneously applied.

5. It is objected: 1º the example of accidental forms which, although unconnected, such as whiteness and sweetness, can be joined in the same subject. 2º That substantial forms are not contrary to one another, because according to Aristotle substance has no contrary. 3º The example of glowing iron, in which the forms of fire and iron seem to be associated. 4º The example of a live coal, or ignited charcoal, where besides the form of fire there is another requiring heaviness; otherwise the coal would rise upward like flame. 5º That human monsters with two heads and one stomach have more than once been seen. In them there were two rational souls; and since neither can be preserved in the body unless it informs the stomach, it follows that the same matter of the stomach is informed by both souls.

6. These arguments press little. To 1º: in accidental forms the same experience does not apply, but rather the opposite. To 2º: among substantial forms there is no strict contrariety, which in Aristotle is taken only for the hostility of qualities gradually overcoming one another, for example cold and heat. There is nevertheless contrariety taken for natural incompatibility, such as two stones also possess in relation to place, although they are not properly contraries. To 3º: nowhere in matter are the forms of fire and iron joined. Rather, into the pores of iron, loosened by heat, several fiery particles are introduced, and new fire is also produced on the outermost surface of

the iron, from which it expels the iron form, as the remaining slag sufficiently indicates. From this proceeds all that heat and brightness. Certainly, if the form of fire cohered with the iron form, iron would not be consumed by fire even if it remained in a furnace for a century; nor would the fire be extinguished so quickly outside the furnace if it had invaded all the matter of the iron.

7. To 4º: the heaviness of the live coal is a quality remaining from the wood which cannot immediately be expelled by the form of fire. To 5º: in monsters of this kind, if there are two souls—which some think should be inferred from a double head, others from a double heart, others from disagreement in operating—a distinct part of the stomach corresponds to each. The stomach itself, although it appears one, in reality contains matter corresponding to two stomachs, at least imperfect ones. Nor could that double or half-double composite otherwise be nourished without a continual struggle between the nutritive faculties of each, each of which would seize the food for itself.

They Can Be United by Divine Power.

8. Thus our authors commonly hold with the Eximious Doctor, disp. 45, *Disputationes metaphysicae*, sect. 10, n. 60, and several Scotists with the Subtle Doctor, according to Mastrius, against almost all Thomists. The assertion is proved: substantial forms are in no respect essentially incompatible in the same matter. Therefore, although they cannot be naturally united, they can nevertheless be united by divine power, just as two bodies can by divine power penetrate one another in the same place although naturally they cannot. The antecedent is proved by overturning the principal grounds of essential repugnance which move the adversaries; the solution of the arguments will overturn the others.

9. 1º The first ground is that the introduction of one form is the formal expulsion of another, or at least the formal and immediate causality of its expulsion. It is overturned thus: a form is not formally expelled except through its privation, or through its non-being in matter, just as conversely privation is not formally excluded except through the being of the form in matter. Likewise, the immediate and formal causality of this non-being or privation is the withdrawal or cessation of the Divine concurrence by which the form was conserved in matter, just as conversely the immediate causality of the form's existence in matter is the action by which the form is produced in matter. But the introduction of a new form is neither the formal privation of the preceding form, as is evident, nor the formal cessation of the Divine

concurrence or conserving action of the preceding form, as is likewise evident. Therefore it is neither the formal expulsion nor the formal causality or execution of the expulsion.

10. Confirmation: according to the Thomists an effect can fail to result while its ultimate causality remains. Therefore, even if introduction of one form were the ultimate causality of the expulsion of another—which we nevertheless do not grant—the expulsion could still be prevented by divine power while that causality remained. The antecedent is clear in the production of substance, which is simultaneously the ultimate causality of accidental properties; for according to the Thomists these are not produced by a distinct action, as may be seen in Bayona, here q. 4, ar. 5, and Froylán, q. 5, ar. 2, 2 ult. And yet, while the production of the substance remains, the properties can fail or fail to result by divine power; nor only by divine power, but sometimes even through violence of a natural agent, as when water is deprived of cold, for the production of the water does not then cease or change. The same is clear in the creation of first matter, which according to the Thomists was simultaneously the ultimate causality of the elemental form at the beginning of the World. Yet today, while the same creation perseveres, as they themselves grant, an elemental form does not result from it, at least in most parts of matter.

11. 2º The second ground is that a newly introduced form essentially requires the expulsion of the preceding form by the title of formal cause. This also is easily overturned. This exigency is called essential because the expulsion of the preceding form is a secondary formal effect of the new form —the adversaries admit that it is not a primary effect. But this reason does not prove an essential exigency, or one that cannot be frustrated by divine power. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is proved: first, because cold and heat in the highest degree can by divine power coexist in the same subject, as several of the adversaries grant; and yet the expulsion of cold is a secondary formal effect of heat, and conversely. Second, because impenetrability is a formal effect of quantity, from which actual non-penetration, or actual exclusion of another body from the same place, follows as a secondary effect. Nevertheless two bodies can by divine power penetrate one another. Similarly, extension in relation to place is a formal effect of quantity; yet because it is a secondary effect it can be prevented by divine power.

12. Nor is there any force in the solution of those who say that a positive secondary formal effect can indeed be prevented because it needs a new concurrence which God can suspend, but not a negative formal effect such as the expulsion of a previously possessed form. This solution, I say, has no

force. 1º Because once water is produced, no new concurrence is needed for cold to result, according to the Thomists; and yet it can fail to result or can cease, because it is a secondary term of that production. 2º Because the expulsion of cold by heat in the highest degree is a negative formal effect, as is also the exclusion of a body from a place occupied by another. For although God denied quantity A concurrence toward every positive action, it would still naturally prevent quantity B from entering the same place as long as it occupied it; and yet either effect can be prevented by God. 3º Because the expulsion of a form from matter is also an effect requiring suspension of the conserving concurrence, which God can refrain from suspending, since he is equally Lord of his concurrence as regards its suspension and as regards its placement.

The Contrary Arguments Do Not Stand in the Way.

13. It is objected 1º: once a form is placed in a capable subject, God cannot prevent its formal effect. But the expulsion of one form is the formal effect of another, for one is not expelled by another except in the genus of formal cause. Therefore the expulsion of one form can in no way be prevented once another has been introduced. Confirmation: actual informing is the formal and ultimate causality by which one form in second act expels another, for it is the ultimate exercise of formal cause as such. But once causality in second act is posited, prevention of the effect is wholly repugnant. Therefore, etc.

14. I answer: there is a twofold formal effect. One is primary and positive, for example the denomination ″hot″ in relation to heat. The other is secondary and negative, for example, in relation to heat, the expulsion of cold from the subject. The primary effect is intrinsically constituted by the form and consists in the form itself as communicated to a capable subject. Hence, once communication is posited, it is wholly contradictory that this effect be prevented by God. But the secondary effect is adequately distinct from the positive form, because it consists in the subject′s being ″deprived of″ or ″abandoned by,″ for example, the form of cold; and since this denomination is merely negative, it cannot be constituted by a positive form.

15. Nevertheless, such a secondary effect is said to proceed from a positive form because the latter requires not to be joined with the other form, and by its exigency moves the Author of nature to suspend the action conserving that other form. It is also called a ″formal effect″ because one form is not opposed to another as regards the subject except insofar as it informs the same subject. Hence, because the exigency of expelling another

is exercised through union or informing, which is the exercise of formal causality, one form is therefore said "formally through itself," or, what comes to the same, "in the genus of formal cause," to expel another. But the exercise of requiring is one thing and the exercise of obtaining another, just as in a poor man the exercise of asking for alms is not the same as the exercise of obtaining them. Therefore, although actual informing is the exercise of requiring the expulsion of the other form and is its ultimate purely exigitive causality, it is not thereby the ultimate executive causality, because another causality still remains which God can deny, namely suspension or cessation of the action conserving the other form. This doctrine can be explained by the example of quantity requiring local extension and by the other examples in our proof.

16. Hence the objection is easily solved. Although God, once a form is placed in a subject, cannot prevent its primary formal effect, because this already has all its constituents, he can nevertheless prevent the secondary effect, because the latter requires further causality, namely cessation of God's concurrence, and God can will not to cause this cessation and can disregard the exigency of the introduced form by his absolute dominion. To the confirmation: actual informing is the ultimate exercise of formal cause as such in order to the primary effect. But in order to the secondary effect it is not the ultimate exercise or ultimate causality in the executive line, but only in the purely exigitive line. Hence, since this exigency is merely natural, its effect can still be prevented by God.

17. The objection is pressed 1º: according to Aristotle, "the introduction of one is the expulsion of another." Therefore introduction cannot stand without expulsion. 2º God cannot prevent the primary formal effect because he cannot supply it by himself without the form; but neither can he by himself supply the secondary effect without the form. Therefore, etc. 3º God cannot bring it about that one metaphysical difference does not exclude another, for example that rationality does not exclude asinine nature. Therefore neither can he bring it about that one physical difference, such as a substantial form, does not exclude another. The consequence is clear both from parity of reason and because "one form has the privation of another form understood with it," as St. Thomas teaches in 11, *Metaphysica*, lect. 12.

18. I answer to 1º: Aristotle's saying is true not in the formal or executive sense, but in the exigitive sense, namely by reason of natural exigency. In this sense we truly say that the introduction of one body is the expulsion of another from the same place, and that "the being of an accident is *inesse*," although an accident can by divine power exist without *inesse*, as in the Eucharist. To 2º, setting aside the major premise, I deny the minor premise

if the discussion concerns a positive form. For God, without any form being newly introduced, can by himself expel a previously possessed form from matter, namely by ceasing to conserve it, just as he can expel cold from a subject without substituting heat, as no one denies. But if the discussion concerns a negative form, I grant the minor premise and consequence, because such a form in relation to the negative effect is the privation of a form in matter; without that privation it is most true that a form cannot be expelled.

19. To 3º, I distinguish the antecedent: that one difference should not exclude another from identity with itself, I grant it; that it should not exclude another from the subject in which it is, I deny the antecedent; and I distinguish the consequence in the same way. Every difference, whether physical or metaphysical, indeed every accidental form also, essentially excludes another from identity with itself, and it can never happen that one be the other. But not every difference essentially excludes another from the physical subject in which it is. Hence a rational soul and an asinine soul can be joined in the same matter, in which event rationality and asinine nature would exist in the same matter or from the same matter. St. Thomas either speaks of negation of identity, which in a broad sense is called privation, or rather he speaks with attention to natural exigency, in which sense one body has the privation of another understood with it in the same place. Moreover, wherever St. Thomas asserts the impossibility of a plurality of forms in the same matter, he is speaking of subordinate forms belonging to the essence of one composite. As regards the others, he nowhere raises the question in relation to God's absolute power, as John of St. Thomas notes, 1, *Physica*, q. 10.

20. It is objected 2º: if two substantial forms existed in the same matter, neither would be the first act, neither in order of time if one came after the other, nor in order of dignity, because neither would subordinate the other to itself or be its root. Confirmation: the later form would not be substantial and would not make something one in itself, since it would come to a being in act, or to one already substantially complete. I answer: each form would then be a primary act, or first in dignity, in relation to its own composite. For there would then absolutely result two composites, because form, the principal constituent of the composite, would be doubled. That matter would be the same matters little. For just as fire made from the matter of wood is said absolutely to be another composite than the wood, although it is not distinct from it as regards matter, so also in our case. There would therefore then be properties and operations corresponding to two composites; and each form would be the primary root of the properties

belonging to its own composite and would subordinate them to itself. In this consists the character of first act. Meanwhile neither form would intrude upon the other composite, whose properties and acts would be governed by the other form. Nor must a substantial form be a first act comparatively with all acts existing in matter, but only comparatively with the acts belonging to that composite which the form constitutes.

21. To the confirmation: the later form would not come to a being in act precisely as in act, nor reduplicatively as complete. For it would not of itself presuppose the prior form, nor would it inform as subject the whole preceding composite. It would therefore come only to matter taken specifically, and would unite only matter to itself, while the other form behaved materially and accidentally preceded in the matter. The three Divine Persons would behave in this way if they simultaneously assumed the same humanity, as according to the Thomists they can; and consequently each would be the ultimate terminus of the nature, although one came after another. If it is said that matter once completed cannot be further completed, I distinguish: it cannot be more completed, nor completed several times, I deny this; it cannot be more completed, but can nevertheless be completed several times, that is, again and again through other complements supervening upon matter not as complete but as taken specifically, I grant this. Thus a place once occupied by one body cannot be occupied to a greater degree, but it can be occupied several times, that is, again and again by other bodies penetrating it by divine power.

22. Consequently, the later form would come to incomplete matter, not with negative incompletion, that is, implying negation of every substantial complement, but with precisive incompletion, insofar as it came to matter taken specifically, in which sense matter abstracts from every complement. The same also occurs in natural transmutation, for prior to the new form, matter is not presupposed with privation of the preceding form, but only with precision from that form, whose privation is understood as posterior to the new form, since it is a secondary effect of it.

23. It is objected 3º: from our hypothesis many absurdities would follow. 1º If the forms of wood and man were posited in the same matter, there would result a composite multiple in species by reason of the forms and yet numerically one, because according to Aristotle, 5, *Metaphysica* text 12, those things are numerically one whose matter is one. 2º It would truly be said, "Wood is man," and conversely, just as it is truly said, "The white is sweet," and conversely, when whiteness and sweetness concur in the same subject. At least the wood would be denominated "animated." 3º If the forms of a goat and stag were placed in one matter, there would be a goat-stag, which is

commonly adduced as an example of a chimerical being. 4º The same body could simultaneously be alive and dead if a soul were joined with a cadaveric form.

24. 5º Two rational souls could also be united to the same body. In that event one would impede the other in operating, and neither would be free; or, if both were free, one could merit Heaven and the other Hell. What then would become of the body? Add that they would not be numerically distinct, because numerical distinction is taken from matter. 6º If the forms of a wolf and sheep were given in one body, the wolf would wish to eat its own flesh because it would simultaneously be sheep's flesh, and the sheep, wishing to flee the wolf, would flee its own body. Many other combinations of this kind can be conceived. 7º Finally, it would follow that the same matter is simultaneously in two substantial species and simultaneously depends totally upon two forms although it needs neither of them both.

25. These difficulties nevertheless readily vanish. To 1º: there would then result a composite absolutely double both numerically and specifically, because the forms, as principal distinguishing principles, would prevail. At the same time it would result as numerically one not absolutely but in a qualified respect, or with the qualification "as regards matter." There is no greater absurdity in this than in fire being made from the matter of wood while being a composite numerically and specifically distinct from it. Aristotle, however, speaks according to the natural order and as regards us, or by the name "matter" he understands thisness, which is called something material in relation to specific essence.

26. To 2º, I deny the consequence, because since substantial composites directly signify matter and form, this proposition, "Wood is man," gives this sense: "The matter and form of wood are the matter and form of man," which would then be false. But concrete accidental terms, since they directly signify only the subject, can be mutually predicated when the subject is the same, because the proposition "The white is sweet" then has the wholly true sense: "What has whiteness is what has sweetness." In almost the same sense we truly say of Christ the Lord, "God is man, Man is God," because the terms "God" and "man," taken personally, refer to the *suppositum* and amount to "that which has Deity" and "that which has humanity." Nor in our hypothesis would there be one *suppositum* of wood and man, but simply two *suppositum*s, although identified inadequately and in a qualified respect; one of them would be a person, the other merely a *suppositum*. Nor would one be communicated to the other in the being of a whole; rather, both would agree only in the material part of subsistence, which is not contrary to the incommunicability proper to a *suppositum*. Nor would the wood be

denominated animated although its matter was animated, because ″wood is animated″ signifies that the whole wood is the subject of the soul or is constituted by the soul, which would by no means be true in the stated hypothesis. Which denominations of parts redound to the whole we stated in cap. 1, n. 25. It could therefore only truly be said that ″what is informed as wood is animated,″ and conversely, taking matter alone as directly signified.

27. To 3º: the goat-stag commonly adduced as an example of a chimerical being signifies one composite which confuses and identifies two really distinct essences into one. But in our hypothesis there would be two composites, goat and stag, with essences really distinct absolutely, because the forms in which their essential diversity consists would be really distinct. That they agree in matter, which of itself is indifferent to constituting various essences, is not absurd, just as it is not absurd that the same matter which is now a goat′s should afterward be a stag′s. To 4º: that body, taken for organized matter, would be living or animated and at the same time would be a corpse, or positively cadaveric, that is, it would receive the positive formal effect of the cadaveric form, because between the positive denominations ″animated″ and ″cadaveric″ there is only natural, not essential, opposition. It would not, however, be ″dead,″ because that denomination is constituted by privation of the soul, and this privation, since it is a negative and secondary effect of the cadaveric form, can be prevented by God.

28. To 5º: that mutual impediment in operating indeed proves a repugnance from the nature of the thing, but not in relation to the absolute power of God. For God can certainly bring it about that any soul, even without partnership with another, is united to a body without being free to operate, for example by withholding simultaneous concurrence, or by injuring or even entirely removing the organic accidents. Moreover, each soul would then be free as regards spiritual operations; one would only hinder the other as regards organic operations, for example if one wished to walk and the other did not. From this nothing follows except a certain natural violence. What is said concerning merit of Heaven or Hell is irrelevant, for even if our hypothesis is repugnant under God′s present providence, it is sufficient for us that it be possible in another order of things in which God could have refrained from decreeing resurrection of the body or destining it for Heaven or Hell. What is added concerning absence of numerical distinction is false. Otherwise the same soul could not successively inform several matters through nutrition, nor could the same matter successively receive several souls, even by divine power. Souls

therefore are numerically distinguished from one another through their thisnesses; their distinction is not taken from matter except as regards us.

29. To 6º: a wolf biting into the sheep's flesh would perceive that it was its own and would immediately abstain; and the sheep, desiring to flee that wolf, would miserably be hindered and unable to do so. But what follows from this except a naturally violent state? Add that God could introduce the form of a sheep, like any other form, into matter without the organs and accidents naturally necessary. Then neither would the sheep desire anything nor would the wolf recognize the sheep. Perhaps also the organizations of different animals are essentially incompatible in the same matter by reason of figure.

30. To 7º: matter would "identically" be only in one incomplete species of first subject. But not "identically," rather "constitutively," it would simultaneously be in two complete species without absurdity, just as it can be successively in several. The dependence of matter upon form—which is not *a priori* but *a posteriori*—can be taken either for the need of matter or for the actual satisfaction of that need. If it is taken for the need, matter depends on no determinate form but on some form vaguely. If it is taken for satisfaction, matter in our case would simultaneously depend upon both forms, not after the manner of one satisfaction but after the manner of a double actual satisfaction, and this without absurdity, just as if one gives two loaves simultaneously to a hungry man who needs one loaf, both satisfy him.

31. It should be noted here, to forestall other absurdities, that if the matter of a man and a horse were the same, the proposition "Man is inadequately a horse" is not to be granted without distinction. For it can signify that man is a part of the horse, or conversely, as when it is said, "The soul is inadequately man." It must therefore be distinguished thus: inadequately, with inadequation signifying identity of matter alone, I grant it; with another kind of inadequation, I deny it. Likewise, this proposition, "Peter can inadequately be a thousand men," or "can inadequately be a fish, tree, stone, fire, etc.," is true in some sense, because into Peter's matter there can simultaneously be introduced—as they can successively—a thousand rational souls, and also forms of fish, tree, etc. But first, "inadequately" must always be distinguished as just explained. Second, one must consider whether the discussion concerns men—and understand the same of fish, tree, and other things—who are presupposed to have distinct matters. In that case the proposition is false, because such men are constituted by their individual matters, with which Peter's matter cannot be identified. And if their souls were transferred to Peter's matter, they would no longer be entirely the same individual men, but others as regards matter. Therefore

the stated proposition is true only of individual men whom God knows in the state of possibility as constituted by Peter's matter. Hence it is false to say that Peter can inadequately be any man whatsoever, any fish whatsoever, any tree whatsoever, etc.

32. It is objected 4º: the potency of matter does not extend beyond its need. But God cannot bring it about that matter simultaneously needs two forms. Therefore neither can he bring it about that it has potency for two forms simultaneously. Confirmation 1º: a form which matter does not need in order to exist completely and simply in the substantial genus is not a substantial form. Since, therefore, matter needs only one form, the others besides one will be accidental. Confirmation 2º: an active power naturally incapable of some effect cannot by divine power be made capable of it unless new power is superadded to it. Therefore likewise a receptive potency naturally incapable of several forms will not be made capable unless a new receptive potency is added; and thus in our case new matter will have to be added, which destroys the hypothesis of the question. At least this addition will be necessary if several educed forms are joined, for in relation to educed forms matter exercises the office of material and sustaining cause, which cannot simultaneously cause two adequate effects, since either exhausts the whole power of sustaining. Confirmation 3º: if matter can receive several forms, it will be able to receive infinitely many. Therefore it has an infinite potency. Confirmation 4º: one form is naturally incapable of being joined with another. Therefore, since it identifies this incapacity with itself, it will always and under every hypothesis be incapable.

33. I answer to the objection by denying the major premise, for matter does not need a form of a determinate species, for example an equine soul, although its potency extends to it. Nor, while under the form of water, does it need heat, which nevertheless it receives. The need of matter, therefore, is the measure only of its effective innate appetite. But this appetite is not the measure of receptive potency, as we have noted more than once elsewhere. This is especially true of passive obediential potency, as is clear in a soul receiving supernatural gifts without natural need or innate appetite.

34. To confirmation 1º, I deny the antecedent, for otherwise neither the rational soul nor any other form according to its specific or individual grade would be substantial. A form, therefore, will be substantial provided that of itself it is capable of satisfying the need and incompletion of matter in the genus of substance, even if it is received alone. To 2º, I deny the consequence. For if the parity held, just as our soul needs an addition of power in order to produce supernatural acts, so it would need an addition of passive potency in order to receive them, as also in order to receive Grace

and infused habits. Active power, therefore, since it must precontain its effect and equal or exceed it in perfection, cannot be made capable beyond its natural powers without an addition of power. But receptive potency need neither precontain the act which it receives nor be commensurate with its perfection, and consequently it need not grow or be increased according to the increase of acts.

35. Hence, although it is sufficient for our opinion that several created forms, or one educed and others created, can be joined in the same matter, nevertheless, whatever Fr. Oviedo may say, we admit that several educed forms can be joined. For the material cause is not wearied or exhausted through sustaining causality. An evident indication of this is that it can naturally cause, and adequately in its own genus, an effect superior to itself and much more perfect, for example when matter materially causes the soul of a horse; whereas nothing similar can occur in active power or efficient cause. Add that otherwise the passive potency of the soul or Angel would be wearied and fatigued while receiving more and more grades of Grace, which indeed according to the common opinion, including that of the Thomists, is produced by eduction. It may be said: therefore one educed form is not an adequate effect of matter as material cause. I distinguish: with adequation of sufficiency, I deny it; with adequation of exhaustion, I grant it.

36. To 3º, I grant the antecedent concerning infinitely many syncategorematically, indeed also categorematically if an actual infinite is not otherwise repugnant; and I distinguish the consequence: matter has an infinite potency in perfection, I deny it; infinite in vacancy from forms, I grant the consequence. This means nothing other than that matter is deprived of infinitely many forms and of itself does not resist union with them even when taken simultaneously. It may be said: this vacancy is not mere lack but is proper to a positive subject and signifies perfection. Therefore it is founded in perfection. Therefore infinite vacancy argues infinite perfection. I deny this final consequence. For although some perfection is necessary to ground privative vacancy, it need not increase according to the measure of that vacancy, notwithstanding a certain maxim to be discussed below in n. 44. Meanwhile I press the point from the receptive potency of a soul or Angel for greater and greater Grace without end. I add that St. Thomas, *De veritate* q. 29, a. 3, ad 3, recognizes an infinite obediential receptive potency in a creature when he says that "such capacity cannot be filled, because whatever God does with the creature, it still remains in potency to receive from God." Certainly, that a greater receptive potency does not by the terms argue greater perfection is clear in celestial matter, which according to the Thomists is limited to one species of form

and nevertheless exceeds sublunary matter in perfection, although the potency of the latter extends to infinitely many forms, at least successively or divisively.

37. To 4°, I distinguish the consequence: under every hypothesis it will be naturally incapable, I grant it, for it will always be true that it cannot naturally be joined with another; it will be incapable obedentially, or in relation to God's absolute dominion, I deny the consequence, because it never had this incapacity. Thus an accident under every hypothesis is naturally incapable of existing without a subject and identifies this incapacity with itself, yet by divine power it exists without a subject in the Eucharist. It should nevertheless be noted that the natural potency and obediential potency of matter are not distinguished subjectively and intrinsically, since each is the whole entity of matter. They are distinguished only extrinsically and terminatively, insofar as the same potency, when compared with forms as producible by a natural agent, is called natural, but when compared with forms as producible by a supernatural agent, is called obediential.

38. Hence, in the hypothesis of the question, both forms would be received in a potency of matter natural by intrinsic and entitative naturality. But because extrinsic naturality would be lacking, since neither form as in companionship with the other would be producible by a natural agent, the potency of matter in those circumstances would therefore absolutely be called obediential. If it is asked whether the productive and conserving actions of both forms together would be natural, I answer that they would be intrinsically natural and natural as regards substance, namely the same actions by which the forms could separately be produced naturally. For if the forms themselves can be joined by divine power, why not the actions also? They would nevertheless be extrinsically supernatural, or supernatural as regards mode, by a denomination derived from God's supernatural decree, from which here and now they would proceed beyond or contrary to exigency. See what we said in a similar matter, disp. 3, cap. 5.

Corollary on the Potency of a Form to Inform Several Matters.

39. The common opinion of our authors consequently holds that one form can by divine power inform two or more matters naturally adequate to it, for example, the same rational soul can inform two bodies, either in different places if the soul is bilocated, or in the same place if the bodies penetrate one another. This is proved briefly against the Thomists and the

Scotist Mastrius. First, by parity with matter, which can be simultaneously informed by several forms, as has thus far been proved. Second, by parity with a body, which can by divine power exist simultaneously in several adequate places, as Mastrius grants with the other Scotists. Third, because one form would inform several matters by the very fact that it was united to several. But no essential repugnance appears in its being united to several, for the form would expend no active powers in causing the unions, which could be produced by God alone.

40. Mastrius objects: if a form can simultaneously inform several matters, it can inform infinitely many; therefore it will be infinitely perfect. The consequence is proved 1º: because the power of informing signifies perfection, and the farther it extends the more perfect it is. Thus the rational soul is judged more perfect than other forms because the same soul can simultaneously inform several parts of the body. 2º Because a form simultaneously completing infinitely many matters would supply the place of infinitely many forms. Therefore it would be equivalent in perfection to infinitely many forms. Confirmation: a new informing is a new causality and a new exercise of power in the genus of formal cause. Therefore it requires a new power of informing.

41. I answer to the objection by denying the consequence. To the 1º proof: there is a manifest counterexample in a multilocated body. For the power of existing in place signifies perfection, and the farther it extends the more perfect it is. Thus a more ample place corresponds to an Angel than to a rational soul, and to the latter a more ample place than to the soul of a mouse. Yet according to Mastrius the same body can by divine power exist simultaneously in infinitely many places, if an actual infinite is not otherwise repugnant. Therefore the power of informing is more perfect the farther it extends by natural due or exigency, because in this sense it extends farther precisely because it is fecund in more diverse operations. But it is not more perfect the farther it extends contrary to or beyond what is due, namely in obedience to God's absolute power. Indeed, in this sense it must be denied that the power of one form extends farther than that of others, because any form can extend to infinitely many matters, that is, to no number so great that there cannot be more.

42. To 2º: similarly, a body existing in infinitely many places would supply the place of infinitely many bodies, and matter receiving infinitely many forms, as it can according to Mastrius, would supply the place of infinitely many matters; yet infinity of perfection does not therefore follow. Hence I distinguish the antecedent: it would supply the place of infinitely many forms in substantially completing matters, I grant it, for all the

matters would be as truly completed as if they received an equal number of forms; in constituting formally distinct composites and in rooting their proper properties and operations, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. Or I distinguish the consequence: it would be equivalent in the generic perfection of substantial form, I grant it; in specific or individual perfection, I deny the consequence. To be equivalent in generic perfection precisely signifies that the generic character of substantial complement is as truly participated by one form as by infinitely many. Thus a mouse is equivalent to man in the generic perfection of animal, without therefore being equivalent in specific perfection.

43. To the confirmation: the counterexample from a multilocated body returns, since its new presence is a new exercise of the power of occupying place; likewise from matter receiving many forms which it materially causes. Second, I deny that a new power is required in a form in order that it inform several matters, not by natural due but by obedience. Causality in the genus of formal cause is not active, since it consists in union, which instead proceeds actively from the generator and in our hypothesis could proceed from God alone. It is only a causality purely communicative of the entity of the form, both to matter and to the composite. This kind of causality does not expend powers, and therefore can be multiplied without addition of power. It may be said: a form perfects matter and gives perfection to it. Therefore, in order to give perfection to several matters, it must possess more perfection. I distinguish the antecedent: it gives a perfection indistinct from the entity of the form, I grant it; distinct from the form itself, I deny the antecedent, and I distinguish the consequence in the same sense. A form gives perfection insofar as it gives itself. But it can give itself to several with multiplication only of the giving, or union.

44. It may again be said: a form, as compared with one matter, signifies perfection. Therefore, as compared with several, it signifies greater perfection, according to the maxim, ″as the simple is to the simple, so the more is to the more.″ I deny the consequence and press the point from matter compared with forms and a body compared with places. That maxim is true in an efficient cause and in a formal cause in relation to a more intense effect, or an effect really multiple insofar as it is constituted by the form. In other cases it often fails, as is clear in matter and in a locatable body, and also in the following examples. The receptive potency of our soul or an Angel, as compared with one grade of Grace, signifies perfection; therefore, as compared with several or infinitely many, it will signify infinite perfection. Humanity, as terminable by finite subsistence, signifies perfection; therefore, as terminable by infinite subsistence, it will signify

infinite perfection. An act of obedience, in order to be finitely meritorious, requires perfection in the being of an act; therefore, in order to be infinitely meritorious, as it is in Christ, it will require infinite perfection in the being of an act. I omit other examples.

45. Three points should be noted here. 1º A form existing in several matters would not necessarily be educed from all of them. It could be produced by creation, or educed from one matter and merely united to the others. But even if it were educed from all of them and simultaneously had several total causes in the sustaining genus, no contradiction would follow, as we shall show among active causes, Treatise 2. 2º In our hypothesis, even by divine power, a form could not without an addition of power actively cause as many collections of operations and properties connatural to itself as the number of matters it simultaneously informed. For it is certain that an active cause needs an accession of power in order to act beyond its natural powers. Otherwise one form would be equivalent to several forms in fecundity, and consequently in perfection. Therefore it would exercise its active power only in one matter designated by God. Nevertheless each matter would have its own quantity and other accidents which precede the form and are not rooted by it except in the genus of final cause.

46. 3º In the same hypothesis there would result a composite one as regards form and multiple as regards matter and union. And because form is the principal quiddity of the composite, it would be called more one than multiple, or one "absolutely" and multiple "in a qualified respect," or "with qualification." If it is inferred with Mastrius that therefore the same man already existing could be generated again, namely if his soul were by divine power united to another body, I distinguish the consequence: generated again simply, I deny it, for he would not pass from non-being simply to being simply, since he already existed simply by virtue of the union of the soul with one body; generated again in a qualified respect, I grant the consequence, for in this sense a man is also produced again when he is nourished. Or distinguish thus: the same man could be generated again insofar as he is the same, I deny it; insofar as he is distinguished from himself as pre-existing, I grant the consequence.

DISPUTATION VI.
ON THE UNION OF MATTER AND FORM IN THE SUBSTANTIAL COMPOSITE.

Having explained the intrinsic principles of a natural body in its completed state, since they do not constitute the composite unless they are united, their union must now be explained. In general, "union" is any connection or bond between extremes. But if the union is immediate and awaits no further determination, in which sense it is now taken, it can be defined generally as "the formal and ultimate determination of adequately distinct things so that they constitute one." This definition can readily be adapted, with due proportion, to the various kinds of unions mentioned, among others, by Fr. Ulloa, disp. 1, Physic. Speculat., c. 6. But it altogether applies to "essential physical union," by which name is chiefly understood that which connects substantial act and potency so as to constitute one essence, or complete nature, of a natural body, which we call a "substantial composite." This union, which alone belongs to the present subject, can be specially defined as "the formal and ultimate determination of substantial act and potency so that they physically constitute one essence of a natural body." Various questions arise concerning this union, the principal ones of which we shall now discuss.

CHAPTER I.
Whether Union Is Really Distinguished from Matter and Form, and in What It Consists.

1. The Nominalists deny that union is really distinguished from matter and form, as do most Thomists very vigorously, together with a few of our own authors. Consequently, all these deny that union consists in a mode superadded to the extremes. But almost all our Scotists, with the Excellent Doctor, commonly affirm this according to Pontius and Mastrius, as do the more recent Thomists Godoy, Aguirre, the Carmelite Complutenses, and Palancus, who cite other Thomists. Consequently, all these assert that union consists in a modal entity really distinct from the extremes: "really," that is, on the side of the thing, or prior to the operation of the mind, whatever may be the case as to whether the distinction between a mode and a thing should be called absolutely real, which is a question about terminology.

Union Is Really Distinguished from Matter and Form.

2. This assertion is proved by a common argument, but one hitherto unsolved. Matter and form can really be separated from union. But separability, even when not mutual, is an evident sign of real distinction. Therefore matter and form are really distinguished from union. The consequence is legitimate, and the major premise is manifestly evident in the matter and form of any man who has died, which in fact exist without union with one another. Indeed, since any material form can be preserved by God outside matter by the same, or stronger, reason by which the accidents are preserved in the Eucharist, the matter and form of any substantial composite can exist separated from union. The minor premise seems unshaken, both from universal agreement and from evident reason. For suppose that A can exist without B, although not conversely, which is non-mutual separability. Then, if A and B are not distinguished but are the very same thing, it follows that A, which can exist without B, can exist without itself, and thus can simultaneously exist and not exist, contrary to the most evident principle: "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be."

3. Take this same argument under other forms. 1º Whatever is really indistinct from Peter's matter and form now exists. But their union does not now exist. Therefore such union is not really indistinct from them. The

syllogism is in Baroco, and it seems that nothing in it can be denied. 2º Every case in which a man's matter and form remain is a case in which whatever is really the same as they are remains; otherwise, in some case a man's matter and form would remain without themselves. Therefore, if union is really the same as such matter and form, it remains in every case in which they themselves remain. Therefore union remains in the case of death. But this is plainly false. Therefore so also is that from which it follows. 3º If union is not distinguished from the pair of entities constituted by Peter's matter and form, this union and this pair are the same. But this pair now exists, and the union does not exist. Therefore the same thing now exists and does not exist.

4. 4º It is contradictory for that to cease to be whose whole entity, and no constitutive element or part of whose entity, ceases to be; otherwise that would cease to be of which nothing ceases to be. But this would occur if union were identified with matter and form alone. For neither the whole entity nor any part of the entity of these ceases to be in the death of a man, although the union does cease to be. 5º A rational soul and matter united are a man; a rational soul and matter not united are not a man. But a man differs from a non-man in some reality and entity, as is self-evident. Therefore a rational soul and matter united differ from those same things not united in some reality and entity. But they do not differ in their own entities, as is evident. Therefore they differ in another entity besides their own. But they differ only in the union. Therefore union is another entity besides the entities of the soul and matter.

5. 6º The absence of a man is the absence of a positive being, for who could doubt it? But at death there is the absence of a man. Therefore there is then the absence of some positive being, or, what comes to the same thing, there is a non-being, a defect of being, the contradictory of being. Therefore at that time something of the man's positive entity is lacking from the nature of things, unless one wishes two contradictories to be given simultaneously, namely the entity and its absence. But the entities of matter and form are not lacking. Therefore another positive entity distinct from these is lacking. But nothing is lacking except the union. Therefore the union is an entity distinct from the entities of matter and form.

6. But the one solution of our opponents is that union, taken entitatively, is altogether identified with matter and form; whereas, taken denominatively, or insofar as it denominates matter and form "united," it implies something else, not as an intrinsic constitutive element of the union or composite, but as an extrinsic connotate, or a condition necessarily required for that denomination to result, such that this denomination

cannot stand when that connotate is lacking. Hence they infer that in the death of a man union ceases to be, not with respect to its entity, but with respect to its denomination; and that matter and form are separated from union taken denominatively, but not from union taken entitatively. Separability with respect to denomination, however, does not always, they say, prove a real distinction. The same thing is signified by other expressions according to which union ceases to be, not materially, with respect to what is implicit, with respect to what is direct, but only with respect to formality, exercise, explication, connotation, and what is oblique. As for the connotate required by the denomination of union, some say that it is the intimate presence of matter and form in the same place; others, the dispositions of matter toward form; others, the divine decree concerning the existence of the composite; others, the generative action.

7. This is precisely the doctrine of the Connotators, which we sufficiently rejected in general in Logic where we treated relation. Hence its refutation as applied to the present subject can readily be obtained from there. But lest we seem to say nothing here, it is rejected, 1º because union, taken with respect to denomination, and add, if desired, with respect to formality, exercise, explication, etc., either is identified, at least inadequately, with something really distinct from the entities of matter and form, or it is not. If the first is said, then union, taken with respect to denomination, is really distinguished from those entities, at least inadequately, which suffices for our assertion. For we are now disputing about union only insofar as it is the ultimate determination and actual exercise of uniting, or insofar as it actually denominates and renders matter and form united; nor is anything being asked except a true real distinction, whether adequate or inadequate. If the second is said, our argument returns with the same force under all the formulas we gave, provided that wherever in them the word "union" or "united" occurs, one adds "with respect to denomination." Try it, I ask, and one will find the argument entirely unsolved.

8. It is rejected, 2º: union, taken with respect to denomination, is not pure nothing, nor is it a fantastic, intentional, or vocal denomination; rather, it is undoubtedly a positive physical denomination existing on the side of the thing, even when no one thinks or speaks. It is also a denomination intrinsically and essentially included in the composite, for example in a man; for the physical essence of a man does not include matter and form in any state whatever, but as actually united. These things are certain to all. Therefore, for union to cease with respect to denomination is for something positive, physical, existing on the side of the thing, and included in the essence of man to cease, and consequently not a mere extrinsic connotate.

But it is not the entities of matter and form that cease. Therefore something distinct from these, which is not a pure connotate, ceases.

9. It is rejected, 3º: union with respect to denomination, or insofar as actually denominating, is a true reality. Otherwise a man would differ in no reality from a non-man, namely from the pair of entities constituted by matter and form not united, for this is a non-man; yet he differs from it only in union insofar as denominating. I now ask whether that reality is adequately distinguished from the connotate one assigns. If one affirms this, as the Connotators commonly seem to affirm, I ask again whether, when the connotate ceases, for example at the death of a man, some reality adequately distinct from such a connotate ceases. If one affirms this, let it be assigned what that reality is, for the reality of matter and form does not cease. If one denies it, then when the connotate ceases, union still remains insofar as actually denominating, since union, so taken, is one of the realities adequately distinct from the connotate. Therefore the man remains.

10. If for this reason one says that union insofar as denominating is not adequately distinguished from the connotate, but includes it and is constituted by it obliquely, as M. Bayona concedes here, q. 6, ed. 2, I infer: therefore union as denominating is already really distinguished, at least inadequately, from matter and form. This is evident, because union as denominating is truly constituted from something really distinct from matter and form, namely from that connotate, and consequently is really identified with it, at least inadequately. But this cannot stand unless union as denominating is really distinguished from matter and form, at least inadequately.

11. Moreover, a constitutive element included obliquely truly constitutes and is truly identified inadequately with the constituted thing, as is evident in accidental concretes, one part of which, whether subject or form, constitutes only obliquely and yet truly constitutes. For example, this denomination, "adoptive son of God," is truly constituted from grace and a rational creature, nor can it be said to be adequately identified with only one of these constitutive elements; and yet one of them is implied only obliquely. But if one contends that an oblique constitutive element does not truly and intrinsically constitute, nor is inadequately identified with the constituted thing, then the whole reality of union as denominating is adequately distinguished from the connotate, and the refutation of no. 9 returns.

12. Furthermore, I ask whether through the absence of the connotate union with respect to denomination ceases formally, or only inferentially. If formally, then the connotate is an intrinsic constitutive element of union insofar as denominating, or is its whole reality. For no thing ceases formally

except through the absence of its whole reality or of some intrinsic constitutive element, as is known. If only inferentially, then the absence of the connotate entails the absence of another reality distinct from the connotate. Say, then, what that reality is. Or otherwise: the absence of the connotate either is the formal absence itself of union insofar as denominating, or it is not. If it is, then the same formal absence, or the same non-being and the same non-entity, corresponds to union and to the connotate. Therefore the being and entity of both are the same. If it is not, then when union insofar as denominating ceases, beyond the absence of the connotate there is another absence, or another non-entity. Therefore there is the defect of another entity.

13. It is rejected, 4º: by the same doctrine of the solution and the same recourse to an extrinsic connotate, all modes can be eliminated from the nature of things, for example local presence, action, passion, and especially the Thomistic mode of relation, by identifying the relation with the foundation alone connoting the term. Since, nevertheless, the Thomists acknowledge these modes as distinct on the side of the thing from absolute things, they employ such doctrine rather inconsistently in the present matter. The Connotators proceed more consistently, since they deny all modes generally. Nevertheless they can be pressed, because many other constitutive elements of things, however rightly posited, would similarly have to be denied. For what prevents man, for example, from being identified with the soul alone connoting present matter as a pure extrinsic connotate? And what prevents one from saying that at the death of a man the soul does not cease with respect to entity, but only with respect to the denomination "man," and with respect to the other denominations included in man, which cease through the absence of the connotate alone?

14. Likewise, what prevents one from positing in all composites a form of one entitative species which, according to the variation merely of an extrinsic connotate, now gives the denomination "horse," now "dog," now "tree," now "gold," now "stone," etc.? Indeed, what prevents one from denying substantial form with the Atomists and constituting the whole variety of composites by matter alone, or by atoms of the same entitative species, with mere variation of combination, without the combination adding anything entitative? If a man differs in no entity from a non-man, which, as we have seen, follows from the opinion denying a distinct union, why should a horse differ in any entity from a dog, or from a tree, or from a stone?

15. Perhaps, on behalf of the Thomists, one will attempt to establish a disparity from the Complutensian College or M. Bayona, and will say that a

new denomination requires a new form, or a new constitutive element, only when it is a primary denomination and exceeds the power and proportion of the preexisting thing, but not when it is a secondary denomination and does not exceed the proportion and power of the preexisting thing, as happens with the denomination "united" in respect of matter and form. But against this, 1º because, whatever denomination one proposes to me, I shall readily say that it is not primary and does not exceed the power and proportion of the preexisting thing, and I shall defend this from one's own doctrine. I shall say, for example, that the denomination "wolf" is not primary with respect to the form of a dog, and that in this form there is the power and proportion to denominate "wolf," provided that a new extrinsic connotate is added. On what basis will this be refuted? Against it, 2º the denomination "man" is undoubtedly primary and most principal. Therefore, besides matter and form, suppose them preexisting, it requires a new constitutive element. But it requires nothing except union.

16. Against it, 3º why, for example, according to the Thomists, must existence be distinguished from created essence more than union from the extremes? Is it because "to exist" is contingent and separable from essence? But "to be united" behaves similarly with respect to the matter and form of a man. Is it because, from the terms themselves, "to exist" is a primary denomination of existence? But likewise, from the terms themselves, "to be united" is a primary denomination of union, for union is related to "to be united" as existence to "to exist." Is it because the extremes have a proportion and power toward union? But why is the same not said of created essence, which of itself is most apt for existence, and, once produced, is connected with existence much more than the extremes are with union? Is it because it belongs to God alone to identify His being with Himself? I distinguish: to identify His being with Himself without need of a connotate for the exercise of being, I grant; with need of a connotate, that is, a productive action, for the exercise of being, I deny. By what reason will one contradict me?

The Foregoing Union Consists in a Mode Really Superadded to the Extremes.

17. This assertion is proved, 1º, because union, first of all, does not consist in the entities of matter and form alone, as has been proved. Secondly, it does not consist in any of the connotates listed in no. 6. Since, therefore, no other entity can probably be called upon to fulfill the office of uniting, it remains that union consists in a mode really superadded to the

extremes. Nothing remains to be proved here except that union does not consist in any of the connotates listed in no. 6. This, however, is commonly supposed by our opponents, who call those connotates conditions for union to exist with respect to exercise, but do not wish union to be intrinsically constituted by them or to consist in them. But it is proved further by going through them individually.

18. First, union does not consist in local penetration, by which the form is present to matter in the same place. For one reason, this presence, since it is an accident, cannot intrinsically constitute a man, whereas union intrinsically constitutes him, since when union alone ceases, although the rest remains, the man formally ceases. For another reason, that presence can stand without union being given. For two men can by divine power penetrate one another without the soul of one being united to the body of the other. Otherwise the soul of Christ at His birth, at His resurrection, and on entering the upper room with the doors closed would have been united to the matter of the virginal enclosure, the stone of the tomb, and the door of the upper room. Add that the three divine Persons are equally present to the humanity of Christ, yet only the second is united to it. Indeed, by immensity they are most present to all human natures without being united to them.

19. Secondly, union does not consist in the dispositions of matter toward form. For one reason, these likewise cannot intrinsically constitute a man, since they are accidents. For another, they too can stand without the union standing, for God can separate the soul from the body without removing any disposition. He can likewise make two men penetrate each other without the soul of one being united to the body of the other, although such a body is equally disposed toward any soul of the same species. The humanity of Christ also is united to the Word alone, although it is equally disposed toward the other divine Persons. Furthermore, neither does union consist in the divine decree concerning the existence of the composite. Otherwise it would follow that Peter or a horse is intrinsically constituted by something divine and therefore is not a purely created being, but partly uncreated. Moreover, by the same right it could be said that the action of a creature, passion, location, motion, indeed heat, whiteness, etc., consist in a decree of God. Finally, that decree wills matter and form to be united. Therefore it regards union as object or term. Therefore it is not the union itself.

20. Finally, as regards the generative action of the composite, if union consists in it, it already consists in a mode, for no one denies that action is a mode, except perhaps some rigid Connotator. And indeed it is probable that the eduction of a material form is identified with its union with matter, of which below. Nevertheless, that action, as posited by the Thomists, is not

the union itself. For the generative action, for example of a man, according to the Thomists is an accidental mode and therefore cannot enter into the constitution of a man. According to them it is also not so much union as uniting, or the production of union; nor does it unite soul and matter formally, but efficiently, and consequently regards union as a term distinct from itself. Hence both our assertions are usually proved against the Thomists. For the generation of a man, since it is a true production of a man, produces something entitative in the man. But it does not produce the matter or form, because neither is produced by generation but by creation. Therefore it produces an entity distinct from matter and form, which can be nothing other than the mode of union. Certainly this generation is the production of the man. What, then, does it produce in the man?

21. One will say, 1º: it produces the whole man as man. Against this: does man as man imply anything distinct from the entities of matter and form? If one denies it, then, since generation does not produce these entities, it does not produce man as man. If one affirms it, what is that something except the mode of union? One will say, 2º: the generation of a man is not the production of an entity, but is an action uniting the parts, or communicating form to matter. Against this: the generation of a man is the true production of a man, which makes him pass from non-being to being. But how can this transition be given without a new entity? Against it again: the generation of a man is unitive and communicative in such a way that, according to the Thomists, it is not formally union and communication, but efficiently so. Therefore it is the production of formal union or communication. But it is not the production of the man's matter or form. Therefore formal union is distinguished from these.

22. One will say, 3º: it is the production of matter and form, not according to themselves, but with respect to simultaneity, because it makes matter and form be together and produces the form insofar as it is in matter. Against this: that "simultaneity," that "being together," that "insofar as it is in," does not signify mere simultaneity of time and place. For one reason, this simultaneity, being accidental, does not enter the essence of a man. For another, matter and form can stand with this simultaneity and yet not be united, as we showed above. What, then, does it signify besides matter and form truly existing according to themselves? For if it signifies nothing else, that production produces nothing.

23. It is proved, 2º, because here the necessity of admitting a superadded mode presses, if anywhere it does. A mode is judged necessary when absolute things are indifferent to some office and can exist without fulfilling it, while nothing else is lacking to them except ultimate determination or

actual exercise. Thus the mode of action is admitted because cause and effect can exist without the effect arising from such a cause. Thus also the mode of location or presence is admitted because the thing and place A can exist without the thing existing in place A. But matter and form can exist without being united and constituting the composite, and nothing is lacking to them except ultimate determination and actual exercise. Therefore, etc.

CHAPTER II.
Objections Are Solved.

1. It is objected, 1º: form is immediately united to matter. Therefore it is not united through a distinct intervening union. The antecedent is proved, 1º, because Aristotle and St. Thomas expressly say so. 2º Because form immediately informs or actuates matter, since through itself it is immediately the act of matter. But to inform matter is to be united to it. Therefore. 3º Because form and matter through themselves are proportioned as act and potency and naturally tend to union with one another.

2. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: immediately "as that which," I grant; immediately "as that by which," or with the immediacy of the actual exercise of uniting, I deny the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: not through a union which properly stands between them, I grant; which stands between them only improperly and abusively, I deny the consequence. Form is united to matter immediately "as that which," because it is that which is denominated and rendered immediately united. For the union which we posit is the formal and immediate union of form with matter. Therefore, when it affects the form, it gives the form its quasi-formal effect, which is the denomination "formally and immediately united with matter." Understand the same of matter with respect to form. Nevertheless form is not united immediately "as that by which," or with the immediacy of actual exercise, because it does not identify this exercise with itself.

3. Nor does the union which we establish properly stand between them. For only that is said properly to stand between things which prevents the extremes from immediately touching one another and joins them only to itself on either side, that is, one on one side and the other on the other, as mortar stands between stones; or that which prevents the extremes from immediately affecting one another and is not the formal union of both, but merely terminates in itself the union of each, in the way whiteness is united to matter through quantity. But none of these belongs to a union which is the pure exercise of uniting. Rather, it is the immediate and intimate contact of the extremes with one another, their immediate affection, and their

formal union. Nevertheless it is improperly and abusively said to stand between them because we speak as we apprehend, and we do not apprehend union through proper species but after the manner of an intervening thing, for example mortar or bitumen, just as we apprehend an angel after the likeness of a winged youth. For the same reason united parts are called "extremes." Therefore, speaking properly, form is united to matter as immediately as the union itself is, because although union is united with matter essentially, and therefore more inseparably than form, each altogether excludes a properly so-called medium.

4. This entire doctrine will become clearer from examples of action, location, relation, and similar modes. Since action is added merely as the formal exercise of producing, it does not prevent the cause from immediately producing the effect and the effect from being immediately produced by the cause. For the same reason location does not remove immediacy between body and place, and the Thomistic mode of relation allows the foundation to be immediately referred to the term.

5. Hence the proofs of the antecedent in no. 1 present no difficulty. To 1º, with Aristotle and St. Thomas we grant a properly so-called immediacy. To 2º, form informs and actuates matter immediately "as that which," and after the manner of an informing act, but not immediately "as that by which," or after the manner of formal information and actuation; just as an active cause immediately acts after the manner of an active power, not after the manner of an action. To 3º, all that proportion and appetite does not render matter and form ultimately and formally determined to be united, since they can exist without union. Therefore it does not remove the necessity of a distinct union by which they are immediately united, just as the proportion and appetite of a cause toward producing does not remove the necessity of action.

6. But, in order to explain or reject certain expressions, observe the following. 1º Union itself, since it is essentially affixed to the extremes, is also "that which" is united. Nevertheless it is not said without qualification to "be united as that which," because this expression signifies that which is united after the manner of an absolute entity, or at least that which is united not in order that it may unite extremes distinct from itself, but is united as it were for its own sake. But that which is united after the manner of an exercise by which other things are united is said only to "be united as that by which." Thus location is said to be located "as that by which," although it is also "that which" is in the place. For the same reason action is said to cause, not "as that which," but "as that by which." If, however, one wishes to speak otherwise, I have no objection, provided it is clear that the union we posit is

the modal and ultimate determination by which matter and form are rendered immediately united.

7. 2º Union also, by reason of its slight entity, actuates and informs matter. Nevertheless it is not called an act but actuation, not a form but information, just as action is not called a cause but causality, although it too, according to its measure, makes the effect exist. Yet lest there be a dispute about the word, if someone contends that union is a form and an act, distinguish thus: after the manner of the information and actuation of another form, I grant; otherwise, I deny. But it must altogether be denied that union actuates and changes matter prior to, and more immediately than, the form whose union it is. For the existence of the union is the same as rendering the form immediately actuating and changing the subject; in this consists the essence of union. Thus location is not in place prior to or more immediately than the body, nor does action give being to the effect prior to or more immediately than the cause.

8. 3º Union can be called the "formal reason" by which the form informs, if by "formal reason" is understood the ultimate and formal determination of the form toward informing. But not if by that name is understood the power or informative potency of the form; for in that sense the "formal reason" of informing is not distinguished from the form itself. Hence it is clear in what way the union of the soul with the body can, or cannot, be called the "formal reason" of vivifying; likewise the action of an active cause the "formal reason" of producing, or the location of a body the "formal reason" of occupying a place. One may also say that union is not the formal reason by which the extremes are unible; it is, however, the formal reason by which the extremes are actually united. Whether it is the formal reason by which the extremes are actually one, we shall say immediately.

9. It is objected, 2º: if a distinct union were given, a man, and understand the same of any other composite, would be formally one through that union, since by reason of it the extremes are undivided, and unity is indivision. But the falsity of this consequence is evident from the fact that a man is formally one through that by which he is formally a being, since unity is a property of being. Yet a man is formally a being through matter and form, not through modal union; otherwise he would be a modal being.

10. The common solution distinguishes two kinds of unity in composite things. One is unity of composition, which consists in the conjunction of parts and denies the division of one part from another. This unity is not transcendental because it presupposes parts and consequently does not belong to every being. The other is the unity of the indivision of a being into several things such as itself, for example of a man into several men or of an

angel into several angels. This is transcendental unity and an attribute of being as such, because it is found in every being. To the objection, therefore, it is answered that by union a man is rendered formally one by unity of composition, but not by transcendental unity; for a man has this not from union alone but from his whole essence, just as from his whole essence he has being as a being.

11. Perhaps it can be said better that "one," or "unity," for these terms differ only in their manner of signifying, as "being" and "entity," formally expresses not indivision alone, but at the same time the positive entity itself. The objection itself supposes this when it says that a man is formally one through that by which he is formally a being. Otherwise, since indivision is a mere negation, as is commonly said, unity would be a merely negative attribute. See Fr. Suárez, d. 4, Met. s. 2. One, therefore, formally signifies "undivided being." Thus a man is rendered formally one by his whole entity, namely matter, form, and union, and in addition by indivision. But this indivision excludes not only the division of the soul from matter, but also the division both of the soul and of matter within themselves. Therefore it proceeds not only from modal union but also from the simplicity of the soul and the unity of matter. Hence it must be denied that a man is rendered formally one or undivided by union alone, although union is the ultimate determinant.

12. The reason why a man is not denominated a "modal being" from the mode of union which he includes must be taken from the rule given disp. preceding, c. 1, n. 25. Namely, that denomination signifies an entity essentially affixed to another, or at least a concrete whose principal form is a mode, and both significations are repugnant to a man. Examples are given l.c. For the same reason the denomination "united," which is as it were the formal effect of union, is not transferred to the whole man, although it belongs to matter and form.

13. One will say: the principal or sole form of this denomination "composite" is composition; but this is the union of parts. Therefore, if union is a mode, a substantial composite will be a concrete whose principal form is a mode. I answer: if "composite" means the same as "placed together," it is a denomination given by composition or union as by its proper form. Yet in this sense it is not said substantially of the whole but of its parts, just like the denomination "united." When, therefore, it is said of the whole, or of a natural body, it signifies the same as "that which consists of united parts," or "that which is identified with matter, form, and union." In this sense it is not a denomination proceeding more from union than

from matter and form; indeed, it proceeds chiefly from the principal part, which is substantial form. Let the same be said of the name "constituted."

14. One will say again: a man would be called an accidental being if the union were accidental. Therefore he must be called a modal being if the union is modal. I answer by denying the consequence. By the same argument it could be proved that a man must be called a partial being or an incomplete being because he includes form, which is a partial and incomplete entity. The disparity must therefore be taken from the rule cited in no. 12: "accidental" is said of whatever is not adequately intended through itself and for its own sake, but contains something adequately distinct from the *suppositum*. This would be verified of a man if he consisted of accidental union. But what belongs to the concept of a "modal being," from no. 12, is not thus verified, just as what belongs to the concept of a "partial being" is not verified. Here one should note that union, although essentially dependent upon the subject and inhering in or affixed to it, is not therefore an accident, because it is intended for the sake of the composite or *suppositum*, in which it is itself included, and therefore is intended for its own sake, or as something of the *suppositum*. Read again what was said disp. 4, c. 3, nn. 17, 18.

15. One will say further: modal union is a transcendental relation of itself to the extremes, and a predicamental relation of the extremes to each other. Therefore a man constituted from such a union will be a relative being, or at least will not be an adequately absolute being, but partly toward itself and partly toward another. I grant the antecedent from what was said in Logic where relation was treated. To the inference, however, say that man and every created being is transcendentally relative, at least with respect to the First Cause, without therefore ceasing to be an absolute being and a being toward itself. See above, disp. 2, c. 2, n. 35, and in Logic, tract. 4, c. 5, n. 4. Nor does man have this from union alone, but from every part of himself, for matter and form also are transcendental relations, both to one another and to God. But it must be denied that man of himself and intrinsically is a predicamental relative being, although he is constituted from a predicamental relation, because the denomination "relative" is not transferred to the whole composite, for the reason given concerning the denomination "modal being." Therefore a man is called an absolute being, not indeed adequately, but nevertheless without qualification, just as he is called a corporeal being without qualification, although not adequately.

16. It is objected, 3°: man is defined as "a composite of body and rational soul," where no mention is made of union. It is confirmed, 1°, from the Athanasian Creed, where it is said: "As rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ." Here the constitutive elements of man and

Christ are distinctly explained, yet union is not named. This is pressed by the syllogism: that which is one man identifies union with itself. But "rational soul and flesh are one man." Therefore rational soul and flesh preserve union within themselves. It is confirmed, 2º, from St. Dionysius, who says: "Death in man is not the corruption of substance, but the separation of things united." But if union perishes with respect to entity, the death of a man will certainly be the corruption of substance. It is confirmed, 3º, from Aristotle, who, without mention of union, adequately divides substance into matter, form, and composite.

17. I answer: when man is physically defined, union, although not expressly named, is presupposed, because unless soul and body are presupposed as united, there is no man to be defined. Union is not explicitly named because it is not so much a part as the bond of the parts, not so much a constitutive element as the actual exercise of constituting. Moreover, the perfection and specific character of the composite is sufficiently known once matter and form have been explained. Nevertheless union is implicitly signified by the name "composite," which means the same as "consisting of united parts."

18. Hence to confirmation 1º: in the Athanasian Creed, both soul and flesh, and God and man, are taken not in any state whatever, but insofar as they are extremes united with respect to exercise or denomination. Otherwise that article would not be true, as is evident in the death of a man, where rational soul and flesh remain and yet there is not one man. The same would be evident with respect to God and man if the hypostatic union ceased with respect to exercise. Therefore in the added syllogism I grant the major premise concerning inadequate identity, and distinguish the minor premise: in the sense in which soul and flesh are taken in the Creed, I grant; otherwise, I deny the minor premise. And I distinguish the consequence similarly.

19. It should be noted here that the same disagreement exists concerning the hypostatic union. The authors of our opinion place it in a mode distinct from the humanity and the person of the Word, whereas most Thomists oppose this. There are theological arguments on either side which it would be inopportune to examine here. I merely note that the divine Word is not properly the subject of the hypostatic union, nor is He perfected, informed, or changed by it, but is only the intrinsic term which the union requires, by a special title, to be most present and intimate to the humanity.

20. To confirmation 2º: the modal entity of union, just as it is not called a thing absolutely, so it is not called substance absolutely. Therefore the death of a man is not called the corruption of substance, namely absolute

substance, although in reality it is the corruption of modal substance and therefore denominatively the corruption of a man who is constituted from such substance. Otherwise the death of a man would not be substantial corruption, which no one would say. To 3º: the Aristotelian division of substance comprehends union under the name "composite," and does not name it more expressly for the reasons given in no. 17.

21. It is objected, 4º: matter and form are proportioned through themselves in second act, for this proportion consists in the character of first subject and first act. Therefore matter and form are united through themselves in second act. It is confirmed: union, since it is the causality by which form causes its formal effect, is less distant from the form than the formal effect itself, for union is as it were the way to such an effect. Yet the formal effect is not really distinguished from the form. Therefore, all the more, neither is union distinguished.

22. I answer either by denying the antecedent, or by distinguishing it: if proportion in second act signifies the full aptitude for receiving and informing, in which the quiddity of first subject and first act consists, I grant; if it signifies the exercise of this aptitude, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. To the confirmation: union is neither less nor more distant from the form than the formal effect by a distance of time or place, nor is the causality of that effect a way to it except metaphorically or abusively; rather, it is an intrinsic constitutive element of it. But if distance is taken for distinction, the distance of the causality and of the formal effect is equal insofar as the latter includes other constitutive elements besides the form. For the formal effect is the whole composite, in which, besides form, matter and union or causality are included.

23. It is objected, 5º: given a rational soul intimately present to the whole body, and given in the body organs ultimately disposed for vital actions, and in addition given God's decree to concur with the soul in the use of such organs, then, even if nothing else were added, the soul could use the eyes for seeing, the ears for hearing, etc., and consequently a man would fully exist. Therefore the new mode of union which we posit is altogether superfluous. I deny the antecedent, because then the soul would not be an informing form but an assisting form, like a demon in the body of a possessed man. Therefore the soul could then use bodily organs only for local motion, but by no means for the vital actions of seeing, hearing, etc.; for these must proceed from an intrinsic principle. But then the soul could act in the body only as an extrinsic cause, just as a demon acts. Read again Dissert. Praesim. n. 27.

24. It is objected, 6º: according to our authors, although conservation is not distinguished from production, there can be production without its

being denominated conservation. Likewise, a thing can exist without being denominated as enduring at instant A, although duration is indistinct from the enduring thing. A foundation of relation can also exist without being denominated as related, although relation is not distinct from the foundation. Therefore, the fact that matter and form can exist without being denominated united does not prove that union is distinct from them. I deny the supposition of the antecedent if it speaks of adequate indistinction. For our authors do not adequately identify conservation with production, nor duration with the enduring thing alone, nor relation with the foundation alone. Rather, according to them conservation as such is constituted also obliquely by the duration of the thing in the preceding instant, as duration is by the instant or time, and relation by the term. Hence, when they do not actually denominate, some constitutive element of the denomination is lacking to them, and not a mere extrinsic connotate which is adequately distinguished from the whole reality of the denomination.

25. Finally, two things should be noted. 1º The mode of union does not need another union in order to be united to the extremes, unless perhaps under some special aspect, but through itself it is immediately united, lest otherwise unions be multiplied without end. Thus an action is produced through itself, and a location is located through itself, without requiring an action of the action or a location of the location. 2º What has been said of substantial union must equally be taken of the union of an absolute accidental form and, generally, of the union of extremes neither of which is essentially determined to be united to the other. For in such a case a modal union must always be added. Hence continuative union also is usually placed in a superadded mode. Unlike essential union, however, this mode is not penetrated with both extremes and does not require their penetration with one another, but is penetrated with one extreme only and essentially requires the other to be in the immediately adjacent place. This matter will be discussed elsewhere.

CHAPTER III.
Whether the Eduction of a Material Form Is Identified with Its Union with Matter.

1. In order that the proposed question may have a place, it must be presupposed that action and passion are identified, or that "eduction" is not only the "action" of the agent but also the "passion" of matter, that is, that causality which matter exercises upon form as material cause and subject of sustentation. This causality is also called "sustentation, inherence,

dependence of form upon matter," and "reception," although "reception" is sometimes taken more broadly for any informative union. This supposition is rightly premised because, if eduction is an action really distinct from passion, it is not received in matter but in the agent, and there is no basis for proving it identified with union. Hence there is no question about the creation of the rational soul, which clearly is not a passion and does not depend upon matter in any genus of physical cause. Therefore the sense of the proposed question is whether that mode by which matter passively causes, sustains, and receives a material form is really the very mode of union which ultimately determines the same form to constitute with matter one being through itself, without any need to superadd another union.

2. The negative position is held by Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Amicus, Compton, Alphonsus, and others whom Fr. Gabriel de Henao cites and follows, in Empyreolog. exercit. 7, n. 68. Fathers Peinado and Ulloa and several more recent authors agree. The affirmative position, however, is defended by the Excellent Doctor, d. 13, Met. s. 9, nn. 10, 11, as well as in other places cited by Henao, n. 82. Fathers Vázquez, Bernal, Ripalda, Lynce, and Quirós agree. The last two are usually cited for the contrary opinion, although, on the supposition that eduction is passion, each expressly affirms the present view: Lynce, lib. 5, tract. 3, c. 3; Quirós, tract. 3, disp. 48, sect. 2, at the end, where he also cites Fonseca and the Conimbricenses. Many eminent recent authors subscribe to it. This same affirmative position also appears more probable to me.

3. It is proved. Eduction, or passion, through itself constitutes the form as actually received in matter, since passion is reception properly and strictly so called, as the opponents concede. Therefore through itself it constitutes the form as actually united to matter, and consequently through itself is union. I prove the consequence: form cannot be understood as received in matter without giving to it its formal effect. But it gives this effect only as actually united to matter. Therefore it cannot be understood as received without being understood as united. Therefore, if eduction through itself renders the form actually received in matter, it also renders it actually united. The rest is certain. And the major premise is proved, 1º, because form cannot be understood as received without being understood as communicated to matter, as seems evident from the terms. But a form communicated to a capable subject thereby gives it its formal effect, as no one doubts.

4. 2º Because a form received in matter, prescinding from any other union, excludes its own privation; otherwise matter would be understood as simultaneously receiving two contradictories. But it is certain that form

excludes its privation from the subject only by informing and giving its formal effect. 3º Because, precisely upon understanding the reception of a new form, that which suffices to expel the preceding form is understood. For the preceding form is expelled by the very fact that it ceases to be received and sustained in matter. But it ceases by the very fact that matter receives and sustains the new form, since two non-subordinate substantial forms cannot be simultaneously received in matter. Yet the expulsion of the preceding form, since it is a secondary effect of the new form in the genus of formal cause, presupposes according to all the primary formal effect and the exercise of formal causality, which is union.

5. These proofs are strengthened by the example of accidental form, in which the opponents admit that the reasoning is parallel, similarly distinguishing the reception and inherence of an accident from its formal union. Habitual grace, precisely by being received in a man, denominates him "just," which is its formal effect. This is clear from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, c. 7, which says: "We are truly called just and are just by receiving justice in ourselves." There nothing else is required in order that we be called and be just except that we receive justice, or grace, within ourselves. Similarly, the same Council of Trent, both there and in can. 11 of the same sess., defines men as justified insofar as grace is poured into their hearts "and inheres in them." Therefore, for grace to inhere is the same as for it to justify me.

6. The point is pressed: if to be received and to inhere is not the same as to be united, then grace could be understood as properly received and inhering, yet not united, and consequently not justifying. This seems plainly contrary to the Council of Trent. Grace could likewise be understood as received and yet not expelling sin or its own privation. For both expulsions proceed from grace in the genus of formal cause, and therefore not as from an assisting form, but as from a form united and informing. From this it absurdly follows that a man, insofar as receiving grace and possessing it as inhering in himself, can be understood not yet to be in grace or a friend of God, but an enemy.

7. The same reasoning holds for other accidents. Light, for example, precisely by being received in the air denominates it "luminous." Therefore it is united to and informs it. The antecedent is evident, for otherwise the air could be understood as receiving light and simultaneously being dark; and not only understood so, but in reality be so. Suppose God were to prevent the union while the reception remained, which most opponents concede to be possible, acknowledging only a natural connection between reception and union. In that event light would not exclude from the air its privation, or

darkness. For one reason, otherwise the air at a real instant would be neither luminous nor dark, which is altogether contradictory. For another, a form not actually informing, however intimately present to the subject, does not exclude its privation from it, as is evident in the soul of Christ when it penetrated the virginal enclosure and the stone of the tomb. Therefore the air would then be receiving light and simultaneously be dark, which, unless I am mistaken, no one will concede. For who can conceive Cimmerian darkness in air in which most intense light, more splendid than the brilliance of the sun, is received and sustained?

8. From what has been said the common answer of the opponents is already anticipated, namely, that by eduction the form is constituted intrinsic to matter as a subject of sustentation, but not as a subject of information or as informable. Matter, they say, does not exercise the office of a subject of information except through union; but it exercises the office of a subject of sustentation through eduction or passion. These offices and exercises, however, can be separated, for the first without the second belongs to matter with respect to the rational soul. Eduction, therefore, is not the exercise of a subject of information and consequently is not formal union, but only radical or inferential union insofar as it is naturally connected with union and entails it. This answer, I say, is already anticipated, for we have shown that reception, prescinding from any other union, through itself ultimately determines form to give its formal effect, which certainly is not given except to a subject of information as such.

9. Moreover, although the office of a subject of information can be exercised without the office of a subject of sustentation, not conversely. For sustentation is true information, although not purely such, but in addition rendering the form received or passively caused by matter. That it is true information is proved: a subject of sustentation as such is truly and properly a subject, as no one denies. Therefore a properly so-called act corresponds to it, since subject and act are correlatives. But a subject under that aspect under which an act corresponds to it is an actuable subject, and its exercise is actuation. Therefore a sustentative subject as such is truly actuable, and its exercise, namely sustentation, is a true actuation. But "actuation" and "information," "actuable" and "informable," "act" and "form," differ only as "sword" and "blade."

10. Hence what Fr. Peinado says here, d. 4, n. 56, seems contradictory, namely that "eduction is the exercise by means of which form actuates matter as a receptive subject, but not as an informable subject." For this is equivalent to saying: "Form actuates matter not as an actuable subject," or "Form informs matter not as an informable subject," since "actuable and

informable," as also "to actuate and to inform," are synonymous. Who does not see the contradiction in saying that form actuates and informs a subject not as actuable or informable? Certainly this is no less contradictory than saying that a cause produces an effect not as producible, or that a soul animates a body not as animable.

11. It is confirmed: eduction, or passion, is formally the union of itself with matter, as is certain. Therefore it is also formally the union of the form. I prove the consequence: passion communicates to the form the denominations by reason of which passion itself is the union of itself with matter. Therefore it denominates the form united "as that which." I prove the antecedent: passion is not the union of itself with matter precisely because it is a mode, for it is also a mode of the agent, to which nevertheless it is not united. Therefore it is the union of itself because it is sustentation, reception, and dependence of itself upon matter as material cause. But passion denominates the form sustained, received, and dependent upon matter as material cause and subject of sustentation. Therefore it communicates to the form those denominations, etc.

12. Now a quasi-*a priori* reason for our opinion can be that passion is a true bond and a true modal, physical, and intrinsic connection between matter and form. For it is a mode intrinsically affixed to matter as subject and to form as term, which it requires to be intimately present and renders inseparable from matter so long as the passion itself exists. For the material cause, whose causality is passion, causes its effect only in itself and within itself, unlike a purely efficient cause. Passion is also a mode physically connecting matter and form insofar as they are extremes ordered to and unible with each other. This is evident because passion connects matter and form insofar as they are a sustentative subject and an educible act. But act insofar as educible undoubtedly expresses an order of incompletion and unibility with respect to the subject from which it is educed. A sustentative subject likewise in its formal concept expresses incompletion, and consequently unibility with respect to the educible term, as all commonly suppose, specifically Fr. Peinado, lib. 3, Phys. d. 1, n. 23.

13. Then thus: a modal bond physically and intrinsically connecting extremes insofar as formally ordered to and unible with one another cannot fail to be their formal union. Otherwise let it be shown to me what further is desired for formal union. Since, therefore, passion is a bond of this kind, it cannot fail to be the formal union of matter and form. One will say: formal union must be a substantial mode, whereas passion is accidental. Against this: whether passion is or is not a substantial mode depends upon whether it is or is not the formal union of substantial matter and form. Therefore, if

passion is proved to be formal union, it is consequently proved to be a substantial mode. Certainly there is no other reason why the union posited by the opponent is a substantial mode except that it is a mode physically connecting substantial extremes under the aspect of things unible, and thereby determining them to constitute one being through itself in which that bond itself is included. But passion possesses this, as we have shown.

14. From these things one will gather that certain modes are inopportunely objected to us which in some way connect matter and form and render them inseparable, and yet are not their unions. For example, suppose matter and form to be terminated by one indivisible subsistence, or to exist in a place through a location common to both, or to be created by the same action; or suppose sensation to be received in matter and form, as many hold. I say these are inopportunely objected, for all these modes, even if admitted as possible, do not connect matter and form insofar as they are formally extremes mutually ordered and unible, nor under the aspect of potency and act or subject and form. Neither do they communicate to them those denominations by reason of which those modes themselves are unions of themselves, nor do they make the form be received in matter and actuate it. Rather, subsistence regards each extreme under the aspect of terminability, location under the aspect of locability, creation under the aspect of producibility, and sensation under the aspect of being a sustentative subject of the sensation itself. Add that sensation and that indivisible subsistence presuppose matter and form already actually united.

Finally, our opinion can be proved because an eduction of form indistinct from its union is possible. Therefore such is the eduction actually given, for here those axioms press: "Things which can be done by fewer are done in vain by more," and "Entities," especially modal ones, "must not be multiplied without necessity." The antecedent is conceded by several opponents with Fr. Compton, nor does it seem it can rightly be denied. For the concepts of eduction and union are not opposed, since in fact they are identified in eduction with respect to itself: eduction is both its own eduction and its own union. What, then, prevents those concepts from being identified also with respect to the form, just as the concepts of eduction and passion are identified?

CHAPTER IV.

Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

1. The more recent authors heap together many arguments, but most of them, including the principal ones, are judged ineffective even by authors of

the contrary opinion, such as Oviedo, Arriaga, and Henao, who at the same time teach us how to solve them. It is objected, 1º: eduction and union have diverse predicates and offices. For union is a pure bond of the extremes and their ultimate determination to constitute one; whereas eduction is the production of the form and its dependence upon the efficient and material causes. Therefore they are really distinct modes, for by no other reason do we distinguish action, duration, and location from one another. Nor does it matter that eduction is connected with the union of the extremes, for it is also connected with the duration and location of the form, yet it is not its formal duration or location, but only radical duration or location. It is confirmed: eduction is prior to the form, since it is the way to the form, whereas union is posterior to the form, since it is the ultimate determination of an already existing form to constitute one with matter and is also the exercise and causality by which form causes the composite. But the same mode cannot be prior and posterior with respect to the form. Therefore, etc.

2. I answer: diverse offices frequently belong to the same mode, as is evident both in eduction, which fulfills the offices of action and passion, and in the hypostatic union, which, according to several theologians, is simultaneously union and the form sanctifying the humanity, and in any union, which is simultaneously materialization and information, or the causality of the subject and the causality of the form in the composite. Therefore, if the offices are not opposed and there is otherwise a basis for their in fact belonging to the same entity, they are not to be placed in distinct entities.

3. Moreover, we distinguish action from location and duration, and these from each other, because we experience them to be separable. A thing can be produced by such a cause without possessing this determinate location or duration, and can remain in place A without the same duration remaining, since duration, if it consists in a mode distinct from the enduring thing, varies with the continual succession of time. Therefore eduction is connected with union in a different way from that in which it is connected with the location and duration of the form. It is so connected with these that it does not determine the form to one instant or place rather than another, but leaves it indifferent to existing in various instants and places. Therefore a new determination is needed for the form to be located and endure here and now. But once eduction is posited, there is no basis for inferring any indifference of the extremes toward union.

4. To the confirmation, it must altogether be denied that eduction is prior to form by any properly so-called priority which they call "in that in which," by virtue of which eduction could be understood in some sign in

which the produced form is not yet understood. For it is contradictory to understand an ultimate determination for the form to be produced and yet the form not yet to be produced. Therefore there belongs to eduction with respect to form only an improper priority which they call "purely from which," and which does not prevent both from existing and being understood in the same sign, as we shall explain in tract. 2, where the priority of nature is discussed.

5. Likewise it must be denied that union is physically posterior to form, notwithstanding its title as ultimate determination, causality, or exercise of the formal cause. The causality and exercise of an efficient cause must indeed be posterior to that cause because it physically originates from it. But the causality or exercise of a formal cause does not originate from the form, since union, even according to the opponents, is produced by the generator or by God alone. Therefore union has at most a logical posteriority with respect to the form, which they call "in consequence of subsistence," insofar as form can exist without union, but not conversely. Yet in this sense determinate eduction also is posterior to form. One will say: eduction is the causality through which the form is caused, whereas union is the causality through which the form causes the composite. But the form cannot cause through the same causality through which it is itself caused. This last is denied when there is question of different genera of cause, as in the present case. For since the causality of form as formal cause does not originate from the form, it can without difficulty be the causality through which the form originates from the efficient cause.

6. It is objected, 2º: eduction in its formal concept does not involve union. Therefore our proof collapses, for this is what it proves, if it proves anything. The antecedent is proved: if eduction involved union in its formal concept, no eduction could be possible which was not union. But this is clearly false in the eduction of human union, which is not the union of its term with matter. For human union is united to matter through itself, not through another union, lest otherwise there be a union of union, which is no less absurd than an action of an action. I answer by denying the antecedent. For, if eduction is passion and reception of form, as is now presupposed, it is contradictory to conceive eduction without conceiving union. There can indeed be a union which is not eduction, but not conversely, because eduction is a species of union just as it is a species of production. Therefore, just as there can be a true production which is not eduction, but not the contrary, so etc. I do not deny that eduction under the concept of action or of procession from an efficient cause can be prescinded from union. I deny this only if eduction is taken under the concept of passion.

7. As regards human union, I admit that it is produced by an eduction distinct from itself, which several deny. Nevertheless I deny that such eduction is not the union of its term. For human union is united to matter under a twofold title: both because it is a mode essentially affixed to matter and because it is an entity educed from the passive potency of matter and is received in it as in a subject of sustentation. Under this second title human union is not united to matter through itself, since it is not its own eduction and therefore, according to the supposition now made with the objectors, not its own passion, sustentation, or reception. Therefore it requires another modal determination by which it is united to matter under the office of a sustentative subject.

8. This is explained: according to the common opinion, including that of the opponents, human union can by divine power be produced through creation, for example if God created the whole man by one action. But then human union would not be united to matter as to a subject of sustentation, as is manifest, but precisely as to a subject of information. Therefore of itself it is indifferent to being or not being united to matter under the office of a subject of sustentation. Therefore, in order to be united under this title, which it naturally requires, it needs to be determined by another union, which is its own eduction. Thus, because the union of the matter and soul of Christ the Lord is of itself indifferent to being united to the Word, it is united to Him by a distinct union. Therefore, if a union of a union with an extreme to which it is not united through itself is possible because it has indifference with respect to that extreme, why not also a union with an extreme to which it is through itself united under one title, if nevertheless it retains indifference with respect to the same extreme in another sense and under a different title? This solution is approved among the opponents by Fr. Oviedo, controv. 4, Phys. punct. 1, n. 26, and Fr. Henao, l.c. n. 78.

9. Therefore, although a quasi-homogeneous union of union is contradictory, namely one which is a pure union or instituted solely for the office of uniting, since this would be superfluous and useless and was therefore rejected by us above, c. 2, a heterogeneous union of union, or one under a diverse title, is not contradictory when it has in addition another office with respect to which it presupposes indifference. Nor must an action of an action therefore be admitted. For action cannot under another title depend upon the agent except insofar as it efficiently proceeds from it. But every action altogether has this through itself, nor does it in any sense remain indifferent to proceeding from the agent. Therefore, if it were produced through another action, it would be produced under the same title and under the same aspect under which it is itself the production of itself. If,

however, an action is shown on some basis to be indifferent to depending by procession upon an agent, an action of an action will not be impossible.

10. What we have said of human union must equally be said of any modal entity produced by an eduction distinct from itself, for example of location and subsistence and generally of a form which is supposed to be essentially affixed to a determinate subject: namely, that it is united to the subject both through itself and through its own eduction. One will say: therefore the form of fire, for example, can also be united to matter by two unions, one which is eduction and the other which is pure union. I deny the consequence if there is question of the natural order. For no necessity establishes a union distinct from the eduction of the form of fire, since this eduction has its term, namely the form, and sufficiently unites it to matter to constitute the composite. But in our case there is first a necessity to establish union between the rational soul and matter, which union unites itself. And since this union is not its own eduction, as the opponents suppose, there is additionally a necessity to admit a distinct eduction through which the union is produced and received in matter and consequently united, since reception is inseparable from union.

11. It is objected, 3º: the eduction of the form is terminated at union. Therefore it is not itself union. The antecedent is proved: the eduction of the form is the generation of the composite and consequently is terminated at it. But it cannot be terminated at the composite unless it is terminated at union, which is the ultimate determinant for the composite to exist. For this reason the creation of the rational soul is not the creation of the composite, nor is it said to be terminated at it. Therefore, etc. I deny the antecedent, and in the proof I deny the minor premise, because for eduction truly to be called the generation of the composite it suffices that it be the production of the form, ultimately determining it to constitute the composite, as it in fact does determine it, since through itself it is formal union. This, I say, suffices, for thereby eduction truly makes the composite exist, and the composite insofar as it is a whole is truly called the term of that action, not formally but denominatively, and it need not be distinguished from that action except inadequately.

12. It is objected, 4º: if eduction is union, the composite will be intrinsically changed as often as the eduction of the form is changed. From this it follows that God could not by Himself conserve a fire produced by another fire. For a fire conserved by God alone would be constituted by another union and consequently would already be another fire, not only numerically but also specifically, because it would be constituted by an eduction originating from God alone, which is specifically distinguished

from the action of fire, since actions are specified by their causes. Add that God would not so much conserve the fire as first produce it, since He would first produce the union which is the ultimate determinant for the fire to exist.

13. There are some who deny the consequence of the objection and say that a determinate union does not pertain to the essence of a numerically and specifically determinate composite, but only some union, whatever its character, provided that it is a true physical and substantial union. Consequently, although the union varies with the eduction, the essence of the composite in no way varies so long as the same matter and form remain coupled by some union. Fr. Henao extensively confirms this doctrine in the cited exercit. 7, n. 72, by reason and by the authority of many, among whom he cites the Angelic and Excellent Doctors. But passing over that doctrine:

14. I answer that, if only union is changed by reason of eduction, the composite is not changed absolutely and without qualification, but only in a certain respect. For the principal constitutive elements, or component parts "as that which," remain unchanged, and from these the perfection, character, and identity of the composite, both specific and numerical, are absolutely taken. Upon them also depend the diversity of operations and properties or accidents of the composite, as well as the diversity or identity of its definition, both physical and metaphysical. Peter, for example, would not be defined differently if, while retaining the same body and same soul, he now had union A and now union B. Hence Fr. Suárez, tom. 2, in 3, p. d. 44, s. 2, teaches with St. Thomas that for the same man truly and absolutely to be said to rise again it is not required that the numerically same union return, provided that the body is the same and the soul the same. Hence also water, although it changes continuative unions, as if it is divided and then made continuous again, does not become absolutely another water.

15. I therefore grant that God by Himself can conserve absolutely the same fire which was produced by another fire, though not the same fire also in every respect and from every aspect. For He cannot conserve the same union, since this is proved essentially dependent upon a created cause. There is no absurdity in this, since all concede that God cannot by Himself produce modal effects essentially dependent upon a created cause, because it does not belong to God's omnipotence to overturn the essences of things. Therefore God can conserve that fire unchanged insofar as it is an absolute effect, but not insofar as that fire includes a modality essentially arising from another fire.

16. I likewise admit a specific diversity of union from the diversity of eduction, not indeed a formal diversity but a purely material one in the order

of the office of uniting and constituting the composite. For an action of God alone, which I suppose to be educive, would not be diverse from the action of fire under the concept of passion or reception, which alone includes union and is specified solely by the subject and the received form, but only under the concept of procession from the active principle. This concept stands as it were materially with respect to the office of uniting or constituting the composite. But whatever this diversity is called, it will never be such without qualification with respect to the composite, but always only in a certain respect. I deny, however, that the new conserving action of God is the first production of the fire, although it truly is the production of the union then supervening. For it cannot be the first production with respect to that term which already existed as absolutely the same in the preceding instant. Nor is the union then supervening the ultimate determinant for that fire absolutely to begin to exist, but only for it to continue existing. Thus the production of a new union between the body and soul of a dead man is not called the man's first production but his reproduction or resurrection.

17. It is replied, 1º: the composite is said without qualification to be generated and corrupted by the generation and corruption of union alone, as is evident in man. Therefore it will be said without qualification to be changed by the change of union alone. I deny the consequence from the rule given disp. preceding, c. 1, for transferring denominations of parts to the whole. For to be generated and corrupted signifies to be that which begins to be from a presupposed subject, and which ceases to be while the subject remains. This sense belongs without qualification to the composite if union is generated and corrupted. But to be changed in essence signifies to be another according to essence. This is not verified without qualification of the composite when union alone is changed, because the composite does not thereby have absolutely different essential predicates or a different definition, so long as there is no diversity in matter and form, of which alone express mention is made in the physical definition of the composite. This reason applies not only to specific but also to numerical change.

18. It is replied, 2º: why, then, would the composite be simply accidental if the union were accidental? I answer, besides what was said elsewhere, that the composite would then be without qualification one accidentally because the principal form would also be accidental, or at least would not be united to the subject after the manner of a substantial act. For if it were so united, the union could in no way be accidental. Therefore the composite would then cease to be substantial, not only from the defect of substantial union, but also from the defect of the form. The same must be said if the union were supernatural formally as union, for it could not be such unless both

extremes, or one of them, were supernatural, or at least unible only through obediential potency. For union is specified by the extremes. I say "formally as union," because as action there can perhaps by divine power be a supernatural union between matter and the form of fire, for example if water, supposing that anything can be elevated to producing anything, were divinely elevated to educe the form of fire. But that supernatural character of the eduction would stand materially in the constitution of the composite.

19. I would not, however, insist too much on these terms "without qualification" and "in a certain respect," or "formally" and "materially," lest the dispute become merely verbal. Therefore, when the variation of union, whether numerical or specific, is objected, and thence the variation of the composite is inferred even though matter and form do not vary, I distinguish more briefly and conveniently thus: the composite varies according to absolute entity, I deny; according to a modal constitutive element, I grant. Under the same terms one must grant or deny that God by Himself can conserve a composite produced by a second cause; that the same composite can by divine power be simultaneously produced by two total causes through eduction; that the conserving eduction of fire proceeding from God alone is the first production of fire; and whatever else of the same kind may be objected. Certainly the opponents must admit some kind of composite, at least accidental, resulting from matter and form by virtue of eduction alone, since they say that by virtue of it matter is intrinsically actuated through form as a receptive subject by a receivable act. For from a subject intrinsically actuated and an act intrinsically actuating in some true sense, some whole cannot fail to result. But in this whole whatever absurdity they oppose to us in the objection thus far solved applies equally.

20. It is objected, 5º: eduction is an accidental mode, both because every action belongs to the predicament of accident and because it exists not for its own sake but for another, namely for the term, which is proper to an accident. Therefore eduction cannot be the union of a substantial composite, since this must be a substantial mode. I deny the antecedent concerning the eduction of a substantial form, for when this is proved to be the union of that form with matter, it is thereby proved to be a substantial mode. Nor is the point concerning the predicament an obstacle. For, as was said in Logic, an intrinsically substantial entity can belong to the predicaments of accident because it is contingently predicated of some subject, as eduction is predicated of an efficient cause, for example. Thus, according to the opponents with whom we are now dealing, the relation of identity or of specific similarity between two substances, although indistinct from them, belongs to the predicament of relation, just as substantial union

also belongs to it insofar as it is a predicamental relation of the extremes to one another. Nor does it matter that action is for the sake of the term, for form also is for the sake of the composite and yet is substantial. If it is said that the form itself is included in the composite and therefore is not for the sake of something adequately distinct from itself, I shall say the same of eduction, which also is principally for the sake of the composite, in which it too is included.

21. It is objected, 6º: the union which the soul of a brute acquires through nutrition with the matter of food is not the eduction of that same soul, since the soul is the cause of that union and cannot be the cause of its own eduction. But that union is of the same kind as the union which the soul of a brute has through generation. Therefore neither is the latter the eduction of that soul. I answer: if the soul of a brute is divisible, as the common opinion of our authors holds, the union acquired through nutrition is the eduction of a new part of the soul and proceeds from the preexisting parts. But if the brute soul is indivisible, then only a new union is educed, of which what was said above about human union must be said. Such a union will be of the same kind as that which was had through generation only with respect to the power and formal effect of uniting, but not with respect to the power of producing the form. There is no difficulty in this.

CHAPTER V.

Two Further Questions Concerning Union Are Resolved.

1. Question 1º: how many unions are there in the composite? It is certain that union consists of several integral parts, namely as many as there are parts of matter in the composite. Therefore it is asked only whether union is essentially simple, that is, whether the union by which form is united to matter is the same as that by which matter is united to form, or whether a twofold union must be admitted, one on the part of form, which is "information," and another on the part of matter, which is "materialization," from which a total union is composed. This latter view is held among our authors by Fathers Hurtado, Amicus, and very few others; among others by Godoy, Echalez, and Mastrius here, d. 5, q. 10, where he cites other Scotists. But the contrary opinion is most common among our authors with the Excellent Doctor, d. 13, Met. s. 9, n. 13, and I agree with them.

2. This opinion is proved: one union, for example that which one calls "information," suffices for the composite to result from matter and form. Therefore a twofold union must be rejected as altogether superfluous. I prove the antecedent: by such union the form is rendered actually informing

matter and matter actually informed by form, since that union is actual information and the denominations "informing" and "informed" are supplied by actual information. But form cannot be actually informing and matter actually informed without the composite resulting. Therefore, etc. The minor premise is evident both from the terms themselves and from the common understanding of philosophers, and because, if form informs and matter is informed, the form is already communicated to a capable subject. Therefore it gives that subject its formal effect, since the formal effect necessarily results and indeed is indistinct from form communicated to a capable subject. But the formal effect of substantial form is the composite.

3. It is confirmed: whenever there is question of reciprocal or correlative denominations, and neither extreme identifies with itself its ultimate determination for being denominated, one superadded determination suffices to supply both denominations, at least if in its own concept it is a determination of both extremes. Therefore one action suffices for the cause to be producing and the effect produced; likewise one cognition for the potency to be cognizing and the object cognized. Conversely, in the divine Trinity there is active generation and passive generation because the Father identifies with Himself His ultimate determination to be generating, and the Son His own to be generated. For the same reason the distinction between Peter and Paul is twofold, one identified with Peter and another with Paul. But neither matter nor form identifies with itself its ultimate determination to be united, and moreover the superadded union in its concept is a determination of both extremes, since "union" signifies a bond of two and is commonly defined as "the ultimate determination of distinct things so that they constitute one." Therefore one union suffices to give each extreme the reciprocal denomination "united."

4. It is objected, 1º: if there is only one union in the composite, the same union will simultaneously be information and materialization, that is, the exercise by which form fulfills the office of form toward matter, and the exercise by which matter fulfills the office of subject toward form. Therefore form will exercise its office through materialization and matter through information. Therefore form will be denominated materializing and matter informing. I press the point: the same mode is really action and passion. Therefore the agent exercises its office through passion and matter through action. Therefore the agent will be denominated patient and matter agent.

5. I distinguish the first consequence: through a materialization which is the materialization of form toward matter, I deny; through one which is the materialization of matter toward form and simultaneously the information of form toward matter, I grant the consequence. Understand the same of

information, which is not the information of matter toward form but conversely, so that it is simultaneously the materialization of matter toward form. Hence I deny the second consequence absolutely, because often the same mode contains diverse denominations which must be supplied only to diverse terms. This is evident in action identified with passion, or in any production, which denominates the cause producing and the effect produced, not conversely; likewise cognition denominates the potency in one way and the object in another.

6. It is objected, 2º: one mode of relation does not suffice for the foundation to be referred to the term and the term to the foundation. Therefore neither does one union suffice, etc. In our principles I deny the antecedent, because when the reason of founding consists in a mode, as happens in relations of the second genus, one mode suffices for two things to be predicamentally referred to one another. Thus the same production relates the cause to the effect and conversely. But in relations of the first genus, for example in the similarity of two white things, two whitenesses are required because one whiteness separately from the other is not in its concept a determination of both extremes, indeed not even of one, for being denominated "similar." Hence the disparity with union is clear. The same disparity also holds in the Thomistic mode of relation, to which its authors do not attribute the concept of a determination of two things for correlative denominations, but only of a determination of that extreme in which it inheres.

7. It is objected, 3º: one continuative union cannot connect two parts of a continuum, for it would have to be received in both. And since those parts are not in the same place, it would follow that the same union would naturally be simultaneously in two places. Therefore one essential union likewise does not suffice. I answer, 1º, by admitting the antecedent and denying the consequence, because in essential union the inconvenience of natural bilocation does not arise. I answer, 2º, by denying the antecedent, because one continuative union suffices which is received in only one part and at the same time essentially requires the presence of the other part in the immediately adjacent place, although the union itself is not in that other part.

8. Question 2º: what is the subject of the aforesaid single union? It is certain that both matter and form are subjects of denomination, because each is denominated united through union. The question is principally about the subject of sustentation from which, presupposed, the union is educed. The first opinion holds that such a subject is both form and matter. So hold several whom Henao cites and follows, cited exercit. 7, sect. 3, and Fr. Ulloa

also subscribes to them. The second opinion says that such a subject is matter alone. So, according to Henao, Rubius, Oviedo, Alphonsus, Bernal, and others, to whom recent authors commonly adhere with Peinado. This second opinion, sufficiently indicated by the Excellent Doctor, cited d. 13, s. 9, n. 13, and often elsewhere, appears to me true.

9. First, as regards the union of a material form, since that union is really indistinct from the eduction of the form, as we saw above, it necessarily follows that the form is not its sustentative subject. Otherwise the form would be a true material cause presupposed for the eduction of itself, which is contradictory. Secondly, those who distinguish union from eduction generally say that union is produced by the same eduction by which the form is produced. Hence, since form is not presupposed for its own eduction, neither is it presupposed for the eduction of union, and consequently it is not the material cause of union, because no effect depends upon a material cause except insofar as its eduction depends upon such a cause as upon a presupposed subject.

10. Finally, prescinding from these points, our opinion is proved in human union, whereby it will simultaneously be proved in every other union. That is the sustentative subject of human union upon which, as presupposed, the eduction of that union depends. But this eduction so depends upon matter alone. Therefore matter alone is the sustentative subject of such union. I prove the minor premise both because in man the eduction of union is the generation of the whole, while all philosophers with Aristotle establish matter alone as the subject of the generation of the whole or composite, just as it alone is the subject of substantial change; and because in generating or educing the generator depends upon that presupposed subject which it previously disposes and prepares for form and union. But in human generation this subject is matter alone, for the generator introduces no previous disposition into the rational soul.

11. Hence one will infer, 1º, that human union is material entitatively, because by its own nature it is caused by and depends upon matter. Therefore it is spiritual only connectively and determinatively, because it is connected with a spiritual soul and ultimately determines it to constitute a man. One will infer, 2º, that a mode does not necessarily depend as upon a subject of sustentation upon every thing whose mode it is and without which it cannot exist even by divine power. Thus eduction identified with passion is not sustained in the agent whose mode it is. Thus human union, if produced by God through creation, as is possible according to the opponents, would have no subject of sustentation, and consequently would be sustained neither in matter nor in form, although it would be a mode of

both. Therefore, although union is a mode of form and is essentially bound to it, it need not thereby be sustained in form. And it should be noted that "to be sustained by another," as now understood, is not the same as essentially to depend upon another and to be unable to exist without it. For in that sense the hypostatic union is sustained by the Word, indeed every creature by the First Cause. It is therefore the same as to be educed from another, or to be caused by another in the genus of material cause.

12. One will infer, 3º, that form does not have physical priority with respect to union, because it neither precedes union in time nor is its physical cause. Except, however, the union which a man acquires through nutrition with the matter of food, for this presupposes the soul, not as a material cause but as an efficient cause. Nor is this inference opposed, 1º, by the fact that union is the exercise and causality of form in the composite. For an intrinsic and constitutive formal cause does not require physical priority with respect to its causality and effect, but at most logical priority, which they call "in consequence of subsistence," insofar as the consequence, at least metaphysically, does not hold from the existence of the form to the existence of the union and composite, but does hold conversely.

13. Nor is it opposed, 2º, by the common saying that a thing's being is prior to its being in such a mode. For this is true only of logical priority, or when it is otherwise proved that the mode is caused by the thing itself. Nor is it opposed, 3º, by the rational soul's indifference toward union. For indifference proves no more than logical priority, since nothing prevents an indifferent thing from being determined by a mode concomitantly produced by another cause. The doctrine of these solutions must be admitted by the opponents for the case in which union were created simultaneously with the rational soul. For then the soul would in no way be physically prior to union, although of itself indifferent to it, and through it would be in such a mode and would cause a man.

14. But it is still principally objected: if form with respect to union is not a subject of sustentation, neither will it be a subject of information, for this too requires physical priority, at least after the manner of an occasion or previous condition, in the way disposed matter is physically prior to the rational soul. Therefore form will in no proper sense be a subject of union. Therefore it cannot be intrinsically affected or perfected by union, just as the Word is not affected or perfected by the hypostatic union because He is not its subject either of sustentation or information. The common answer is that form with respect to union is not properly a subject, namely neither of sustentation nor of information, but is only an "intrinsic term." By this name is signified a thing which some mode essentially requires to be intimately

conjoined with itself, although the mode is not received in it. Thus eduction or passion regards the form as a pure intrinsic term. Many confuse "intrinsic term" with a "subject of pure adhesion," concerning which, however, not all seem to agree.

15. It is denied, however, that form cannot be intrinsically perfected by union even though it is not properly its subject, because through union form is intrinsically conjoined to its subject, which it innately desires and in which it attains its natural complement. With this conjunction and attainment the form is intrinsically better disposed than without it, and this very being better disposed is to be perfected. Nor is it precisely because the Word is not a subject of the hypostatic union that He is not perfected by it, but because, on account of His perfection infinite in every genus, He cannot be better disposed with union than with its absence. Moreover, that a thing can be perfected by that of which it is not properly a subject is evident both in the humanity of Christ, which is perfected by the Word, of which it is not a subject; in the degrees of intensity of qualities, which mutually perfect one another although they do not mutually receive or inform one another; and in any substantial or accidental form, which is perfected by the subject although it is not a subject of the subject.

16. But, to confess the truth, I find no great difficulty in saying that union is in form as in a partial subject of information. For, as we noted disp. 2, c. 2, a subject of information does not in its concept require physical priority, although it ordinarily has it because it ordinarily at the same time fulfills the office of a subject of sustentation either of the form or at least of its union. But if it does not simultaneously fulfill this office, it does not need physical priority. Therefore, if God were simultaneously to create the matter, soul, and union of a man, matter would have no physical priority with respect to either soul or union, because with respect to neither would it fulfill the office of a subject of sustentation, although it would truly be the subject of information of both.

17. Therefore nothing prevents union from being in matter as in a partial subject of information and a total subject of sustentation, and at the same time being in form as in another partial subject of information. Thus union can be considered both insofar as it is the causality of form in the composite and insofar as it is a certain form of the form itself, with which it constitutes a certain whole, namely the denomination "actually informing" matter, of which denomination the union itself is the principal physically distinctive difference.

DISPUTATION VII.

ON THE DISTINCTION OF THE SUBSTANTIAL WHOLE FROM ITS PARTS. WHERE ALSO SOMETHING IS SAID OF THE SUPPOSITUM.

From the intrinsic principles of a natural body, which are called and are its "parts," there results, as an effect originated or caused by those principles, the natural body itself, which is called the composite or substantial whole. In order that its quiddity may be thoroughly known, it remains to be seen whether it consists in something really distinct from the principles thus far explained, namely, from matter and form and their union, or whether instead it is really indistinct from them. And the question concerns matter, form, and union taken together, or all the parts taken collectively. For if they are taken singly, an inadequate real distinction of each part from the whole, and conversely, must unquestionably be admitted, because the whole includes any one part and, in addition, another; and in this consists the inadequate distinction which they call that "of the including and the included." Likewise, the question now concerns the substantial whole, not insofar as it is a *suppositum* (for as such it adds subsistence to the aforesaid parts, of which shortly), but precisely insofar as it is a natural being, or a substance complete in the being of nature, which in man, for example, is signified by the name "humanity," or "human nature," or "man taken essentially."

That the substantial whole is really distinguished from all its parts taken conjointly, and consists in a third absolute entity superadded to matter and

form united, is maintained with Scotus by all or almost all Scotists, to whom some from our School and from the Thomistic School adhere. Some restrict this opinion to the substantial whole resulting from matter and form, and do not wish it extended to the integral whole or to the accidental whole, whether the latter consists in a physical union, as a "white thing," or merely in local aggregation, as a "heap" of stones. Thus Mastrius with other Scotists. Others, however, distinguish even an integral composite, whether homogeneous or heterogeneous, from all its parts. Thus the Scotist Merinerus, who reports others. Yet no one seems to distinguish the accidental whole from its parts; at least Merinerus assumes as certain that it is by no means distinguished from them, which Mastrius also confirms from the common judgment of all. But that the substantial whole, and still more any other whole, is really indistinct from the collection of its parts and their union, is the most commonly received opinion in our School and the Thomistic School, with Aristotle and St. Thomas in the places cited by P. Suárez, disp. 36, *Metaphysica*, s. 3.

CHAPTER I.
The Substantial Whole Is Really Indistinct from Its Parts and Union, Taken Together.

1. Proof: first, the substantial whole is not adequately really distinguished from all the united parts; next, neither is it inadequately really distinguished from them; therefore there is no real distinction. The premises must be proved separately. Proof of the major premise, which alone the Scotists seem to deny: the whole, insofar as it is adequately distinguished from the parts, is either really composite in its entity or really simple. If it is composite, then it consists of other parts. If this is so, I ask whether the whole is distinguished from these other parts. If one affirms this, we shall proceed to infinity, for the whole, insofar as adequately distinguished from these new parts, will again be composed of others, concerning which the same question will arise. If one denies it, then the whole is not distinguished from all the parts of which it consists, which the Scotists utterly deny; and if this is granted, no reason remains for them to distinguish the whole from matter, form, and union taken together.

2. But if the whole, insofar as adequately distinguished from its parts, is asserted to be a really simple entity, "this implies a contradiction in terms and is manifestly contrary to Scotus," as Mastrius says here, disp. 5, n. 169, and rightly so. For it follows 1º that the composite is not composite; that a simple entity has parts; and that man is no less simple and uncompounded

in his entity than an Angel. It follows 2º that the simple entity in which the quiddity of the whole man consists is neither spiritual nor material. It is not spiritual, because it essentially depends upon matter and naturally upon quantity. It is not material, because it would be more imperfect than the rational soul, and it is contradictory that the whole should be more imperfect than its part.

3. Confirmation 1: if man in the being of a whole is adequately distinguished from the rational soul, he will not by identity be a rational animal; indeed, he will not even be living, because he does not identify with himself the sole root of reasoning, sensing, and vegetating, which is the soul. The same absurdity applies equally to a horse and to every composite, for no composite would have its definition by identity, since the definition is always taken from the form. And indeed, who can conceive a true humanity, or true human nature, which excludes the rational soul from real identity with itself? The Scotists say, as may be seen in Mastrius, n. 170, that this third entity, which is "the whole quiddity of the whole," is not united to the parts and does not make a composition with them, because it is not a partial but a total entity. They further say, in the same Mastrius, n. 173, that a man's intellection is not received in that third entity, nor does it belong to it immediately and by reason of itself, but only by reason of a part, namely the soul; yet material operations, such as all sensations, formally and immediately belong to the whole and are received in it.

4. From these things I infer 1º that humanity does not truly understand. Proof: that which receives intellection neither immediately nor mediately does not truly understand, as is evident. But humanity does not receive intellection immediately, as you concede; nor mediately, because it does not receive the receptive principle of intellection, namely the soul, since the soul is not united to humanity, as you maintain. Therefore, etc. One may say: humanity receives intellection by reason of a part by which it is intrinsically constituted. Against this: according to you, for the soul to be a part by which humanity is intrinsically constituted is not for the soul to be really identified with humanity or united to humanity. It therefore always remains true that intellection is received in something which is neither identified with nor united to humanity. But this is for intellection to be received in humanity neither immediately nor mediately, and not to be united to it.

5. I infer 2º that humanity does not truly sense by sensation either, even if it receives sensation in itself. Proof: because to sense is to live, and humanity does not truly live by a sensation which it does not actively elicit but merely passively receives, as is evident from the concept of life. But humanity certainly does not elicit sensation if it is adequately distinguished

from the sole elicitive principle of sensation, which is the soul. Hence elsewhere the Scotists infer, and rightly, that the soul would not truly live by supernatural love if the habit were the entire ground of acting. Yet here the difficulty is smaller, because at least the habit is united to the soul, whereas the soul is not united to humanity, as they now maintain.

6. Confirmation 2: because the statement in the Athanasian Creed will not be verified: "As the rational soul and flesh are one man, so God and man are one Christ." For if the first part, as the Scotists maintain, does not yield an identical but a causal sense, as though it said, "the rational soul and flesh are the cause of man, who is indeed really distinct from them," the latter part will yield the same sense, as the particles "as" and "so" require. Therefore God and man will be one Christ, not identically but only causally. Therefore Christ will be adequately distinguished from God and man, and consequently will not be God, which is contrary to the Faith.

7. Confirmation 3: if that third entity which is the whole quiddity of the composite is adequately distinguished from the parts, it is truly produced from nothing and ceases into nothing; therefore it is not generated but created, nor corrupted but annihilated. Proof of the antecedent: that is truly and properly produced from nothing which is produced both from nothing of itself and from no sustaining subject from which it is educed, as we saw in disp. 4, c. 4. But that entity, first, is produced from nothing of itself, because nothing of it precedes, since matter, form, and union are nothing of that entity, seeing that they are adequately really distinguished from it. Furthermore, it is also produced from no subject of sustentation or eduction, both because that entity has neither matter nor form as its subject, for otherwise it would be received in them and united to them, which the Scotists deny; and because no entity is educible from the potency of a subject unless it is a form and makes a composition with the subject. Such is not that third entity, for otherwise it would be a partial rather than a total entity, as Mastrius inferred. And hence it is concluded in the same way that this entity truly and properly ceases into nothing, namely both into nothing of itself and into nothing of a subject.

8. I know that the Scotists say that "the parts are something of the composite," that they are "of the essence" of the whole, that they "pertain to its essence," that they are "really distinguished" from it but "not essentially"; these and similar expressions may be seen in Mastrius, disp. cit., q. 13. Hence, since the composite is made from the parts, it is truly made not from nothing but from something of itself, from something pertaining to its essence. But these expressions are either equivocal or imply a contradiction in terms. For if the parts are adequately really distinguished from the whole

entity of the composite, how are they "something of it"? They certainly are not something of it by identity, since they are adequately distinguished from it; nor are they something of it by physical union, since according to the Scotists they are not united to the whole. It remains, therefore, that they are something of it by possession or ownership, in the way Peter's cloak is something of Peter. But this sense is irrelevant to a philosophical explanation of production "from something," as everyone sees.

9. One may say that it cannot be denied that a part is something of the whole. I grant it, provided we do not abuse the name "part," which among everyone except the Scotists signifies something inadequately identified with the whole; indeed, among the Scotists it signifies this very thing when they speak of the parts of an integral whole, or of a physical accidental whole, or of an artificial whole, or of a whole by aggregation. But if you so abuse the name "part" that you apply it to a thing adequately distinct from the whole, the part will be no more something of the whole than a cloak is something of Peter. Indeed, it will be most truly said that "the part is nothing of the whole," because "it is no entity identified with the whole"; and that it "is not something of the whole," because it is "no what of it," since it is not its quiddity either adequately or inadequately.

10. Moreover, what does it mean for the parts to be "really, but not essentially, distinguished" from the whole? Mastrius answers, nn. 164 and 174, that the parts constitute the essence of the whole, and that one thing is said to be essentially indistinct from, or the same as, another when it constitutes its essence. But according to Mastrius himself, ibid., for the parts to constitute the essence of the whole does not prevent the parts taken together from having an essence really distinct from the whole essence of the whole. Therefore the essence of the parts is not really the essence of the whole; therefore they are really distinguished according to their essences. Provided this is established, abuse the terms as you please and deny that the parts are "essentially" distinguished from the whole. Nevertheless, it will remain true that the essence of the whole, when it is made from the parts, is made from nothing of itself, or from no part of its own essence, since it is made from something which, though it is "of its essence and pertains to its essence," to speak in your manner, nevertheless really is not its essence, not even inadequately, and therefore is no essence of it, no quiddity, no what, or no something of it.

11. Finally, confirmation: if an adequate distinction of the whole from the parts is posited, intrinsic and constitutive causes do not differ from extrinsic or efficient causes, especially from those which cause their effects by natural resultance or emanation, as when water recovers its lost coldness. This is

absurd among the Scotists and among everyone; but it is proved as follows. According to the Opponents, the parts taken together make one total cause, upon which the composite follows as an adequately really distinct effect. But why does this total cause differ from an efficient cause? Is it because the effect is caused by resultance? But coldness also results from water. Is it because there is an essential connection and inseparability between cause and effect? But even a necessary efficient cause, given the application of the First Cause, is essentially connected with its effect; and Omnipotence itself, insofar as applied by the free decree to produce the world, is metaphysically inseparable from the world, and the world from it. I omit that the Scotists gratuitously posit a metaphysical inseparability between the whole and the united parts, although neither are the parts a mode of the whole nor conversely, and furthermore they are adequately really distinguished, not as formalities but as things.

12. One may say with the Scotists: intrinsic causes differ from the others because they cause by intrinsically constituting and composing the effect; because they are included in the effect and remain within it; because they are of its essence and pertain to its essence. But against this, 1º: according to you, intrinsically constituting and composing the effect is not to be really identified, even inadequately, with the effect; indeed, it is not even to be united to it, although union with the effect is often found in an efficient cause. What, then, does this constituting or "composing" signify which cannot belong to an efficient cause? Against this, 2º: apart from identity and union, what is it "to be included" and "to remain within the effect"? Is it to penetrate it locally, or to remain in the same place? But an efficient cause also penetrates an immanent effect, and Omnipotence is intimately present to every creature. Is it to be included and contained like a silkworm in its cocoon? But the silkworm also efficiently causes and weaves the cocoon within whose hollow it conceals itself. Against this, 3º: if an intrinsic cause is neither identified with nor united to its effect, it can be "of its essence" or "pertain to its essence" only insofar as it is essentially connected with the effect and the effect with such a cause. But connection is also found in an efficient cause, as we have shown. Therefore Omnipotence, insofar as applied to creating, could by the same abuse of terms be said to be of the essence of the creature and to pertain to its essence.

13. From what has been said you will understand the idiom of the Scotists in the present question. When they unhesitatingly admit these expressions, "The parts intrinsically constitute and compose the whole; they are of the essence of the whole; they are something of it; they are essentially included in the whole," and "the whole is distinguished from the parts only

as the including from the included," do not think that by these expressions the Scotists signify a real identity, at least an inadequate one, between the parts and the whole, as is signified by other Scholastics and, when speaking of an accidental whole, by everyone. Therefore, in order to attack them, use the arguments indicated from n. 8 onward. They do indeed abstain from the name "adequate distinction" between the whole and its parts, but they plainly intend it when they say that the whole is distinguished "by its whole self" from the united parts, and that the third entity added over the parts "is not something of the composite, but its whole entity, for it is not added in the manner of a part but in the manner of a whole," and is not "a partial entity but a total one," and is "the whole quiddity of the whole." These and similar expressions are the words of Mastrius, Merinerus, and Pontius.

14. Mastrius adds two things. 1º The whole is distinguished from the parts "by its whole self taken categorematically," in which sense the expression stands for the third superadded entity, but not "by its whole self taken syncategorematically," for in this latter sense it "stands for every and each part of the whole." 2º The essence of man, and understand the same of other wholes, namely humanity, taken "directly and as the direct term," consists wholly in that third entity; but "causally, constitutively, indirectly," and "in the oblique mode," body and soul "are of the essence of man" and "pertain to the essence of man." Or, as Merinerus says, they are not "formally" the essence of man but only "causally" and "on the way to it."

15. Therefore, in order to use the arguments set forth above, you must take man "categorematically," which means the same as "substantively"; likewise "directly," "as the direct term," or "formally." Thus you will be able to infer that man, taken substantively, directly, and formally, is distinguished according to his whole self from every composition and from every soul, and consequently from every substantial vitality, animality, and rationality. Hence he will not be "formally" something composite, nor "directly" living, nor "substantively" and "as the direct term" a rational animal, which are very strange consequences. You will likewise be able to infer that body and soul are not of the essence of man except "constitutively," that is, "causally" and "on the way to it," namely by causing, with essential connection if you please, the essence of man adequately distinct from them. And this very thing is to pertain to the essence of man "indirectly" and "in the oblique mode." Hence in the same manner the action of an efficient cause will be of the essence of its effect; and Omnipotence, insofar as freely applied, will pertain to the essence of the creature, which in its being as such cannot be conceived except as dependent upon Omnipotence, with which it is essentially connected. But who would not call this absurd?

16. Now the minor premise of the first syllogism in n. 1, namely that the whole is not inadequately distinguished from the parts taken conjointly, is easily proved. For the whole to be inadequately distinguished from the parts signifies that the whole is identified with them and, in addition, with another entity which is not the whole essence of the whole and therefore is another part of it. I therefore ask whether the whole is inadequately distinguished from the collection of this new part and the others. If one denies it, then the whole is not inadequately distinguished from all its parts taken collectively. If one affirms it, then beyond the collection just mentioned the whole further adds another new part, concerning which, insofar as it is collected with the preceding parts, the same question will return; and so to infinity.

17. One may perhaps say: the superadded entity is not a part but a totality, or the form of the whole. But this says nothing. For that totality is either the whole quiddity of the whole or it is not. If it is, then the whole quiddity of the whole will be distinguished from the parts not inadequately but adequately. If it is not, then it is a part of the quiddity, for it is altogether contradictory that something should be a what of the whole and yet be neither the whole quiddity nor a part of the quiddity. Moreover, that form of the whole is either united to the parts or it is not. If it is not united, then the whole is identified with entities not united to one another and consequently is not one. If it is united to the parts in order to compose the whole, what does it lack in order to be a part?

18. One may say again: although the whole is in no way distinguished from absolutely all its parts, nevertheless it is inadequately distinguished from matter, form, and union taken collectively, because it adds in addition another new absolute part. But against this, 1º: almost all the arguments for the contrary opinion either prove a distinction from absolutely all the parts or prove nothing. Against this, 2º: because this new part is altogether superfluous and useless. For, once there are posited, for example, an organic body, a rational soul, and their union, everything sufficient for a man to exist is posited. For the complex of these three, prescinding from anything else, is first of all one through itself, since it consists of act and potency of the genus of substance substantially united; or else explain why the complex of these together with another part superadded by you is one through itself. Next, it is capable of eliciting all the operations proper to man, because it contains their active and passive principles, namely the soul and the body. And it is evident that a rational soul substantially united to a suitably disposed body furnished with organs for seeing, hearing, etc., can elicit vision, hearing, etc. Therefore that complex is one through itself, capable of sensing and

reasoning, and consequently is a rational animal. Therefore the definition of man belongs to it. Therefore it truly is a man.

19. Finally, our opinion is strengthened by the example of the integral, accidental, and aggregate whole, in which the Scotists' arguments are most plainly countered. For first, an integral whole, for example the sea, is not distinguished from all its parts. This is so both because from the terms themselves and from everyone's conception it is evident that two halves of the sea united by continuity are the whole sea, and because otherwise the sea would be really distinguished from all divisibility, since divisibility pertains wholly to the parts. Hence the whole sea would be something entitatively indivisible even though diffused throughout the whole world. Next, the same is evident in an accidental whole. For if such a whole were distinguished from subject and accident, then insofar as so distinguished it would be an accident, since it is repugnant that a substance should be caused from an accident as from an intrinsic part of itself. Therefore it would have to be received in a subject, because "the being of every accident is *inesse*." Therefore from it and the subject another accidental whole would result, concerning which the same question would arise, and so without end. The same argument applies to an artificial whole. Finally, no one doubts concerning a whole by aggregation, for even countrymen know that a heap of wheat is nothing other than many grains of wheat heaped together. Likewise, no one seems to doubt concerning a numerical whole, for example the number three, or concerning a metaphysical whole constituted from genus and difference.

20. If one asks whether the whole is at least distinguished by reason from the parts taken collectively, I answer: it is not distinguished by a proper and strict distinction of reason, but only by that less proper distinction which they call one "according to the implicit and explicit," or that which exists between a definition and the thing defined, for example between man and rational animal. The reason is that this concept, "matter, form, and the union of both," expressly and distinctly sets forth the whole physical essence which the name "composite" or "substantial whole" signifies confusedly or indistinctly. Nor does it matter that the whole is said to "result" from the parts. For a heap of wheat is also said to "result" from many grains, the number three from three units, a species from genus and difference, and a hot thing from heat and subject, yet in these no strict distinction of reason exists. Therefore this "resultance" does not prove any true efflux of the whole from the collection of the parts, but only a distinction "from the mode of signifying," or our manner of conceiving the whole as though it flowed from them.

CHAPTER II.
The Contrary Arguments Are Answered.

1. For a clearer understanding of the solutions, certain things must be noted beforehand. 1º Under the name "parts" we here include the union also, because although it is not so much called a part as the bond of the parts, and is not a part or constitutive principle "as that which" but "as that by which," it is nevertheless an entity truly inadequately identified with the whole. Hence, when we deny that the whole is distinguished from the parts taken collectively, we deny that it is distinguished from the complex or collection of matter, form, and union. But if the complex is taken as consisting only of the absolute parts, namely matter and form, the whole is indeed inadequately really distinguished from it, because it further includes the union.

2. 2º It is commonly said that all the parts taken "distributively" are inadequately distinguished from the whole, but not all the parts taken "collectively." This distinction signifies that propositions are true in which distinction is affirmed of the "individual" parts or of "each" part. For in distributive supposition "all" signifies the same as "each," and the predicate is affirmed in full of "each individual," not of "all" in the manner of one real subject, as is known from the *Summulae*. But the proposition is not therefore true when distinction is affirmed of all the parts as constituting one real subject to which the predicate belongs, as collective or conjoint supposition requires. Hence the proposition, "all the parts are distinguished from the whole," under distributive supposition yields this sense: "matter is distinguished from the whole, and form is distinguished from the whole, and union is distinguished from the whole," which sense is true. But under collective supposition it is equivalent to this: "matter and form and union are distinguished from the whole," which proposition is false. These things are evident from the "descent" of suppositions explained in the *Summulae*.

3. Hence one would argue ineptly as follows: "All the parts taken distributively" are "all the parts taken collectively," because in either way all are signified, with none excepted; but all the parts taken distributively are distinguished from the whole; therefore all the parts taken collectively are also distinguished from it. Ineptly, I say, just as if one argued thus: "All the Apostles taken collectively" are "all the Apostles taken distributively"; but all the Apostles taken collectively are twelve; therefore all the Apostles taken distributively are twelve, or, what means the same, each one is twelve. The

major premise can therefore be denied, because each part is not all the parts and is not the collection of all. But because room for quibbling still remains, I distinguish the major premise thus: all the parts taken distributively are all the parts taken collectively, that is, collected into one subject of which "to be distinguished from the whole" is verified: I deny it, for all the parts so collected are chimerical parts with which the true parts are not identified, just as conversely all the Apostles so distributed that "to be twelve" is verified of each are chimerical; collected in another way, let the major premise pass. Then, granting the minor premise, I distinguish the consequence: all taken collectively, that is, collected into one subject of distinction from the whole: I deny the supposition, namely that such parts exist or are possible; collected in another way, let the consequence pass. To the appended proof say that in either manner all the parts are signified, not chimerical parts but true parts.

4. 3° "Intrinsic cause" or "constitutive cause" means the same as "intrinsic constitutive principle" or "part intrinsically composing"; and "to cause the whole intrinsically" means the same as "to be an actual part of the whole." Hence, just as it implies a contradiction in terms to be a part of a whole and at the same time to be adequately distinguished from the whole, because this is equivalent to being something of the whole and at the same time nothing of the whole, so it implies a contradiction in terms to be an intrinsic cause and at the same time to be adequately distinguished from the thing caused, or whole. Likewise, just as no part fails to be inadequately distinguished from the whole, for otherwise it would no longer be a part but the whole, the same must be held of an intrinsic cause. Likewise, just as a part, when it constitutes and composes the whole, does nothing other than be united with the other parts, so an intrinsic cause, when it causes the whole, does nothing other than be united with the others and thus become something of the whole. For this is what it is for form, for example, to give being to the whole: it gives its own being in such a way that it becomes the being of the whole, as in fact it does by the very fact that it is united with the being of the other parts. Hence you see that there is a great difference between an intrinsic cause and an extrinsic cause, for example an efficient cause; for the latter causes by giving to the effect a being adequately distinct from the being of the cause. Finally, just as the office of a part does not belong to all the parts taken collectively or together, for in this way they have the character of the whole, as is evident in a heap of wheat, but only to the parts taken separately or individually, so one must judge of the office of an intrinsic cause. Yet do not think that by the adverbs "separately," "individually," and the like, the actual state of union is here excluded, for

without it the office of part or intrinsic cause is not exercised. Only the conjunction or simultaneity of the other parts under the aspect of constituting one subject or direct term of which "to be a part" or "to cause the whole intrinsically" is verified is excluded, because these predicates, even when the parts are actually united, are verified of them only "separately," that is, "singly."

5. 4º It is truly said, "the form united to matter causes the whole"; but it is falsely said, "form, union, and matter cause the whole." For in the first assertion only the form is signified as the direct term, while the union and matter are signified obliquely. Hence, since the predicate falls only upon the direct term of the subject, it falls only upon the form. But in the second assertion all the parts are taken as direct terms in the manner of a conjoint subject, and thus they are falsely said to cause the whole. This assertion, however, "matter and form united," or "matter and form with the union, cause the whole," is commonly denied because matter and form united, or with the union, are judged to be the whole itself. But it is denied for this reason: although the union is verbally placed in an oblique position, mentally it is nevertheless taken as a direct term, like matter and form, as though together with them it constituted one conjoint subject. If, however, according to the speaker's intention the union is taken obliquely, the assertion must be granted, because it yields this sense: "matter and form, when they are united, cause the whole." In this sense the predicate falls only upon the entities of matter and form, which are inadequately distinguished from the whole, since the latter further includes the union, and consequently are truly said to cause it.

6. Understand the same when it is said, "matter and form, insofar as united, cause." For this is true if the union is reduplicated precisely as a circumstance or condition; but it is false if the reduplication takes the union as a direct term. One may say: "direct" and "oblique" are intentional terms which do not exist on the side of reality. I grant this; but by these terms we signify what exists on the side of reality. For we call the "direct term" that to which we say the predicate belongs on the side of reality, and the "oblique term" that which, although signified together with such a direct term, is nevertheless not signified in such a way that we say the predicate in question belongs to it on the side of reality. See how widely the affirmed objects of these expressions differ on the side of reality: "God's creature is something finite"; "the creature and God are something finite." From these preliminary points, which, if anyone refuses to admit them, must be urged by the example of the accidental whole and the others discussed in the preceding chapter, n. 19, you will now easily solve the principal objections.

7. Objection 1: the parts of the composite are causes of the substantial whole, and the latter is their effect; but every cause is really distinguished from its effect; therefore between the substantial whole and all its parts there is a real distinction. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: the parts of the composite taken distributively, separately, or singly are causes of the whole: I grant it; taken collectively or conjointly: I deny the major premise. Then, granting the minor premise as to either an adequate or an inadequate distinction, I distinguish the consequence under the same terms. The sense and truth of the solution are evident from the preliminary points, once it is supposed that the parts are causes of the whole, not extrinsic but intrinsic. This must furthermore be admitted by the Opponents in an integral or accidental whole.

8. If one says that there are no causes properly so called in an accidental whole because it is not properly one, first, an integral whole is properly one. Next, an accidental whole, for example a "hot thing," although it is not called one through itself because it is not composed of act and potency of the same genus, is nevertheless properly one by the proper union of a physical union between heat and fire, for that union is without doubt proper and natural. And at least in the manner in which it is one physical concrete, it depends and results from heat no less than man does from the soul, and therefore is no less intrinsically caused. Add that an intrinsic cause and an intrinsic part differ in nothing. But even if the name "cause" is omitted, the objection is plainly countered under the name "part" as follows: the subject and heat, understanding also the union, are parts of the concrete "hot thing," and really compose and constitute it; but every part really composing and constituting is really distinguished from the constituted thing of which it is a part, for nothing is a part of itself, nor does it really compose or constitute itself, as is evident. Therefore between that concrete and all its parts there is a real distinction. The same argument can be made concerning a heap of stones.

9. Reply 1: the form, for example, does not cause itself, nor matter, nor the union; therefore when it causes the substantial whole it causes something distinct from these three. I counter, as just now: heat is not a part of itself, nor of the subject, nor of the union; therefore when it is a part of the concrete "hot thing," it is a part of something distinct from these three. Therefore I distinguish the antecedent: the form does not cause itself, nor matter, nor union, taken singly: I grant it; taken conjointly: I deny the antecedent. Then I distinguish the consequence: something distinct from these three taken conjointly: I deny it; from them taken singly: I subdistinguish: something inadequately distinct: I grant it; adequately

distinct: I deny the consequence. The form therefore intrinsically causes itself, matter, and union taken conjointly, because taken thus they are their whole collection, and the form intrinsically causes this collection by the very fact that it is a part of it; for to cause something intrinsically is nothing other than to be a part of it.

10. Reply 2: form, matter, and union, taken singly, are not intrinsically causable by the form; therefore neither is their collection intrinsically causable by the form. Thus a collection of three chimeras is not efficiently causable by God, because three chimeras taken singly are not efficiently causable by God. But this too is subject to the counterinstance just given, because similarly heat, subject, and union taken singly are not intrinsically causable or constitutable from heat as from a part of themselves. Moreover, I say that form, matter, and union taken singly are intrinsically causable by the form, not indeed through a causality distributively affecting each of them, but through a causality denominating all of them conjointly, so that the denomination "caused" belongs to all taken collectively. That is to say: each is capable, not of being caused by the form singly or separately, but of being caused collectively, because each is truly capable of being included in the collection which is intrinsically caused by the form, that is, of which the form is a part.

11. If one infers: therefore the form also is intrinsically causable and caused by itself. I answer by distinguishing: without any real distinction between the form as causing and as caused: I deny it; with an inadequate real distinction: I grant the consequence. The form receives the denomination "intrinsically causing" only when taken alone or separately from the others, see above n. 4; and it receives the denomination "intrinsically caused" only when taken collectively with matter and union, so that this denomination is verified only of the whole collection as of a single subject. But between the form taken collectively and the form taken separately there is indeed an inadequate real distinction. Hence you will solve this syllogism: The form does not cause the composite insofar as the composite includes the form itself; neither does it cause the composite insofar as the composite includes matter and union; therefore the form in no way causes the composite. For you will answer that the form causes the composite insofar as the latter includes the form itself as collected with matter and union, and likewise insofar as it includes matter and union as collected with the form; so that the denomination "intrinsically caused" by the form can never be applied either to the form alone or to matter and union alone, because it means the same as the denomination "having form as a part of itself," and this belongs only to the collection of all as such.

12. Reply 3: matter, form, and union, taken singly, are partial or inadequate intrinsic causes; therefore their collection is the total or adequate intrinsic cause of the substantial whole, no otherwise than the collection of all partial efficient causes is the total and adequate efficient cause. But the adequate cause of the whole is really distinguished from it; therefore, etc. I answer: the same counterinstance applies in the accidental whole, as well as in the very collection of which we are speaking. For matter, form, and union actually existing, every other entity being prescinded from, are a physical collection of entities or a certain physically undivided conjunction, for matter and form are not divided from one another nor from the union. But the inadequate intrinsic causes of this conjunction are matter, form, and union taken singly. Will their collection therefore be the adequate intrinsic cause of this same conjunction or collection itself? And if the name "cause" is omitted, the counterinstance is more evident under the name "part." Matter, form, and union, taken singly, are parts inadequately composing the collection of themselves; therefore their collection will be an adequate part composing itself, or an adequate part of itself. This is a manifest contradiction in terms, both because of the lack of distinction and because of the repugnance of the words, for a "part adequate" to the whole is a part which is not a part and is not less than the whole, contrary to the self-evident principle, "The whole is greater than its part."

13. Therefore, to the reply the antecedent is granted, counting the union among the intrinsic causes in the sense in which it is counted among the parts according to n. 1; but the consequence is denied. For "intrinsic cause" means the same as "composing part." Hence, just as "total part" or "adequate part" implies a contradiction in terms because the concept of "part" is inseparable from partiality and inadequacy, so "total intrinsic cause" or "adequate intrinsic cause" implies a contradiction in terms for the same reason. Matter and form may indeed each be called an intrinsic cause adequate in its own genus, that is, the sole one: matter in the genus of subject, and form in the genus of formal cause. The same has a place in the office of part, because either may be called an adequate, that is, sole, part in its own genus: form in the genus of formal part, and matter in the genus of material part. But in the notion of an intrinsic cause absolutely so called, a total or adequate cause is altogether contradictory. Nor does the example of an efficient cause avail, because the latter does not imply inadequacy in its concept; nor is there any reason why its name should be verified more of the individual partial causes than of the collection of all, since this collection is really distinguished from the effect and remains outside it.

14. From this doctrine, 1º it must be denied that an office or predicate belonging to each of the parts without exception must belong to the whole, or collection of all. Therefore these arguments are inept: each part, without exception, is simple, is incomplete, is a part of their collection; therefore the collection is simple, is incomplete, is a part of itself. Likewise: each part of the binary number is a unit; therefore the collection, or the number itself, is a unit. Likewise: each grain of wheat is something small; therefore an enormous heap of wheat is something small. The reason is that between the collection and the individual parts, or the parts taken singly, there is an inadequate real distinction, which suffices for diverse and opposite predications. 2º It must be denied that an inadequate intrinsic cause implies a relation to an adequate intrinsic cause. For it is related only to the other intrinsic concauses, likewise inadequate, and also to the composite under the aspect of the "intrinsically caused," just as a part does not imply a relation to a total part, but to the other co-parts and also to the whole under the aspect of whole. Hence "inadequate" is superfluously added when intrinsic cause is being discussed, just as if one said "partial part"; indeed, in a certain way it falsely supposes that an intrinsic cause could exist which was not inadequate.

15. But one will still insist: the composite is adequately caused intrinsically, or in the intrinsic order; therefore in that same order an adequate cause corresponds to it. Proof of the consequence: because from the terms themselves an adequately caused thing without an adequate cause is repugnant. I answer: the same counterinstance returns under the same terms in the integral whole, accidental whole, etc. Likewise under the name "part intrinsically composing," for by the same reason an "adequately composed thing" seems repugnant without an "adequately composing thing," and hence an adequate part would have to be assigned. Therefore, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. As to the proof, I distinguish the assertion: an adequately caused thing without an adequate cause is repugnant when the discussion concerns something adequately caused in the extrinsic order: I grant it; when it concerns something adequately caused in the intrinsic order: I subdistinguish: without an adequate cause and without many inadequate causes: I grant it; without an adequate cause but with as many inadequate causes as are necessary: I deny it. To be adequately caused intrinsically signifies being constituted from many parts in such a way that none of those necessary is lacking. But to such a constituted thing there does not correspond one part adequately constituting it, but many parts, each constituting it partially, beyond which no other is required. And "constituting part" signifies the same as "intrinsic

cause." Here it should be noted that the composite is caused adequately by each part according to adequacy of the effect, not adequacy of the cause. That is, by the form, for example, the whole composite is caused in the being of a whole, because only as a whole does it include form as a part of itself, which is to be intrinsically caused by it. Yet it is not caused by form alone as though form alone sufficed, but also by matter and union singly. Thus, even among extrinsic causes, when potency and habit influence an act of love, love is caused adequately by each, not according to adequacy of the cause but according to adequacy of the effect.

16. If one asks why matter and form united, with the union taken obliquely, cannot be called the adequate cause of the composite, since they truly cause it according to n. 5, and furthermore there is no other intrinsic cause besides these, since the union is not a cause but a causality, I ask in return why these same things are not called a total or adequate part, since the union is not a part but the bond of the parts. The reason, therefore, is that a cause is not called adequate unless it contains the whole being of the thing caused. But matter and form, even when united, taken by themselves alone as direct terms do not contain by real identity, which is the proper containment of an intrinsic cause, the whole being of the composite, since the latter includes also the union, which matter and form do not identically contain. Therefore the union, so far as the present matter is concerned, just as it is counted among the parts, is also counted among the intrinsic causes, because here every true entity intrinsically included, upon which the composite essentially depends, is called an intrinsic cause. It is therefore called, not simply a cause, but a causality, only because its concept is that of the ultimate determination of the other causes. For the rest, it is most truly included in the composite, and the latter essentially depends upon it.

17. Objection 2: through generation man receives some being simply as such, and through corruption he loses it. But this being is not the being of matter and of the rational soul, since these are neither generated nor corrupted; nor is it the being of the union, because this is not being simply, nor being "as that which," but purely being "as that by which." Therefore it is something else distinct from these. Confirmation 1: because if in the death of man only the union perishes, man will remain according to his whole absolute being; for whatever absolute reality man includes will all remain in matter and soul, and only a pure relation will perish. Confirmation 2: because when Aristotle divides substance into matter, form, and composite, by the name "composite" he does not signify matter and form, for then the division would be nugatory; nor does he signify the union, for then by the name "composite" he would signify something more imperfect than matter

and form. Therefore he signifies something else. To this also pertains Aristotle's statement, l. 5, *Metaphysica*, t. 19, that six is not twice three but once six; and l. 7, t. ult., that the syllable "ba" is not "b" and "a" but something else; and l. 8, t. 15, that a whole which is not merely heaped together is something else besides its parts.

18. To the objection I grant the major premise. As to the minor premise, I say that the being simply as such which man receives by generation and loses by corruption consists in the being of matter, soul, and union, not taken distributively but collectively, because it is the very being of the composite, or the being of man. For although the union alone is the formal term of generation, nevertheless man in the being of a whole is truly the term of denomination, namely, that which is physically, or with physical propriety, denominated "generated," because through generation he is ultimately efficiently determined to existing simply, since he is determined to having all his parts, that is, not only the union but also matter and soul. For man does not have these as parts of himself until the union exists, which both by itself composes man and renders matter and soul actually composing parts. And this is the reason why man is said to be generated through the generation of the union rather than created through the creation of the soul. Similarly, through the corruption of the union man is determined to losing his being simply, because he is determined to having no part of himself; for now soul and matter are no longer actual parts of man. Hence man is truly denominated "physically corrupted." Matter and the rational soul, therefore, are neither corrupted nor generated when taken distributively or as the formal term; they are, however, when taken collectively with the union, as a term of denomination.

19. Hence to Confirmation 1 it must be denied that in the death of man the union alone perishes; for man perishes simply in the being of man and retains no absolute being. For the being which remains in soul and matter was indeed the being of man, but it is no longer the being of man. It must also be denied that the union is a pure categorical relation, for it possesses other predicates in addition, since it is a substantial mode determining and perfecting the extremes and at the same time pertaining intrinsically to the essence of man. To Confirmation 2: by the name "composite" Aristotle signifies in that division not merely the union, nor matter and form alone, but these three entities collectively. Hence the third member of the division is distinguished from the others only inadequately. Nor for this reason is the division nugatory or defective, as we noted in the *Summulae* concerning the rules of division. What Aristotle says concerning the number six and the syllable must likewise be answered by the Opponents, for these are

accidental composites. Therefore six is not said formally to be twice three, either because the two threes are taken not conjointly but singly, or because six includes the continued union or coordination of six units which two threes do not include. Hence there is already some inadequate distinction, namely by reason of the union, and there is no need to add another entity, lest otherwise six become seven. The same should be said of the syllable "ba," which likewise is inadequately distinguished from the letters "b" and "a," both as taken singly and by reason of their conjunction and order in pronunciation or writing.

20. When, however, Aristotle says that a whole which is not merely heaped together is something else besides the parts, he is speaking of parts juxtaposed, or merely locally conjoined, and signifies that the whole further adds a physical or natural union, which a mere heap does not add. For the rest, Aristotle's thought in favor of our opinion is sufficiently evident from the places cited by P. Suárez, especially 4, *Physica*, t. 23 and sqq., and 5, *Metaphysica*, t. 31. Add the authority of the great Augustine, 7, *De Trinitate*, c. 4, and 13, *De Civitate Dei*, c. ult., where he speaks thus: "This indeed is true, that the soul is not the whole man, but the better part of man; nor is the body the whole man, but the lower part of man; but when both are conjoined together, they have the name of man." This is also the express teaching of St. Thomas, 4, *Contra Gentiles*, c. 81, ad 3. Nor does the Holy Doctor teach the opposite in 3, d. 2, q. 1, a. 3, corp., when he says that in Christ there were body and soul, "and further the form of the whole resulting from the conjunction of body and soul, which is called humanity." For he means only that in Christ there were body and soul, not in any manner whatsoever but together with their union, so that true humanity was constituted from them. See there resp. ad 3, quaestiunc., and ibid. ad 3.

21. Objection 3: if the substantial whole is not distinguished from the collection of the parts, it will not be one through itself but one accidentally; for it will be simply many and one only in a certain respect, namely according to the union. Moreover, the collection of parts is like a heaping together of several entities, which can no more properly be called one thing than a heap of stones. I deny the consequence, because that is called one through itself which is constituted from act and potency of the same genus physically united, as we have often said. Nor is this constituted thing one merely in a certain respect or according to the union; rather, it is one from its whole entity, as we explained in the preceding disputation, c. 2, nn. 10 and 11. Nor is plurality of parts opposed to its unity, provided "plurality" does not signify division but only distinction; for otherwise the substantial whole would not be one by unity of composition but by simplicity, not a

composite one but a simple one, like an Angel. Therefore the parts together can be called "simply many" parts and "simply one" whole. What is added concerning a heap is false, for heaping does not include the physical or natural union of the parts which the collection of which we speak certainly includes.

22. Objection 4: many things are verified of the composite which are not verified of the parts even taken collectively; therefore the composite is distinguished from the parts even so taken. Proof of the antecedent: the composite is containing, including, and constituted; the parts are included, contained, and constituting. The composite is one; the parts are only many. The composite is not united; the parts are united. The composite acts and receives accidents "as that which"; the parts do not. I deny the antecedent. To the proof: this entire diversity of predicates must be referred to the parts taken distributively. For if they are taken collectively, they are the composite itself and consequently receive all the predicates verified of the composite, including those which the objection enumerates.

CHAPTER III.

Certain Peculiar Opinions of Authors Distinguishing the Whole from the Parts Are Rejected.

1. The Scotist Faber, theorem. 21, c. 3, posits matter and form united in a certain priority or instant in which they are not yet the whole but are distinguished from it. He then says that through generation these parts are converted into the whole, so that they no longer formally retain their own entities but pass into the substance of the whole. But this Author is very well attacked by Merinerus and Mastrius. He is now briefly rejected. First, because the production of the composite would not be generation but transubstantiation, no less wondrous than the Eucharistic. Next, because if the parts do not retain their own entities within the composite, the composite will not formally consist of parts, nor will it be formally composite, but formally simple. Next, because if the rational soul loses its entity through conversion into the whole, it could not recover it at the death of man unless it were created anew. Finally, because it would follow, contrary to the Faith, that the rational soul does not remain in Christ the Lord.

2. P. Vázquez, in 3 p., d. 19, from n. 28, recognizes in substantial composites, especially in animate beings, besides matter, form, and union, a certain substantial being derived into matter from the form in the genus of formal cause; and he seems to place the totality of the composite in this. He

is moved 1º because matter in the substantial whole is not a mere vehicle of form, as is the subject of an accidental form, but concurs through itself in the operations of the composite in the manner of an acting principle. Thus, in man, for example, not only the soul lives and operates, but matter informed by the soul also does so; for otherwise not the whole man but the soul alone would properly see, build, etc., just as in hot water heat alone properly heats. Therefore some being derived from the form must be admitted, by reason of which matter lives and operates. 2º Because the rational soul gives matter the being of a body, which must be distinguished from the spiritual soul. 3º Because otherwise it would follow that man could no less be called spirit than body, for just as in one respect he is body, so in the other he is spirit. 4º Because the soul of man vivifies matter with a corporeal and corruptible life, which cannot fail to be distinguished from the incorruptible and incorporeal soul.

3. Yet these arguments do not sufficiently prove what they intend. Not the first, because matter never actively concurs in the operations of the composite even if that being derived from the form is admitted. For that being is distinguished from matter, which consequently always remains distinct from every being that actively concurs. Or if matter can be said actively to concur because it receives that active being, why, even apart from such a being, can it not be said actively to concur because it receives the very being of the form, which is certainly active? Therefore matter is not a mere vehicle of substantial form, but further contributes and assists toward the operations of the composite, either as at least a partial subject of material immanent operations, or because it is the proper subject of accidents instrumentally concurring in the operations of the form. Hence it happens that the form in operating depends upon matter, in a way in which heat does not depend upon water, and therefore the operations are attributed to the whole composite. Neither the second nor the third argument proves the point; to these we answered sufficiently in disp. 5, c. 1, from n. 22 to 27.

4. Nor does the fourth, because although the soul in itself and as though in the abstract is incorruptible and incorporeal life, nevertheless in the concrete, or insofar as in second act it vivifies matter, it is corruptible and corporeal life by reason of the union which it involves and by reason of the requirement for quantity, without which such vivification cannot stand. Moreover, the aforesaid opinion can be attacked as follows. That being derived from the form is truly in matter as in a subject; therefore it will be a certain form and act of matter, and indeed a substantial one, since it is substantial being and pertains to the constitution of one thing through itself. Therefore in every composite there will be two substantial forms, which P.

Vázquez elsewhere rejects; and in animate beings there will be two souls, for that being derived from the soul will be another soul, since it is an incomplete substance actively concurring in vital operations.

5. Somewhat akin to this opinion is that which M. Manso reports from Giles of Rome and follows at length, l. 2, *Physica*, q. 7: namely, that the formal effect of every form, whether substantial or accidental, is really distinguished from the form communicated to the subject and consists in a certain being derived from the form, which is not a thing but an entitative mode indistinct from the subject, or entitatively identified with it. But, to begin from this last point, since this mode changes and perishes while matter does not perish entitatively, such indistinction or identity of the mode with matter is altogether repugnant, unless indistinction is taken improperly for non-mutual inseparability. Repeat the arguments of the preceding disputation, c. 1, against the indistinction of the union from matter and form.

6. Next, this opinion is rejected because the formal effect of form is the whole composite. For the latter is intrinsically caused by the form, and only in the genus of formal cause, as is manifest. But the composite can be caused in this way by the form even though it includes nothing besides matter, form, and union, as was explained in the preceding chapter. Therefore, in order to explain the formal effect, that purely modal being adequately distinct from the form and derived from it is superfluous. Add that the formal cause with respect to its primary and positive effect is an intrinsic cause and therefore cannot be adequately distinguished from such an effect; otherwise it would not differ from an extrinsic cause, as we argued against the Scotists above, c. 1. Nor say with Manso, q. cit., n. 26, that the formal cause differs from the efficient cause in that the formal cause is received in the subject to which it gives its effect, whereas the efficient cause is not received within the subject to which it gives its effect. Do not say this, because the habits of our soul, whether natural or supernatural, such as Faith and Charity, are certainly received in the subject to which they give their effect, namely a vital act, of which nevertheless they are efficient causes. Manso's arguments have partly been solved above and partly will be solved where we treat the intension of qualities and the formal effect of quantity.

7. But it should be noted here that when it is commonly said that the formal effect, which is nothing other than the denomination or concrete, whether substantial or accidental, resulting from the form united to the subject, is not distinguished from "the form communicated to a capable subject," the meaning is that such an effect is not distinguished from form,

subject, and communication or union taken collectively. For it is indeed inadequately distinguished from the form and the communication, unless perhaps the formal effect is taken only "for the formal element," as the formal effect of an accidental form is often taken, for example the denomination "white." It should further be noted that this expression, "the form gives its formal effect to the subject," does not signify that such an effect is adequately distinguished from the subject to which it is given or from the form giving it. Otherwise this concrete, "adoptive son of God," which is the formal effect given to man by Grace, would be adequately distinguished from man or from Grace. It signifies only that the form, when it gives itself to the subject, constitutively brings it about that there results a formal effect constituted also from the subject and indeed attributed to that same subject as the direct, either sole or partial, subject according as the effect is accidental or substantial.

8. P. Lynce, l. 2, *Physica*, tr. 9, c. 1, singularly maintains that the substantial whole is altogether the same as the *suppositum* or subsistence. He does not consider subsistence, as the other Authors do, as something incomplete which together with nature constitutes one *suppositum*, but judges human subsistence, for example, to be something complete, adequately distinct from the collection of the parts, and something which truly would be the whole man even if, impossibly, it existed without the parts. He is moved 1º because the Divine Word assumed the collection of soul, body, and union, and yet did not assume a man; therefore man is something distinct from that collection. But that which was not assumed by the Word is human subsistence alone; therefore this subsistence is the whole man. 2º Because if man consists in the collection of the parts, an old man will not be the same as himself when a boy, because of the variation of matter. 3º Because if man identifies with himself the union of the parts, Peter will differ specifically from Paul. He proves this because Peter's union differs more from Paul's union than from other Petrine unions which could exist in place of the present union between the body and soul of Peter alone. For with those unions Peter's present union agrees in an essential binding to these numerically identical extremes, in a way in which it does not agree with Paul's union. But from those unions it differs only numerically. Therefore it differs from Paul's union by more than number; therefore it differs specifically and consequently renders Peter specifically diverse from Paul.

9. This opinion is rejected, 1º because if the composite is not identified with the parts, it will not be a composite being. Lynce says that in order to be called a composite being it suffices that it essentially connote the parts from

which it results. But against this: first, in that case man will be composite only connotatively; otherwise, constitutively, formally, and intrinsically, he will be an altogether simple being, like an Angel. Next, although an accident often results from matter and form united, it is not therefore called composite; nor is a creature called infinite although it essentially connotes an infinite Creator. 2º This opinion is rejected because it is subject to the same attacks by which we rejected the Scotists in c. 1. 3º Because the Word assumed the whole humanity or human nature. If Lynce grants that this is indistinct from the collection of the parts, he agrees with us, for we are not now disputing about the *suppositum*, as we warned at the beginning of the disputation. Yet this Author is singular and speaks contrary to everyone in attributing the name man to subsistence alone. Besides the difficulties indicated in c. 1, he is obliged to think the same of the name Angel and to say that an angelic nature, although it is a complete spiritual substance, is neither an Angel nor in any way identified with an Angel, which is sufficiently absurd.

10. Nor do the arguments of n. 8 stand. To the first: the Word did not assume a man taken personally, or insofar as man signifies a person, because He did not assume human subsistence. This proves indeed that subsistence belongs to the concept of *suppositum* or person, but by no means that it is the whole *suppositum* or the whole man. Thus humanity fails when the union fails, yet the union is not the whole humanity. To the second, we have already answered sufficiently in disp. 4, c. 5. To the third, we have also answered sufficiently in tr. 3, Logic, d. 1, c. 3, n. 12; and the objection is plainly countered by the very humanities of Peter and Paul, which certainly do not differ specifically even though they identify with themselves their respective unions, just as the humanity of Christ does not differ specifically from the others.

CHAPTER IV.
On the Suppositum in Brief.

1. The treatment of the *suppositum* belongs to Metaphysics or Theology. But because mention of it frequently arises even among natural philosophers, we shall now give some account of it, deferring elsewhere questions which require lengthy examination. That which is signified by the concrete names of things standing through themselves, such as "horse," "man," and the like taken absolutely, is called the *suppositum*. But that which is signified by the abstract names corresponding to these concrete names, such as "horseness," "humanity," is called the "nature" of the *suppositum*, or

also its "essence and substance." And this substance or integral nature is what we have thus far explained under its own name of the "substantial composite."

2. The real distinction between *suppositum* and nature is not made known by any physical sign or natural effect, and therefore does not properly belong to Physics. Hence to pagan philosophers man and humanity seemed to differ only according to the mode of signifying, as being and entity do. To Christians, however, this distinction became known from the mystery of the Lord's Incarnation. For the Divine Word assumed human nature constituted from matter, form, and union, and did not assume a man, that is, a created *suppositum* or human person. Hence in Christ the Lord there are two natures, namely Divine and human, but only one *suppositum* and one person, which is not created but Divine. From this it is plainly gathered that the *suppositum* is not nature alone, but adds something further, whether positive or negative. Otherwise humanity could not be separated from its proper *suppositum*, but wherever human nature existed, a created *suppositum* would also exist, which is evidently false in Christ.

3. Therefore the *suppositum* intrinsically includes nature, for who could conceive man absolutely without humanity or human nature, which is the substance of man? But it adds something else, upon whose absence the *suppositum* fails even though the nature does not fail; and this added thing is called "subsistence." For although this name is sometimes taken concretely for the whole *suppositum*, it is more frequently taken abstractly for such an addition. What has been said of a human *suppositum* applies equally to an equine, stony, and other purely corporeal *suppositum*, as well as to an angelic one. But when the nature is rational or intellectual, as in man and Angel, the *suppositum* is called a "person," and its subsistence "personality." The Greek name "hypostasis" means the same as the Latin "person" or "*suppositum*"; hence the union of humanity to the Word is called "hypostatic," that is, "personal." But when the nature is irrational, as in a horse or stone, its *suppositum* is not called a "person," nor its subsistence "personality," but "suppositality" or "pure subsistence." Hence *suppositum* extends more widely than person, because every person is a *suppositum*, but not conversely.

4. You will now ask what subsistence is, or what it adds over nature. The Scotists answer that created subsistence, by which nature is constituted in the being of a *suppositum*, adds nothing positive over nature but only the negation of dependence or union, both actual and aptitudinal, upon another *suppositum*; namely, that the nature is neither naturally apt to be united nor in fact united to another *suppositum*. Hence they infer that the humanity of Christ is not a person or *suppositum* because at least the negation or absence

of actual union is lacking. For although humanity is not naturally apt to be united to a Divine *suppositum*, it is nevertheless in fact supernaturally united to it. But if the humanity were released by the Word, according to this opinion it would immediately by that very fact be a person without any positive addition, for by that very fact it would subsist in itself, or stand in itself and through itself, which is to be a *suppositum*.

5. The most common opinion among Thomists and among our Authors, however, is that created subsistence superadds something positive to nature. This is usually supported both from the mystery of the Trinity, in which not only the Divine nature but also the threefold personality consists in something positive, and because when the Councils define that the Word did not assume a person but human nature, they do not define merely that the Word did not assume the absence of union of human nature with the Word Himself. For this was self-evident and could be denied by no heretic. They therefore suppose that a human person includes, beyond nature, something positive which was not assumed by the Word but was "consumed," as the Fathers say, that is, prevented from being added to such a humanity. This positive reality in which subsistence consists must be something substantial, since it intrinsically constitutes a *suppositum*, which is not one accidentally but one through itself. It is commonly judged, however, to be not a thing but a mode, or a certain form intimately adhering to nature, not absolute but purely modal.

6. Now the office of subsistence, as is quite commonly explained, is to render nature ultimately terminated in the substantial order, or, what is the same, in the order of existing through itself, so that nature insofar as thus terminated is incommunicable to another *suppositum* or subsistence by physical union. We know nothing more concerning a *suppositum* in created things than such incommunicability. For the Fathers against Nestorius infer that there is no created *suppositum* in Christ from the fact that His humanity was united to the person of the Word. This inference would not be valid if a created *suppositum* were not an impediment to the union or communication of human nature to a foreign *suppositum*. Hence at the same time it became known to us both that the *suppositum* adds something over nature and that this something is an impediment to such communication, and indeed an essential impediment, or one essentially incompatible with the union, not only of the whole *suppositum* but also of the nature, to a foreign *suppositum*, as P. Suárez regards as probable, disp. 34, *Metaphysica*, s. 5, n. 51. For a merely natural repugnance to such a union belongs to the nature by reason of itself and prior to its own subsistence.

7. Consequently, incommunicability belongs to the concept of *suppositum* according to all. Therefore, in Boethius's definition, "A person is an individual substance of a rational nature," "individual" means the same as "incommunicable," as all explain. Although incommunicability is verbally a negation, in reality it is something positive, just as incorruptibility, immortality, and immateriality are. Yet a twofold incommunicability arising from subsistence seems to be distinguished. One belongs to the whole *suppositum* in the being of such a thing, and this essentially prevents communication to another *suppositum* or another subsistence, whether of the same or another nature. The other belongs to the nature in the being of such a nature, but nevertheless by reason of the subsistence, unless the nature otherwise has it by reason of itself. This incommunicability consists in this: that nature in the composite sense of its own subsistence, although it may further have other subsistences proper to itself, is altogether incapable of being communicated to a foreign *suppositum*, or to the subsistence of another complete nature. And each of these incommunicabilities belongs to the concept of an "ultimate substantial term." Hence human nature through its own subsistence is rendered incommunicable even by Divine power, both in the being of a *suppositum* to another subsistence even proper to itself, and in the being of nature to a foreign subsistence, although by Divine power it can simultaneously have several proper subsistences. Hence also the Divine nature through the subsistence of the Father, for example, is rendered incommunicable in the being of a *suppositum* to any other subsistence, but in the being of nature remains communicable to the other subsistences proper to itself, namely those of the Son and the Holy Spirit. I add that if a nature, in the divided sense from its proper subsistence, is terminated by a foreign subsistence, through the latter it is rendered incommunicable in the being of nature to every other subsistence except those which are proper to the same nature to which that subsistence which terminates here and now belongs. Hence the subsistence of the Word does not prevent the humanity of Christ, in the being of nature, from being terminable by the subsistences of the Father and the Holy Spirit; but it does prevent it from being terminated in the composite sense by any other subsistence not proper to the Divine nature.

9. [**sic**] From what has been said, subsistence can be defined as "the ultimate term of nature in the substantial order," or "in the order of existing through itself." If one asks what "ultimate term" signifies, I say that it signifies a substantial entity physically united to nature, or identified with it in Divine things, which together with nature ultimately constitutes a concrete reality incommunicable to every other thing in a similar order, and

renders the nature itself incommunicable to a foreign term, that is, one having a similar office in another complete nature. Consequently, the formal effect of subsistence is "to render," or "constitute, nature ultimately terminated in the order of existing through itself." Or otherwise: the formal effect of subsistence is the "*suppositum*"; but the *suppositum* is "complete nature insofar as ultimately terminated, etc." What "insofar as ultimately terminated" signifies remains explained in the explanation of "ultimate term." This explanation appears imperfect to many because it is ultimately reduced to the negative terms of incommunicability. But a clearer or better explanation can scarcely be derived from the principles of Faith from which the distinction of *suppositum* from nature became known to us, especially if an explanation common to created and uncreated subsistence is to be given.

10. Nevertheless, at least as regards created subsistence, the explanation may be reduced to positive terms as follows. The formal effect of subsistence as an ultimate term is to render nature "ultimately subsisting," for thus nature is constituted in the being of a *suppositum*. But "to subsist" is "to stand in itself." Therefore nature ultimately subsists when it ultimately stands in itself. But nature "ultimately stands in itself" when it so possesses itself and is so much its own master in the physical order that it ought primarily and principally to be denominated from its own operations, while at the same time possessing a positive impediment to existing in another by which it might be possessed or physically had and to which its operations might be attributed. Therefore the formal effect of subsistence involves a twofold concept: one positive, namely, "that nature is so much its own master in the physical order that it is simply the principle as that which of its own operations"; the other quasi-negative, namely, "that nature is impeded from existing in another," namely through the incommunicability explained in n. 7, yet in such a way that this quasi-negative concept is founded upon a positive entity. Both concepts are required for subsistence insofar as ultimately terminating.

11. The following points must now be observed. 1º If "to subsist" means the same as "to stand in itself," nature subsists only when it has its proper subsistence; for if it has a foreign subsistence, it does not "stand in itself" but "in another." Hence many reject the expression, "humanity subsists in the Word," because only the Word subsists, whereas humanity exists in another. Yet that expression is true if "to subsist" means "to stand there," or even "to stand under another." 2º Thus far we have spoken of subsistence which is suppositality, or the ultimate constitutive principle of a *suppositum*, as complete subsistence always is in creatures. If, however, as many maintain, there is in God an absolute subsistence besides the relative

subsistences, that subsistence is not suppositality nor the ultimate term of nature, because it does not constitute a concrete reality incommunicable to every other subsistence. Therefore it agrees with the other subsistences only in constituting nature as fully existing through itself without dependence upon any intrinsic substantial term, but not in constituting it as ultimately standing in itself, or incommunicable.

12. 3º In a substantial composite, especially in man, many posit a complete or total subsistence composed of two partial and incomplete subsistences, one belonging to the form and the other to matter, so that the separated soul carries its subsistence with it and matter would retain its own if it existed without form. If this is true, the definition given in n. 9 does not belong to these subsistences taken separately or singly, but only to them taken conjointly with the union of both, just as the definition of man does not belong to the parts except conjointly. Nor is incomplete subsistence taken separately properly "subsistence," insofar as this name is now taken to mean suppositality or the ultimate constitutive principle of a *suppositum*. Nevertheless, it has some office proper to subsistence, namely to render the soul, or also matter, positively incommunicable to a *suppositum* adequately distinct from it, or to the subsistence of another complete nature; and in this sense it denominates the separated soul "subsisting." That may also in a certain way be called incomplete subsistence which a part of water, or of another integral whole, has in a state of continuous union. For in such a state each part of the water is not called a *suppositum*, but the whole water is called one *suppositum*. Yet each part, as soon as it is discontinued from the others, becomes a *suppositum*, because its subsistence is immediately completed through quantitative terms incompatible with union.

13. 4º Operative power is commonly not attributed to subsistence, nor an active influx upon the operations of the *suppositum*. Nevertheless a certain physical priority with respect to them is attributed to it, namely in the manner of a condition required on the side of the active principle, because it is prior for nature to be fully and ultimately constituted in its substantial being than to break forth into operations. 5º It is an axiom received among Theologians and Philosophers that "Actions belong to *supposita*." Yet many apply various exceptions and explanations to it; on these see P. Ulloa, *Prolegomena Scholastica*, disp. 3, c. 1. It is commonly understood thus: whenever operations proceed from a nature existing in a *suppositum*, they are truly attributed to the *suppositum* and truly denominate it "operating as that which," because subsistence, although it is not the ground of acting or active power, nevertheless does not stand accidentally

related to the operations, but is of itself presupposed for them on the side of the nature, as we have just said.

14. Indeed, with respect to the operations of a created nature, the principal principle, or the operator "as that which," is the *suppositum*, whereas nature taken specifically is rather said to be the principle "by which," or the ground of acting. And if the *suppositum* is created, it is related to the nature taken specifically as a whole to a part. But a part, both in being and in operating, belongs more to the whole than to itself; hence by an operation of the hand, for example, man is more properly said to operate than the hand itself. But if the *suppositum* possessing the created nature is uncreated, as in Christ the Lord, then it physically possesses that nature as its own, that is, through physical union, with preeminence and excellence of dignity. Hence the humanity of Christ, just as in being it is not its own master but is the proper nature of the Word as the *suppositum* in which and under which it exists, so its operations are more principally the Word's, or are attributed more principally to the Word, than to the humanity itself from which they immediately flow. And from this arises the communication of properties, of which the Theologians treat.

15. It should be noted here, however, that in created *supposita* for operations to be principally attributed to the *suppositum* is the same as for them to be attributed to nature, not taken specifically, but insofar as terminated by its proper subsistence. Nor should it be admitted, as some seem to wish, that by the name of a created *suppositum*, for example by the name "man" said simply of a mere man, subsistence is signified as the direct term and nature obliquely. For who could believe that the name "man" should be explained thus, "a mode ultimately terminating human nature," rather than thus, "human nature ultimately terminated by a mode"? It is otherwise in Christ, for there by the name "man" subsistence is taken as the direct term and humanity obliquely, both because of the excellence of dignity and because the subsistence of the Word, insofar as distinguished from the humanity, is an entire *suppositum*. But neither reason applies to created subsistence. Nor infer from this that the name "man" is not said univocally of Christ and other men. For it is said univocally according to the expressed and formal signification, which is humanity, and no other univocity is required. For as regards the confused signification, which is the *suppositum*, it is certain that there is a difference greater than generic. Therefore by the name "man," taken for a created person, human nature is signified insofar as ultimately standing in itself, adequately insofar as incommunicably possessing or having itself, so that it is its own master in operating, that is, has the physical right that the operations which it elicits

be principally attributed to it; yet in such a way that the reduplication "insofar as" does not imply subsistence as the direct term, at least not as the principal direct term, but as that "by which" nature is constituted in the being of one possessing or having itself taken specifically. And let these remarks concerning the *suppositum*, as well as concerning Book I of the *Physica*, suffice.

TREATISE II.
ON CAUSES, OR THE EXTRINSIC PRINCIPLES
OF NATURAL THINGS.

In Book II of the *Physica*, Aristotle treats of the causes of natural things which do not intrinsically constitute their effects, but remain outside their constitution, and therefore are called "extrinsic causes." For although in the first chapter he again treats of matter and form, he discusses them under the concept of nature, insofar as they are extrinsic causes of the motions of a natural body. He discusses them, I say, in order to explain at the outset what nature is and how it differs from art. We too shall do the same in the present treatise.

DISPUTATION I.
ON NATURE AND ART.

CHAPTER I.
What Is Nature?

1. The name "nature" is taken in many ways: 1º for God, the Author of all things, who is called "creative and universal nature," and sometimes "naturing nature," while creatures, conversely, are called "natured natures"; 2º for the totality of all things actually existing, in which sense we say that this or that exists in the nature of things; 3º and most frequently, for the

totality of things, including even the Angels, which belong to the integrity due to this Universe, or World-Machine, insofar as it is said to have been created by God as Author of nature, and likewise for all those things which have proportion to the powers or exigencies of these, or belong to the same order, even if they do not actually exist. According to this notion of nature, natural beings are distinguished from supernatural ones; and supernatural things, such as Grace and the hypostatic Union, are said to be above nature, or to exceed the active and exigitive powers of the whole of nature.

2. 4º for the innate exigency and inclination of any things whatsoever, even those supernaturally constituted in their being, in which sense each thing is said to do or require this or that by its nature; 5º for the temperament of the humors in living things, in which way someone is said to be mild or irascible by his own nature; 6º for the birth of living things, the name "nature" being taken from "being born," for thus this man is said to be blind or lame by nature; 7º, to omit certain other acceptations, it is taken for the essence or quiddity of each thing. For the same being of a thing is called "essence" in relation to being, "quiddity" in relation to the definition explaining what it is, and "nature" in relation to operation.

3. None of these acceptations pertains to the present matter, but only that in which "nature" is taken for the internal principle from which each thing has the motion proper to itself. Under this notion nature is defined by Aristotle here, c. 1, as "a principle and cause of motion and rest in that in which it is primarily and essentially, and not accidentally." This definition is usually explained thus: "a principle and cause," that is, a causative principle, or one endowed with a power of causing; "of motion and rest," that is, of an action received in a subject and of the conservation of the term produced. For "motion" is not taken here merely for local motion, but generally for an eductive action which is a first production; nor does "rest" here signify idleness or cessation from every action, but the conservation of the term sought through motion, in which the innate appetite of the cause comes to rest. "In that in which it is," that is, of the composite or whole in which such a principle is. For nature is not here defined in relation to just any motion, but in relation to a motion wholly proper to the composite in which nature itself is included, not as an accident in a subject, but as something belonging to its primary and substantial constitution, as the last words require: "primarily and essentially, and not accidentally."

4. Now that motion is wholly proper to some composite by which the composite moves itself, or by which it is denominated both mover and moved, because the motion has an active and a passive principle within the same composite; either in such a way that it depends actively upon one part

and passively upon another, which occurs in material motions; or in such a way that it arises from and is received in one part alone, but insofar as that part presupposes a state of union with the other, as the motion of intellection is found in man. Hence every vital act in animate beings is a wholly proper motion, and in every body local motion toward its center, and the acquisition or recovery of accidents belonging to the connatural state of the composite, are wholly proper motions. Therefore nature is defined here in relation to motion of this kind, not in relation to motion impressed from without, nor to motion which a thing actively impresses upon an extraneous patient, although this too arises from nature in things which have a nature. In sum, under Aristotle's definition is comprehended every "part intrinsically constituting a substantial whole, which can cause a motion wholly proper to that same whole and conserve the term produced by such a motion." Hence:

5. You will infer 1º that both matter and form are nature, but the composite is not. Aristotle expressly teaches this here from text 10 to 13. The reason is that the definition of nature applies both to matter and to form: to matter, because it is the passive principle or material cause of motion; to form, because it is the active principle and, in living things, also the passive principle of vital motions. But the definition abstracts from active and passive principle. The definition of nature, however, does not apply to the composite according to Aristotle's meaning, because the composite, since it is not a part but a whole, cannot be called the principle of motion "of that in which it is." Hence it is not nature, but something constituted by nature. For nature, as now defined, imports the concept of a part and consequently is not said of the whole as such. I said "according to Aristotle's meaning," because he did not recognize the distinction between the composite constituted from matter and form and a *suppositum*. Yet if the composite is considered insofar as it is a part of the *suppositum*, or insofar as it further constitutes the *suppositum* together with a really superadded subsistence, it can and must be called an "integral nature," even according to the Aristotelian definition. And in this sense an Angel also, personally taken, has a nature.

6. You will infer 2º that every substantial composite is constituted by nature, because there is none which is not constituted by matter and form capable of causing its proper motion and the rest corresponding to that motion. For at least any composite, if drawn away from its proper center, will be able to move itself locally toward it and there come to rest again; and if by some force it is deprived of accidents proper to itself, it will again be able intrinsically to acquire and conserve them, as is seen in hot water

becoming cold again. Hence some falsely say that not every composite has in itself a principle both of motion and of rest, but either of motion or of rest, because the Heaven is perpetually moved and the earth perpetually rests. Falsely, I say: both because the Heaven conserves its proper accidents and the earth everywhere recovers properties it has lost; and because the Heaven of itself can also rest locally, and would rest were it not rotated by a moving intelligence, while the earth, if drawn away from the center, would return there by its innate weight.

7. You will infer 3º that no accident is nature as here defined, because, although it is often a principle of motion and rest of that in which it is, it never verifies the last words of the definition, "primarily and essentially, and not accidentally." You will say: why, then, is the downward motion of a stone said to proceed from the nature of the stone, since it proceeds from gravity, which is an accident? I answer: because it proceeds at least mediately from the form of the stone, which intrinsically grounds gravity. Nor does the definition of nature seem to demand that the principle of motion always be immediate. Hence matter is called nature by way of passive principle with respect to the motion by which a quality connatural to the composite is acquired, for example, that by which cold is recovered by water, although qualities, according to the common opinion, are not received immediately in matter but in quantity. Hence with still greater reason an impulse impressed upon a stone for upward motion, although it truly is a principle of motion of that in which it is, is not called nature: both because it is not a principle of rest, and especially because it neither inheres in the stone "primarily and essentially" nor is grounded in any intrinsic part of the stone. Hence upward motion is in no way from the nature of the stone.

8. You will infer 4º that, according to Aristotle's meaning, not even the rational soul in the state of separation is nature, except with the addition "aptitudinally," because the motions which the soul causes in that state are not proper to any composite in which the soul is. Yet if the soul is considered insofar as in that state it has a really superadded subsistence, which Aristotle did not recognize, and together with it constitutes this concrete "subsistent," it can also in that state be called "nature." But if by divine power it were deprived of every subsistence and were not united to a body, it would not be nature except in aptitude. The same must be said of the integral nature of a *suppositum*, for example humanity, if by divine power it were conserved without either its own or another subsistence. For those words of the definition, "of that in which it is," require for the concept of "nature" the office of an actual part, or one involving actual union; and this union in a substantial composite can be called nature "as that by which."

9. Finally, you will infer that in artifacts as such there is no nature, because they have no motion proper to themselves, namely one which depends upon them both actively and passively; for an artificial form is not active, as we shall say in c. 3. Aristotle therefore places the difference between artificial and natural composites in this, that the latter, but not the former, have nature. You will say: artifacts have matter, by which the artificial motion itself is passively caused; but matter under the office of passive cause is nature; therefore, etc. I answer by distinguishing the minor premise: under the office of passive cause of just any motion, I deny it; only of that motion which is wholly proper to the composite in which the matter is, I grant the minor premise and deny the consequence. The reason for the distinction is clear from what was said in n. 4, provided one knows that the artificial motion by which artifacts are made does not proceed from any active principle intrinsic to the artifacts, but from an artisan operating extrinsically. Concerning the motions which we experience in artificial automata, see below, c. 3.

CHAPTER II.
On Natural and Violent Motion.

1. On occasion of the manifold acceptation of the word "nature," it is customary here also to explain in how many ways motion, taken generally for an eductive action, is called "natural." 1º It is so called insofar as it is distinguished from supernatural motion, in which sense any motion that does not exceed the active and exigitive powers of natural things, or of the whole of nature as explained at the beginning of the preceding chapter in the third acceptation, is natural. 2º Insofar as it is opposed to free motion; in this sense also we call causes operating without freedom "natural." 3º Insofar as it is distinguished from artificial motion, namely one proceeding from study and art. 4º Insofar as it follows the regular order and series of causes; in this way rain in winter and heat in summer are natural. 5º And quite properly, motion is called natural when and insofar as it accords with the innate inclination or exigency of any thing whatsoever, whether of the thing operating or of that receiving the motion. 6º And in the strictest sense, natural motion is that which corresponds to nature as defined by Aristotle, namely one which has an active and passive principle within a substantial composite.

2. To natural motion according to the fifth and sixth acceptations is opposed "violent" motion, which Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* III, c. 1, defines as that "whose principle is outside, with the thing to which force is

applied contributing nothing at all"; or, as others commonly define it according to Aristotle's meaning, "that which is from an extrinsic principle, the patient contributing no force." Hence it is inferred that three things are required for violent motion. First, that its active principle be outside, that is, extrinsic or adequately distinct from the subject to which force is applied. Second, that the subject contribute nothing to such motion, namely neither actively nor by exigency; for merely passively it necessarily concurs if it undergoes the motion. Third, that the subject resist the motion by an exigency contrary to it, namely by requiring that such motion not exist. Everyone understands this resistance implicitly in the definition of violent motion, and Aristotle indicated it by the words "to which force is applied," for force is not applied except to something resisting. The heating of water by fire, or the projection of a stone upward, supplies an example; for these motions are violent because they have these three conditions.

3. But it should be noted, 1º, that with respect to prime matter considered in itself, no motion is violent, because matter of itself resists no motion, form, or accident, but is indifferent to all. Yet if matter is considered insofar as united to a form, for example the form of water, the motion of heating is already violent to it; or certainly violent to the whole aqueous composite, which resists admitting that motion in the matter it possesses. It should be noted, 2º, that a motion violent to the subject can be called natural with respect to the agent, as the heating of water with respect to fire, according to the fifth acceptation in n. 1. It should be noted, 3º, that certain motions seem violent with respect to some part, although absolutely they are natural because they accord with the exigency of the whole. Thus the motion by which someone raises his arm, although contrary to the weight and gravity of the arm, is absolutely natural because it conforms to the exigency of the man whose part the arm is. Yet motion of this kind can be called violent in a qualified respect, namely in view of the peculiar disposition of the part which undergoes the motion, as St. Thomas noted, Summa Theologiae I-II^{a}, q. 6, a. 5, ad 3. But more on this below.

4. It is asked whether there is a motion which they call "preternatural" or "neutral," namely one which is neither natural nor violent. I answer: such a motion is commonly admitted. As examples are usually given both the production of light in the air and the circular motion of the Heaven. For the production of light, for example, is not a motion natural to the air, because it neither proceeds from nor is innately required by the nature of the subject; and on the other hand it is not violent, because it is not contrary to the innate exigency and inclination of the air, nor does it encounter resistance in it. I judge this doctrine to be true if motion is called natural by conformity to

the exigency or innate appetite of the subject, not just any appetite but an efficacious one; for in reality illumination of the air is neither violent nor efficaciously desired by the air innately. Yet if conformity with an inefficacious innate inclination or appetite, which we recognized in things in tr. 1, d. 3, c. 1, suffices for natural motion, it will scarcely be possible to find a nonviolent motion that is not natural. For if a motion neither harms nor corrupts the subject, but positively perfects it, why should the subject not be judged innately disposed to receive the motion, as it were willingly, although it does not efficaciously require it because it does not need it? Aristotle also seems to think thus in *Physica* IV, t. 69, when he says that "every motion takes place either by force or by nature."

5. Now, since we have dealt with violent motion, it must be said how many kinds of violence are inflicted or can be inflicted upon the innate exigencies of things. One is positive violence, another negative. Positive violence consists in the violent motion itself, explained in n. 2. Negative violence consists in the withdrawal or denial of a good naturally due and required. Hence a stone projected upward suffers both kinds of violence: positive violence in the impression of the impulse and upward motion; negative violence in the denial of downward motion or of rest at the center. If it is asked whether one can be found without the other, and in what things, the answer depends upon the decision of the following question.

Can God Inflict Violence on Creatures?

6. No one doubts that by absolute power God can deny creatures what they naturally require, for example, deny fire concurrence for burning, water its native coldness, and quantity its due extension; and likewise that by Himself alone He can impress upon them motions or positive accidents by which creatures are accustomed to inflict violence upon one another. Hence the question, largely verbal, is only whether in those cases God inflicts violence upon creatures, or, what amounts to the same thing, whether He acts against their nature.

7. Most Thomists deny this, especially the more recent, as regards violence simply and absolutely so called, that is, violence opposed to the principal inclination of a thing; though they admit violence in a qualified respect, that is, opposed to a less principal inclination. The first foundation is that God does nothing against the nature of things. For, as St. Augustine says in *Contra Faustum* XXVI, c. 3, "God, creator and founder of all natures, does nothing against nature; for whatever He does will be natural to each thing." Hence M. Manso, here q. 2, n. 6, argues thus: Violence cannot be

inflicted by that agent from whom whatever exists is natural; but whatever God does in creatures is natural to them; therefore God cannot by Himself inflict any violence upon creatures. This is confirmed from Wis. 8, where it is said of Divine Wisdom that "she disposes all things sweetly"; for if all things are disposed sweetly, nothing is done violently.

8. The second foundation is that in every creature, besides the innate inclination toward particular goods, there is an inclination to obey the Divine will, and this inclination is more principal and prevailing, subordinating to itself the other inclination toward particular goods. Therefore whatever God does with a creature will always accord with the principal inclination and exigency of the creature, and consequently cannot be violent to it. The antecedent is proved: first, because every thing is more inclined toward the universal good than toward a particular good. Hence water rises upward without violence when this is necessary to avoid a vacuum, because it innately desires the good of the Universe more than its own; and similarly a good citizen prefers the common good of the Republic to his private advantage. But obeying God and fulfilling His will is related to other advantages as the universal good to particular goods. Again, because every creature belongs to God more than a part belongs to a whole and is subordinated to God more than a part to the whole. But a part innately prefers the good of the whole to its own utility. Hence the hand without deliberation exposes itself to a blow for the preservation of the whole body; and the body itself walks and leaps against its own gravity without violence, because this serves the interest of the man whose part it is. Again, because the ebb and flow of the sea is not violent to water, but rather accords with its principal exigency because it proceeds from the influence of the Heaven, which is a superior and universal cause. But God is the supreme and most universal cause with respect to every creature.

9. The third foundation is that at least a creature never resists God. Therefore it never suffers violence from God, since violence exists only in one resisting. The antecedent is proved, first, from Sacred Scripture, where it is said that nothing resists the Divine will; indeed in Wis. 16 fire is said to have been "forgetful of its own power" in order to obey God. Again, because no creature innately resists its own perfection. But just as obeying God is a moral perfection in free creatures, so it is a physical perfection in the others. Again, because in a creature with respect to God there must be posited a subjection greater than which none can be conceived. But a subjection which excludes every resistance is greater than one which does not exclude it.

10. Nevertheless, that God can inflict violence upon creatures is the common opinion of our authors, of many Thomists as well, and among the

Scotists of Mastrius, who cites Scotus. Their opinion commends itself to me chiefly because the opposite foundations prove too much and must be answered even by the adversaries themselves, as will appear by going through them individually. The first proves that nothing done by God is supernatural. For if "whatever He does will be natural to each thing," then Grace or the hypostatic union will be natural to the just man and to the humanity of Christ. To make this clearer, reformulate Manso's syllogism thus: Nothing supernatural is produced by an agent from whom whatever exists is natural; but whatever God does in creatures is natural to them; therefore God cannot by Himself produce anything supernatural in creatures. By the same foundation it can be proved that nothing in things is violent even when one creature acts upon another. For when water, for example, is heated by fire, that motion truly comes from God cooperating and principally acting. Therefore if whatever comes from God is natural to water, that motion will be natural and not violent to water. The text of Wis. 8 also bears on this. For the heating of water by fire undoubtedly takes place under God's disposition; therefore it takes place "sweetly"; therefore not violently.

11. The second foundation similarly proves that no operation of God in creatures is supernatural, since every operation of God accords with the principal and prevailing innate inclination and exigency of the creature, which abundantly suffices for the operation to be natural, if the examples of n. 8 prove anything. Indeed, with respect to a rational soul, for example, the reception of Grace will be more natural than the reception of its powers, because the latter accords with a less principal exigency of the soul, while the former accords with the principal exigency. Nor does it matter that Grace actively proceeds from God alone. For the creation of a rational soul likewise proceeds from God alone, and yet is natural because it accords with the exigency of organized matter. Hence the mark of a supernatural being is to be above the powers of the whole of nature, not merely its active powers but also its exigitive powers. Hence also we distinguish the offices of God as Author of nature and as supernatural Author solely from whether His operation is according to or above the exigencies of things. If it is said that the inclination of a creature to obey God operating supernaturally is not natural but obediential, I infer: therefore there is no natural inclination except toward particular goods advantageous to each nature; therefore, when God removes or impedes these goods, He acts against every natural inclination of the thing, which undoubtedly is to inflict violence. If it is said again that this exigency of obeying is only conditional, namely on condition that God wills it, I infer: therefore, when God wills to produce Grace, this

will have the character of a natural being, since it is then produced according to the innate and principal exigency of the soul. Furthermore, the exigency of fire, for example, toward heat is absolute, because it not only asks for heat if God wills to give it, but also asks that God will it. Therefore it is a prevailing and greater exigency than the purely conditional exigency of the same fire toward privation of heat, if God wills to deny it. Thus someone who absolutely asks you to give him bread requires bread more than its absence, although he is prepared willingly to go without bread if you deny it.

13. [**sic**] Nor can it any less be established by the same foundation that nothing violent ever occurs in things. For when water, for example, is heated by fire, the heating undoubtedly proceeds from the will of God, who as Author of nature wills that fire, being stronger than water, heat it, and God Himself willingly cooperates toward this. Therefore if water with an innate inclination obeys the Divine will, that heating will accord with the innate exigency of water, and consequently cannot be violent even insofar as it comes from fire, because even under this reduplication it is willed by God. The examples in n. 8 prove the same. For a good citizen is inclined to obey not only the supreme Prince but also inferior Ministers who, having received power from the Prince and in accordance with his will, command something. Likewise it pertains to the good of the Universe that fire heat water; for unless particular agents oppose one another by acting and reacting, there will be no propagation of species, which the variety and beauty of the Universe require. Likewise the motion of one part by another fellow part of the same whole is not called violent. Likewise the ebb and flow of the sea is not called violent, although it does not proceed immediately from the Heaven alone, but through the intervening impressions of the air.

14. The third foundation equally excludes all violence from things. First, because water cannot resist heating proceeding from fire unless it resists the will of God, as we have just seen. Again, because for water to obey God heating it through and together with fire will be a physical perfection, just as it is a moral perfection in free creatures to obey God commanding through an inferior Prelate. Again, because greater subjection is that which without resistance obeys God however He operates, whether by Himself alone or together with a created agent, than that which without resistance obeys God alone. The foundations of the negative opinion therefore prove too much, and hence prove nothing; and they must necessarily be answered or explained by everyone. Therefore, in answer to all of them:

15. To the first I answer: St. Augustine takes "nature," not as it is now taken for an internal principle of motion or for the innate exigency of things, but for God Himself and His will, from which, as from "naturing nature,"

whatever is produced in creatures is denominated "natured nature," from n. 1 of the preceding chapter. See Augustine, both *De Civitate Dei* XXI, c. 8, and *Contra Faustum* XXVI, c. 3, and you will plainly discover this to be his meaning. But just as this does not prevent God from doing something truly and properly above nature, taking nature as it is now taken, as when He produces Grace, so neither does it prevent Him from being able to do something truly and properly against nature. Hence Augustine, *Contra Faustum*, l.c., says: "Yet we not unfittingly say that God does something against nature when He does it against what we know in nature. For we also call nature that course known to us and customary to nature," namely because it accords with the innate exigencies of things. To Manso's reasoning, say that not everything God does is "natural," that is, conformable to the exigencies of things, although it is "natural," that is, conformable to the will of God. To the text of Wis., say that God disposes all things "sweetly," both because as Author of nature He accommodates Himself to the exigencies of things, and because as supernatural Author He disposes all things with the highest order and the greatest facility.

16. To the second, I deny the antecedent, if the discussion concerns the Divine will operating supernaturally, and likewise if the creature's inclination is taken for innate appetite, as it is here. For innate appetite is borne only toward connatural goods, as we said from St. Thomas and common Philosophy, tr. 1, d. 3, c. 1. Who, indeed, would say that it was connatural to the Babylonian fire, for example, not to burn the three youths placed in it? To the proof: everything there presupposed or asserted can be denied. For water, if it is true that it rises through a tube in order to avoid a vacuum, does not rise without violence or from its own inclination, but from the pressure or attraction of other bodies, at least heavenly bodies, in which there is this attractive power to prevent a vacuum. Likewise a good citizen, when killed by an enemy in defense of the Republic, suffers violence; nor are the inconveniences he undergoes for the common good according to his innate inclination. An elicited and free inclination, however, is irrelevant, because it can be toward anything and against anything, even against God.

17. Think the same of the hand, which, when wounded in defense of the body, suffers violence; nor does it oppose itself to the blow from innate inclination, but from the command of the will presupposing some advertence. For if the impending blow is not noticed, the hand is not opposed. But when the human body walks and leaps, that motion is not violent to the body taken substantially, for thus within man it has an active and a passive principle; nevertheless it is violent to the accidental gravity of the body, because with respect to that gravity the motion is from without,

from n. 3, and gravity itself innately resists such motion. Otherwise man would not become tired by leaping or walking. The same must be said of seawater rising upward through the advancing tide, for it rises with resistance from its own gravity, and therefore violently. In sum, all motions of this kind are called natural when considered in relation to the exigency of universal nature or of the nature of the whole; yet if the nature of the particular thing upon which such motions are impressed is considered, they are violent and against nature. Hence similarly a motion proceeding from God can be against the particular nature of the created thing upon which it is impressed, although it be called natural in relation to the will of God, which is called the most universal nature.

18. This is the express doctrine of St. Thomas, *De veritate*, q. 13, a. 1, ad 2, in these words: "Nature is twofold: namely, particular nature, which is proper to each individual thing, and universal nature, which comprises the whole order of natural causes. Hence something is said to be according to nature or against nature in two ways. In one way, with respect to particular nature; in another way, with respect to universal nature. Thus every defect and corruption and old age is against particular nature, yet it is natural according to universal nature that every composite of contraries be corrupted. Since, therefore, the universal order of causes has this characteristic, that inferior things are moved by their superiors, every motion which takes place in an inferior nature through the impression of a superior, whether in corporeal or spiritual things, is indeed natural according to universal nature, but not according to particular nature, unless it is so impressed by the superior upon the inferior nature that the impression itself is its nature. And thus it is clear how those things which are done by God in creatures can be said to be according to nature or against it." Thus far St. Thomas.

19. I admit that St. Thomas in many other places denies that God does anything "violent" or "against nature" to creatures, and sometimes uses the examples of n. 8 to prove that in creatures there is a greater natural inclination toward the universal good than toward their own. But first, St. Thomas frequently takes "nature" in the same sense as St. Augustine, whose words he cites. Secondly, by the name "natural inclination" perhaps he understands the necessity and intrinsic determination of inferior natures to serve superior ones and subject themselves to them, a determination which in creatures with respect to God is essential. But to be "inclined" in this way is not to "desire innately," but to be "bent," or "subjected and bound," or "necessarily to follow another's impulse," even if it is violent. Nor in general does determination or necessity of executing something or yielding to

another coincide with an exigency or innate appetite. This is clear both in a servant, in whom there can be a necessity of obeying his master without an exigency, and in water, which must necessarily yield to the stronger fire. Nor does it matter that the determination is essential. For water, for example, is essentially determined either to have or not to have cold, yet it does not vaguely desire either cold or its absence. God too is essentially determined to coexist either with sin or with the absence of sin, yet He does not therefore vaguely desire either extreme.

20. Now, taking inclination in this sense, we admit that nothing can be done by God against the inclination of a creature to obey its Creator, and that this inclination is principal and prevailing over the inclination toward a particular good, since the latter is purely natural and the former essential. For water is more determinately bound to lack cold if God so wills than to have cold in the order of nature. Yet, taking inclination for innate appetite, as it must now be taken, God can absolutely act against the inclination and nature of a creature. Nor does St. Thomas deny this, but rather expressly grants it both in the words quoted in n. 18 and in II, d. 18, q. 1, a. 3, where, speaking of marvelous things "which are caused immediately by Divine power," he says: "These, however, are sometimes above nature, sometimes beyond nature, sometimes against nature"; then he adds examples, and regarding those which are against nature says: "As if a heavy thing were moved upward, and that a Virgin gave birth, or something of this kind, so that the act follows miraculously while the contrary nature remains, namely the principle of the contrary act."

21. Read also the Holy Doctor, *De potentia*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 1, where he expressly teaches our doctrine and explains St. Augustine as we explained him above; and ibid., a. 2, ad 3, where he teaches again that some things are done miraculously by God above nature, some against nature, and some beyond nature, adding: "A thing is said to be against nature when a disposition contrary to the effect which God produces remains in the nature; as when He preserved the youths unharmed in the furnace while the power of burning remained in the fire, and when the water of the Jordan stood still while gravity remained in it."

22. To the third: a creature never resists God with a resistance that impedes or delays the effect of God's efficacious will; nevertheless it resists with resistance taken for a natural appetite and exigency toward the contrary. For the water of the Jordan, while it stood still by God's will, at the same time naturally required to flow; and fire likewise, although with respect to the effect of not burning the youths it conducted itself as though it had been "forgetful of its power," did not do so with respect to the innate

appetite for burning. You will say: it is natural for fire not to burn without God's concurrence; therefore, when God denies concurrence, fire naturally, not violently, fails to burn. But this argument is like the following: It is natural for a man to be naked if he has no clothing; therefore, when unwillingly stripped of his clothing, he goes naked naturally, not violently. Or like this: It is natural for a man not to live without a head; therefore, when his head is cut off, the man dies naturally, not violently.

23. I therefore distinguish the antecedent: it is natural for fire not to burn without God's concurrence, if the burning is to be conjoined with the denial of concurrence, I grant it; for this is not only natural but essential to fire, which certainly can have neither an exigency nor a capacity for a chimerical combustion. If the combustion is divided from the denial of concurrence, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Or otherwise: if the phrase "without concurrence" makes a composite sense with combustion, I grant it; if only with the exigency of fire, I deny it. For fire, even while conjoined with God's nonconcurrence toward burning, naturally requires to burn, not by requiring combustion to be joined with nonconcurrence, but by requiring concurrence and combustion, and thus by requiring the divided sense in relation to the denial of concurrence, which is violent to it. Examples are obvious. Thus a hungry man to whom food is denied requires to eat, not by requiring eating to be conjoined with the absence of food, but by requiring food and eating.

24. To what was objected in n. 9 concerning physical perfection, I answer that creatures are indeed physically perfected when they obey God in receiving something positive that does not impede connatural goods, or goods naturally required by creatures. Thus the soul is physically perfected by Grace and other gifts, to which the soul does not innately resist because they are not against but above nature. But a creature is not physically perfected when it obeys God merely denying connatural goods or impressing a contrary motion. Who would say that fire is physically perfected by the denial of concurrence for burning, or water by the removal of cold or by the impression of heat from God? It is otherwise in moral matters. For freely obeying God is always a moral perfection, both because it never impedes another good better for the will in the moral order, and because it always imports an approach toward the ultimate end and conformity with the first rule of moral rectitude.

25. What was objected last in n. 9 proves against the adversaries that not even violence in a qualified respect could be done by God. For greater subjection and obedience is that which is exercised without any violence than that which suffers some. It also proves that one creature could not

suffer violence from another, as we already noted above. Therefore there is in creatures a supreme subjection, which is the essential inability to frustrate or delay the will of God, whatever He may will to do with them. But a subjection excluding the innate exigency of a connatural good denied by God is impossible in creatures once they are presupposed to exist. For such an exigency consists in the being of the thing or in its proportion to the being of the desired good; and that proportion cannot vary unless the essences of things vary.

26. From what has been said a positive proof of our opinion can briefly be constructed thus. According to everyone, nothing more is required for violence, whether positive or negative, than that something occur from an extrinsic agent, not according to the exigency of the subject but rather against its positive exigency. But something of this kind can happen to creatures from God, for example, if God were to impress heat upon water without the intervention of fire or another secondary cause. Therefore violence can be inflicted upon creatures by God. The minor premise is proved: because heat impressed upon water by God alone would first of all occur from an extrinsic agent, as is clear. Secondly, it would be no more according to the exigency of the subject than if it proceeded from fire; for it would be of the same species and no more useful, advantageous, or connatural to water than heat proceeding from fire, since it would equally destroy the connatural state of water. Recourse to an exigency of obeying God has been sufficiently excluded by what was said. Finally, it would be against the positive exigency of water; for water, in desiring cold, consequently desires not to have heat. Nor do the adversaries deny this, since for that reason they grant violence in a qualified respect.

27. Two things, however, must be noted. 1º "Violent" is sometimes taken for "injurious," and "violence" for "injury." In this sense it is certain that nothing violent is done by God, because no creature has a right against God; indeed, properly speaking, not even water has a right against stronger fire not to be heated by it. Therefore "violent" is now taken solely for what occurs against the innate exigency of a thing, which, like an elicited exigency, can exist without a right. 2º To avoid violence it is enough that God's operation be equivalently or eminently according to the exigency of the creature, even if not formally. Hence the hypostatic union, or the personality of the Word as terminating, is not violent to the humanity of Christ. For although it is not formally according to the exigency of humanity, because it is not formally that term which humanity requires, namely created subsistence, nevertheless it eminently contains that very term and perfects humanity in the same genus much better than created subsistence does.

28. You will say: humanity determinately requires its own subsistence and in no way the Divine subsistence; therefore, while it lacks its own, its exigency is violated. I distinguish the consequence: if it lacks its own subsistence both formally and eminently, I grant it; if it lacks it formally but nevertheless receives it eminently, I deny the consequence. Divine subsistence is in no way innately desired by humanity, not because it is contrary or harmful to it, but because it is above its natural powers and merits. Yet if it is gratuitously given, it satisfies the appetite of humanity, because in the same line of an "ultimate substantial term" it supplies in a more eminent manner whatever humanity could expect from its own subsistence. Thus if you gratuitously give a gold coin instead of a copper coin to a creditor determinately requiring a copper coin and in no way thinking of a gold one, as being above what is owed to him, you do not violate but abundantly satisfy his exigency. It is replied: the creditor in that event is content because, his will having changed, he ceases to demand the copper coin; but humanity, when it receives the subsistence of the Word, does not cease to require its own, because an innate exigency does not change. But to the contrary: even if the creditor did not cease to require the copper coin, the gold one would nevertheless fully satisfy him, nor would he then suffer injury or violence through the denial of the copper coin. Again to the contrary: although the innate exigency does not change, nevertheless, for it not to be violated but satisfied, it is not required that it obtain the term formally taken, provided it obtains it eminently.

Inferences.

29. Presupposing that God can inflict violence upon creatures, one will easily infer what must be said to the question which we left suspended in n. 5. You will infer 1º that negative violence can exist without positive, and conversely, because God can cause water, for example, to lose cold without receiving heat, which would be purely negative violence; and He can likewise cause it to receive heat without losing cold, which would be purely positive violence. You will infer 2º that violence, at least negative violence, can be inflicted upon any things whatsoever. For substances can by divine power be denied accidents naturally due to them, and accidents can be denied inherence in a subject. And at least, since no being seems possible, unless perhaps a modal being, which does not naturally require to be conserved for some period of time, it will be able to suffer violence if destroyed by God within that period. For although the thing at the instant of destruction no longer requires to be conserved, it nevertheless required in the preceding

instant to be conserved for this instant in which it is destroyed, and the destruction now occurs against that exigency.

30. You will infer 3º that a creature can suffer violence from God even as Author of nature. For when water receives heat from fire, the heating is not only from fire but also from God as Author of nature; and although it is a natural motion with respect to fire, God, and the Universe, it is nevertheless violent in relation to the particular nature of water. You will infer 4º that negative violence can be inflicted upon an active, passive or receptive, and even a formal principle. Upon an active principle, if concurrence for acting is denied to it in circumstances in which it is naturally due, as happened to the Babylonian fire. Upon a passive or receptive principle, as if God were to conserve matter without form. Upon a formal principle, both by denial of a secondary effect while the primary is posited, as if God were to deny the expulsion of cold from a subject already hot, and also by denial of the primary formal effect, by denying the union of the form with the subject. Yet if the form is presupposed united to a capable subject, God can no longer impede the primary formal effect, since it is indistinct from the form, subject, and union.

CHAPTER III.

Art Is Defined and Compared with Nature.

1. Art, according to Aristotle, is "a habit productive with reason," and according to St. Thomas it is "right reason concerning things to be made." The meaning of these definitions we expressed in Logic in these words: "A habit which by means of a true judgment directs the free agent in which it exists toward a work not pertaining to good morals." Recall what was said tr. 1, Log., d. 1, c. 8. Art agrees with nature in many things and differs from it in many. I shall select some points from those which the Conimbricenses discuss at length and learnedly here, c. 1, q. 5.

2. Art agrees with nature: 1º because it proceeds in operating according to a fixed order and established laws; 2º because, just as a natural agent for the most part produces a form similar to its own natural form, so the artisan intends to induce into matter a form after the likeness of that which he has preconceived in his mind; 3º because art, like nature, makes nothing except from presupposed matter; 4º because it begins from more imperfect things and gradually reaches more perfect ones; 5º because art imitates nature with respect to the external appearance and figure of its works. Hence human art is called "the rival of nature and the ape of nature," or better, "the disciple of nature," for it learned from nature the mode and norm of its works. Thus

from natural shadow it fashioned painting, from caves houses, from the outspread wings of birds sails, and from the tail of fish the rudder of a ship. Art in turn also somehow perfects nature, not because it is more excellent than nature, but because by its rules it often assists nature so that nature may perfect itself. Thus the art of music is said to perfect nature with respect to voices, and logic with respect to the discourses of the mind, although these works implicitly have their being from nature, but their facility from art.

3. Art differs from nature: 1º because nature operates from bare prime matter, while art operates from secondary matter, that is, from a complete substantial body such as gold, stone, or wood; 2º because nature is immediately productive of its works, while art concurs only by directing; 3º because nature makes things truly such, whereas art makes shadowy representations, such as a painted man; 4º because art stops at the external surface, while nature works in more hidden things; 5º because forms introduced by nature are vigorous and active, and thus fire produced by nature is productive of another fire, whereas forms introduced by art are inactive, sterile, and lifeless. Hence an artifact as such does not have in itself a principle of motion and rest, according to Aristotle, who places in this the principal difference between nature and art.

4. Hence you will infer what must be said to that question treated by the Conimbricenses, l.c.: namely, whether art can of itself produce the works of nature. It must be denied altogether. For first, art itself, insofar as it is a habit residing in the mind, produces nothing except rules or precepts purely directing other faculties toward operation, namely by producing acts similar to those from which the habit itself was generated, as is sufficiently clear from what was said tr. 1, Log., d. 1, c. 4. Secondly, the artificial form which is introduced into external matter, and this is principally or uniquely the question, consists in figure or coordination of parts, as I shall presently say. But figure imports nothing positive besides a certain mode of quantity, which is not a principle of acting, just as quantity itself is not. See Fr. Suárez, *Metaphysica*, d. 18, s. 4. Hence philosophers and theologians rightly reject ignorant or malicious men who attribute various natural effects to certain characters and figures. For since figures possess no natural activity, if no other proportionate cause is present, those effects must be attributed to the agency of demons attending through an implicit or explicit pact.

5. Although, therefore, there is in art no physical activity producing natural effects, art or an artificial form can nevertheless be a condition or occasion, and thus a moral cause, of many natural effects, namely either "by applying actives to passives," as they say, that is, by joining and adapting

natural active causes to passive ones; or by supplying some condition so that a natural power may produce its effects, which it would not produce here and now unless applied in such a mode and proportion. Thus the medical art is said to confer the natural effect of health, and agriculture is in some way a cause of natural fruits. Thus also by the artifice of natural magic, which without the assistance of demons applies the hidden powers of nature, marvelous effects are produced. These and similar effects, however, do not proceed from art except as from a condition, application, or occasion; the whole power for them is presupposed in nature.

6. Nor does the motion of a clock proceed from art in any other way, for its true active cause is the gravity of the suspended weight or the elastic force of the steel spring. Similarly, in every automaton some natural cause of the motions is always hidden, as in fact was hidden in the statues of Daedalus, the dove of Archytas, and the sphere of Archimedes, concerning which see the Conimbricenses, l.c. Hence it always remains true that art never provides an active power, and consequently an artifact as such, that is, according to its form or according to what proceeds from art, does not have in itself a principle of motion. There remains, however, a question.

In What Does Artificial Form Consist?

7. It should be held as certain, whatever some have said, that the artificial form by which an artifact is constituted in being such does not consist in some absolute accident superadded to the quantity of the matter. For, to omit other arguments, which may be seen in Cardinal de Lugo, *De Eucharistia*, d. 8, s. 2, such an accident is wholly superfluous, since without it, for example, the structure of a temple can plainly be understood, provided its matter is understood to be disposed in a certain mode and order. Therefore artificial form contains nothing positive in external and permanent matter, for this is principally what we are discussing, besides certain modifications of the parts of the matter.

8. Hence several authors whom Fr. Peynado cites and follows say that artificial form or figure consists in certain presences or locations of the parts, with certain negations added. For precisely by certain parts being removed from rough wood, while the remaining parts stay in a certain situational order and at a certain distance according to the rules of statuary art, the figure of the statue, which is its artificial form, is fully understood. But all this consists in certain locations of the remaining parts together with the negation or absence both of other locations differently distant and of union with the parts removed.

9. But from this opinion it follows, 1º, that whenever a statue is transferred from place to place, it changes its artificial form as often and receives it anew from the porter, however ignorant of art he may be. It follows, 2º, that when a garment is folded or a picture rolled up, it loses the artifice of the garment or image. The cited authors answer that in scholastic rigor a statue moved from place to place loses its former artificial figure and acquires a new one. Yet because the new figure is distinguished from the preceding not specifically but only numerically, and proceeds from the prior artifice, it is regarded as the same in common speech and is attributed not to the porter but to the first artisan. Similarly, they say that a folded garment and a rolled-up picture are really and strictly not the same garment or image; yet they are regarded as the same because by virtue of the preceding artifice they can easily again acquire the locations and distances corresponding to such artifice.

10. But first, it is sufficiently incredible that a marble statue or silver cross, when moved from place to place, is physically and scholastically another statue or cross, numerically distinct and made by the porter without any art or instrument; and much more incredible that a cloak, when taken off or placed in a chest, is really not a cloak, because it now has situational figures and distances of parts specifically diverse. For by the same reasoning it follows that it is not truly a cloak even while placed upon the shoulders, and when its fabric hangs, is agitated by the wind, is gathered beneath the arm, or wrapped around the body. Secondly, the aforesaid authors grant that from the preceding operation of art the statue remains determined to acquire presences of the same kind when moved from place to place; and likewise that the colors of a painting remain determined so that, if the canvas is unrolled, they again acquire the presences and distances proper to the image.

11. I now ask: what is that determination which remains, for example, in the rolled-up picture? First, it is not merely the quantity of the colors, which of itself requires no one situational figure rather than another. Next, it is not the art of the painter, whom I suppose to be distant or already dead. Likewise it is not the antecedent local presence, which now is nothing and may already have passed away long before the picture is unrolled. Finally, it is not the locations of the rolled-up canvas, which have no kinship with the locations of the expanded canvas. It remains, therefore, that it is the artifice or artificial form which the painter introduced and which actually perseveres the same, although the locations and distances have varied.

12. I therefore say, 1º: there are some artifacts which do not require union of parts, but merely juxtaposition, or a certain distance or certain

local proximity, for example an army arranged according to the prescription of military art. In these the artificial form consists in determinate locations of the parts together with negations of others, as the authors cited in n. 8 said, because nothing else can be devised in which it consists. Hence, when an arranged battle line is moved while the same order specifically remains, its form is changed as to the individual, not morally but physically, which is readily credible. Nor is the determination of the soldiers to move in the prescribed order something artificial, since it consists in their will.

13. I say, 2º: there are other artifacts which require parts united or bound together in a certain order, for example a statue, picture, or garment. In these the artificial form, at least the primary one, is the figure of the parts in relation to one another or to the whole, which can be called intrinsic and quasi-organic figure. This is explained as follows. There is a twofold natural figure, for example in man. One, called "intrinsic and organic," consists in the order of union and continuity, with absence of redundancy added, which the parts observe among themselves, for example, in the fact that the head is immediately united to the neck and not to the feet, and that between the head and feet so many parts of matter and quantity intervene. The other, called "extrinsic, local," or "situational," consists in a certain disposition of those same parts according to place, which disposition is indistinct from their location or connatural extension together with absence of redundancy. That these figures are distinct and separable is plainly seen in the hand, which, whether bent or extended, retains the same intrinsic and organic figure, or figure in relation to itself, but a different situational figure, or figure in relation to place. Indeed, even if the whole man were by divine power placed in a point of space, provided he retained the number and order of the union of his parts among themselves, he would not lose his organic figure, although he would then have no situational figure. And so it occurs in the body of Christ the Lord, insofar as He is wholly present in every particle of the host, as the Excellent Doctor explains very well; this doctrine is his, tom. 3, in III^{a}, d. 48, s. 1.

14. I say, therefore, that in the aforesaid artifacts there is similarly a twofold figure: one after the likeness of natural intrinsic figure, and this is their artificial form, which consequently consists in such unions of parts together with the absence of others; another after the likeness of natural extrinsic figure, and this is not the artificial form, at least not the primary one, but is a sign or effect of it. Hence it is very well understood that a garment, whether folded or extended, retains the same artificial figure, just as a man retains the same natural figure whether standing or sitting. Why the former rather than the latter figure should be the artificial form must be

explained both from what was said in nn. 10 and 11 and from the parity with natural figure, which the artificial imitates; for in man the organic figure is that which principally and primarily bears the name of natural figure. Hence, if the unions were imperceptibly removed from a garment or statue while the locations of the parts remained, the artificial form would not simply remain, but only its vestige or sign, by which the senses would be deceived, as is clear from the example of natural organic figure if something similar were to occur in it. Or, if preferred, call those presences a secondary artificial figure.

15. But it must be noted that, for an intrinsic figure to be called artificial, it is enough that what constitutes it be completed by art. It often happens that either the positive or the negative constituent of the figure naturally precedes in the matter, and only the other, which is lacking, is added under the direction of art. Thus in wood there often naturally precedes the whole positive element of the form of a statue, which is union of the parts, while generally only the negative element is added by art, namely the removal or absence of redundant matter. Therefore the whole figure is then called artificial because it is attributed to the art which completes its constituents. Thus in natural things the whole fire is said to be generated and the whole is attributed to the generator, although one of its constituents, namely prime matter, is presupposed as produced by creation.

16. I say, 3º: there are other external artifacts whose form consists neither in intrinsic nor extrinsic figure, but only in the mixture of various portions of matter. An example is a medicine compounded from various liquids according to the medical art. I say, 4º: there are other works of the liberal arts whose artifice or artificial form is really identified with the matter, with at most certain durations of the parts together with absence of redundancy added. Such are the artifacts of Logic, Music, Rhetoric, Poetry, and also of the arts of dancing to rhythm and playing the lyre. In these, art does nothing more than direct nature to select matter which is of itself correct and suitable, omitting what is useless, and sometimes to elicit that correct matter either continuously or with certain brief pauses. See what was said in the Prolegomena to Logic concerning the artifice of acts of the intellect; after its model one can easily explain what proceeds from other arts of this kind.

DISPUTATION II.

WHAT IS A CAUSE, AND HOW MANY KINDS ARE THERE? WHERE THE FOURFOLD ARISTOTELIAN DIVISION IS EXPLAINED IN PARTICULAR.

CHAPTER I.

Cause is Defined, Distinguished from a Mere Condition, and Divided in Various Ways.

1. In the broadest sense, a cause is anything which in some way provides an occasion for something else to exist, or intervenes in any manner in its production, although it does not confer existence upon it. A cause also has various definitions when taken strictly and properly, perhaps differing more in words than in meaning. Omitting these, the definition given by the Excellent Doctor, *Metaphysica*, d. 12, s. 2, which our authors quite commonly approve, explains a cause properly taken thus: "A principle essentially influencing being into another." Here "principle" is placed as the genus, because principle extends more widely than cause, as was said at the beginning of tr. 1. "Essentially influencing being" is added to distinguish a cause from a mere condition prerequired for causing, which as such does not essentially influence. The word "influence," however, is not taken in that strict sense which is proper to the efficient cause alone, but more generally, insofar as it means the same as "to give" or "communicate" being. Finally, "into another" is added to signify that the term must be distinct in essence

from the influencing principle, for this force belongs to the substantive expression "another thing."

2. And thus care is taken that the definition of cause not apply to those persons of the Divine Trinity which, and insofar as they, have the character of principle *ad intra*. For although the eternal Father, for example, is a principle influencing being into the Son, and therefore into "another person," and indeed into "another" adjectivally taken, insofar as "another *suppositum*" is said, He does not influence into "another thing" substantively taken, because the Son does not receive a distinct essence and nature, but numerically the same one which is in the Father. Hence, according to theologians, in the Trinity "there is not one thing and another thing," but "one person and another person," because "another person" is taken specially for a distinct person. In Christ, however, insofar as He is a composite person, "there is one thing and another thing," but not "one person and another person," because in Christ there are two natures, Divine and human, but not two persons. See St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I^{a}, q. 31, a. 2. Hence it is clear that the Father in the Trinity is the principle of the Son in such a way that He is nevertheless not His cause, as the Latin Fathers constantly teach, although the Greeks do not reject the name of cause.

3. It is objected: the word "another thing" placed in the definition signifies either essence or nature properly so called, insofar as it is distinguished from subsistence, or nature more broadly taken for the quiddity of any thing, even relative, modal, or accidental. If the first, then a created nature will not be the cause of its own subsistence, its own location, or its accident, because none of these will be "another thing." If the second, then the eternal Father, in generating the Son, truly influences into "another thing," because the Son has His own relative quiddity distinct from the relative quiddity of the Father. I answer: by that word is signified generally the quiddity of the thing which receives being, of whatever kind it may be, provided it can absolutely and without qualification be called the quiddity and essence of such a thing. Since, therefore, the essence of the Divine Son, absolutely so called, is not another essence from the Father's, for it is impious to say absolutely that there are three essences in the Trinity, it follows that the expression "another thing" has no place in the Trinity, although there is there otherness of quiddity, not absolutely so called but with the qualification "relative." Conversely, created subsistence, and think the same of location and accident, if it consists in something positive, is of such a kind that one can say absolutely and without qualification, "the essence of subsistence is not the essence of human nature"; and therefore it

is truly called "another thing" from humanity, as much as is sufficient for it to be caused by humanity.

4. It is also customary here to object *ad hominem* that, if some thing were to produce itself with respect to a secondary being, as Fr. Suárez thinks possible, it would be its own cause, although it would not influence into another. But this objection will be resolved in its proper place. For now I add that from what Fr. Suárez teaches when explaining his definition of cause, another definition no less suitable can be drawn: "A principle conferring being upon a term of limited perfection." This definition pleases all the more because it is less exposed to quibbles. For from it there immediately appears why in the Trinity a principle producing *ad intra* is not a cause; and likewise why the subsistence of the Word is not properly an intrinsic cause of this Divine composite "Christ." Nor does it matter that God, as some think, could produce *ad extra* an actually infinite being. For no one thinks that something simply infinite and infinite in every genus of perfection is possible outside God. But something infinite only in some line, which alone some think possible, for example infinitely intense whiteness or infinitely extended quantity, would have a simply limited perfection, since it would lack infinitely many other perfections within the genus of being; hence God would be its true cause.

Difference Between a Cause and a Mere Prerequired Condition.

5. Since we said incidentally that a cause differs from a mere condition necessary for causing, this difference must be explained further. It often happens that on the part of a cause, for influencing here and now, something besides the influential power is required, not because it influences the effect, but because it in some way prepares, disposes, or applies the power of the cause to influence. This is not properly called a cause, unless perhaps morally, of which below, but "a mere prerequisite" or "a mere condition without which not." Improperly, however, and reductively, it is usually called a cause of the same genus in which it somehow assists, because the effect so depends upon such a condition that without it it cannot naturally, and sometimes not even essentially, proceed from its cause in that genus. Thus the application of fire to the patient is a mere condition for burning and is usually reduced to the genus of efficient cause. So also an accidental disposition of matter is a mere condition for receiving a substantial form and is usually reduced to the genus of material cause.

6. The principal difference between a cause and a mere condition, therefore, is that a cause influences while a condition does not. From this follows another difference: namely, that if the cause is varied, the action or causality is necessarily varied, because it is essentially tied to this individual influencing principle; but not so if the condition is varied. For numerically the same causality can remain although a determinate condition is absent, provided another equivalent one is substituted or God provides otherwise if the condition is only naturally necessary. If it is asked how one is to discern whether a prerequisite influences or does not influence, and therefore whether it is or is not a mere condition, I answer that this must be inferred from the indications and arguments suggested by the particular case in which doubt occurs. Regularly it is inferred from the fact that we experience something to be prerequired here and now for causing, while on the other hand no proportion for influencing appears in it, nor does any perfection appear in the effect which ought to be attributed to such a prerequisite.

Various Divisions of Cause in General.

7. Cause in general is divided, 1º, into first and secondary cause. The first cause is God, three and one. His primacy in the character of cause consists in this: that He has His operative power produced by no other; that He gives to all other causes the power or potency for their proper effects; that no other cause can operate without God's concurrence; and that He can at will impede the operations of all others. A secondary cause is one which essentially presupposes the first and has its power or potency produced by it, namely every created cause. It is divided, 2º, into intrinsic and extrinsic cause. An intrinsic cause is one which causes by intrinsically constituting the effect, with which it therefore is inadequately identified in every case. Such, with respect to a composite, are matter and form, of which throughout tr. 1. An extrinsic cause is one which is adequately distinct from its term, at least from its immediate and formal term, or remains outside its entire constitution, whether otherwise intimately united to it or not. Such is the efficient cause and the others of which presently. I said "at least from its immediate and formal term," because sometimes an extrinsic cause is at the same time an intrinsic cause of its denominative term, namely of the composite resulting from its formal term. For example, when the rational soul produces intellection, it is an intrinsic cause of this concrete "one understanding," and at the same time an efficient cause of it insofar as it produces intellection in itself, from which that concrete results and is therefore denominated as efficiently produced by the soul. In that case,

therefore, the soul is adequately distinct only from the formal term of the production, which is intellection.

8. It is divided, 3º, into adequate and inadequate cause, or into total and partial cause. An adequate cause is one which by itself can influence as much as suffices for the effect to exist. An inadequate cause is one which needs the assistance of another cause in order to make the effect exist. But it should be noted, 1º, that God alone is absolutely a total cause, because He alone can by Himself, without the intervention of another intrinsic cause, produce all effects distinct from the action of a secondary cause. For although He cannot by Himself supply in composite things the offices of intrinsic causes, He can nevertheless by His influence alone produce those causes themselves and their union, which is to give existence to the whole composite. But a created cause cannot be absolutely total, since it always needs the concurrence of the first cause, but only with the expressed or understood qualification "in the genus of secondary cause," or still more restrictively, "in the genus of efficient cause, final cause," etc. It should be noted, 2º, that a cause can be adequate with respect to power and inadequate with respect to actual influence, because it tempers and diminishes its effort here and now, not from need but lest it impede the cooperation of another suitable cause which is present at the same time. Thus if two fires are simultaneously applied to the same patient, although each can burn the whole, nevertheless here and now neither influences except partially, so as to leave room for the other.

Essential and Accidental Cause.

9. It is divided, 4º, into essential cause and accidental cause. "Essentially" sometimes in a broad sense signifies necessity. Thus any cause which is necessarily prerequired for an effect is called an essential cause, whether it properly causes the effect or not. One is said to be essentially necessary in an essential manner when the effect essentially prerequires it; another naturally necessary when the effect only connaturally presupposes it. But if it is in no way necessary, even if it truly influences and properly causes here and now, it is usually called an accidental cause, that is, one influencing not necessarily but contingently, with regard to the exigency of the effect. We shall give examples in the course of the discussion. Sometimes "essentially" also signifies the character of determination or connection, of which below. In the present context, however, we do not take it thus, but only insofar as it signifies propriety of causality, or propriety in causing, whether or not the effect necessarily needs such a cause. An essential cause

taken in this sense is explained variously by authors; nor is it easy to assign a concept common to rational and purely physical essential causes.

10. Nevertheless, an essential cause can generally be described thus: "One which influences the effect with some inclination, innate or elicited, at least interpretative, virtual, or indirect." An accidental cause, as opposed to it, is "one which either does not influence the effect or influences without any inclination whatsoever." Authors think thus quite frequently, as Fr. Peynado testifies here, d. 2, s. 1, n. 8, although he himself dissents as regards a purely physical essential cause. Fr. Ulloa likewise thinks thus more recently, *Physica speculativa*, d. 2, n. 42. And indeed, that a rational agent, that is, one operating with rational counsel, is not regarded as properly and essentially acting unless it somehow wills what it does is clear from the common judgment of men; we shall confirm this below, where we treat of God's concurrence with an act of sin. Concerning any cause whatsoever it is also most commonly said that it does not cause essentially but accidentally what it causes against or beyond its intention. In purely physical causes, innate inclination takes the place of intention. Hence the production of monsters is commonly said to be accidental with respect to a physical cause deviating from the intention, that is, the innate inclination, of producing offspring perfect according to the disposition of its own species.

11. It is objected: if water were divinely elevated to produce Grace physically, it would be an essential cause of Grace, although it would influence without innate inclination, since there is no innate inclination in natural things toward supernatural goods. Similarly, the intellect of an Angel does not innately desire the beatific vision, nor can it elicitedly desire it insofar as distinguished from the will; and yet it essentially causes the vision together with the light of glory. I answer: an instrumental cause, at least when it is a purely obediential instrument, just as it has proportion to the effect only insofar as elevated, or insofar as conjoined with the elevating principle, so too only insofar as elevated must it have inclination toward the effect. In this way water and the intellect have such an inclination in the proposed cases. You will say: the inclination toward the vision, for example, is only in the elevating principle, namely the light of glory. I distinguish: it is only formally there, I grant it; it is only denominatively there, I deny it. For just as the intellect is denominated elevated, proportioned, and connected with the vision by the light, so it is denominated disposed and inclined toward the vision. For we truly say that an intellect illuminated by the light of glory requires the beatific vision.

12. This denominative inclination suffices for instrumental essential causes, and it belongs to every instrument elevated for acting when the

instrument itself does not resist such a denomination by a contrary inclination. For if it does resist in this way, it will not be a subject capable of that denomination. Hence if water were divinely elevated to produce heat in itself, it would not be an essential cause of the heat, because it would influence neither formally nor denominatively inclined toward it, but rather wholly coerced, that is, with violence and positive resistance. It could also be said that the intellect is inclined toward the vision not formally but constitutively, because together with the light it constitutes a complex absolutely inclined toward it; just as the rational soul is called corporeal not formally but constitutively because it constitutes an absolutely corporeal composite; or just as the intellect itself is connected with the vision only constitutively because with the light it constitutes the adequate principle of the vision, proximately connected with it. For the light is not proximately connected with the vision except insofar as conjoined with the intellect.

13. Among essential causes certain pagan philosophers chiefly number "fate." By this name they understand a certain general, absolute, and inevitable necessity, whose force no thing in the World can evade, not even human freedom, and according to some not even God Himself. Fr. Suárez excellently attacks this error as heretical and pagan, *Metaphysica*, d. 19, s. 11, and says that to the Holy Fathers not only the thing signified but the very name "fate" is odious, and therefore should not be used by Catholics except with explanation. It can nevertheless be reduced to a sound and true meaning if taken for the disposition or order of secondary causes insofar as they are subject to Divine providence and operate infallibly according to its preordination, or permission and foreknowledge, as is gathered from St. Augustine, Boethius, and St. Thomas. In this sense fate is an essential cause with respect to many effects. See Suárez, l.c.

14. Among accidental causes, which are various and some fall away from essential causality more than others, "chance and fortune" are usually numbered. Chance can be taken both for an effect and for a cause. When taken for an effect, it generally signifies whatever occurs unexpectedly. More strictly, from Fr. Suárez, d. cit., s. 12, it can be called an effect "which accidentally and beyond expectation and intention is joined to the essential operation of some cause." Thus, if someone digging the earth with the intention of sowing unexpectedly finds treasure, or if a wall collapsing through age kills a passerby, there is a chance effect. With respect to God nothing is by chance, since nothing happens beyond His foresight. But chance taken for the cause of a chance effect can be any efficient cause insofar as the chance effect, with respect to which it is an accidental cause, is accidentally and unexpectedly joined to its operation.

15. If it is asked how a true effect can exist without an essential cause, I answer: since a chance effect is not properly one being but the concurrence of several unconnected things, it does not require an essential cause in the character of a whole, but it suffices that its parts be caused essentially one by one. For example, the placing of treasure beneath the earth is essentially caused by the man who hides the treasure; then the digging is essentially caused by the digger. But the concurrence of the digging with the existence of the treasure in that place, in which concurrence the finding of the treasure, which is the chance effect, consists, is caused by no essential cause, because no cause posits anything connected with such a concurrence. Nor, on the other hand, do those two causes mutually assist or cooperate with one another; rather they are wholly unconnected and disparate, and consequently do not properly constitute one total cause with respect to which the finding of the treasure would be an essential effect.

16. Concerning "fortune" the pagans utter many trifles, imagining for themselves an improvident goddess who governs human affairs by blind impulse. St. Augustine refutes this error, *De Civitate Dei* IV, c. 18. In a sound and philosophical sense, however, fortune is taken for a fortuitous effect, or also for its cause, not in such a way that it is subject to no providence, for nothing happens fortuitously with respect to Divine providence, but in such a way that it is fortuitous and unforeseen by inferior agents. Fortune so taken does not differ from chance except that chance extends more broadly than fortune, which is properly found only in human affairs. The production of monsters is also commonly reduced to chance effects; on this see the Conimbricenses on *Physica* II, c. 9, q. 5.

Immediate and Mediate Cause.

17. It is divided, 5º, into immediate and mediate cause, or proximate and remote. An immediate cause is one which so influences that there is no other cause nearer to the effect. A mediate cause is one which influences a cause nearer to the effect under discussion; thus a grandfather is the mediate cause of a grandson. Hence for a mediate cause it is required that it influence the immediate or nearer cause; otherwise it will in no way be a cause, either proximately or remotely. But it must be noted that one cause is purely mediate, namely one whose influence does not proximately reach the effect but another cause nearer to it. Another, however, is not purely mediate but at the same time immediate, namely one which influences the proximate cause and then together with it immediately influences the effect. God is thus related to effects proceeding from secondary causes. A mediate cause

can also be more or less remote from the effect according as there are more or fewer intervening causes.

18. It is asked here whether a purely mediate cause is properly a cause of a remote effect. For example, when fire A produces fire B and the latter adequately produces fire C, does fire A then properly cause fire C? Our authors commonly deny this with Fr. Suárez, *Metaphysica*, d. 18, s. 2, nn. 8 and 22. The reason is that it properly causes only that upon which it properly influences and to which it gives being. But fire A in the proposed case does not properly influence fire C, since its whole influence terminates in fire B and does not extend farther; otherwise it would no longer be a purely mediate cause of fire C. The point is pressed: that whose adequate production can remain the same even if fire A is absent is not properly produced by fire A. But the adequate production of fire C can remain the same when fire A is absent, if fire B, by which C is adequately produced, is conserved by another fire or by God alone. Therefore, etc. Or otherwise: fire A obtains in fire B its adequate effect, supposing fire B as now produced to be adequate to the whole powers of fire A. Therefore it does not properly produce fire C. The consequence is clear, because otherwise fire A would properly produce at once two adequate effects, namely fires B and C, or would at least produce something else beyond its adequate effect, which is impossible.

19. Nor does the maxim "the cause of the cause is the cause of the thing caused" stand in the way. For it is understood of cause taken broadly and improperly. Thus Adam is called the principle and father of all men, although, having been dead for so many centuries, he cannot properly be the father or cause of a man generated today. Thus also the spark of fire which first ignited a forest, although now extinguished, is called the cause of the whole continuing conflagration, although it does not properly cause it, both because it no longer exists and because so great a conflagration exceeds the adequate effect of the spark by more than a hundred thousand times. Nor does the example of a moral cause stand in the way. For if this is properly such, it immediately causes the effect in its own moral line. Thus one who by command or counsel moves Peter to wound you is properly called the moral cause of your wound, because although he does not immediately produce it physically, he nevertheless immediately produces it morally, insofar as the wounding, when posited at his command, is regarded in the estimation of prudent men just as if physically posited by him.

20. Nor does it stand in the way that a remote cause, while actually conserving the proximate one, is necessary for the existence of the mediate effect, such that the latter would necessarily fail if the remote cause failed

and no other were substituted, conserving the proximate cause. For this proves only that such a cause is necessary for the effect, which can remain true although it is not properly a cause, as is clear in a mere condition without which not. Add that not even that cause is determinately necessary, but vaguely this one or another, such that the production of fire C by fire B remains numerically the same whether fire B is conserved by fire A, by D, or by God alone. But if it were properly a cause, the production of fire C could not fail to vary with its variation, from what was said in n. 6.

21. You will say: the effect properly depends upon the remote cause conserving the proximate one, for if that cause failed and no other were substituted, the effect would necessarily fail; therefore it is properly caused by it. I distinguish the antecedent: it properly depends by dependence of need, let this pass, and even thus it does not depend determinately upon it but vaguely upon it or another; by dependence of causality, I deny the antecedent and consequence. Dependence of need often exists without dependence of causality properly so called, as is clear both in the dependence of an effect upon a mere condition without which not; in action, which wholly needs a term by which it is not caused; and in union, which is not essentially caused by the extremes which it essentially needs. You will say again: a remote cause conserving the proximate one is not an accidental cause like music in a builder; therefore it is an essential and consequently proper cause. I answer, 1º: accidental cause admits of breadth and various degrees. Hence a remote cause can be accidental although it is not so improper as music in the builder. I answer, 2º: that remote cause can be called an essential cause by essentiality of necessity, of which n. 9, and in this sense properly; but not by essentiality of influence or causality into the remote effect, of which we now speak.

22. Nevertheless it must not be denied that an effect is often attributed and imputed properly to a mediate cause, not only as moral cause but as physical cause. Thus a man's death is properly attributed to one who administers poison, shoots a weapon, or discharges a gun, although many causes intervene. For the one who fires the gun, for example, is at most only the immediate cause of the motion by which the flint strikes the steel. Then fire is caused from the flint; this ignites the gunpowder; the powder impresses a violent impulse upon the iron ball; this then causes the motion of the ball until it reaches the man, in whom it produces a wound; and finally death follows from the wound, often not immediately but after various alterations of the humors. Behold how many causes intervene; and yet the shooter is said physically to have killed the man, and properly so, just as one is properly said physically to cut wood who cuts it through an impulse

impressed upon a saw or axe, and physically to burn a house who applies a torch to some part from which the fire is then propagated.

23. It must therefore be said that a mediate cause, when it further posits an influence from which through physical connection, or without a new natural indifference, the remote effect finally follows, is properly called an essential cause of such an effect, not indeed by propriety or essentiality of influence, because of what was said in n. 18 and following, but by propriety and essentiality of determination or connection, which was intimated in n. 9 and which is very often considered in the imputation and attribution of an effect. Therefore it is not a cause properly and essentially giving being, unless perhaps morally; yet it is a cause properly and essentially determining others to give being, or properly and essentially connected with the fact that the mediate effect receives being from other causes. But not even in this sense is a remote cause properly a cause when such a connection is lacking. That the propriety of determination is separable from the propriety of influence or causality is clear in one who applies fire to a disposed patient, and also in the operation of an artisan, which often determines natural causes to act. Hence natural effects are often attributed to art or artificial form, not improperly, although art does not properly influence them, nor artificial form, as we saw in the preceding disputation, c. 3.

The Fourfold Aristotelian Division.

24. There remains the celebrated division given by Aristotle both here, c. 3 and following, and in *Metaphysica* V, c. 2, by which cause in general is divided, 6º, into material, formal, final, and efficient cause. That these four genera of causes concur toward any composite is usually shown thus. First, since a composite cannot be made by itself, it is made by something; and this we call the efficient cause. Secondly, since it is not made from nothing, it is made from some presupposed subject; and this we call the material cause. Furthermore, since something newly produced must accrue to this subject in order that a composite of determinate species may result, a physical difference, or the specifying part of the composite, now intervenes, which we call the formal cause. Finally, since the cause efficiently producing the composite is an essential cause, not acting by chance or violently, it must operate for the sake of something, or in favor of some end; and this is the final cause.

25. It is asked, 1º, whether this division is immediate. It is not, because cause in general is divided more immediately into intrinsic and extrinsic; then intrinsic cause is subdivided into material and formal, and extrinsic

into efficient and final. It is asked, 2º, whether it is an indivisible division. It is not, because each member is subdivided into others, as will presently appear. Although this division is neither immediate nor indivisible, Aristotle nevertheless especially recommends it because it reduces all causes to certain general heads which have better-known and more distinct modes of causing, and therefore are more suitable for a doctrinal division.

26. But hence it is asked, 3º, whether the division is adequate. It is commonly affirmed with Aristotle, because through it an answer is given to all questions ordinarily raised concerning the making of a thing, namely: by what? from what? through what? and for the sake of what is the thing made? The first is answered through the efficient cause; the second through the material; the third through the formal; the fourth through the final. In addition, no true cause seems to remain which is not reduced to one of these genera. For the exemplary cause, "after whose likeness" a thing is made, is reduced either to efficient cause or to extrinsic formal cause, as will be explained below. The objective cause, that is, the object by which cognition is specified, can be reduced either to extrinsic formal cause, final cause, morally efficient cause, or even physically efficient cause, insofar as the object through its species produces cognition. A dispositive cause, for example heat disposing matter to receive the form of fire, is usually reduced to the genus of material cause and sometimes to the genus of formal cause. Properly, however, it is not a physical cause of the form but a mere condition, unless perhaps it instrumentally co-produces the form, in which case it will be an efficient cause.

27. It is asked, 4º, whether those four members must really be distinguished from one another. Not all must always be, either with respect to different effects or with respect to the same effect. For the same rational soul, for example, formally causes man, materially causes Grace, efficiently causes all its acts, and finally causes some of them. Likewise with respect to immanent acts, the same thing is efficient, material, and often also final cause. Moreover, with respect to man as composed of matter acquired through nutrition, the same soul is the formal cause and at the same time in some way efficient cause, since it produces the union of itself with that matter. Hence even with respect to the same effect a real distinction does not always seem necessary except between material and formal causes of the physical genus. See Fr. Suárez, *Metaphysica*, d. 12, s. 3, from n. 9.

28. It is asked, 5º, whether the character of cause properly belongs to each of the four members. There is no doubt concerning the efficient cause, because it is the cause par excellence, since it is as it were the fountain from which the existence of the effect arises. Concerning the others we shall

speak presently while explaining their proper offices. We shall immediately undertake this explanation, both because concerning material and formal causes, upon which tr. 1 labored, few things remain which ought not to be delayed longer, and because the questions to be discussed in this treatise pertain almost solely to efficient cause, and therefore we shall treat them more expeditiously if we are now freed from concern with the other causes.

CHAPTER II.

On Material and Formal Causes.

1. Material cause in general extends more broadly than prime matter and is defined by Aristotle here, c. 3, as "that from which, while it inheres, something is made," that is, that from which, as from a subject intrinsically remaining in the composite, the composite is made, whether substantial or accidental. For the particle "from" is now taken insofar as it peculiarly denotes the office of a subject. More clearly and generally according to the Philosopher's meaning, material cause can be defined as "that which causes as a subject." It is divided, 1º, into material cause of a substantial term and of an accidental term. The former, at least with respect to a substance which is not purely modal, is prime matter alone. The latter is any subject, whether corporeal or spiritual, from which an accidental form is educed or an accidental composite is constituted.

2. Material cause is divided, 2º, into intrinsic and extrinsic. An intrinsic material cause is "that which causes by intrinsically constituting the composite as the subject of information by the other co-part." What a subject of information is was explained tr. 1, d. 2, c. 2. This cause is called "intrinsic" because it belongs to the intrinsic constitution of its effect, namely the composite. An extrinsic material cause is "that which causes the form as the subject sustaining it," that is, as that presupposed subject upon which the production of the form essentially depends. Under the name "form" are also comprehended accidental and modal forms. We also explained this kind of subject and material cause tr. 1, d. 4, c. 4, n. 3 and following, where we gave the reason why Aristotle did not expressly mention material cause of this kind. It is called an "extrinsic" cause because, although it intrinsically receives the form which it causes, it nevertheless does not intrinsically constitute that form, but remains outside its entire identity.

3. We have already sufficiently shown, tr. 1, d. 2, c. 2, that the office of a subject of information is rationally distinct and separable in exercise, although not mutually, from the office of a subject of sustentation. By the former, however, as rationally distinct, intrinsic material cause must be

defined, because the latter causes under no other title than because by way of material part, that is, as not specifying the composite, it gives its own proper being to the composite. But it gives this precisely because it is united to the form, whether or not it sustains the form or the union; and consequently it gives precisely because it is a subject of information. Hence the causality of matter in the intrinsic genus is union precisely as union, not as passion or sustentation of the form or union, although it is really indistinct from that sustentation. For even if matter did not sustain either the form or the union but were united by a union produced through creation, it would be no less an intrinsic material cause of the composite than it is now.

4. Therefore, what is formal to the concept of intrinsic material cause is that it be a subject truly united to a form and therefore truly informed. What is only as it were material to that concept is that it also sustain the form or union; this latter pertains formally only to the concept of extrinsic material cause. And since a definition ought to explain only what belongs formally to the concept of the thing defined, we therefore gave those definitions in n. 2. This does not prevent the same cause from often exercising both offices of material cause through really the same causality, as happens in purely corporeal composites, where sustentation of the form is identified with union according to our principles. Thus the same rational soul with respect to its acts is at once material and efficient cause, indeed through the same indivisible causality; nevertheless the soul is defined differently as efficient and as causing materially.

5. The generation of a composite is usually numbered among the effects of material cause. But since this generation is nothing other than the eduction of the form or union, including or identified with action and passion, it does not increase the number of effects. For insofar as it is passion, it is the causality of matter into the form or union by way of formal term, and hence also into the composite by way of denominative term; just as, by the same reasoning, insofar as it is action it is the causality of the efficient cause into the same terms. Hence when a composite is generated, for example man, matter is a cause of it under a twofold title: 1º because it is united to the soul as a subject of information, under which title it is the intrinsic material cause of man; 2º because it is the subject sustaining the union, and consequently the generation of man, which is the eduction of the union; and this title pertains to the character of extrinsic material cause. That the same thing can with respect to the same effect be an intrinsic and in some way extrinsic cause we already saw in the preceding chapter, n. 7. Yet from the passion or sustentation of the union man is not denominated

"sustained," that is, "passively received," but only "materially caused as though extrinsically"; just as from generation, which is the eduction of union, he is not denominated "educed" but "produced" or "generated." This arises from the congruous or incongruous sense of denominations according to the rule often given in tr. 1.

6. But still against the definition of intrinsic material cause you will object that matter, prescinding from the office of a subject sustaining the form or union, cannot be called material cause even if considered truly united to the form. For matter, precisely as united, has no other office than intrinsically to constitute the composite. But intrinsic constituents of a thing, especially those expressed in its definition, constitute the thing not "materially" but "formally," because they belong "formally" to its essence and are therefore usually called "formal parts" of the thing. I answer: matter, prescinding from the office of sustaining, or even united without it, as if human union were divinely created, would truly be a subject of information. For in that hypothesis of a created union the matter of man would truly be informed and the soul would be informing, not conversely. Therefore man would then truly be constituted from matter as "from an inherent subject," which alone Aristotle requires for the character of material cause.

7. Furthermore, in that hypothesis not matter but the soul would be the specifying part of man or the ratio of his quiddity. Therefore the soul alone would be formal cause. Therefore matter, which certainly would then be a true intrinsic cause, would truly be material cause. Otherwise the matter of man would in fact be both formal and material cause: formal, because it intrinsically constitutes man and pertains to his definition; material, because it sustains human union. Therefore intrinsic constituents of a thing are called "formal parts" and are said to constitute "formally," or to belong "formally," only insofar as they do not belong "accidentally" or "irrelevantly" to the essence of a thing or to its definition, for this is often what "materially" or "in a material respect" means. Yet this does not prevent one part from constituting as form and the other as subject, and therefore one from being formal cause and the other intrinsic material cause.

8. These things being established, it is asked, 1º, what is the causality of material cause? I answer from what has been said: causality in the intrinsic genus, or with respect to the composite as intrinsically constituted, is union as such; but in the extrinsic genus, or with respect to the form, it is the eduction of the form itself insofar as it is passion or sustentation. The reason is that by union and passion respectively the material cause is ultimately and formally determined to cause in second act, in which determination the concept of causality consists. It is asked, 2º, whether

material cause, insofar as it intrinsically causes the composite, is properly a cause. This question, which is common to every intrinsic cause, we shall resolve below where we treat of formal cause.

9. It is asked, 3º, whether extrinsic material cause, or material cause with respect to form, is properly a cause. The common opinion affirms it. For prime matter, for example, is essentially and immediately presupposed for the forms which are educed; but not as a mere condition; therefore as a proper cause. The minor premise is proved, first, because the eduction of a form is a causality essentially tied to the individual matter presupposed, and would necessarily be varied if the matter were varied, which does not belong to a mere condition. Again, because matter is presupposed in one way for the eduction of a material form, and in another way for the first creation of a rational soul. But for the latter it is presupposed as a mere condition; therefore for the former as a proper cause.

10. It is objected, 1º: material cause does absolutely nothing, but behaves merely passively with respect to form; therefore it does not properly cause. The consequence is proved because what does nothing does not properly influence or confer being, as seems evident from the terms. Hence St. Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus*, q. 28, says: "Every cause is efficient," because, namely, that which does not effect or act is not truly a cause. I grant the antecedent, because "to act" is proper to efficient cause alone, but I deny the consequence together with the proof attached. For although "to influence and confer being" belongs with the highest propriety to an acting cause, nevertheless it is not improperly said of any principle upon whose determinate presupposition the production of an effect essentially depends, as the eduction of a form depends upon matter, not insofar as it is action but insofar as it is passion. That is not improperly said "to give being" to which the effect truly owes its being. But an effect truly owes its being to every principle without whose determinate presupposition the production which here and now receives being would essentially and *a priori* fail, at least if such a principle contributes to the existence of the effect in this way from inclination. St. Augustine can be understood as speaking of cause par excellence. For, as Fr. Suárez notes, *Metaphysica*, d. 12, s. 3, n. 6, the name "cause" is sometimes taken par excellence, or even by reason of its first imposition, for efficient cause.

11. It is objected, 2º: the efficient cause must precontain the whole perfection of the form to be produced; therefore it alone is responsible for causing the form. I deny the consequence, because from the precontainment of the whole perfection of the effect it does not follow that a created efficient cause can by itself supply every mode of dependence which the

effect needs. Otherwise it could also supply the immediate influence of the first cause. Hence every created agent, just as from its condition as secondary cause it requires the concurrence of the first cause, so from its condition as finite agent it requires the assistance of material cause, that is, of a presupposed sustaining subject; for it cannot act from nothing. So much for the common opinion.

12. I would not deny, however, that "to influence," "to confer," or "to give" being is not said of material cause without some impropriety, although not so great as that which belongs to a mere condition. First, because it is not said absolutely and without qualification that matter influences a form or gives being to a form, much less that a rational soul influences Grace or gives being to the Grace which it receives. Again, because otherwise matter would give what it does not have, since it does not prepossess the being of the form either formally or equivalently. Again, because a merely passive cause purely receives, while there is a certain opposition between "giving" and "purely receiving." Hence a passive cause is not called one influencing and giving being except with the qualification "in the genus of a sustaining subject." In that genus, because it positively contributes to the existence of the effect in such a way that the production of the latter determinately and essentially depends upon such a presupposed subject, it is said to give being not without some propriety.

13. Let us now come to formal cause. It is defined by the Philosopher as "the ratio of the essence," or "the quiddity of the composite." We explained this definition in tr. 1, d. 4, c. 5, when treating of substantial form. Now, according to the Philosopher's meaning, formal cause can generally be defined as "that which causes by intrinsically constituting the composite as a part specifying, at least principally, its quiddity." This definition is sufficiently clear from what was said in tr. 1, both l.c. and d. 2, c. 2, from n. 10. It can be applied to the formal cause of any composite, whether substantial or accidental, physical or metaphysical, whether resulting from an intrinsic union of form with subject or from an extrinsic union; for example, of this concrete "seen," which is constituted from vision and object. For although vision is a form extrinsic to the object, it nevertheless intrinsically constitutes and specifies that concrete. Hence formal cause can be divided, 1º, into substantial and accidental, 2º, into physical and metaphysical, 3º, into intrinsic and extrinsic to the subject; in such a way, however, that neither a metaphysical cause nor one extrinsic to the subject is properly a cause, because it is not properly a part, owing to defect of distinction or union.

14. What is caused by formal cause is usually called a "formal effect," which for the most part is twofold, one primary and another secondary. The primary formal effect, which can also be called "intrinsic," is the composite, concrete, or denomination which results from a form united to a subject and consists in the collection of the form, subject, and union, with no other superadded being, as we showed tr. 1, d. 7, c. 3. With respect to this effect the form is intrinsic formal cause; and its causality is union insofar as information, because it is the ultimate determination and exercise by which the form as specifying part constitutes the composite. Nor does it matter that the same union, insofar as materialization, is also the causality of intrinsic material cause. For this is no more repugnant than that the same eduction be action and passion and consequently the causality of agent and sustaining subject.

15. It should be noted, however, that the intrinsic formal effect, at least with respect to an accidental form, is one thing when proper and as it were essential to the form, and another when improper and as it were accidental. The proper and essential effect is that whole or denomination which the form is of itself and by its own nature ordered to provide, for example, with respect to heat, "hot"; with respect to intellection, "understanding"; with respect to Grace, "holy." This is what absolutely bears the name "formal effect" and is commonly said to be given only to a "capable subject," that is, to that subject which the form is of itself ordered to inform, or which the denomination proper to the form essentially includes in the sense in which it is commonly taken. The improper and as it were accidental effect is the concrete or conjunction resulting from a form united to an extraneous subject contrary to its proper nature. Hence, if Grace were divinely united to a stone, it would not give its proper and essential formal effect, namely the denomination "holy," for lack of a capable subject, because not a stone but only a rational creature is that subject which Grace is of itself ordered to inform and which the denomination "holy" essentially requires and includes. Nevertheless even then some concrete or conjunction would result, and the stone would be denominated "having Grace" or "informed by Grace," which would be as it were an accidental effect of Grace.

16. The secondary formal effect, which can also be called "extrinsic," is that which so results from the union of a form with a subject that it is adequately distinct from the form. Thus the expulsion of cold from a subject is a secondary formal effect of heat and is usually called a negative formal effect. In general, any effect, whether negative or positive, which follows as though by necessary resultancy upon the information of a form and is not intrinsically constituted by it, is called a secondary formal effect. But it

should be noted that the form in relation to secondary effects is not properly a formal cause, since it does not cause them by intrinsically constituting and specifying their quiddity, but rather induces them in the genus of morally efficient cause. For heat causes the expulsion of cold by moving the Author of nature through its exigency to cease conserving the cold. It is nevertheless said to cause in the genus of formal cause because it does not require that expulsion except when it informs the subject and causes its primary effect. Hence the ultimate and executive formal causality of a secondary effect is not the union of the form with the subject, but the positing or cessation of Divine concurrence in another being, insofar as willed by God in accordance with the exigency of the form united to the subject. Read again what was said tr. 1, d. 5, c. 4, from n. 9 to 19, where we also showed that, once the form is posited in the subject, the secondary formal effect can generally be impeded by divine power, but not the primary effect.

17. It should further be noted that form is not the formal cause of matter specifically taken, but only reduplicatively as completed, or as existing in physical act, in which sense matter is the whole composite. The Thomistic doctrine that matter is rendered existent, or at least capable of existence, by form alone as informing has been sufficiently refuted in tr. 1, d. 2, c. 3 and following, and d. 3, c. 4, n. 22. You will say: form is the formal cause of that of which it is the form; but it is form with respect to matter specifically taken; therefore it is formal cause with respect to matter itself. I press: matter is the material cause of that of which it is the subject; but it is the subject of the rational soul; therefore it is the material cause with respect to the rational soul itself. I press again: Grace is a form with respect to the rational soul specifically taken; therefore with respect to the same soul so taken it will be formal cause. Therefore I distinguish the major premise: it is the formal cause of that of which it is the form intrinsically constituting and specifying, I grant it; of that of which it is a merely informing form, I deny the major premise. Then I distinguish the minor premise: it is form with respect to matter, etc., merely informing, I grant it; intrinsically constituting and specifying, I deny the minor premise and consequence.

18. There remains the question whether formal cause with respect to its primary effect, or the composite which it intrinsically constitutes, is properly a cause. Several authors whom Fr. Peynado cites and follows deny it, and they think similarly of material cause insofar as intrinsically constituting the composite. They are moved, 1º, because a cause properly such must influence through an action proceeding from its power; but formal cause does not influence the composite except through union, which is not an

action of the form nor proceeds from its power. 2º Because every true cause must communicate being to a term simply distinct from itself; but the composite is not a term simply distinct from the form, since it is inadequately identified with it. These arguments equally apply to matter with respect to the composite.

19. Nevertheless, the most common opinion, which the Excellent Doctor holds in *Metaphysica*, d. 12, s. 3, affirms it. For formal cause truly gives being to the composite, since it presents itself, and therefore the whole of its own being, so that from it the composite may arise. Hence it is commonly said that the composite has its being from the form, and form is frequently defined as "an intrinsic cause which gives being to the thing," as Suárez notes. The same reason applies also to material cause, since this too presents itself and gives its being so that from it the being of the composite may result and be constituted. You will say: "to present" and "to give oneself" imply a proper action which matter and form do not have with respect to the composite; hence they do not actively present or give themselves, but are only as it were passively given and presented to the composite by the efficient cause. But to the contrary: matter and form, according to the adversaries, properly compose and constitute the composite, and yet "to constitute and compose," being active verbs, also imply a proper action. If it is said that this is a grammatical action, not a physical one, take the same answer as given to yourself. Therefore not only does a thing properly give itself when it confers itself by its own action, but also when it as it were spontaneously offers itself to be possessed by another, or so that another may be constituted from its being; and in this way matter and form give themselves to the composite.

20. Nor do the contrary arguments stand. Not the first, because it is proper only to an extrinsic cause, especially the efficient, to influence through an action proceeding from its power. Generally, however, for the concept of a true cause it suffices to influence through a causality by which it is ultimately determined to confer being upon an effect. Since, therefore, union, although it does not proceed from the formal cause, is nevertheless its ultimate determination for giving being to the composite, it consequently suffices for the form to exercise the office of a true cause. Hence you will infer that a purely intrinsic cause is not the cause of its own causality into the effect except insofar as that causality, taken together with the other constituents, constitutes the composite, according to what was said tr. 1, d. 7, c. 2, n. 9. Hence such a cause need not have priority of nature with respect to its causality. What sort of priority it must have with respect to its effect we shall say below in the proper place.

21. Nor the second, because an inadequate real distinction, such as exists between whole and part, is a distinction simply speaking, since by virtue of it whole and part are not simply the same. Otherwise it would truly be said, "The soul simply is man." You will say: a cause truly such must confer being distinct from the being of the cause itself; but form confers only its own being. I answer, 1º: form confers and causes being distinct from its own, because it causes the whole being of the composite with the totality of an effect, as we noted in d. 7, c. 2, n. 15. But the whole being of the composite is distinct from the being of the form, as we have just seen. I answer, 2º: even if form were not said to confer anything but its own being, nevertheless the definition of cause applies to it, since that definition requires only that what receives being be "another thing" from the cause, or that it be a term of limited perfection. But the composite which receives the being of the form is "another thing" from the form itself and has limited perfection.

22. Finally, note that the parts of an integral whole, which compose solely by continuative union, must be reduced to the genus of formal cause. For in a piece of wood one palm long, for example, each half-palm constitutes as an intrinsic and specifying part of the whole, and neither is the subject of the other. Hence you will infer that there can be an intrinsic formal cause which is not an informing form and consequently does not imply a relation to material cause. The integral nature with respect to a created *suppositum* also seems to be of this kind. For although human nature may perhaps be an extrinsic and sustaining material cause with respect to subsistence, if the latter consists in something positive, and consequently also an intrinsic material cause of the denomination "subsistent," adjectivally signified, nevertheless with respect to the *suppositum* substantively expressed by the name "man" or "this man," it rather has the office of formal cause, since it is the intrinsic part principally specifying the quiddity of the whole.

23. Note also that, because it is proper to formal cause to "specify," that which extrinsically communicates species to an effect, or from which the effect is extrinsically specified, prescinding from physical influence, is not rarely called an "extrinsic formal cause." Thus an act of the intellect, for example, is sometimes said to depend upon its formal object in the genus of extrinsic formal cause. Dependence of this kind, however, seems rather to pertain to the genus either of final cause or of morally efficient cause.

CHAPTER III.
On the Final Cause.

1. The final cause contains many things worthy of knowledge, concerning which the Theologians and Animasticians have written, and especially the Excellent Doctor throughout d. 23 Met.; from whom we shall briefly give those points which seem more pertinent to the present matter. "End" is said most broadly both of whatever is last in some series, as the last part of a year, of the earth, or of a book, and also of the cessation of a preexisting thing, in which sense someone is said to make an end of speaking or living when he falls silent or dies. "End" is not taken thus here, but more strictly insofar as it signifies the terminus of some appetite or action. In this sense it is commonly defined from Aristotle, here c. 3 and 7, and often elsewhere, as "that for the sake of which something is done," where "for the sake of which" means the same as "on account of which," or "on account of whose goodness"; and therefore the expression "on account of," when taken strictly, is as it were the mark of the final cause. Yet not even in this sense is every end properly a final cause, as will presently appear, but only that which is foreknown by the agent as good in itself and, as thus foreknown, moves the agent by its goodness to act, alluring and as it were inviting it. And this is what the expressions "on account of" and "for the sake of which" properly signify among Philosophers.

2. But if an operation or work is posited as conducive to attaining the end, it is called a "means," and there can and usually are many means to one end. Hence it belongs properly to a means to be loved "on account of another," that is, precisely because it is conducive and useful for attaining another thing; whereas it belongs properly to the end to be loved "on account of itself," that is, because of the worth of its own goodness, namely because it is, or is apprehended as, something honorable, or delightful in itself, advantageous, or suitable to some subject. Some note that these statements are true of an end as something to be attained, not of an end as something to be avoided; for we often intend to avoid some evil and execute means on account of it, not because it is good, but because it is evil. Yet even then what has the character of an end is the avoidance of the evil, which is apprehended and loved as good.

3. The end thus explained is divided 1º into the end "which" and the end "for whom." The end "which" (otherwise the end "whose") is that which the agent intends to attain. The end "for whom" is the person or subject for

whom the end "which" is procured as his good. Thus, when you procure health for a sick man, health is the end "which," while the sick man is the end "for whom." The true character of an end belongs to both. For when the sick man applies medicines to himself in order to be healed, he executes those means on account of himself and from love of himself; likewise on account of the health which he loves and intends. Therefore he truly acts for the sake of both ends, and indeed in such a way that he would not employ such means merely on account of himself unless health were to be obtained, nor on account of health unless that health were good for the sick man himself. It may be said: nothing is truly an end except what is intended to be obtained through means; but only the end "which" is intended to be obtained through means; therefore, etc. I answer 1º by denying the major premise: because it is sufficient for a true end that something be done on account of it and for its sake. I answer 2º by denying the minor premise: for the end "for whom" also is intended to be obtained through the means, not according to itself or separately from the end "which," but insofar as it is included in the concrete thing whose existence is procured. For through medicines the concrete "healthy" thing, or "healthy man," is intended and procured; and in this concrete thing the end "for whom" is included. Thus, when natural agents intend the existence of the whole composite, matter also is intended and obtained, not taken separately, but insofar as it is in the composite.

4. It may again be said: the end "which" is not desired on account of itself, but on account of the end "for whom"; therefore it is a means rather than an end. I answer: the end "which" is not desired on account of the end "for whom" as on account of some good to be obtained through the end "which" as a means, in which sense a means as such is said to be intended on account of another; rather, it is desired on account of the end "for whom" as on account of the subject formally to be perfected or honored by the end "which" itself. Hence this end is at the same time desired on account of itself, as a good to be attained; and therefore it is also called the end "whose," that is, for the sake of attaining which. For through it some other goodness is not merely procured, as through a means; rather, it itself is the goodness formally procured and procured on account of itself. Indeed, the end "which" alone is what is usually meant absolutely by the name "end" and "final cause," unless something else is explained; and therefore the end absolutely is defined by many as "that which moves toward its own attainment through means."

5. The end is divided 2º into formal and objective. The formal end, which is also usually called the end "whereby," is the actual attainment and

possession of the good which we intend to obtain. The objective end, which is also especially called the end "which," is that good which we wish to attain. Thus, when we seek beatitude through good works, God is the objective end, and the beatific vision is the end "whereby," or formal end. Father Suárez notes from St. Thomas, s. 2, n. 12, that these are not so much two ends as one, because they are intended and procured as one. Hence they may be called as it were two parts of the end "which," of which we spoke in the first division.

6. The end is divided 3º into that which is produced and that which is purely obtained. The former is that which is not presupposed to exist but is brought into the nature of things by the efficacy of the means, as the health of a sick man. The latter is that which is presupposed already to exist from another source and is intended merely to be possessed, as God with respect to one seeking beatitude, and money with respect to a miser. It is divided 4º into the end of the work and the end of the agent. The end of the work is that to which the action or work is ordered in itself, as the relief of the poor man with respect to one giving alms. The end of the agent is that which the agent intends at will beyond the character and nature of the action or work, as if you give alms for the end of vainglory.

7. Akin to this division is that by which the end is divided 5º into intrinsic and extrinsic. An intrinsic end is that which an action, especially an intentional action, intrinsically regards as specifying it. An extrinsic end is one which the action does not so regard but to whose attainment it can nevertheless be useful, and therefore is ordered to attaining it by another act. Examples are obvious in acts of intellect and will. Thus, when someone, from a preceding intention of obtaining forgiveness of sins and avoiding hell, elicits an act of love of God above all things, the intrinsic end of this love is God alone as supremely good in Himself; but the extrinsic end of the same act is the forgiveness of sins and avoidance of hell. Yet the extrinsic end of one act, while actually being procured, is always intrinsic with respect to another act that orders it beforehand, as in the proposed case the avoidance of hell is intrinsic with respect to the preceding intention.

8. It is divided 6º, omitting other less useful divisions, into ultimate and non-ultimate end, or remote and proximate. The proximate or non-ultimate end is that on account of which some means is employed, yet in such a way that the agent's intention does not rest in it but proceeds to a further end. The ultimate or remote end is that in which the intention of the agent finally rests. But since it belongs properly to an end to be loved on account of itself and not precisely as useful for another, from n. 2, hence, if in order to one end you choose several means subordinate one to another, none of which is

loved on account of itself, none of them will properly be an end, either proximate or remote. For example, the effusion of blood, because it is loved only as useful for health, is not properly the end of cutting the vein, even though the latter is immediately ordered to it. Yet because the vein is in some way cut on account of the effusion, the effusion is usually called an end relatively to that preceding means, namely insofar as it is the terminus and as it were the intrinsic end with respect to the cutting, although with respect to the agent it is a pure means. And in this sense St. Thomas said, 3 Cont. Gent., c. 2: "All intermediates between the agent and the ultimate end are ends with respect to what precedes them."

9. But if it happens that something is loved both because it is good in itself and because it is useful for another, then it can properly be called an end and yet a proximate or non-ultimate end. For example, if you study Theology because knowledge of Theology is good and at the same time because it is useful for obtaining a Chair, Theology will truly be an end insofar as it is loved on account of itself, and it will not be the ultimate end insofar as it is ordered as a means to the Chair. Nevertheless, if we speak in a formal and precisive sense, Theology can even then be called an ultimate end in that respect in which it is loved on account of itself, because under that aspect it is not ordered to another. For it is loved on account of itself under the aspect of an honorable or delightful good, which is formally distinguished to some extent from the aspect of useful good, under which alone it is ordered to the Chair. Hence in this sense there will be no end which is not ultimate, as the name "end" seems to require and Aristotle indicates, 1 Ethic. c. 7.

Some Questions.

10. Question 1: What in the end is the reason for finalizing, otherwise called finalization in first act, otherwise the reason for moving and attracting to love of itself and to the employment of means? Is it the objective goodness of the end, or the cognition of that goodness? In other terms: does the end move according to real being, or according to intentional being? The common and true opinion, proved by Father Suárez, d. cit. s. 8, holds that objective goodness alone, represented by cognition, is the reason for finalizing; whereas cognition of that goodness is only a condition without which it cannot occur, or a pure application of the motive power. Before the proof I note four things. 1º, the end does not move the will except as known, both from the principle "Nothing is willed unless foreknown," and from other arguments in Father Suárez, s. 7. Yet that reduplication, "as known,"

can have place even though cognition is a pure condition or application of the power, as when we say, "Fire does not burn except as applied."

11. 2º, the question is not about cognitions whose attainment is not presupposed but intended and procured, as when someone intends to attain the vision of God, or contemplation of truth, or certainty concerning another end already obtained or yet to be obtained; for these are true ends and must be foreknown by another cognition. Therefore the question also arises concerning them, whether they move according to real being or according to the intentional being which they have as foreknown. The question therefore concerns only the prior cognition of the end to be obtained. 3º, nor is the question about the influx of cognition upon acts of the will in the genus of efficient cause; for this influx, which is also commonly denied, does not pertain to the end as such, since according to all the end as such is not an efficient cause. Therefore the question concerns influx in the genus of final cause, that is, in the genus of alluring as a lovable object toward love and intention of itself and toward the employment of means on account of itself. 4º, the doubt concerns only the end "which," or "whose"; for concerning the end "for whom" no one seems to doubt that it moves according to real being.

12. With these points established, the stated opinion appears so clear that there could scarcely be any reason for dissent unless equivocation in words be introduced, as Father Suárez says. For 1º, the reason for moving proper to the end is that goodness and suitability which someone desires to obtain, for the sake of obtaining which he chooses and executes means useful for attaining it, and which when finally obtained gives rest and satisfaction to the appetite. All this is clear from the definition of an end as explained by all. But none of this belongs to the prior cognition of the end, since that cognition is presupposed as already obtained, present, and made known before the end begins to be desired; therefore, etc. 2º, the reason for finalizing is nothing other than the proper and specifying motive of love and intention of attaining the end; but that motive is not the prior cognition, but its object, as is evident from the most received doctrine concerning the motives specifying acts of virtues and vices, for example acts of fear of hell and hope of eternal life, or acts of envy, avarice, etc.

13. Objection 1: cognition is often assigned as the reason for willing the end; for it is commonly said, "I intend this because I know it is good for me, because I know it is advantageous for me"; therefore cognition is the reason for finalizing. I answer by distinguishing the antecedent: as the reason for willing "whereby," that is, by way of condition and application, I grant; as the reason for willing "which," that is, by way of motive power or goodness

alluring to itself, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. We also often say, "wood is burned because it is applied to fire; I fear the bull because I see that it is fierce; I love God above all things because I know that He is supremely good"; and yet in these and similar cases it is not the motive power but a mere condition that is given as the reason.

14. Objection 2: intentional existence is required for the final cause in the same way that physical existence is required for the efficient cause; but physical existence is not a pure condition but an effective power; therefore likewise, etc. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: it is required in the same way, that is, with equal necessity, let that pass; in the same way, that is, with equal identity, I deny the major premise; and having granted the minor premise, I deny the consequence. Since in our principles physical existence is not distinguished from essence, the existence of the power is the power itself; but intentional existence, or cognition of the object which is the final cause, is certainly really distinguished from its object. If, however, with the Thomists you really distinguish physical existence from essence, I shall likewise say that it is a pure condition for efficient causation.

15. Objection 3: the office of a cause is more suitably attributed to a physically present thing than to an absent and often nonexistent thing, indeed sometimes even to an impossible thing; but while the Will intends an end, the cognition is physically present, whereas the object is absent and often does not exist, as health intended by the sick man, and sometimes is not possible but chimerical, as when the prince of demons said, "I shall be like the Most High"; therefore, etc. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: the office of final cause, I deny; of an efficient, directing, or illuminating cause, I grant the major and minor premises and deny the consequence. Since the office of the final cause is to move to action for the sake of its goodness, not as obtained but as to be obtained, not because it is, but that it may be, at least in possession, it is unsuitably attributed to a physically present thing whose possession is already obtained and concerning which there is no doubt, such as the cognition of which we speak. Therefore the end by its genus requires only intentional presence; and this can belong to a thing that does not exist, will never exist, and is even chimerical, provided it is apprehended as possible.

16. If you ask how a goodness which is truly nonexistent and impossible can cause a true and real appetite, I answer from Father Suárez, s. 5, n. 15, that whenever the will desires an impossible good it is always moved by true goodness, although falsely applied to a particular object. For it is not moved unless the intellect proposes honorableness, delightfulness, or suitability to nature, which are true forms of goodness. Yet the intellect sometimes errs in

attributing true goodness to a particular object to which it does not in reality belong and cannot belong; and then the object which moves is only apparently good, in which sense the will is usually said to be capable of being moved by an apparent good; nevertheless the formal reason for moving is true goodness. It can also be said that the appetite for an impossible good does not have a truly final cause but only an apparent one, and is not truly on account of an end except apparently; while for the appetite itself to be true and real, the power of the efficient cause together with the appearance of an end suffices.

17. Finally observe that the appetite for an end is often varied by diversity of cognition, not because cognition is the finalizing reason, but because it represents an objective goodness that is in some respect diverse, or at least intentionally applies the same goodness in different ways, now more clearly, now more obscurely; whence the goodness of the object moves in different ways. It is no otherwise than with the active power of fire, which, according to diversity of application by which it is rendered now more and now less proximate to what is acted upon, exercises its influx differently. Hence, just as the goodness of the object requires cognition as a condition without which it cannot move, so in order to move to a particular species of appetite it can require a particular species of cognition as an altogether necessary condition. And from this St. Thomas is to be explained when he says that diversity of apprehension pertains to diversity of object, and that differences of the apprehended are in themselves differences of the appetible; for he speaks of diversity and difference not formal but applicative. See Father Suárez, cit. s. 8. Yet if cognition varied only numerically concerning an entirely identical object, the same individual motion and appetite for the end could remain.

18. Question 2: What are the effects of the final cause? I answer: regularly there are many, internal and external, which are usually elicited in this order. 1º, there is aroused in the will simple love or complacency in the goodness of the end proposed by the intellect. 2º, intention or desire to attain the end; which, if it determines one to inquiry and choice of means, is called efficacious intention; if it does not determine, inefficacious. 3º, deliberation and consultation of reason concerning suitable means follows. 4º, the choice of means. 5º, their execution. 6º, the real production or attainment of the end through the means. 7º, joy in the end obtained. That this series of actions is actually found when, for example, a sick man loves, procures, and obtains health will easily be evident to one who considers it. That all these are on account of the end and are caused by the end is proved at length with St. Thomas by Father Suárez, s. 3.

19. Question 3: In what does the proper causality of the final cause consist, which is also called finalization and the reason for finalizing in second act? I say 1º: with respect to acts of the will which intrinsically regard the end as their formal object, the causality of the end is the physical action by which such acts are produced by the will. Proof: because, when such an action is posited, the end is understood actually to cause and the effect actually to be caused, or posited on account of the end, as the concept of causality requires; and if such action is removed or prescinded from, an act of the will cannot be understood as actually depending on the end. For the cognition of the end alone, however vivid, is not actual causality, since it can be separated from an act of the will; otherwise a vehement temptation, although the Will resist it, would actually cause consent, which no one would say. Nor can anything else be devised in which the causality of the end consists, as Father Suárez shows, s. 4.

20. Moreover, the causality of the end is the exercise by which the will is actually attracted by the goodness of the end; but for the Will to be attracted by the object is for it to be borne toward the object through an elicited appetite. Hence St. Thomas, q. 22 De verit. a. 2, says: "As the influx of the efficient cause is to act, so the influx of the final cause is to be desired or longed for," namely with "to be desired" taken in becoming for the efficating of the appetite, if this is distinguished from its own production. But if love is its own production, it will at the same time be both the causality and the effect of the end, just as it is of the Will. To this also pertains the passage of St. Augustine, tract. 36 in Joann., where he beautifully discusses the Poet's saying, "his own pleasure draws each man"; and among other things he says, "the mind is drawn also by love... Nuts are shown to a boy, and he is drawn... he is drawn by loving... he is drawn by the bond of the heart." From these things it follows that the same action is simultaneously the causality of the efficient cause and of the final cause: of the efficient cause insofar as it arises from the active power of the will; of the final cause insofar as it has a relation to the foreknown end. Thus the same eduction under diverse respects is the causality of the agent and of what is acted upon with respect to the same form.

21. It must, however, be noted here that the causality of the end is metaphorical motion, as the Authors commonly teach in Father Suárez, cit. s. 4. For proper motion does not occur except through impulse or physical influx of the thing moving; but the end does not thus move the will, since it need not be physically present nor really existing. Therefore it only in a certain way invites the will through the allure of its goodness proposed by cognition; and because the will, thus invited, is accustomed to elicit love by

the force of a certain sympathy with the apprehended good, as though it were impelled by such a good and drawn by a gentle cord, the end is therefore analogically or metaphorically said to impel and move the will to love. Hence the same production of love, insofar as it physically arises from the will, is proper motion; and insofar as it depends on the end, it is metaphorical motion. There is no absurdity in this. Thus the same eduction, insofar as it is from the agent, is action, and insofar as it depends on the subject, is not action but passion. Thus also the same cognition is the proper and physical existence of itself and only the intentional and metaphorical existence of the object.

22. I say 2º: with respect to external acts, or even internal acts of the intellect or will when they are commanded from love and intention of an end which they nevertheless do not intrinsically regard as object, the causality of the end is their physical production, not taken alone or specifically, but insofar as here and now commanded through an act of will intrinsically regarding the end. The reason is that, first, external action alone, and understand the same of an internal action commanded in the manner stated, does not sufficiently determine the effect as done on account of the end; for the same action, for example walking, can exist without proceeding from that end, but from another or even from none. Then neither does the internal commanding act alone ultimately determine the external effect as caused by the end, because when such an act is posited the effect can be impeded, at least divinely. It therefore remains that the external action, insofar as determined and commanded by the internal act, is the causality of the end with respect to external effects.

23. Question 4: Is the final cause a true and proper cause? It is certain that a purely final cause is not active and does not exercise influx through an action physically proceeding from its power, as can be gathered from n. 21; and Aristotle noted this, 1 De Gener. t. 33, saying: "The cause for whose sake the rest are done is not active. Hence health itself is not active except by transference," namely insofar as it is metaphorically said to "impel" and "move" toward love of itself. Yet that it is a true, real, and proper cause is held by the most common opinion, which the Excellent Doctor, d. cit. sect. 1, calls "a received doctrine and as it were a first principle in Philosophy and Theology." Such authority alone would suffice to support it.

24. But in addition the reason can be this: the end, as intentionally existing, is prerequired for acts of the will, for these are what are immediately and formally caused by the end; and moreover it is not prerequired as a mere condition. Proof: because such acts are truly said to exist for the sake of the end and on account of the end, and truly savor of its

character and nature, insofar as chiefly from it they derive their species and become more or less noble, or even good or bad. Hence the end intrinsically regarded is usually the principal *a priori* reason why those acts have such a character and such perfection. But all these things are wholly foreign to a mere condition, as is evident in the application of fire and other cases; and they suffice for the acts truly to owe their being to the final cause, to which therefore true influx, or the giving of being, belongs, as the definition of cause requires. Confirmation: because if the end is varied, the production of the act of will and the act itself are necessarily varied, as is certain. Hence, if a diverse object, although equally good, is proposed by the intellect and the individual goodness which previously appeared ceases to be proposed, the act of the will necessarily perishes; and this kind of dependence distinguishes a cause from a mere condition, as we saw above.

25. Nor is it an obstacle 1º that the final cause, at least the end "whereby" and often even the whole end "which," does not require real existence in order to cause. For exercised real existence is required only for those causes to which, considering the character and quality of their influx, intentional existence does not suffice. But since the influx of the final cause is by metaphorical motion, by alluring and as it were inviting the will, intentional existence suffices for it, as we experience. Observe, however, with Father Suárez, s. 9, n. 6, that although the motion of the end is metaphorical in the being of motion, it is nevertheless proper in the being of causality, because it makes the effect truly and properly receive its being dependently upon the end as an *a priori* principle whose character it participates. Observe again that when we say the end is a "real" cause, we do not mean that it is always a really existing cause, but only that by reason of a goodness not purely fictitious, as we explained in Question 1, it causes a real effect.

26. Nor is it an obstacle 2º that the end in some way causes itself, since by the power of the means its production or attainment comes to exist. For, first, the end produced by the power of the means is its own cause and effect according to diverse existences: it is cause insofar as intentionally existing, and effect insofar as really existing. Hence without absurdity it can be prior and posterior to the means, and in a certain respect even to itself, according to one and another existence, in accordance with the saying, "What is first in intention is last in execution." Then the end does not immediately cause its own physical being, but through intention, choice of means, and the other acts enumerated in Question 2. Hence it does not properly cause itself with propriety of influx, according to what was said in c. 1 from n. 18.

27. Question 5: Which agents act on account of an end? I answer: concerning rational creatures there is no doubt that they act on account of

an end. Nor is there doubt that God acts *ad extra* on account of Himself as end, so that He is the first efficient principle and ultimate end of all things, according to Prov. 6: "The Lord has made all things for Himself." For although acts of the Divine will have no cause of themselves and consequently no final cause, but the infinite goodness of God is itself the reason for willing in a most eminent mode short of causality, nevertheless the operations of God *ad extra* are caused by God both efficiently and finally. The fact that in a created agent the end does not cause external actions unless it first causes internal acts occurs because the end, in order to cause, must be loved, and cannot be loved by a created agent unless it causes love. But an end can indeed be loved by God although it causes nothing in God. Moreover, an external action of a creature is of itself indifferent to being commanded from various ends, and therefore depends upon a determinate end only insofar as it depends on an internal act which is first caused by the end. But the external action of God is not indifferent with respect to the ultimate end, since it is essentially incapable of being caused by God except as acting on account of Himself. Hence it is of itself the causality of God both as efficient cause and as ultimate end.

28. Concerning insensible agents, it must be said that their actions, insofar as they arise from themselves, do not properly have a final cause, because this does not cause except as foreknown by the agent. Yet because "end" is often taken more broadly insofar as it signifies a fixed and destined terminus toward which an action tends according to the inclination of the agent, such agents are therefore commonly and truly said to tend toward an end and to act on account of an end. Nevertheless this common and true manner of speaking should rather be understood of the actions of those agents insofar as they proceed simultaneously from the Author of nature, or insofar as the agents themselves stand under the direction of the first cause. For thus they are properly said to act on account of an end as on account of a true final cause, and on account of an end, I say, not only remote and ultimate, which is God, but also proximate and intrinsic to the action, which is foreknown and intended by the Author of nature through such an action.

29. Concerning brute animals there is greater difficulty, for they know an object advantageous to themselves and often employ suitable means with remarkable sagacity in order to obtain it. Therefore some concede to brutes operation on account of an end as properly alluring and finalizing. And indeed in them there is found a certain analogy or participation in the motion which an end exercises upon human acts. Nevertheless, as the common opinion of almost all holds, that motion in brutes is not properly finalization, nor sufficient for a brute to be said to act on account of an end,

except in nearly the same way as an insensible agent. For a brute does not discern between a good desirable on account of itself and on account of another, nor does it perceive as such the proportion and utility of means, since for this comparative and subtler cognition is required than belongs to a brute, namely a cognition by which the agent can give a reason why it desires this or that, for so the proper force of the expression "on account of" requires; and this kind of cognition belongs only to a rational agent. See St. Thomas, I-II, q. 5, a. 2.

30. A brute therefore is moved by an end only materially, imperfectly, and improperly, and employs means not from a discerning cognition of their utility but from mere natural instinct, "which is nothing other," says Father Suárez, s. 10 n. 14, "than a certain act of imagination or estimative power naturally flowing from it with necessity upon the positing of the phantasm of such a thing, by which act the brute as it were practically judges that this is to be avoided, pursued, or desired by it, although it cannot discern the reason of suitability or unsuitability." But this quasi-practical cognition and the appetite resulting from it do not signately or formally order the means to the end, but tend in the same manner toward both. And when St. Thomas, I, p. q. 78, a. 4, says that "the bird gathers straw not because it delights the sense, but because it is useful for building a nest," he does not intend that the utility of the means as such is known by the brute, but that the brute is determined by the Author of nature to desire it because in itself it is truly useful for another advantage of the same brute. Thus fire also is said to heat wood from an intention of burning it, or because heat is a disposition useful for the form of fire.

CHAPTER IV.
On the Exemplar Cause.

1. I append the exemplar cause here because, although it is in reality a certain species of efficient cause, as I shall presently say, it is nevertheless usually explained separately as deserving special consideration. "Exemplar" means the same as an idea of a thing to be made, and is commonly defined from St. Thomas, q. 3 De verit. a. 1, as "the form which something imitates from the intention of an agent who determines an end for himself," that is, a certain likeness, species, or image preconceived in the mind, according to the likeness of which some work is made, not by chance, but from the intention of the agent, who proposes to himself as a proximate end to imitate it in the work. Hence only rational and intellectual agents, namely God, Angels, and man, properly employ an exemplar or idea, because they

alone can properly intend an end, distinctly preconceive the likeness of the thing to be made, and compare the work with the exemplar. Yet improperly even apes employ an exemplar when they imitate human actions. Hence also it is commonly said that an exemplar has place only in artifacts, as those alone according to their whole structure depend upon the direction of reason and the will of the agent; and because all creatures depend upon God in this way more than an artifact upon a human craftsman, God is therefore said to be, and is, the supreme artisan of all things and prepossesses their eternal ideas.

2. An exemplar is divided into external and internal. An external exemplar is a thing placed before the eyes and proposed for imitation. Thus, if you look at Peter or his image in order to fashion another image of him, Peter or the other image will be the external exemplar. The internal exemplar, which is properly called an idea, is the likeness of the work to be made which you form in the mind; and it is subdivided into formal and objective concept. The formal concept is the cognition itself distinctly representing the nature, structure, and manner of the thing to be made; the objective concept is the object of that cognition.

3. Question 1: Which of these is properly the exemplar? I answer 1º: although the external exemplar may perhaps from the first imposition of the name be called an exemplar and is thus commonly called, nevertheless with respect to the office of exemplar cause it is not properly and in itself an exemplar. First, because it is not required in itself for the work, since skilled artisans commonly form ideas of artifacts for themselves without it, and God, the supreme artisan, uses no external exemplar. Secondly, because it directs toward the work only mediately and remotely, namely by arousing the mind of the artisan and giving it occasion for the internal exemplar, whose office is to direct immediately and in itself. The question therefore concerns the internal exemplar alone.

4. I answer 2º: the formal concept alone is properly the exemplar or exemplar cause. Thus our Authors frequently hold with the Excellent Doctor, d. 25 Met. s. 1. It is proved 1º because the Divine ideas consist in science and cognition, as the Excellent Doctor shows by reason and by the authority of the Fathers and Philosophers; therefore the same must be judged of created ideas, for a created idea is a certain imitation of the Divine idea, just as created active power is a certain participation in Omnipotence. 2º, because the office of the exemplar cause is to direct the artisan toward the work and illuminate him so that he does not proceed blindly; but cognition alone, as the light of the mind, does this. 3º, because the exemplar properly is that concept which the work imitates and according to whose

likeness it is made; but the work does not imitate the objective concept. This is clear, because otherwise it would imitate itself and be made according to the likeness of itself. For when the artisan intends to build a house, he delineates it in the mind and thus forms its idea; therefore the house itself is the objective concept corresponding to the idea or formal concept.

5. Objection 1: an artifact does not become similar to cognition. I answer: the artifact becomes similar to cognition, not by physical likeness or in the being of an entity, but by intentional likeness, insofar as it is made as cognition prescribes and so disposes itself in being as cognition does in representing. In this sense we commonly say that cognition is a likeness of the object and therefore not infrequently call it by the name of the object, as when we call the idea of a house, that is, its ideal cognition, the archetypal house. Objection 2: an exemplar is that to which the artisan looks while working, as Seneca says after Aristotle; but the artisan looks not to cognition but to the object. I answer: this doctrine either was handed down only concerning the external exemplar when it is present, or it must be understood of an exercised inspection or reflection which is contained in the direct cognition itself of the thing to be made. For cognition, as intellectual light, exercisedly manifests itself to the intellect and is therefore an inspection of itself or toward itself. Add that the artisan usually reflects upon his own cognitions and ideas, although he does not always advert that he is reflecting; hence he also signately and reflexively looks to the internal exemplar.

6. Objection 3: the final cause does not properly consist in cognition but in the object; therefore likewise the exemplar cause. I deny the consequence. The disparity is 1º because it belongs properly to the final cause to allure the will to itself and attract it, which belongs only to the object of cognition; but it belongs properly to the exemplar to direct toward the work and be its norm, which is the office of cognition alone. 2º, because the final cause is the thing to be made or obtained and therefore is not cognition already present and obtained; but the exemplar is a thing not to be made but to be imitated as a rule, which is verified only of cognition. 3º, because the end causes under the aspect of good; but the exemplar under the aspect of likeness showing how the work is to be constructed.

7. Question 2: In what does exemplar causality consist? I answer: it consists in the external production of the work insofar as arising from, or determined by, an internal act of will which is the intention of imitating the idea. Proof: because when these are posited nothing is lacking for the work here and now to proceed from and depend upon the idea, as will be clear to one who considers it; and moreover both acts, internal and external, are

altogether required. For if external action is lacking, the effect will not exist and consequently there will be neither causality nor cause exercising influx in second act, as is evident. But if the intention of the will is lacking, although the effect is produced in reality, it will not be produced by the force of the exemplar cause but by chance or fortune, as occurred with that famous representation of a horse's foam which a painter produced by throwing a brush at the panel.

8. Question 3: Is an exemplar a true and proper cause? The affirmative opinion, which the Excellent Doctor, d. cit. s. 2, says must be presupposed as certain from the common judgment of Philosophers and Theologians, can be proved 1º because it seems certain that art concurs in artificial works, not accidentally or after the manner of a mere condition, but properly and in itself by causing their form; but art concurs only through an exemplar or idea. 2º, because just as it belongs properly to a natural agent to precontain the physical form and likeness of the effect which it produces, so it belongs properly to an intellectual agent acting not by chance and apart from the agent's intention to precontain the ideal likeness of the work which it effects. Therefore, just as in a natural agent that form in which physical likeness with the effect consists has the true character of a cause, so in an intellectual agent that form which is an ideal likeness must participate in the office of a true cause. 3º, because an artificial work, insofar as made in itself and not fortuitously, properly depends upon the preceding idea, and in such a way that it in some manner savors of and imitates its perfection; but this is nowhere found in a mere condition.

9. Question 4: To what genus of cause does an exemplar belong? I answer: first, it does not belong to the genus of material cause because it has no character of a subject; next, not to the genus of final cause, because of what was said in n. 6; likewise not to the genus of intrinsic formal cause, because it is not an intrinsic part constituting its effect. Nor does it matter that the exemplar is called the "form" of the thing to be made. For "form" is said generally of a likeness, norm, rule, or model, in Spanish "modelo." Nor does it matter that the exemplar is called by the ancients a formal cause. For the extrinsic formal cause, to which alone the ancients reduce the exemplar, can often be reduced to the genus of efficient cause, as we noted in c. 2. I therefore say with Father Suárez, cit. s. 2, that the exemplar cause is reduced to the genus of efficient cause.

10. It is proved 1º: the concurrence of art in external effects belongs to the efficient genus, both because art is practical and "practical" means the same as "operative," and because art concurs by directing and dictating what is to be done; but all reduce concurrence through direction, dictate, and

counsel to the genus of efficient cause. But art concurs in external works through the exemplar which it first forms in the mind; therefore, etc. 2º, the artisan by reason of the idea contains within himself the likeness of the effect, just as a natural agent by reason of its physical form; therefore, just as the natural form concurs in the effect as efficient cause, so does that intentional form. Confirmation: whatever is necessary for the agent to be simply capable of causing in itself in the efficient genus belongs to the genus of efficient cause; but the idea is necessary for the artisan to be simply capable of causing an artifact in itself in the efficient genus, for if he causes some work without an idea he will not be its author in itself, but fortuitously and accidentally.

11. Hence the exemplar cause is as it were a complement of the artificial efficient cause, which it constitutes proximately capable in itself of causing in its efficient genus. From this it appears why the final cause is not reduced to the genus of efficient cause as the exemplar is, namely because the final cause presupposes an agent proximately apt to act and moves it to act; whereas the exemplar does not presuppose but constitutes the agent proximately apt to operate artfully.

12. It must nevertheless be noted that an exemplar considered in itself is not a physically efficient cause but a moral cause; because a mental idea neither physically effects the external work, as is evident in itself, nor physically exercises influx upon the act of will, according to the common opinion denying this sort of influx to acts of the intellect. Therefore the mental idea concurs only by dictating, directing, and as it were giving counsel; and this manner of concurring belongs to a morally efficient cause. Hence the idea is properly called the cause of the external work, although the latter depends on the idea not immediately but through the act of will, for a moral cause is properly so called although it does not exercise influx upon the effect with physical immediacy. It must also be noted that when the exemplar is said to determine the action of the artisan, the discussion concerns determination as to species, insofar as the artisan cannot act in itself except according to the idea which he prepossesses; but as to exercise the will alone determines.

CHAPTER V.
On the Efficient Cause.

1. The cause best known of all and that which most frequently comes under the name "cause" said absolutely is the efficient cause. It is defined by Aristotle here, c. 3 and 5, in these words: "Whence is the first principle of

change and rest"; which definition is criticized by some as deficient, by others as redundant, and by others rejected as altogether false. To the Excellent Doctor, d. 17 Met. s. 1, it seems obscure and in need of much exposition, which he supplies at length and excellently. From his doctrine the efficient cause can be defined more clearly thus: "A cause from which action properly arises," or "effection." "Cause" is posited in place of the proximate genus, and the remaining words in place of the difference. For action as such does not arise from the formal cause, nor from the material cause, which cause through union and passion, not through action as action. Nor likewise does it properly arise from the final cause, since the latter is not active and causes only through metaphorical motion, as we saw in c. 3.

2. It may be said: the unknown is defined through what is more unknown when the efficient cause is defined through order to action. I deny the assertion. For although the philosophical notion of action, or its quiddity and distinction from agent and terminus, is more remote from common understanding than knowledge of the efficient cause, nevertheless some rough notion of action or effection is sufficiently common and ordinary; and from the likeness of the production of artificial works, which all know how to discern, it is easy to conceive the action even of natural causes. Indeed, by this reasoning the common definition of man by rational animal, or by a principle of sensing and reasoning, would likewise have to be rejected, since the quiddity of sensation and reasoning is less known than man. It may further be said: why should the efficient cause be defined through order to action rather than to effect? I answer: order to effect is sufficiently expressed when action is expressed, since for action to arise from a cause is equivalent to the effect arising from the cause through action. Action rather than effect is mentioned because the latter, although it derives its name from effection, in common usage says order to every genus of cause, whereas action as such says order to the efficient cause alone.

First Division of the Efficient Cause: Whether Second Causes Are Truly Causes.

3. The efficient cause is divided 1º into first and second; or, what comes to the same thing, into uncreated and created; or also into creating cause and purely generating or educing cause. The first, uncreated, and creating cause is God alone; a second, created, and purely generating or educing cause is a creature. The difference between creation and eduction was explained tr. 1, d. 4, c. 4. The present question is whether second causes are truly causes, that is, whether they truly produce anything by their own and

inherent power, or whether they only apparently effect, or seem to us to effect, insofar as effects are produced in their presence by God alone, who decreed to produce heat in the presence of fire, light in the presence of the Sun, and so on in other cases.

4. Certain ancients asserted the latter; and modern Corpuscular Physicists are bound by force of consequence to assert the same, since they deny that even the least new entity can be produced except by creation, and therefore limit all the activity of a second cause to new modifications which add no proper entity to preexisting things, lest that celebrated dictum, "Nothing comes from nothing," should waver. And at least concerning bodily causes there is no reason why the Cartesians, whom Tosca imitates, should think otherwise, since they deny to bodies every action except local motion and maintain that this is impressed by a spiritual mover alone apart from any requirement of the atoms. See what we said on this matter in Prelim. Diss. n. 21. I said just now that these Philosophers are bound to assert the same "by force of consequence," because they are constrained to it by their own principles, although verbally they maintain the contrary, at least most of them, explicitly Tosca, Metaph. l. 4, c. 2, prop. 25, where he rightly proves that creatures truly act and effect something, though by arguments which the same Author would have to solve if he wished to stand by the principles established by himself in Physics.

5. One man whom I have seen, Malebranche, a celebrated modern writer and Priest of the Bérullian Oratory, in the French work *La Recherche de la verite*, or *Inquisitio veritatis*, l. 6, De Method. part. 2, c. 3, flatly denies the power and efficacy of creatures for producing anything, and says that natural causes are merely "occasional" causes, namely insofar as on their occasion God alone acts according to the order prescribed by Himself. Indeed, he proceeds to such boldness that he calls the contrary opinion "miserable Philosophy and an error" arising from pagan idolatry. He attempts to establish and vindicate this opinion of his more fully in tom. 3 of the same Work, "Eclaircissement," or "explanation 15." His arguments tend toward removing all activity from second causes, not only bodily but also spiritual and free causes, although in the latter he attempts to preserve the fact that they somehow act and truly determine themselves, and speaks with sufficient perplexity.

6. "But this position," says St. Thomas, in II, d. 1, q. 1, a. 4, "is foolish, because it destroys the order of the Universe and the proper operation of things, and destroys the judgment of sense." The Angelic Doctor expressly rejects it, 3 Cont. Gent. c. 69 and I, p. q. 105 a. 5, as does the Excellent Doctor, d. 18 Met. s. 1, where he says that it can be called "rash and

erroneous"; and he judges the opposite opinion, which attributes to created causes a power for effects proportionate to them, to be "not only most evident by sense and reason, but also most certain according to Catholic doctrine." Therefore it must be held altogether that second causes are true causes and truly act and effect by their own power, and this is to be proved briefly, 1º from Sacred Scripture, which often attributes productive power to natural things, for example Gen. 1: "Let the earth bring forth green vegetation, and fruit-bearing trees producing fruit according to their kind." Mark 4: "Another fell on good ground and yielded fruit, etc." And below: "The earth bears fruit of itself, first the blade, then the ear, then full grain in the ear." Luke 21: "When the trees now produce fruit from themselves, etc." I omit countless others. Who could tolerate twisting all these into an improper sense against the agreement of the Fathers and experience, with no compelling reason?

7. 2º, from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 4, where it condemns those who say that human free choice "does absolutely nothing, but behaves merely passively." And in truth the dogma of human freedom, if all activity whatsoever is excluded, can in no way be understood; nor likewise can the dogma defined by the Councils concerning two operations and two principles of operating in Christ the Lord. 3º, because otherwise God would be the author and the sole true cause of every depraved work and sinful action, which it is wicked to say. 4º, because from that doctrine it would follow that a man generating offspring could as truly be said to create a rational soul as fire is said to produce heat, since God also creates the soul in the presence of the generator as an occasional cause.

8. 5º, because there would be no intrinsic difference between living things and inanimate things; for if God decreed to produce vital acts in the presence of a stone as He now decrees in the presence of man, according to the contrary opinion the stone would as truly live as man. And hence 6º, because there would be no basis for proving a difference between a man and a donkey, since each would be equally destitute of every power of reasoning, nor would it otherwise appear why the human soul rather than the asinine should be called rational or spiritual. 7º, because the foundation of natural Philosophy would utterly fail, since from effects one could not investigate the diverse power, character, and nature of things, but only the diverse will of God now acting in this way, now otherwise, according to occasions appointed by Himself by mere choice without a foundation in things. Finally, there is no repugnance or contradiction in creatures having a power of acting; why then should it not be believed that they in fact have it, since both

the agreement of the human race and manifest experience and so many oracles of Holy Writ openly attest it?

9. Objection 1: a creature depends essentially upon God alone; therefore it is made or caused only by God alone. 2º, God immediately concurs in all effects; therefore He concurs either through a sufficient power, in which case created power is superfluous, or through an insufficient power, which cannot be said without injury to Omnipotence. 3º, there is no repugnance in all effects which we experience in the presence of created causes being made by God alone; therefore it must be believed that they are in fact so made. Proof of the consequence: both because powers are not to be multiplied without necessity, and this necessity would wrongly be founded upon the testimony of the senses, which often deceive; and because Sacred Scripture seems to testify thus, as 1 Cor. 13: "God works all things in all."

10. To this testimony others can be added which Malebranche collects, cit. Expl. 15, namely Isa. 44: "I am the Lord who make all things, who alone stretch out the heavens, who establish the earth, and none is with me." Job c. 10: "Your hands, O Lord, made me and fashioned me wholly round about." 2 Macc. 7, the Maccabean mother said to her sons: "I myself did not join together the members of each of you, but the Creator of the World, who formed the birth of man, etc." Acts 17: "Since He" (God) "gives to all life and breath and all things." Ps. 103: "Producing grass for cattle and vegetation for the service of men, that you may bring forth bread from the earth." To these is added that St. Augustine, 5 De Civit. c. 9, expressly says that bodily causes are not to be numbered among efficient causes.

11. 4º, from the same Malebranche: the concept of the supreme power of acting is the concept of the supreme Divinity; therefore the concept of a lower active power will be the concept of a certain Divinity, inferior indeed but nevertheless true, at least according to the opinion of pagans. Therefore those who attribute true power of acting to creatures, although subordinated to the supreme power, seem incautiously to imitate pagans, who fashioned for themselves certain inferior divinities subordinate to supreme Jupiter. Confirmation: fear and love are due to those things which can truly harm or benefit us, or bring evil or good upon us; both because the dictate of nature bears this out, and because in Sacred Scripture God for this reason exhorts the Israelites to fear and love Him alone and not the gods of the Gentiles, because nothing was to be feared or hoped for from them; and also because what is capable of acting upon us is above us and therefore ought to be feared and loved by us. But adoration consists in fear and love. Therefore either true power to burn us and warm us with heat is to be denied to fire, for example, or fire will have to be adored by us. I omit certain other things

added by Malebranche, because they are denied with the same ease with which they are said.

12. These things are answered without difficulty. To 1º: although every creature, at least one which is an absolute entity, depends essentially upon God alone as a cause necessary in every event, nothing prevents many creatures from depending at the same time by their own nature upon other creatures, so that they naturally require their influx. Whence do you prove that it belongs to the concept of a true cause that the effect according to itself depend essentially upon it? To 2º: God concurs in all effects through a power more than sufficient of itself and in first act, but not always unfolding itself in second act so as to render the influx of the created cause idle. For He so tempers His concurrence as to leave to second causes room to exercise influx upon effects proportionate to them; for, as St. Augustine says, 7 De Civit. c. 30, "He so governs all things which He created that He also allows them to exercise and perform their own motions." Nor can created power be called superfluous, since it serves both so that effects may be produced in a mode connatural to themselves and so that creatures may in some way participate in the goodness and power of their Creator and thus bear witness to His munificence.

13. To 3º: although there is no metaphysical repugnance in the proposed hypothesis, provided it be supposed that there is in creatures no vital, free, or sinful motion, for those motions of creatures as such to be made by God alone is metaphysically repugnant, nevertheless there is a physical or natural repugnance which cannot be overcome except by miracle. Hence in Sacred Scripture, Wis. 16, it is attributed to miracle that fire, forgetful of its own power, did not harm the just. There is, I say, a natural repugnance in actually existing creatures not being permitted to act at all; for since their specific diversity, especially that which exists between bodily and spiritual substances and between living and inanimate things, cannot be conceived without an active power for diverse effects, they are proved to possess this power not only by the testimony of the senses but by reason. But if they possess it, they naturally require to exercise it and cannot be restrained without violence. Hence it is false that we multiply powers without necessity, even metaphysical necessity. Moreover, physical necessity would suffice; the necessity of not imposing the reproach of lying or falsity upon Holy Writ and the agreement of the whole human race would suffice. It is likewise false that the senses can deceive us in so clear, common, and perpetual a matter. Certainly, if nothing is to be embraced as true from the testimony of the senses, as Malebranche seems to wish, there will be no basis for philosophically believing that the Heaven, Earth, and the other

things of the bodily World exist, nor even that we ourselves actually have bodies.

14. Nor do the testimonies of Sacred Scripture favor the contrary opinion. Not 1º, because for God truly to be said to work all things in all it suffices that nothing occur without the operation and concurrence of God, although in many things a created cause acts at the same time. Not 2º, because the passage manifestly speaks of the first creation of the World, which no one denies was God's alone. Not 3º, because when God concurs in the formation of man He forms not merely a part but the whole with totality of effect, as they say, and also with totality of the directing and knowing cause as to how the human body is to be organized; but from this the purely physical influx of created seminal power is not excluded. Not 4º, because "I myself did not join them together" must be understood in the sense just stated, namely so as not to exclude the mother's purely physical influx, but only concurrence by industry, cognition, or an idea concerning the joining of the members. Not 5º nor 6º, because they are properly verified by the fact that God both gave created powers and immediately concurs with them in all effects. Thus one who gives a poor man clothing and helps him with his own hands to put it on is truly said to give both the clothing and its use, although the poor man himself cooperates in the latter. Augustine, however, in the words objected speaks of efficient causes which apply themselves to acting and have dominion over their own actions.

15. To 4º: that argument is futile and very similar to this: the concept of supreme being is the concept of supreme Divinity; indeed the concept of an existing thing par excellence is proper to God, according to Exod. 3: "I am who am, and He who is has sent me to you." Therefore the concept of an inferior being or existing thing is the concept of a certain inferior Divinity; therefore whoever attributes entity and existence to created things falls into the error of pagans. The consequence must therefore be denied, because just as entity and existence, so also active power, by the very fact that it is finite, participated, and dependent upon another, is repugnant to true Divinity. But if pagans through error and most shameful ignorance thought otherwise, fashioning for themselves a chimerical and contradictory concept of Divinity, what is that to us? We assert this one thing: that the Divine goodness, supremely liberal and diffusive of itself, made creatures in some way participants in its perfections and willed that they in some respect imitate their Creator not only in existing but also in acting, though by an imitation most remote from the summit of true Divinity.

16. To the confirmation. Many things are mixed together there that are said either falsely or confusedly. For the present it is enough to say 1º that

adoration is an act of submission and reverence by which we honor another on account of his excellence. Hence not every fear or love is adoration or implies it; for one who loves a horse or fears a bull does not therefore submit himself to them as more excellent or show them reverence. 2º, that the adoration proper to Divinity, which is called "latria," and the fear and love corresponding to it, is not owed to every thing which can harm or benefit us, even if it is more excellent than we are either by nature, as an Angel, or by dignity, as a King; but it is owed only to that thing which possesses a supreme and independent power of harming and benefiting and so subordinates all other causes to itself that without its most free will or permission no advantage or disadvantage can happen to us. Hence God alone is to be feared and loved in all things as supreme Arbiter of goods and penal evils; not because created things lack every power to inflict some good or evil upon us, but because that power depends altogether upon the judgment of God both in acting and in existing.

The Remaining Divisions.

17. The efficient cause is divided 2º into physical and moral. Physical cause is not here taken for bodily cause alone, but is any cause which by its own power really and independently of human estimation executes the effect, as the Sun produces light. Moral cause is sometimes taken for a free cause capable of good or depraved morals. Here, however, it is taken for a cause which does not execute the effect by its own power but nevertheless somehow induces another cause, or another potency of the same *suppositum*, to execute it; whereby morally, that is, in the estimation of prudent persons or according to the common manner of speaking and judging, the effect is attributed to such an inducing cause just as if it executed it by its own power. Thus command, counsel, and prayers are moral causes of the work to whose execution they induce. Thus merits also are moral causes of rewards, and crimes of punishments. This induction of the moral cause can be manifold and diverse, namely now determinative, now directive, now inclinative, now properly motive, now purely impulsive, now formal, now virtual or interpretative, now subjective, now objective, now exercised, now signate. Father Ulloa, Physic. specul. d. 2, c. 1, from n. 6, enumerates and explains these and other modes of causing morally at length; and we do not discuss them here, because in the course of the Sciences they are usually explained individually when occasion arises.

18. For now I note only two things. 1º, Father Ulloa numbers the final cause among moral causes; but although an end agrees with a moral cause in

that it does not physically produce the effect but moves and induces another effecting cause, nevertheless it is commonly distinguished from it in this, that the end moves so that it may be, that is, so that means may be employed for its attainment, whereas the moral cause moves because it is, as can be seen in the examples of command, prayers, merits, etc. 2º, many things which in another genus are called mere conditions are causes in the moral genus, because they direct, determine, or move causes of another genus. Thus cognition of the end is a pure condition for love in the genus of final cause and at the same time is a moral cause insofar as it directs or exercisedly inclines the will. Thus also the application of fire is a pure condition for burning in the physically efficient genus, and yet can be called a moral cause of combustion insofar as it determines the Author of nature to concur with the fire.

19. It is divided 3º into univocal and equivocal. A univocal cause produces an effect of the same lowest species as itself, as a horse produces a horse and fire fire; and such a cause is said to contain the effect "formally." An equivocal cause produces an effect of a different species. An equivocal cause contains the effect "eminently" when it surpasses it in perfection, as God all creatures; it contains it "equivalently" if there is found a cause of indeed diverse perfection yet equal to the effect; it contains it "purely virtually" when the cause is surpassed by the effect in perfection, as often occurs with an instrumental cause. But three things are to be noted here. 1º, no efficient cause contains its effect "formally" in the sense that it prepossesses within itself the very individual entity of the effect and afterwards spews or gives birth to it like a female to offspring previously conceived in the womb; nor is it said to give being to the effect in the sense that it bestows upon it the entity of the cause itself or a part of it. For this understanding is crude and altogether foreign to the minds of the wise; and otherwise creatures would be so many little fragments of Divinity. Therefore no efficient cause contains an effect except "virtually," insofar as it has power to effect that the effect, which was nowhere, begin to be in the nature of things. Hence, when one cause is said to contain the effect "formally" and another "eminently," the sense is that the one belongs entitatively to the same formal specific concept, while the other belongs to a diverse and more eminent one.

20. 2º, an efficient cause cannot be adequate even in the genus of created efficient cause unless it has a perfection either superior or at least equal to the effect. This is clear both from the common judgment of the Schools and because otherwise it would follow that a fly could be an adequate cause of the Universe. Therefore the saying, "No one gives what he does not have," is

commonly applied even to a created efficient cause, and must be understood of an adequate cause in such a way that by its action it cannot bestow upon the effect a perfection beyond the measure which it prepossesses within itself. Hence when from a tiny spark a vast house is consumed by fire, the first spark does not effect the whole conflagration, but a small fire not unequal to itself, which immediately produces another, and so on. Why then, you ask, is God's concurrence always required? General concurrence is required, not to supply an inequality of perfection in the created cause when it is total in its own genus, but to preserve God's immediate dominion over all effects and the immediate dependence of all of them upon the first Cause. 3º, in order for thing A to be judged the efficient cause of thing B, whether univocal or equivocal, equality or excess of perfection is indeed required, but does not suffice unless fecundity with respect to thing B is proved by experience or otherwise. Therefore neither the Sun produces a Sun, nor a diamond iron, nor a horse a mouse.

21. It is divided 4º into universal and particular. The universal cause par excellence is the first cause, because it concurs in all effects of the Universe. But with respect to the elemental World the heavenly bodies are also called universal causes because they are judged to cooperate by their influx in all sublunary bodily effects. A particular cause is one which concurs in only one or some species of effects. It is divided 5º into free and necessary. A free cause is one which, when all prerequisites for acting are posited, can act and not act; concerning which there will often be occasion to treat elsewhere. A necessary cause is one which, when all prerequisites for acting are posited, necessarily breaks forth into a determinate operation.

22. It is divided 6º into one operating immanently and one operating transiently. A cause operates transiently when it effects something in an alien subject, as when fire heats water. It operates immanently when it effects something within itself, so that it itself is both the agent and subject of the operation. But if the immanent operation is of the genus of those which presuppose a connatural state of the thing, such as intellection, sensation, and nutrition, the cause is living; but it is not living, or does not act as such, if the operation is of another genus, as when water produces cold in itself. It is divided 7º into natural and supernatural. "Natural" is often elsewhere taken for necessary cause; here, however, it is taken for a cause of an operation not exceeding the active and exigitive powers of the whole of nature. A supernatural cause is one which elicits a supernatural operation, or one exceeding those powers of nature. But if a thing entitatively natural is elevated to a supernatural operation, as the human intellect to the vision of God, it is called an obediential cause supernaturalized.

23. It is divided 8º into principal and instrumental; this division will more suitably be explained in disp. 5. Finally, one efficient cause is in first act, another in second act. A cause in first act is that which does not yet effect but is apt to effect; and when the aptitude or power of the cause is joined with all prerequisites for acting, so that nothing is now lacking except actual operation, it is said to be in proximate first act. But if some prerequisite condition is lacking, the cause is said to be in remote first act; and this act will be more or less remote according as more or fewer conditions are lacking. Indeed, even the proximate first act of a created cause can be either entirely and absolutely complete, namely when the Divine decree of concurring with the created power is present, in which event the first act of a necessary cause is metaphysically connected with second act or actual operation; or complete only in the genus of second cause, namely when no other condition is lacking except God's will to concur, as happened in the Babylonian fire, and then the first act of a necessary cause is physically or naturally connected with second act. A cause in second act is one which is now actually effecting, or which now has actual causality and action, which is essentially inseparable from the effect. This division can also be applied to other causes, especially the material and final.

On the Causality of a Created Efficient Cause.

24. This causality is action or effection, and that it is a mode on the part of the thing distinct from the cause and effect, at least when the effect is of itself indifferent to proceeding either naturally or divinely from diverse causes, as occurs in fire A, which can proceed from fire B, or from C, or from God alone, is not so much disputed as presupposed in the Schools. Only some Connotators, enemies of all modes, oppose it; and they can easily be refuted from what we said concerning the mode of union distinct from its extremes in tr. 1. Here I only warn that action, not only from the concept of mode and ultimate determination by which such an effect is made by such a cause, is essentially inseparable from such cause and effect, but also from the concept of egression and actual origin essentially regards such an active power as its source and cause, so that the action of fire A, for example, cannot even divinely arise from another power in its place, nor from God alone.

25. But it is objected that from this it follows that there is some true created entity which cannot be produced by God alone, and consequently with respect to which omnipotence is a power insufficient of itself and necessarily partial. I answer: the very same thing follows from the probable

opinion of many who assert that there are human acts essentially vital and free. But whatever may be said of this, I grant that God alone cannot produce only that entity whose essence consists in "proceeding from a created cause." For God cannot make, for example, proceeding from fire to be proceeding from God alone, since this is an essential inversion and manifest contradiction to which the Divine power does not extend, just as neither can it make man irrational or produce other chimeras of this kind. This does not arise from an imperfection of Omnipotence, but rather from its supreme perfection, whose character it is to render impossible whatever is not worthy of God as artisan.

26. Therefore the action of fire also arises from God, for every action of creatures is indivisibly an action of God, as we shall say elsewhere, but it cannot arise from God alone. Hence God concurs in such an action as a necessarily partial cause, that is, not the sole cause, though the necessity arises not from poverty but from the supreme perfection of Omnipotence which is repugnant to making chimeras. Hence this repugnance is not to be called an "insufficiency" of God, but rather "essential refusal." Yet this does not prevent it from being most truly said that God can do by Himself alone whatever He does through second causes. For this is true of every effect distinct from the action of the creature; indeed absolutely of every effect, for action is not properly an effect but an effection or exercise of effecting. Hence the sense of that assertion is that God does not need the actions of creatures in order to cause to exist whatever exists through those actions, or that He can by Himself alone posit an action by which the action of a second cause is supplied, indeed eminently, in relation to the effects which the latter regards.

27. It is again objected: the proximate first act of a necessary cause, completely perfected even on the part of the Divine decree, is metaphysically connected with a determinate effect; therefore no indifference remains to be removed through a modal action. I answer: first, the objection does not press in the case of a free cause, since that connection on the part of first act is repugnant to it. Next, neither does it press in the case of a necessary cause. For the decree applying Omnipotence to concur with fire A toward fire B wills that this fire be made by that one; but for it thus to be made does not consist precisely in each fire existing, since each can exist without B being made by A. Therefore it consists in an effection distinct from both, and the applicative decree regards this as its object. Hence that decree does not remove the indifference of first act to second except radically, or insofar as it is connected with the mode of action. What we have said concerning the causality of a second cause is to be

understood likewise of the causality of the first Cause when the latter acts by itself alone and not through creation. Whether creation also is a mode distinct from cause and effect will be discussed elsewhere.

DISPUTATION III.

ON THE PREREQUISITES, OR CONDITIONS FOR CAUSING.

A prerequisite, or condition necessary for causing, with respect to the efficient cause, of which alone we now speak, although the same doctrine can easily be applied to causes of other genera, is said to be anything which, although it is not a power properly exercising physical influx, is nevertheless required on the part of the cause for exercising influx. I say "on the part of the cause," so that without it the active power cannot be understood as proximately ready, or in proximate first act for acting, or at least sufficiently complete in the being which it prerequires. For other things without which the effect cannot exist, but which should not be understood on the part of the cause and do not render its power ready, are not called "prerequisites" but mere "requisites." Thus, although you cannot write without God seeing it, nevertheless the Divine science of vision is not a prerequisite but merely a requisite for your writing, because it is not understood on the part of the first act of a power ready to write. Moreover, prerequisites can be diverse according to the diverse condition of causes: some are positive or consist in something positive; others negative, namely consisting in the absence or removal of some positive impediment, as the removal of shackles for running; likewise some are metaphysically or essentially necessary, others purely physically or naturally, others morally only. For now we shall treat only certain general prerequisites which have place in every created cause, especially a bodily one. The principal of these is the decree applying

Omnipotence; but because this will have its proper place where we treat of the concurrence of the first Cause, it is omitted for now.

CHAPTER I.
Whether the Existence of the Cause is Prerequired for Causing.

1. Let it be certain that the existence of the cause is so necessary for acting that a cause which never existed can do nothing. And in this sense those who really distinguish essence from existence in created things say that existence is not a power exercising influx but a prerequisite condition for the essence to exercise influx. But in our principles, which deny that distinction, if essence is a power, so also is existence. Yet whatever may be said of the distinction between essence and existence, the question is whether the power of the cause immediately exercising influx must necessarily exist at the instant in which it causes. We deliberately speak of the power immediately exercising influx, not of the cause in any sense whatever. For things which cause through a power adequately distinct from themselves are often said to cause when they do not exist. For example, one who hurls a weapon at Peter, although he immediately dies before Peter is wounded, is nevertheless said to kill Peter or to cause Peter's death. Whether this denomination of "causing" is proper or improper can be gathered both from what was said d. 1, c. 1, from n. 18, and from what will be said d. 5.

2. Several Thomists, whom Master Juan Martínez de Prado cites and follows, 2 Physic. q. 15, answer the question negatively, judging that a cause, taken even for the power exercising influx, can cause something at an instant in which it does not exist, provided it existed immediately beforehand. But that an active power must necessarily exist while actually causing, so that the opposite is repugnant even divinely, is held, and rightly, by our Authors and the Scotists. The reason is that a thing at an instant in which it does not exist is nothing; therefore at that time it can effect nothing. Proof of the consequence: because nothing seems more evident than that "a being cannot be made by a non-being," or that "from nothing nothing is made"; and therefore all Philosophers demonstrate the existence of the first Cause from the existence of creatures. Certainly, what is nothing does not actually contain the perfection of the effect in any way, since it actually has no perfection; but it is certain that a cause cannot act except insofar as it contains the perfection of the effect. Hence if it does not actually contain it, it cannot actually produce it. Or otherwise: "No one gives

what he does not have"; therefore a cause not having existence cannot communicate it to the effect. Hence St. Thomas, III, p. q. 77, a. 3, says: "Because each thing acts insofar as it is a being in act, it follows that as each thing stands toward being, so it stands toward acting." Likewise St. Thomas often insists elsewhere, from which the axiom arose: "Each thing operates insofar as it is in act."

3. Confirmation 1º: a cause, before it exists, although it is going to exist immediately afterward, can do nothing, as the Thomists admit in the cited M. Prado, Metaph. p. 2, contr. 13, a. 1, where he again treats this question; therefore the same must be said of a cause which no longer exists although it existed before. The consequence is clear, for what has ceased to be is just as much nothing, just as truly is not "in act," just as truly does not contain or have what it might give, as what has not yet begun to be. Confirmation 2º: nothing is actually caused without an existing action; but action, since it is a physical mode of the efficient cause, is essentially inseparable from it in existing. M. Manso denies that action is a mode of the cause. But the concept of mode is the concept of an ultimate determination of a thing for performing some office; action, however, according to all, is the ultimate determination of the efficient cause for the physical office of acting. Confirmation 3º: if a nonexisting cause can first produce something, it will also be able to conserve it for a long time; for more, or certainly no less, is required for producing than for conserving. But the consequence is absurd to all.

4. Confirmation 4º: if once any positive action can physically arise from a nonexisting cause, any actions at all, at least transient ones, will be able to do so; whence an extinguished lamp could shine, a dead dog bite, and however long the goat had been dead someone could still warn Tityrus with the Poet: "Beware of meeting the goat; he strikes with his horn." Indeed even immanent actions, such as sensing and knowing, could proceed from a nonexisting thing, nor would their inherence in their cause as subject be an obstacle; for why could efficiency without an agent be given any more than inherence without a subject? From what has been said you will infer that the Thomists vainly restrict their doctrine to those causes which are successive beings, such as the words of the Sacraments or an alteration successively preparing the subject for a form. For our arguments equally press in every cause, as will be evident to one who considers them.

5. Objection 1: the words of the Sacraments cause Grace after they have been uttered, or in the first instant of their nonbeing, which is usually called the last extrinsic instant of existence. I answer: the Sacraments either do not physically cause Grace, but only morally, as several great Theologians think;

or, if they cause physically, as very many others judge, they do not exercise physical causality except through the last particle or terminus by which the Sacrament is intrinsically completed and consummated. This terminus, while then actually existing, physically effects Grace, nevertheless presupposing as an altogether necessary condition that the remaining words preceded in due order and continuity. See Father Suárez, t. 3 in III, p. d. 8, s. 2.

6. Here note that a thing which no longer physically exists can be a necessary condition for another physically existing thing to cause; for since a pure condition does not properly exercise influx or give being to the effect, our arguments do not apply to it. Likewise a thing not physically existing can cause morally, provided it exists morally. Thus merits cause reward and sins punishment when they no longer physically exist. Nor is it permissible from this to argue to a physical agent; otherwise, just as merits and sins physically past morally cause reward and punishment for all eternity, so Trojan fire could physically burn us now and forever. But the moral existence of a past thing consists, or is founded, in something physically persisting which in some respect had its origin or motive from that same thing while it was present.

7. Objection 2: the preceding alteration of a subject causes generation or the introduction of a substantial form; yet at the instant of generation the alteration ceases, as being a successive motion which must cease when the ultimate terminus arrives and succession is finished. The same argument is made concerning motion of intension, augmentation, and any other successive motion. I answer: the preceding alteration is taken either for the action productive of the quality preparing the subject for the form, or for the preparing quality itself. If for the quality, this certainly persists at the instant of generation, whatever may be said of whether it physically effects it, for the Thomistic doctrine concerning the resolution of the prior composite all the way to prime matter will elsewhere be rejected as false. If for the action, the alteration indeed ceases under the aspect of successive motion or under the aspect of gradually overcoming the contrary quality, because at the instant of generation succession and overcoming are ended; but under this aspect alteration is not a cause of generation except as a mere remote condition. Yet it need not cease under the aspect of an action conserving the produced quality, since the quality itself perseveres. Hence under this aspect, if nothing else obstructs, it can be a cause of the generation of the form or of the ultimate terminus of successive motion. Let the same be said proportionately of motion of intension, etc.

8. Objection 3: a cause can act in a proximate or contiguous place in which it itself is not; therefore also in an immediately subsequent time or instant in which it itself no longer exists. But I infer likewise against the Thomists: therefore it can also act in the instant preceding the first existence of the cause itself, since that instant too is immediate. Likewise: therefore it can act for a long period of time after it has ceased to be, just as the Sun, far distant from the earth, produces many effects in it. Therefore I deny the consequence: because a cause, although not locally penetrated with the effect, can actually exist and consequently actually contain the perfection of the effect; but if it does not exist in the same instant as the effect, it in no way presently exists, since no other instant is present. Therefore at that time it is mere nothing and accordingly capable of acting upon nothing.

9. Objection 4: the existence of the cause is a pure condition for causing; but conditions can at least be divinely supplied. I answer: first, in our principles the existence of the power is the power itself, as we noted at the beginning. Next, it does not belong to the character of a pure condition that it can be supplied by God, as is evident in cognition, which according to the common opinion is essentially prerequired for loving; and as even the Adversaries must admit in the present matter, since they teach that the existence of the cause is essentially necessary at least at some preceding instant or time before the production of the effect.

10. Objection 5: a living thing, when it dies, is truly changed; and yet at the instant of death it no longer exists. Therefore a nonexisting thing can undergo true change; therefore it can also cause. I answer: in the death of a living thing matter alone is properly and physically changed, because physical change requires the transition of the same existing subject from one terminus to another. The living thing itself is changed in death only insofar as it was and now is not; this is usually called a logical change, in which the subject under both states is not the same except by extrinsic attribution. But from a change of this kind a parity is ineptly drawn to causality. For who would not laugh at one arguing thus: "A living thing, when it dies, truly does not exist; therefore a nonexisting thing can cause"? Do our arguments apply here even by a shadow?

11. Final objection: the final cause can cause while it does not exist; therefore so can the efficient cause. But why do you not infer that an efficient cause can cause before it exists, or even if it never existed nor ever will exist, since the final cause can? No one doubts that every cause requires existence either in the same instant as its causality or at least in some preceding instant. Whether that existence must be physical, intentional, or

moral is gathered from the mode of influx of each cause. Hence all infer that intentional preexistence suffices for the final cause, but that physical existence is necessary for a physically efficient cause and moral existence for a moral cause. Therefore the controversy is not whether a physical cause must physically preexist, but whether it must retain that existence in the instant of causality. To deny this, it is inept to argue from the physical existence of the end, since all agree that such existence is material to finalizing. Therefore the argument must be from the intentional existence of the end to the physical existence of the efficient cause. So understood, however, the argument favors us, for the final cause cannot cause, at least internal acts which it intrinsically specifies, except as actually existing intentionally.

12. Finally observe that when Thomists say that the cause exists at least "virtually" whenever it produces the effect, by "virtually" they do not here understand something left behind by the past cause which is a power exercising influx upon the effect, as for example the impulse of a projected stone exercises influx upon its motion, for thus we would scarcely disagree from n. 1. Rather, they understand the effect itself or the causality in which the power of the cause shines forth. Hence in this sense for a cause to exist, not in itself but virtually, is nothing other than for the causality and effect to exist although the cause and its influxive power do not exist. And this is what we have thus far opposed.

CHAPTER II.
To What Extent the Location, Duration, and Subsistence of the Cause Are Required for Causing.

1. If a thing could exist and nevertheless be divinely absolved from every place and time, the location or presence of the cause in a place, nor its duration at the instant of production of the effect, would seem altogether necessary, because without these modes the cause could truly exist and consequently truly contain the perfection of the effect; nor from any other head does the essential necessity of such modes appear. But because the opinion of almost all denies that a thing can exist without existing in some place and time or instant, the cause must certainly actually endure and be located while it causes, because it cannot cause unless it exists, and cannot exist unless it endures and is located.

2. But there is a doubt whether location, and understand the same of duration if it consists in a mode distinct from the enduring thing, is a prerequisite or pertains to the first act of a cause proximately ready to cause.

I answer 1º: in order for a thing to produce its own location, location is not required on the part of first act. For neither is the location which is produced required, since it cannot precede itself, nor another distinct location, lest otherwise, which no one admits, a thing should naturally have two locations in the same instant, since it is certain that the whole first act exists in the same instant as the effect. Hence even when someone acquires presence in place A through immediate motion from place B, formal presence in B is not understood for a prior sign; otherwise the thing would be present in two places in the same instant. Therefore only radical presence in A is preunderstood, consisting in this, that the thing for a prior sign is determined to leave the location in B and acquire one in A, either by reason of impulse or by reason of its own or the Divine will.

3. I answer 2º: neither is location prerequired in order for a thing to produce in itself its own subsistence or its properties or other immanent acts. First, because location is not prerequired by title of absence of distance between agent and what is acted upon, since a thing has absence of distance with respect to itself not from location but from identity. Nor does it otherwise appear why location must be understood as prior, for it does not deserve to be required before other intrinsic and more noble perfections, nor is there any reason why a power sufficient for effects of this sort, impeded under no head, cannot be conceived while prescinding from location. It may be said: the power of the cause must be preunderstood as existing before every effect; but it cannot exist except somewhere, or located in some place; therefore it must be preunderstood with some location. But this proves that before the first location a location must be understood, which is absurd. Therefore not everything without which the power of the cause cannot exist at the real instant must be understood on the part of first act or for a prior sign, but only those things without which the ready power cannot be conceived, or at least cannot be conceived as placed in that state which it first requires to have before it operates.

4. I answer 3º: for transient actions upon an alien thing acted upon, the location of the agent is a presupposed condition. Some prove this from the fact that approximation of the agent to what is acted upon is prerequired, according to what will be said in the following chapter; and this approximation consists in the proximate locations of each. But it could be said that for a prior sign to acting radical approximation, to be explained from what was said in n. 2, suffices. It is therefore better proved from the fact that each thing regularly first requires to perfect itself before an alien subject; for it must first provide for itself before others. Hence the common doctrine is that substance first produces its own properties before it

operates transiently. Since therefore the location of the agent is a certain intrinsic perfection of it, it must be produced prior to transient operations. The same doctrine, as I already warned, must be applied to duration if it consists in a superadded mode. But if location and duration are compared with each other, neither seems to precede the other, but they are produced or result concomitantly.

5. As regards subsistence, if it consists in something positive, it must be said 1º that it is not an influxive power in the operations and effects of nature, as Father Suárez proves excellently, d. 34 Met. s. 7. It must be said 2º that subsistence is a condition in itself prerequired on the part of nature for all operations, whether immanent or transient, except the production of subsistence itself. Thus the common opinion with Father Suárez, loc. cit., against Father Vázquez and others. And first, as regards transient operations, it is proved from what was just said, because nature first requires to perfect itself before another. Next, as regards immanent operations, even if they tend toward connatural properties, it can be proved because subsistence alone is the substantial property which perfects nature in its own proper genus and fully constitutes it in its substantial being, whereas the other properties are accidental and give nature accidental being. Therefore nature first requires, even in the order of execution, subsistence rather than other properties. Proof of the consequence: because it must first require a perfection more cognate to itself; first proper being, or being of its own genus, rather than adventitious being; first being through itself rather than being accidentally, at least unless the latter is proved to be a disposition preparing for the former, which is in no way proved in the present case. To this pertain the axioms, "Being is prior to operating," and "Operating follows upon being." Moreover, an accident must first inhere in a subject before it operates; but subsistence stands to substance as inherence to accident.

6. Yet I do not dislike the doctrine of Father Ulloa in Prolegom. Schol. d. 3, c. 1, namely that something can in two ways be a condition in itself presupposed prior to an effect: 1º, immediately and directly; 2º, mediately and indirectly. That is presupposed immediately and directly which, if removed or mentally prescinded from, prevents the proximate and ready power of the cause for acting from being understood, at least without a new miracle, as cognition is prerequired for loving and approximation of fire for burning. And this kind of condition directly pertains to the proximate first act of the active power and is said to constitute it. But that is presupposed mediately and indirectly, not indeed everything which is necessary for the existence of some immediate prerequisite, as Father Ulloa seems to wish, but that which is pre-required by the agent by a certain priority because it

more concerns the agent itself, although, when it is prescinded from or divinely removed, the proximate power of acting can be understood without a new miracle. Or otherwise: that which the cause prerequires not for the sake of the effect but for its own sake; not that it may operate readily, but that it may exist conveniently; not immediately by title of agent, but by title of an existing thing. And this kind of condition does not immediately and formally constitute proximate first act for acting.

7. Subsistence therefore is a condition prerequired for acting only in this second manner. Hence Father Suárez himself, loc. cit. n. 13, notes that subsistence is prerequired in itself not on the part of the action or effect, but on the part of the agent, that is, not because the action in itself immediately presupposes it, but because the agent prerequires it in order to be fully constituted in its being. Therefore below, n. 15, the same Excellent Doctor grants that if a nature were divinely deprived of every subsistence it could exercise other operations without a new miracle, because nothing would be lacking to it immediately and formally pertaining to proximate power of operating. Understand the same of the inherence of an accident. For it is commonly said that an accident divinely conserved without a subject could operate without a new miracle. Indeed, even location, which in n. 4 we said is prerequired for operating transiently, seems to be prerequired only mediately and indirectly, because it does not appear why proximate act for acting could not be conceived while prescinding from it.

CHAPTER III.
On the Approximation of the Agent to What Is Acted Upon.

1. Every created agent claims for itself a determinate local sphere of activity beyond which it cannot physically operate. This sphere is said to be that space within which it can exercise its powers or diffuse its power, which space is greater or lesser according to the measure of the power and perfection of the cause. Hence a vast conflagration extends heat and light farther than a small lamp; hence also the Sun has a very extensive sphere, since it operates even within the depths of the earth.

2. Within a sphere of this kind a cause is said to operate "uniformly difformly": "uniformly," because it produces effects of the same character throughout the whole sphere, as the Sun produces heat and light throughout the whole region of the air; "difformly," because it acts more intensely upon the nearer part of the sphere and more weakly upon the more remote, for the power and operation grow weaker the farther they recede from the

principal agent. Or, as others prefer, it operates "difformly" because the vigor of the action continually decreases in proportion to the distance; but in this very difformity it proceeds "uniformly," because if in the second part of the sphere it decreases by one degree, in the third it decreases by two, in the fourth by three, and so on in a uniform tenor. Yet this admits an exception when within the sphere of activity what is acted upon, that is, the receptive subject, which is more remote is found to be more or otherwise disposed than what is proximate. For then the cause produces more intense or diverse effects in the more remote subject. Thus the Sun illuminates crystal more intensely than nearer air, because the latter is less disposed; and it produces gold in the earth, not in the air nearer to itself but otherwise disposed.

3. Although no cause can naturally act except upon something situated within its sphere, as all presuppose, the question is nevertheless 1º whether it can divinely act beyond its sphere. It is asked 2º, and principally, whether either naturally or divinely it can act upon something distant, and anything not contiguous with the cause is called distant, although situated within the breadth of the sphere; or whether the agent must be contiguous with what is acted upon and touch it immediately. This immediate contact can be either by immediacy of power, as when fire reaches what is acted upon not by its own entity but through heat diffused in the medium, which is called the power of fire, or by immediacy of the *suppositum*, as when the entity of fire is contiguous with the entity of what is acted upon. According to Aristotle's method this question pertains to l. 7 Physic., but it must be treated now because the proximity or approximation of agent to what is acted upon, whether formal or radical, concerning which see the preceding chapter n. 4, is one of the better-known conditions for acting. It must likewise be treated only in the efficient cause, for the final cause requires no physical proximity, while the material and formal causes require not proximity but penetration in the same place, which penetration the efficient cause does not in itself require, as experience teaches.

First Assertion.

4. No cause can naturally act upon something distant unless it immediately touches it at least through some concause, power, quality of its own, or series of actions diffused without interruption through the medium. The same sense is intended by the more frequent terms, "No cause operates upon something distant unless it operates through the medium," unless it happens that the effects which it would produce in the medium are found already produced by another cause. The assertion is common among

Thomists and our Authors against the Scotists, who, although they acknowledge this sort of contact to be necessary in many agents, nevertheless do not admit it in all, at least in such a way that it conduces to acting in itself and not accidentally.

5. The proof is taken from experience. For we commonly see the action of an agent upon what is acted upon to be impeded, although the latter is situated within the sphere, whenever something is interposed which prevents contact of the power diffused by the agent. Thus, when a window is closed, the Sun ceases to illuminate the room; thus, when a hand is interposed between the eyes and the object, the species ceases to be produced by the object in the visual potency; thus fire does not burn nearby tow until it gradually penetrates an iron plate interposed. Finally, if a vacuum were given between agent and what is acted upon, the agent would cease from exercising influx, as Philosophers commonly presuppose, who from this give the reason why nature so greatly abhors a vacuum and takes care to avoid it, namely lest the influx of agents, especially the heavenly ones, into lower bodies be interrupted.

6. Moreover, these and many similar things arise from no other cause than that the diffusion of power or operation through the medium from the agent to what is acted upon is interrupted. For a closed window, for example, first does not remove the fact that the air of the room remains within the sphere of solar power, since it does not thereby become more remote from the Sun. Next, it neither removes the intrinsic capacity of the air, nor weakens the power of the Sun, nor diminishes the exterior light, as is manifest. Finally, neither does it produce any quality contrary to light, since there is none, nor can any be devised, especially one which would arise more from a closed window than from an open one. It may be said: these experiments prove what we intend in some agents, but a universal canon cannot be made from them, especially since many experiments from other causes are usually brought forward in the opposite direction. I admit that from the manner of acting of certain agents a general rule cannot always be deduced for all; hence, although some act only through a straight line, as I shall soon say, the same need not therefore be asserted of all.

7. Yet in the present matter a universal canon is reasonably derived, both because the experiments favoring us are taken not from one or another agent but from innumerable agents of diverse genera, indeed from all bodily agents; for there is none whose operation cannot be suspended by some interposed body even within its proper sphere. Both because, if our assertion holds in the Sun, which has the greatest activity and sphere among bodily causes, it can rightly be extended to the rest. Both because the opposite

experiments do not press, as will appear in the following chapter. Both because it is commonly judged to belong to all agents not to act when a vacuum is interposed. Finally, because our experiments are strengthened by a general reason, namely that every finite cause determines for itself a limited sphere of space, as no one denies; and the sole reason for this limitation is that, since it must operate through the medium in order to act upon what is distant, it expends more powers the greater the distance, and thus is wearied by the very progress until it finally stops, unable to proceed farther. For if no powers are expended in the medium, greater or lesser distance seems altogether irrelevant to acting.

Second Assertion.

8. A cause can divinely act upon what is distant, whether within or beyond its natural sphere, even if it does not operate in the medium and is not contiguous with what is acted upon even through a power diffused in the medium, indeed even if it is separated from what is acted upon or from the place where the effect is produced by a vacuum. Thus the common opinion in every School. The reason is that no contradiction appears in this, as the solution of the objections will show. Moreover, the fact that we perpetually experience the opposite proves natural but not essential necessity, since we similarly experience many things which nevertheless are not essentially necessary but can divinely occur otherwise, as that matter always has a form, that a material form is always in a subject, that the Sun perpetually shines, that body does not penetrate body. Moreover, absence of distance or approximation of the agent to what is acted upon is a mere condition for acting. But a condition, unless positively proved essential, should be asserted to be purely natural and divinely capable of being supplied, because essential conditions are not to be multiplied without necessity. Hence it is commonly said that substantial generation can divinely occur without preceding alteration, although the latter is a naturally necessary condition for it.

Third Assertion.

9. A cause can naturally act immediately upon what is distant, provided it diffuses some power or operation that far, or at least is continuous up to what is acted upon with other concauses extended that far. The Assertion is explained: in order for the Sun to produce gold beneath the earth it must indeed extend heat and other qualities through the medium that far;

nevertheless the very production of gold depends also upon the distant substance of the Sun as an immediate cause by immediacy not of place but of causality. Likewise, when fire heats nearby air, the production of heat immediately flows not only from the outermost surface of the fire contiguous with the air but also from the inner parts of the fire which are distant from the air. The same occurs in very many other cases. The Assertion thus explained is very commonly received among Our Authors and the Scotists against the Thomists, who judge that every effect is immediately produced by the power alone contiguous with what is acted upon, although it is often attributed to the distant agent.

10. It is proved because it often happens that the effect produced in a distant place is more perfect than the power diffused in the medium and contiguous with what is acted upon, and surpasses its activity. Therefore the effect cannot then be produced by the contiguous power alone, but must immediately depend upon the distant agent. The antecedent is clear 1º in the production of gold beneath the earth; for since gold is a substantial effect, it cannot adequately be produced by an accidental power of the Sun diffused through the medium, from what will be said in disp. 5. It is clear 2º in the brightness of the Moon, which an eclipse demonstrates to come from the Sun; for that brightness cannot be produced by the light alone of the contiguous air or ether, since this is weaker. For it is certain that weaker light does not by itself effect a more intense light. It is clear 3º in the example of fire just indicated: for when a vast mountain is aflame, it produces light and heat outside itself farther and more intensely than if only the outermost surface of the mountain were burning. Therefore the production of light and heat comes immediately not from the external surface alone but also from the interior parts of the conflagration which are distant from the external air.

11. And from this the reason is given why the part of a room which receives the solar rays in a straight line is more illuminated than other collateral parts equally or less distant from the Sun, namely because that part directly opposed to the Sun is illuminated not by contiguous light alone but by the distant Sun itself, which does not occur with the parts placed to the side. For the Sun, as most other agents though not all, either acts only or acts more strongly through a straight line than through an oblique one, that is, through a space in which a straight line can be drawn from agent to what is acted upon without the obstacle of some body or vacuum interrupting the continuous operation. Such a straight line cannot be drawn from the Sun to the parts of the room situated at the sides of the window because of the obstacle of the walls. And this same reason explains why, when the hand is interposed, sight does not receive the species of the distant object, namely

because the species in the eyes must be produced not by the species alone diffused in the neighboring collateral air, but by the object itself, whose straight line the interposed hand interrupts.

Fourth Assertion.

12. An agent can naturally operate upon what is distant although it does not operate in the medium, provided it is continuous up to what is acted upon with other agents or powers partially concurring in the effect. Thus Fathers Suárez and Hurtado, whom Father Quirós cites and follows, d. 57, s. 4, and commonly our more recent Authors. It is proved by the experiment of a burning mountain recently adduced, for the more remote parts of the conflagration immediately concur with the nearer parts in producing the heat of the exterior air, although they do not act upon the parts of fire nearer the air, because "like does not act upon like," according to the common maxim. It may be said that the inner parts of the conflagration act through the medium at least by conserving the external parts of the fire. But against this is that such conservation is material and in no way necessary for the same heat to be produced in the external air. Both because the conflagration could have begun from the outer parts, and then these would not be conserved by the inner parts since they would rather be their causes; nor would less heat emanate *ad extra*. And also because, if the whole conflagration were conserved by God alone, it would not therefore heat the external air any less and consequently would act no less according to all its parts.

13. Hence you will gather that if all the light and heat in the region of air coming from the Sun were conserved by God alone, while the Sun remained present, the Sun would not therefore cease to act upon the earth as it now does together with the light and heat proximate to the earth, although it would then operate nothing in the medium. Both because no reason to the contrary appears, and because a cause operates equally with a partial power which it requires, whether that power is produced by the cause itself or by God alone, as can be seen in the species and habit by which the Intellect and Will are aided in operating. Therefore a distant cause requires the aid of a power or quality conducive to the effect and diffused in the medium; but it seems to make no difference whether that power or quality was produced by the same cause or by another.

Summary of the Whole Doctrine.

14. The summary of the doctrine concerning the approximation of the agent to what is acted upon or to the place of the effect is this: every agent can by a transient action divinely operate at any distance whatever without operation through the medium, indeed even if a vacuum intervenes. Naturally, however, it cannot operate except within a certain sphere of space, which is greater or lesser according to the diversity of causes. Within this sphere, however, the agent must be contiguous with what is acted upon in one of three ways. Either 1º by immediacy of the *suppositum*, as when fire burns immediately adjacent wood; in which event contact is not required according to every part of divisible agent and what is acted upon, but suffices according to some part, provided the rest are sufficiently applied for immediate influx. Or 2º by immediacy of power, so that although the principal agent is distant it is nevertheless assisted by some dissimilar partial power continuously diffused from the agent to what is acted upon, whether produced by the same agent or another, as when fire together with intervening heat produces something in a distant place; for then from that heat and the substance of the fire there is integrated one adequate agent which according to some part of itself is contiguous with what is acted upon. Or 3º by immediacy of operation continued as one up to what is acted upon.

15. For Father Suárez notes, d. 18 Met. s. 8, that when the effect produced at a distance is of the same character as the one produced through the medium, it is not necessary, speaking in itself, that the effect existing in the medium be a power partially exercising influx upon the distant effect. For then the agent is sufficiently joined with that effect through a continuous series of similar actions, and the production of the ultimate terminus is not so much called a new action as the continuation of the same action which, beginning from the agent, has as it were progressed to the ultimate terminus. Thus the hand impresses impetus not only upon the surface of the stone which it touches but also upon farther parts of the stone which it touches only through a continued production of a similar quality. For it does not touch them through itself, nor through an intermediate power, since impetus, as many judge, is not productive of another impetus but only of local motion.

16. But when the effect distant from the principal agent is of a different character or specifically dissimilar to the effect produced through the medium, then it is necessary that the intervening effect be a power partially

exercising influx upon the distant effect, or at least upon the ultimate disposition for it; because then the production of the distant effect is not a continuation of the action existing in the medium but another diverse action, which must naturally be contiguous with some part of the adequate agent. Hence the Sun does not illuminate the air of a room when the window is closed, because although not every action of the Sun is interrupted, since the production of heat can continue even through the window, nevertheless the production of light is a diverse action and heat moreover does not in any way conduce to it as a power or disposition.

CHAPTER IV.

Arguments against the Preceding Doctrine Are Solved.

The arguments which can oppose the doctrine handed down will be distributed into four classes according to the order of the Assertions in the preceding chapter.

Against the First Assertion.

1. Objection 1: there is manifold experience of operation upon what is distant without an operation through the medium appearing. Thus those who fascinate harm by their gaze; the basilisk kills a man by its sight; the torpedo fish, while attached to a hook, makes the fisherman's arm numb; the herb aproxis catches fire from afar; weapon ointment and sympathetic powder heal distant wounds; the magnet attracts iron situated at a distance while the intervening agent suffers nothing, as St. Augustine testifies, 21 De Civit. c. 4. But I answer that in all these cases nothing is ever produced in a distant place without some operation through the medium. Although that operation does not manifest itself sensibly in the medium itself, it is sufficiently inferred by reason, both because none of these causes operates at any distance whatever and because in most at least, as in those who fascinate, the basilisk, etc., the action is interrupted by something interposed.

2. Therefore fascination, if it does not occur by the work of a demon, proceeds from poisonous vapors diffused through the medium which issue from the eyes, excited by the imagination and attention of the one looking; Father Delrio discusses this learnedly, Disquis. Magic. l. 1, c. 3, q. 4. Let the same be said of the basilisk, and likewise of the wolf which induces hoarseness in a shepherd whom it sees first, concerning which Delrio, l.c. The same proportionately can be said of the ostrich and tortoise, of which it

is reported that by sight alone they hatch chicks from eggs upon which they do not sit; for this, if true, they accomplish through fiery spirits emitted from the eyes. For it must be held generally that immanent acts, such as sight, imagination, etc., can in themselves do nothing upon alien bodies altogether separated, but at most accidentally or occasionally, insofar as within their own body they stir humors which emit various vapors or qualities outward.

3. The torpedo fish diffuses harmful qualities through the rod, by which it numbs the fisherman's arm; the sign of this is that only the fisherman holding the rod is poisoned, but no other, even if he stands nearby. Aproxis does not catch fire until the intervening space grows hot. Sympathetic powder and weapon ointment, if they operate at any distance whatever, act by the power of a demon, not their own; but if they act only within certain limits, perhaps they act by their own power, yet not without some operation through the medium, although hidden from the senses; otherwise a determinate distance would contribute nothing.

4. Concerning the magnet, amber, and other things which possess an electrical or attractive power over other bodies, there is a great controversy among Philosophers whether they exercise their power through mere qualities or through substantial effluvia of corpuscles. Yet in either way they diffuse something in the medium. If effluvia of this kind are granted, the matter is certain. But if attraction occurs through qualities, the medium also receives these, although sometimes solid, such as jasper or silver separating the magnet from iron. This is plainly inferred both because the magnet does not attract at any distance whatever and because not every medium suffices; for if you interpose diamond, goat's blood, or garlic juice, attraction will cease, as is commonly asserted, although otherwise the distance between magnet and iron is proportionate. But when St. Augustine says that the intervening silver suffers nothing, he speaks of sensible passion through local motion, not of the reception of every quality whatever.

5. The recourse of Peripatetics to occult qualities in order to explain the operation of the magnet and other similar marvels is called an asylum of ignorance by modern Corpuscular Philosophers. But they would rightly do this if they themselves brought forward something clearer or more certain. As it is, since they themselves perpetually have recourse to corpuscles variously figured and variously moved, although in many effects they cannot say what the figure or direction of motions is, and in others designate the figure and motion or cause of motion only by conjecture and with great disagreement, especially in magnetic matters, where there are as many opinions as men, there is certainly no reason why the one recourse rather

than the other should be called an asylum of ignorance, since each is equally open to every ignorant person and through each the secrets of nature remain equally inaccessible.

6. Others say that magnetic quality is undeservedly called occult, since it is sensibly manifested by local motion. But we call an occult quality one to which there does not correspond an immediate and proper sensation immediately discerned from others, as for example corresponds to heat and cold, but which is known only from some effect indifferent in itself to proceeding from diverse causes, such as local motion. Others object that magnetic quality cannot be received in the medium, since it does not there have its formal effect of attracting, or determining to the local motion of attraction, as is seen in interposed silver. But it can be answered that the quality diffused by the magnet in a non-ferrous medium is not formally attractive but purely virtually so, insofar as it can concur with the magnet to effect in distant iron another specifically dissimilar quality which is formally attractive. Hence the formal effect of the quality received in the medium is to denominate the medium "proximately apt" to coeffect the quality immediately moving the iron toward the magnet. But we already said in the preceding chapter that an agent need not operate uniformly throughout the whole sphere when subjects diversely disposed occur within its range, and that an effect of a diverse character can be produced in a distant place provided the effect existing in the medium cooperates in it together with the principal agent. I have said these things not to determine anything here concerning magnetic power, but to vindicate from calumny the recourse, often necessary, to occult qualities.

7. Objection 2: imagination existing in the head moves appetite residing in the heart, and appetite moves the locomotor potency which is in the feet, without operation through the medium. Likewise no such operation intervenes when an object touched by the hand is immediately perceived by the imaginative power. The example of an Angel is also usually added, who in order to move bodies does not need local approximation, both because an Angel has no position and because he operates through intellect and will, which potencies do not need contiguity with their objects. I answer: imagination or phantasy moves appetite, and hence the external potency, not by physically acting but by inclining or determining after the manner of a condition. In order thus to incline or determine, even if it be presupposed in a distant place, sympathy suffices, founded in the fact that both potencies are rooted in the same soul or at least belong to the same *suppositum*; for from this diverse potencies can so agree among themselves that when the act of one is posited the other is determined to operate. The imaginative

power perceives an object touched by the hand not without operation through the medium, for from every external sense species of the object are transmitted most swiftly through nerves prepared by nature all the way to the brain, concerning which in Animastics.

8. An Angel cannot move a locally distant body. And although he has no position, he nevertheless has a real, determinate, and finite presence which must be contiguous or immediate to the body to be moved, at least according to some part of that body. He is said to act through intellect and will, not because every Angelic operation is volition or intellection, but because in an Angel the locomotor potency and every other is perfectly subordinated to intellect and will. The communication of Angels among themselves, which is also usually objected here, is a mystery impenetrable even to Theology. It is commonly said not to occur through a transient action, but to consist in this: when the volition of one Angel to open his mind to another is posited as a naturally necessary condition, the other immediately elicits a perceptive act, either through God infusing a new species or arousing one which the Angel himself had as it were dormant; concerning which Theologians treat at length in tr. De Angel. But we do not deny that something can contribute after the manner of a condition to a distant effect, provided the active power is not distant from the effect.

9. Objection 3: an effect produced at a distance is often more perfect than the power diffused through the medium; therefore it is then produced by the distant agent alone, and operation in the medium is accidental. Thus gold produced beneath the earth by the Sun surpasses in perfection the qualities diffused by it. Thus more intense light and heat are produced by the Sun in crystal than in the intervening air. Thus the bottom of a kettle full of boiling water is more lukewarm and temperate than the upper water farther from the underlying fire. Thus also, while paper remains unharmed by fire, oil poured over it is accustomed to boil. I answer: these prove what we said in the third Assertion of the preceding chapter, but nothing in favor of the Scotists. For although a power less perfect than the effect, such as that which is often diffused in the medium, cannot be an adequate cause, it can nevertheless sometimes concur inadequately and instrumentally with the distant agent in the production of such an effect, or at least in its ultimate disposition. Thus an impressed species, although less perfect than cognition, concurs in it together with the Intellect. Operation through the medium can also, although it does not partially exercise influx, be a naturally necessary condition without which the effect cannot occur, from the nature and character of the cause, which nature and character become known to us

through experience. From this the answer to the first and second examples is clear.

10. To the third say that the bottom of the kettle is hotter than the water at the beginning of heating; but afterward, when the water is already boiling, it is more lukewarm than the upper water because the lower parts of the water, growing hot and becoming lighter, ascend upward, while other colder and therefore heavier parts descend and temper the bottom of the kettle. The circulation of boiling water sufficiently shows this. Yet if the water boils so long that all its parts are equally heated, the bottom of the kettle will not be lukewarm. And perhaps Father Arriaga performed the experiment under these circumstances when he testifies that he did not do so with impunity. Something similar occurs in paper which contains oil, for the thicker and moister particles of the latter descend and temper the paper, preventing its combustion.

11. Objection 4: one who projects a stone produces an impulse in the stone when it is already somewhat distant; for the impulse in the first instant in which it is produced is the cause of the stone's motion. Therefore it causes the stone to recede from the place in which it was contiguous with the projector. Therefore in that first instant it causes the stone to be distant from the projector. Some deny that the impulse causes motion in the first instant of its production. But because this is difficult to believe, it is easier to answer that in order for the hand to project the stone, first there is necessary, after the manner of a prior condition, contiguity of both in the preceding instant; then in the first instant of projection for a prior sign one prescinds from the present locations of both until the impulse is produced which determines those presences. The impulse or preceding motion is produced not in the stone alone but also simultaneously in the hand; understand the same of any created projector, for there is no difficulty concerning God, which at the same time impels and moves both itself and the stone. Hence it happens that the hand in the first instant of the production of the impulse, or even in some imperceptible tract of time in which it immediately conserves the impulse of the stone, is not separated from the stone; because although it causes the stone to recede from the place in which it was, the hand itself also changes place and, retaining contiguity, accompanies the stone for a time. But when the hand stops and allows the stone to go away, the impulse of the stone no longer immediately depends upon the hand, as is manifest.

Against the Second Assertion.

12. Objection 1: no cause can operate even divinely outside its sphere. I answer: there is a twofold sphere of activity, intrinsic and extrinsic or local. The intrinsic sphere is the formal reason under which a power operates, whether physical or intentional; or it is the capacity of the effect to terminate the action of such a cause, and no power can transgress a sphere of this kind. Thus the visual potency cannot perceive anything except a luminous colored object, nor the auditory anything except sound. Thus also a purely physical cause cannot produce an effect which it in no way contains, or which is not intrinsically apt to terminate its action. The extrinsic sphere is that space or range of place within whose limits the activity of the cause is naturally confined; and there is no reason why a cause cannot divinely operate beyond this sphere, because although proximity of place is a naturally required condition, it is under no head proved essentially necessary.

13. Reply 1: a cause cannot act when it does not exist; therefore neither can it act where it does not exist. But this proves against all that local penetration of the agent with the effect is required, just as temporal penetration or coexistence in the same instant is required. Therefore I deny the consequence: because a cause can simply exist now and consequently virtually contain the effect although it is not in this place, provided it is in another, for if it is nowhere it is nothing; but if it is not in this instant it simply does not exist and contains nothing. Reply 2: if a cause operating divinely requires no determinate sphere of place, it will also be able to operate at an infinite distance. I deny the consequence concerning categorematic infinity; for cause and effect would have to exist in determinate places, and infinite distance terminated on both sides by determinate places is contradictory in terms. Yet I admit syncategorematic infinity, namely in such a way that no distance is assignable beyond which the cause cannot divinely act. Nor does infinite power follow from this; for although a wider natural sphere is usually an argument of greater power because more strength is expended in acting through the medium, nevertheless when nothing is acted through the medium, as in our hypothesis, greater or lesser distance is material to the measure of the power.

14. Objection 2: causality or action cannot even divinely be locally separated from the effect whose mode it is; therefore neither from the cause,

since it is likewise its mode; therefore it essentially requires absence of distance from both. I answer: first, the objection proves too much, namely that action must penetrate the cause just as it penetrates the effect. Next, action is locally inseparable from the effect, not precisely because it is its mode, but because from its own office it is a mode intrinsic to it. For it is either eduction or creation. If eduction, it is the intrinsic union or reception of its terminus within the subject. If creation, which I now presuppose to be distinct from God, it has nothing to which it adheres intimately except the terminus alone. But with respect to the cause, transient action is not an intrinsic mode but an extrinsic one from its office; for it does not have to constitute the cause within the effect, or conversely, but rather to constitute itself and the effect outside the cause and outside the place of the cause. Therefore, for action truly to be called a physical mode of the cause, it suffices that it be essentially inseparable from it, both "egressively," or "in proceeding," insofar as it essentially has to proceed from such a cause, and "in existing," insofar as it is essentially incapable of actually existing in reality unless such a cause exists in reality. As for the rest, local inseparability from every modified thing does not belong to the concept of mode as such, but must be gathered from the peculiar office of each mode.

15. Objection 3: even divinely an end cannot move without intentional approximation, although this is not the motive reason but a mere condition; therefore neither can a physical cause act without local approximation. I deny the consequence. For the antecedent is commonly judged true both because cognition is not only approximation but also the intentional existence of the object, which stands to the genus of final cause as physical existence to the efficient genus; and because the will, as a blind potency, cannot be borne toward an unknown good, which by that very fact is outside the intrinsic sphere of the will. But no similar reason applies to local approximation. Hence there is no reason why this approximation should be established as a condition more than naturally necessary. It may be said: action depends essentially not only upon the power of the cause but also upon prior conditions, since it is also their exercise and causality, at least in the genus of moral cause. I answer: first, from this at most it will be proved that an action at a distance would be diverse from an action in proximity; but not that the cause and effect would not be the same. Next, not even this is proved. For with respect to conditions as causing in the moral genus, the exercise or causality is not the physical action precisely according to itself, but insofar as willed by God in view of the presence of the conditions and as it were for their sake. Such a volition of God indeed varies when the

conditions are varied; but the physical action need not therefore become intrinsically diverse.

16. Objection 4: God in no way can operate in a place distant from Himself; therefore much less can a created cause. But from this it similarly follows against all that every created cause must be intimately present and penetrated with the effect; likewise that it cannot even mediately act at a distance by acting through the medium; likewise that it cannot act in one place without being in all places. Therefore God cannot act unless most present everywhere, not formally because He is an agent, but because He is immense. For if immensity were imagined to be lacking while there remained in God the entire power of acting which He now has, God could act at any imaginable distance. Reply: the immensity of God, by which He is present everywhere, is usually proved from the fact that God operates everywhere; the Apostle used this argument in Acts 17, proving that God is "not far" from each one of us because "in Him we live and move and are." Therefore operation essentially implies absence of distance in the agent.

17. I answer: several with Scotus deny that local presence or immensity is well proved from the operation of God, but say that immensity is an attribute immediately belonging to the Divine essence by reason of itself, not by reason of operative power. They understand the Apostle to signify either that God is present everywhere through cognition, providence, and care of all things, or even that God is not far from our natural cognition by which we can detect Him from His effects and in some manner "feel after" Him, as the Apostle says, since "in Him," that is, through His power, we live, move, and are. This interpretation sufficiently agrees with the whole context, as Father Vázquez shows, in I, p. d. 28, c. 4. But perhaps it can more truly be said that the inference by which God's presence is gathered from His operation, and immensity from infinitely possible action, is not founded on the necessity that agent and what is acted upon be together, but on a proportion or parity of reason. For if God operates in all things, therefore He also is in all things, since He is not less infinite in existing than in operating. It can likewise be founded on a mediate argument which does not hold in every agent but in God alone: namely, if God operates everywhere, He can be everywhere; for every agent, although it need not, can nevertheless be where it operates. But if God can be everywhere, He already is everywhere from eternity, because He cannot be moved locally or acquire a new presence, since He is immutable.

Against the Third Assertion.

18. Against the third Assertion most of the arguments just solved can be employed. But it is especially objected: a cause distant in place, as the Sun from the earth, is equally distant from what is acted upon whether it operates through the medium or not, whether it is continuous up to what is acted upon through other intermediate powers or actions or not. Therefore in neither case can it immediately act upon something distant. Proof of the consequence 1º: because an immediately acting cause must immediately reach what is acted upon; otherwise it will not be applied. 2º, because according to Aristotle mover and moved, that is, agent and what is acted upon, must be together; St. Thomas also often confirms this, explicitly in I, d. 37, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2, saying: "That which acts by its absence is not a proximate but a remote cause of that which is made; for the power of the Sun is proximately impressed upon the body joined to it, and so on successively to the last." 3º, because agent is compared to what is acted upon as act to potency; but act and potency must be locally joined. 4º, because a hand immersed in the sea does not become colder than in a well; yet it would otherwise happen if more distant parts of sea water immediately concurred with nearer ones in cooling it. And from this the experiment of the burning mountain adduced in the preceding chapter is weakened.

19. I answer: a distant cause, although according to its entity equally distant from what is acted upon in each event, nevertheless is distant in a different way; for when it acts in or with the medium, its distance does not exclude mediate and virtual approximation, which reason and experience teach is a naturally necessary condition for a cause to operate upon something distant; and when this is posited, distance of the *suppositum* or of some part of it is no obstacle, provided what is acted upon is otherwise within the sphere of the agent. Hence I deny the consequence, and the proofs do not obstruct. To 1º: an immediately acting cause must immediately reach what is acted upon by immediacy of causality and dependence, insofar as the causality exercised in what is acted upon depends upon and arises from such a cause, not precisely through another intermediate cause, but in itself and by reason of itself. Yet it need not always immediately reach what is acted upon by immediacy of quantity or place; for often in this genus mediate reach through a power or action diffused in the medium suffices for the cause to be judged applied to what is acted upon.

20. To 2º: mover and moved must be together both by simultaneity of time or coexistence in reality and also by local simultaneity, at least mediate, namely one excluding interruption of power or operation in the intervening space. But St. Thomas speaks of the distant cause considered according to itself, which, because it cannot proximately act upon what is distant unless it first in the order of nature operates in the medium, is therefore called "remote," that is, "remotely capable," until through that prior operation it is constituted "proximate," that is, "proximately capable" of immediately causing the distant effect. Thus matter according to itself is called a remote potency for the form of fire and does not become proximate except through accidental dispositions; and yet matter in itself immediately receives the form of fire.

21. To 3º: informative act must be locally joined with informable or receptive potency; but not so efficient act when compared with the passive potency from which it educes its effects. For it is not united with such potency, nor does it compose one being with it; otherwise it would have to be penetrated with it. To 4º: the more distant parts of sea water therefore do not act together with the nearer upon the hand because their action is retarded or impeded by various heavenly and subterranean causes which temper sea water by introducing heat and deprive it in large part of its native cold. The action of fire in a burning mountain is not so impeded, because fire is not so easily deprived of intense heat.

Against the Fourth Assertion.

22. Against the fourth and final Assertion it is objected: action proceeds from the agent and passes all the way to what is acted upon; hence it is also called "transient action." Therefore it must pass through the medium; for just as a body cannot pass from one place to a distant place without passing through the medium, neither can an action. I answer: action does not proceed from the agent as an arrow proceeds from a bow and reaches the target, as though it first existed in the agent and then leapt or flew from it to what is acted upon. This is a crude understanding of rude Minerva, whose absurdity is manifest in the actions of God *ad extra*. Therefore action first begins to exist within what is acted upon, from which it is educed and in which it is received; but because it exists by the power and efficacy of the agent, it is therefore said to "proceed" from the agent and is called "transient," so as to be distinguished from immanent action, which is received not in an alien thing acted upon but in the agent itself. Thus we speak from poverty of words, but correct the common notion in the mind.

Hence the passage of a body from place to place is beside the point, since it presupposes that the body previously existed in one place from which it migrates to another. Whoever wishes more concerning this whole question should consult Father Suárez, d. 18 Met. s. 8.

CHAPTER V.
Other General Prerequisites Are Indicated.

1. Besides what has been explained thus far, three general prerequisites for acting are commonly required from Aristotle: 1º distinction of the agent from the patient; 2º dissimilarity between the two; 3º a proportion of greater inequality. The last is evident of itself once the terms are understood, for it means that such a proportion is prerequisite between agent and patient that the power in the agent be greater than the resistance in the patient. The first and second require much discussion, which we shall provide as occasion requires in the course of Philosophy; meanwhile it may be consulted in the Eminent Doctor (d. 18, Met. s. 7 and 9). For the present it is enough to say, as regards the first, that it rests upon the general principle handed down by Aristotle, "Everything that is moved is moved by another." Hence it is inferred that, since the patient is moved by the agent, it must be distinguished from it, though not always by a distinction of *supposita*; for it is certain that the same *suppositum* often acts and undergoes motion, as when a man moves himself. There must, however, be at least a distinction of part from part, or faculty from faculty, so that, although the *suppositum* is the same, one part acts and another undergoes motion, or one faculty or potency is proximately active with respect to the motion and another proximately receptive. I say another, at least by an inadequate otherness, or a distinction of what includes from what is included, so that the active faculty is distinguished from the receptive at least according to some co-principle or partial power.

2. This distinction, thus explained, is required generally in every agent, if it is considered not as purely created but as having joined to it the power of the cooperating First Cause; for in this sense it is certain that the adequate active potency is always at least inadequately distinguished from the passive potency, namely insofar as it includes the power of the First Cause. If, however, the discussion concerns a purely created power operating equivocally, that principle, which was handed down by Aristotle either exclusively or principally concerning physical motion tending toward substantial generation, is not universally true. For at least acts of the will are, or can be, produced by the same potency in which they are received,

with only an imperfect distinction of reason. Nor does it avail to object, 1º that the agent is compared to the patient as act to potency. For this comparison means only that the agent can actuate the patient through some form produced by itself; but there is no contradiction in an agent producing an accidental form by which it itself is actuated and perfected.

3. Nor does it avail to object, 2º that with respect to the effect to be produced the agent is said to be "in act," and the patient "in potency." For this must be understood of "first act" and "potency to second act," or, what comes to the same thing, of "virtual act" and "formal potency." Nothing whatever prevents the same will, for example, from being presupposed in first or virtual act for loving, that is, as actually possessing the productive power of love, and at the same time being in potency for receiving formal love as the second act of that first act. Nor does it avail to object, 3º that the agent is said to subject the patient to itself. For this "subjecting" is metaphorical, and means precisely that the agent produces a form which the patient receives. Nothing in the terms prevents some form from being received by the same thing by which it is produced. Nor is a real relation always necessary between the agent and the patient taken specifically, but only between the agent and the effect or formal terminus.

4. As regards the second, it is a common maxim handed down by Aristotle and confirmed by experience that "Like does not act upon like." This has its principal place in alterative action, or action corruptive of a form existing in the patient; for water does not of itself destroy water, nor fire fire. It also has a place in intensive action, for one luminous thing is not intensified by another like it; hence, if a thousand other lamps are brought near one lamp, one does not thereby find it more luminous. The same point is expressed by this other principle: "Every agent tends to assimilate the patient to itself," namely either by specific likeness, when the agent is univocal, or by generic or analogical likeness, when the agent is equivocal. Therefore, if assimilation is already presupposed, the end of the action ceases, and consequently the action itself ceases. Dissimilarity, therefore, or the absence of likeness between agent and patient, is prerequisite as a necessary condition for acting. Yet this, omitting other exceptions to be discussed elsewhere, must be understood to mean that like does not act upon like by an action presupposing likeness, although it can indeed do so by an action producing or conserving likeness. It must likewise be understood so that only the likeness of the patient to the agent according to the proximate power of acting is an impediment. For although there is substantial likeness between cold and hot water, one nevertheless acts upon

the other accidentally because they are dissimilar in the quality which is the proximate power of acting.

5. Certain other prerequisites remain to be reviewed briefly. 1º For substantial action there is prerequisite in secondary causes, both on the side of the agent and on that of the patient, a certain temperament of qualities, which varies according to the diversity of the agent and of the form to be produced. Hence fire, however closely applied to wood, is not proximately capable of inducing the form of fire until the matter of the wood is prepared through the qualities due to fire. 2º In general, for acting there is prerequisite an absence of impediments with whose existence the existence of the effect cannot coexist. But it must be noted that some impediments are removable through second act, while others are irremovable. With respect to a free agent, those are called removable which can be removed at the agent's pleasure by the very fact that it wills to act. Thus voluntary sitting impedes walking, and a free hatred impedes love; but either impediment can be removed merely by the man's willing to walk or to love. Those, however, are called irremovable which the agent cannot remove at will, for example, iron chains by which a man is held against his will so that he cannot depart.

6. With respect to a necessary agent, an impediment is removable when it can be removed by the very production of the effect and, moreover, has no naturally prevailing right to exist over the agent's right to act. Thus the coldness of water is an impediment to the production of heat in it, yet it is removable by stronger fire through the very production of heat. Likewise the form of wood is an impediment to the form of fire in the same matter, yet it is removable by the very introduction of the form of fire when the wood, having already lost its proper dispositions, no longer has a prevailing right to its own conservation. An impediment is irremovable, however, when the agent has no exigency for removing it by the very production of the effect that prevails over every contrary natural exigency. Thus interposition of an opaque body impedes illumination; likewise, the presence of a stronger agent impedes the action of a weaker one.

7. The absence of impediments of the former kind, therefore, is required but is not prerequisite, nor must it precede the effect, but rather follow it. The absence of impediments of the latter kind, however, is prerequisite and must precede. The reason is that a cause is not said to be in proximate first act and wholly unimpeded for operating as long as something remains to be accomplished or removed before the action is reached; or as long as it is not understood as entirely freed from those impediments whose removal either is not an effect of the action or is not within the choice or right of the agent. But this is the case as long as there is no absence of an irremovable

impediment. On the contrary, although in what is prior the removable impediment is not understood as positively removed, but abstraction is made from its existence and absence, nothing remains for acting except the action itself, which, if posited, will introduce the absence of such an impediment. Indeed, if every impediment had to be understood as positively removed beforehand, the very absence of the effect, which certainly is an impediment to the action, would also have to be understood as positively excluded beforehand; and since it is excluded only through the existence of the effect, the effect would be understood as existing before itself, which is contradictory.

8. 3º The existence of a remote cause conserving the proximate cause is prerequisite. For a created cause cannot cause unless it exists, and cannot exist unless it is actually conserved by another cause. Yet no determinate remote cause is prerequisite, but some cause indeterminately, when the proximate cause can be conserved distributively by several causes. Nor, likewise, is the remote cause to be numbered among the immediate and direct prerequisites constituting proximate first act for acting, but only among the mediate and indirect ones, concerning which see above, c. 2, n. 6. The reason is that proximate first act can plainly be conceived without being conceived as constituted by a remote cause. For provided that fire A is conceived as existing and applied to disposed matter, it will be conceived as proximately capable of burning, even though the cause by which it is produced or conserved is not understood as constitutively included in that proximate burning potency.

9. It may be said: if the fire is conceived as actually existing, it must be conceived as existing by virtue of some cause, nor can abstraction be made from every conserving cause. I answer: granted that the existing fire cannot be conceived apart from every cause of itself as from a terminus of connection, it can nevertheless be conceived without that cause as constituting the fire itself in the character of an existent and of what is proximately capable of burning; so that in being such it is conceived as adequately distinct from the remote cause, although connected with it. Thus rationality is not constituted by discursive reasoning, nor a creature by the Creator, nor a union by its extremes, without which nevertheless, as termini of connection or of transcendental relation, the union cannot be conceived, and so forth. These remarks concern the remote cause considered in its first act. But if the discussion concerns the action producing or conserving the proximate cause, that action perhaps constitutes the first act of the proximate cause in the being of what is prior with respect to the effect to be produced.

10. 4º Finally, for causing the possibility of the effect is prerequisite; for if it is impossible, how will it be caused? But a twofold possibility must be distinguished. One is extrinsic, consisting in the very power of the cause; and this possibility is without doubt prerequisite and belongs on the side of first act, not as a mere condition but as the proper principle of acting. The other is intrinsic, consisting in the very coherence, or non-repugnance, of the predicates of the effect. Although this possibility is a terminus with which the power of the cause is essentially connected, it nevertheless does not constitute first act or the cause in the being of what is proximately capable of acting: both because complete first act can be conceived without it as a constituent, and because such possibility is the terminus to which the entire proximate potency of the cause is transcendentally referred, and consequently must be adequately distinguished from it. Let the same be said of the possibility of the action.

11. Moreover, it must be universally observed that from the precise fact that thing A cannot exist without B it is not rightly inferred determinately that A is constituted by B, unless this is proved from some other source. Otherwise the creature would be constituted by God, action by its terminus, and union by its extremes. It is therefore inferred only that A is constituted either by B or by something else necessarily connected with B. If, however, among the known and certain constituents of thing A none is found necessarily connected with B, but all can exist without it, then, if thing A nevertheless fails when B alone fails while the others remain, it is rightly inferred that A is constituted by B. This is not what occurs in the present case; for among the certain constituents of proximate power for acting there is something essentially connected with the possibility of the effect and of the action, namely the power of the cause.

12. It may be said: a cause is constituted as actually causing through actual action; therefore it is constituted as capable of causing through possible action. I answer by denying the consequence: because the denomination "causing" has causal efficacy, which is action, for its form; but the denomination "capable of causing" does not have the possibility of action for its form, but the potency of the cause, which is its power. I grant that this concrete expression, "a cause possibly causing," or "a cause causing as possible," is constituted through possible action, because the constituents which, as actual, constitute the actual whole, as possible constitute that same whole as possible. But such a concrete expression involves more than this other one, "a cause capable of causing," whose form is not action but the power of the cause.

DISPUTATION IV.
ON PRIORITY OF NATURE. WHETHER MUTUAL PRIORITY IS POSSIBLE.

CHAPTER I.
Priority of Nature Is Explained.

1. Priority of nature properly so called belongs only to causes with respect to effects upon which they exercise physical or moral influence. Hence it is not to be confused with priority of time or duration, by virtue of which one thing exists at a time or instant in which another, which will exist afterward, does not yet exist. For not everything that preceded us in time is our cause or prior by nature with respect to us. Nor is it to be confused universally with priority or precedence of place, perfection, dignity, or honor, for priority of this kind can belong even to things that are not causes. Nor, further, is it to be confused with priority of reason, which is sometimes found between predicates distinguished only by reason, when one is conceived as the root of another, as when rational is said to be prior to capable of wonder, and capable of wonder to risible; for no real causality intervenes here.

2. Finally, neither is it to be confused generally with the priority of "non-mutual independence in being," which is also called priority "in the consequence of subsisting," "logical" priority, and priority "of universality and non-convertibility." In this sense, that is said to be prior which can exist without another, while that other cannot exist without it; or that from whose

positing there is no valid consequence to the positing of the other, although there is a valid consequence conversely. This kind of priority can be found both among predicates really identified, one of which is more universal than the other, as animal with respect to capable of neighing, and among really distinct extremes when a non-mutual connection intervenes. In this way God is prior to the creature, and the rational soul is prior to its union with matter.

3. I say, therefore, that priority of nature is not to be confused with this priority of independence or non-mutual connection. 1º Because there is often non-mutual connection without priority of nature, for example, between this numerically determinate effect and this numerically determinate action. For fire B can exist without such an action of fire A, since it can be produced by another fire or by God alone; but such an action can in no way exist without fire B. Nevertheless this fire, or any other effect, is not prior by nature to the action by which it is produced. 2º Because priority of nature is also often found between extremes mutually connected in existing. Fire is prior by nature to the heat which it radicates in itself, as likewise the soul is prior to its potencies, and the Sun to its inherent light. Indeed, every necessary cause completely disposed is prior by nature to its effect; and yet fire and heat, and so forth, are mutually connected in existing.

4. Nor does it avail that Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 5, c. 11, says that those things are prior by nature to others "which are such that they can be without the others, but the others cannot be without them." For he is speaking of non-mutual independence by title of causality, so that things prior by nature, as they exist here and now, can be "without the others" as causes, but the others, as existing here and now, cannot be "without them" as causes. That they can nevertheless be mutually connected on other grounds Aristotle acknowledges, c. 2, *De postpraedicamentis*, saying: "Of things which are convertible in the consequence of being, one which is in any way the cause that the other exists may not improperly be said to be prior by nature." There he plainly supposes that there can be reciprocal dependence and convertibility of two things in being, and nevertheless that one can be prior by nature to the other because it is its cause.

5. Priority of nature, therefore, is nothing other than "the non-mutual independence of one thing from another as from a cause," just as, conversely, posteriority of nature is nothing other than "non-mutual dependence," and so forth. Thus authors commonly teach, especially Fr. Suárez, d. 26, Met. s. 2, n. 18. Accordingly every cause is prior by nature to its effect, because it makes that effect depend upon itself as upon what gives being, while it does not in turn depend upon the effect precisely as such, at

least as upon a cause of the same kind, in the character of what is proximately capable of causing; rather, it is presupposed already to have this proximate potency from elsewhere. For it is inconceivable that thing A should be proximately capable of producing thing B and yet, in order to possess this very ability, await the influence of thing B insofar as produced by itself. This will be further established in the following chapter from n. 4.

6. This non-mutual independence founded upon the office of a cause is rightly called "priority." First, because non-mutual independence on any title whatsoever is generally so called. Second, because it is a certain priority of dignity, since it implies a certain excellence of office, according to Acts c. 20: "It is more blessed to give than to receive." Most of all, because it cannot be conceived or explained according to the reality of the object except by terms denoting precedence. For the existence of the effect follows upon the existence of the cause, arises and springs from it, is added to it and supervenes upon it, so that the line of being proceeds from cause to effect. But progression, supervention, addition, springing forth, and following plainly require the cause to be placed first, presupposed, and preexistent. Why this priority is called "of nature" appears to be because "nature" is said from "being born," and this priority is founded upon the order by which one thing is born, or arises, from another.

Inferences.

7. From this explanation the following are inferred. 1º Priority of nature is found only between cause and effect. Hence in the Divine processions, although there is priority of origin, there is no priority of nature, because there is no causality there, nor dependence properly so called, which requires a distinction of natures. 2º Dependence or independence on grounds other than causality is materially related to priority of nature. 3º Likewise priority of time is materially related to it, although it often occurs because of the peculiar condition of many causes. For nothing in the terms prevents a cause from truly being a cause and non-mutually independent of its effect, although it produces that effect in the first instant in which it itself exists; and therefore nothing prevents everything required for priority of nature from being present then. Thus the Sun in the first instant of its existence produced light with priority of nature; likewise an Angel produced intellection and love. Indeed, with respect to priority of nature in immediately influencing causes, simultaneity of time, or coexistence of cause and effect in the same instant, is materially related to it, since no physical cause immediately causes unless it actually exists.

8. 4º Every priority of nature is priority "from which," although this expression extends more widely, since according to many it is also said of priority of origin in the Trinity. For a cause is prior by nature precisely insofar as it is that "from which" the effect receives being. Priority "in which," however, is used in various ways. Sometimes, and more frequently, it is taken for priority of time alone. Sometimes also, and quite frequently, it is taken for priority of nature, not of every cause, but of one not connected with the effect; though, to distinguish it from priority of time, it is then commonly called priority "in which by nature." Accordingly, when a cause is not connected, at least essentially, with the existence of the effect, but is indifferent so as to exist without it, and can therefore be perfectly conceived and understood as actually posited without the effect being understood to exist, then it is said to be prior by nature, not only "from which," but also "in which"; and the more strictly so, the more indifferent it is. Hence this sort of priority "in which," which is also called "perfect priority of abstraction," belongs especially to free potencies. But when a cause is wholly connected with the effect, it has mere priority "from which."

9. 5º The signs of nature, prior and posterior, which are mentioned very frequently in the Schools, can now easily be explained. A prior sign is nothing other than the first act of the cause, or the cause in first act, and it can be remote or proximate according to the same degrees as first act, in accordance with what was said in disp. 2, c. 5, n. 23. A posterior sign is nothing other than the effect insofar as dependent upon the cause. Hence these signs are not instants of time or parts of any instant. Rather, the prior sign, I speak of the proximate one, is adequately identified with the complex composed of the power of the cause and the prerequisites for causing, while the posterior sign is identified with causality and the effect. Nor is it anything other for something to be understood or to exist in the prior sign than to be the power of the cause or a prerequisite for causing; just as it is nothing other to exist in the posterior sign than to exist after the manner of an effect.

10. From this it is evident how easily, in a real sense, many propositions are verified which cause difficulty for beginners when they are referred to prior and posterior signs existing in the same indivisible instant of time, as they in fact do whenever the effect is actually caused. For example: "The effect exists throughout the whole instant, and yet does not exist in the prior sign"; likewise, "In the prior sign neither the effect nor its absence is understood or really given"; likewise, "For the prior sign there is indifference, and for the posterior determination." These propositions, I say, and other similar ones will be found most true, provided the signs are rightly

understood. For the first means that the effect indeed exists throughout the entire instant, but is not for that reason its own cause or a prerequisite for causing itself. The second means that neither the effect nor its absence constitutes the cause in the being of what is proximately capable of causing. The third means that the cause in the being of what is proximately capable, when it has the priority "in which" discussed in n. 8, is not constituted by anything necessarily connected more with the effect than with its absence; whereas the effect itself and its production wholly exclude its absence for that instant. In all these things there is not even a shadow of contradiction.

11. Hence it will be gathered that the distinction of signs of this kind, and priority of nature, are not works of reason but something altogether real. For independently of our concepts there is in the same instant dependence of the effect upon the cause and independence of the cause from the effect. There is likewise a distinction between first act and second act, or between the cause together with the prerequisites for acting and the effect as flowing from it. I grant that priority of nature is often apprehended by us after the likeness of priority of time, and that prior and posterior signs are considered after the likeness of parts or little chambers of the same instant, for which reason they are sometimes called "instants of nature" and "instants of reason." But it is one thing to apprehend after the likeness of something, another to judge or attribute it; for we apprehend an Angel after the likeness of a winged youth, yet we do not attribute corporeity to him. Moreover, when we say that the cause in the prior sign is "abstracted" from the effect, the discussion concerns a real abstraction, which can be twofold. One is "of non-connection," or "of indifference," which belongs only to causes prior "in which." The other is "of non-inclusion," which belongs even to causes prior purely "from which"; for although these cannot be conceived without the effect as a terminus of connection, they nevertheless do not constitutively include it in their first act.

12. Unjustly, therefore, do certain enemies of Scholastic terminology malign the doctrine concerning prior and posterior signs as an empty speculation. For it is of great importance accurately to discern, among things existing simultaneously, what pertains to the prior sign and what to the posterior, so that from this we may know what has the office of cause and what of caused. Two things should be observed here. First, there can be in the same instant not merely two but three or more signs of nature, if there is a series of several causes and effects. For example, in the same instant there is 1º a sign in which God is prior by nature to the Angel whom He creates; 2º a sign in which the Angel is prior to his intellective potency; 3º a sign in which the Angel's intellect is prior to intellection; 4º a sign in which

intellection is prior to love, and so forth. Second, prior and posterior signs are found not only in the first instant of the production of an effect, but also in every instant of the conservation of that same effect by the same cause, since in each the cause has its first act and second act.

13. 6º Simultaneity of nature, which is opposed to priority of nature, must be explained by participation in the same causality. Accordingly those things are said to be simultaneous by nature with one another which are produced by the same action, as, according to many, the matter and form of the heaven; nor do they then constitute two signs but a single one, because they are produced after the manner of one effect. But if two effects are produced in the same instant by the same cause through distinct actions, they will not properly be simultaneous by nature, nor will they exist in the same sign, but in concomitant signs; or they will be simultaneous by nature negatively, insofar as neither is prior or posterior by nature to the other. In this same negative sense sweetness and whiteness in sugar are said to be simultaneous by nature. Those things, however, are simultaneous by nature with respect to a third which integrate, and insofar as they integrate, one adequate cause with respect to the same effect. Hence it can happen that one is prior by nature to another and yet both are simultaneous by nature with respect to a third; for example, if fire A produces fire B and afterward, together with B already produced, concurs immediately after the manner of one cause in producing fire C. Understand what has been said of simultaneity "from which." For by simultaneity "in which," or mutual connection, any things are often said to be simultaneous by nature when they coexist in such a way that one cannot be conceived as existing without the other, whether or not it is the cause or effect of that other. In this sense relatives are said to be simultaneous by nature.

14. 7º Priority of nature belongs to all causes. First, the efficient cause has priority "from which" in the strictest sense, and if it is not necessarily connected with the effect it will also have priority "in which." Next, the material cause and the final cause, as existing intentionally, precede in almost the same manner and strictness as the efficient cause. Finally, if the formal cause is produced by creation, as the human soul, it precedes the composite by priority of nature both "from which" and "in which." But if it is an educed form, it precedes the composite by priority "from which," since it is truly its cause, but not by priority "in which," because, since eduction is really union and the ultimate determination that the composite exist, the form cannot be understood as existing by virtue of eduction without being understood as wholly connected with the existence of the composite. This alone is what those mean who deny that a material form can be understood

in any sign prior to the composite; for they are speaking of the sign of priority "in which," that is, one implying non-connection or some indifference.

15. 8º Priority of nature with respect to the effect also belongs to previous conditions, or prerequisites, on the side of the cause. First, because the effect does not follow upon the cause except insofar as the cause is clothed with those conditions; nor does it presuppose the cause in just any state, but as proximately capable of causing, and consequently as joined with those conditions through which it is constituted proximately capable. Second, because pure conditions, although they do not exercise physical influence, nevertheless exercise a kind of moral influence, insofar as by their existence they move, or at least determine, the exigency of the cause so that it moves God to concur. Accordingly there is no one who does not place such conditions in the prior sign.

Whether Action Is Also Prior by Nature to the Effect.

16. In this minor question it is first certain that action does not precede the effect by priority "in which," for since it is the ultimate determination and exercise by which the effect is posited in the order of things, it is essentially incapable of existing unless the effect exists. Next, speaking of priority "from which," it is likewise certain that action, just as it is not a cause "as that which," so neither is it prior to the effect "as that which," for the character of cause is the measure of priority of nature. Finally, it is certain that action is prior to the effect "as that by which," just as it is a cause "as that by which," or after the manner of the exercise by which the cause is rendered actually causing and prior in second act. The sole question remaining, therefore, is whether this priority "as that by which" suffices for action properly to be called prior by nature to the effect. I answer negatively with many authors.

17. 1º Because something is prior by nature precisely insofar as it is a cause or a prerequisite on the side of the cause. But action, although it causes "as that by which," is not properly a cause nor a prerequisite on the side of the cause, as all admit. Therefore it is not properly prior, although it precedes "as that by which." 2º Because, when one effect is produced, commonly only two signs are enumerated, prior and posterior. But action does not pertain to the prior sign, otherwise it would belong on the side of first act, which no one would say. Therefore it pertains to the posterior sign, which is the sign of the effect. But things which pertain to the same sign are

simultaneous by nature. Certainly, if action properly preceded the effect, it would have to constitute a separate sign of its own, intermediate between the signs of the cause and effect; yet this is not commonly acknowledged. 3º And this comes to the same thing: action belongs to second act, since it certainly does not belong to first act; but the effect likewise belongs to second act according to all. Therefore action and effect are simultaneous by nature. The consequence is clear, because if action properly preceded, the effect would belong not to second act but to third act, since it would supervene after the act of action, which is second. Finally, action and effect are produced by the same action, since action is also its own production. Therefore simultaneity of nature belongs to them, from n. 13.

18. Hence it will be gathered, 1º that it is entirely consistent for action to be prior "as that by which," and nevertheless not properly prior. Thus, as I said shortly before, a cause purely "as that by which" is not properly a cause. Thus ocular vision is not properly seen, and yet it is seen "as that by which," because it is that by which color is constituted as seen. Likewise the reception of form in a subject does not properly receive, although it is receiving "as that by which." Indeed, action itself is also, "as that by which," the cause of itself and prior to itself, since it is the exercise by which the cause is rendered actually causing in second act and prior to the action itself. Will action therefore properly be called prior to itself? It will be gathered, 2º that when action is called the "way" to the terminus and "mediating" between cause and effect, the expression is improper and abusive, arising from the fact that action is not known through a proper species but is apprehended after the likeness of a mediating way tending toward the effect. In reality, however, action is the ultimate formal determination and execution of the effect, and its entire essence consists in rendering the effect actually posited in the order of things. I am speaking of instantaneous action; for successive action, as regards its earlier parts, certainly precedes the ultimate terminus, because it is not the immediate production of that terminus except according to the final part of the action.

What Is the Form Denominating a Cause Prior by Nature?

19. The common answer is that the form, or quasi-form, by which a cause is rendered "prior in remote first act" is its power or potency not yet unimpeded; that by which it is rendered "prior in proximate first act" is its power or potency as joined with all the prerequisites for causing; and finally, that by which it is constituted "prior in second act" is action, or actual

causality. The reason for all of these is that through forms or quasi-forms of this kind the cause is constituted in the being of a cause according to that threefold act; therefore through the same it is constituted in the being of what is prior, since it is prior by nature precisely insofar as it has the character of a cause. It must be noted, however, that a cause in first act, just as it is not actually causing but capable of causing, is likewise not actually prior to the effect but capable of being prior. For since priority of nature is the non-mutual independence of the cause from the effect, it implies not only the independence of the cause but also the dependence of the effect, which is not yet present in first act. Therefore priority in first act is only potential priority, insofar as it is a power to make the effect depend upon itself.

20. It must likewise be noted that actual priority, or priority in second act, is not action or causality alone. For it does not consist only in the dependence of the effect upon the cause, which is action, but simultaneously in the independence of the cause from the effect. This independence consists in the cause having its being and its proximate potency independently of the influence of the effect which it causes. This priority, therefore, besides the action of the cause upon the effect, implies on the side of the cause a sufficiency or title for being which does not require the influence of the effect to be caused by it, whether that title is aseity, as in the First Cause, or the influence of another cause, as in a created cause. The same title also pertains to priority in proximate first act as one of the previous conditions. Finally, it must be noted that this same form, as though compounded from dependence and independence, is posteriority of nature, or the form denominating the effect "posterior." For it frequently occurs that the same form with respect to different things contains diverse and opposite denominations, for example, "producer and produced, receiver and received."

21. But against the answer insofar as it says that through action the cause is constituted prior in second act, it is commonly objected: 1º action is the form by which effect and cause are simultaneous by nature, since it gives them the correlative denominations "causing" and "caused," while it is proper to relatives to be simultaneous by nature. 2º Action is not prior to the effect and is not understood in the prior sign; therefore it cannot constitute the cause in the being of what is prior. 3º Through the same form the cause is prior both to the effect and to the action. But it cannot through action be prior to action unless action precedes itself. This is proved because the cause, as prior to action, precedes action; therefore, if the cause as prior to action involves action, action will also precede itself.

22. But these objections have little force. To 1º: action is the form by which effect and cause are simultaneous by nature with simultaneity "in which," which alone is required by correlatives from n. 13, because, given the action, the cause can in no way exist without the effect, nor conversely. Yet it is consistent with this that action be the form of priority "from which," since through action the cause is in second act that "from which" the effect arises and depends. But this priority, especially in second act, is not opposed to simultaneity "in which." To 2º: for action to constitute the cause in the being of what is prior, or, what is the same thing, for it to be prior "as that by which," it is not required that it be properly prior and "as that which," from what was said in n. 18. Nor is the denomination "prior in second act," any more than the denomination "causing," understood in the prior sign according to all its constituents; for the prior sign is the very first act of the cause, in which not everything required for actual priority is found, from n. 19.

23. To 3º: the cause is indeed constituted through action as prior in second act to the action, just as through the same action it is constituted as actually causing the action in second act; but it no more follows from this that action precedes itself than that it is its own cause. This will be evident if the attached proof is applied as follows: the cause, as causing, is the principle of the action; therefore, if the cause as causing involves action, the action will be the principle of itself. Just as, therefore, it is granted without absurdity that action is the cause of itself purely "as that by which," after the manner of an exercise of a distinct power to which alone the denomination "cause" properly belongs, so the same judgment must be made concerning the name "prior," which has the same force.

CHAPTER II.
Whether Mutual Priority of Nature Is Possible.

1. Since priority of nature belongs only to causes with respect to effects, the sense of the proposed question is: Is mutual causality possible? Or, can two things be causes of one another, so that one causes the other and in turn is caused by it? First, the question concerns mutual priority in the same instant; for in different instants there is no reason why mutual priority should be repugnant, since fire B can now be produced by fire A, and afterward, while conserved by God alone, can conserve that same fire A, or reproduce it if destroyed. Second, the discussion now concerns mutual priority or causality with respect to first being, that is, with respect to the single or primary total production by which a thing receives its being or is

conserved in its being; for we shall speak of mutual priority with respect to second being in c. 4. Third, there is no difficulty concerning final and efficient causes, which no one doubts can be causes of one another. For since a final cause does not presuppose physical existence but causes only as known, or as existing intentionally, it can certainly exercise its causality before physically existing and therefore can cause finally that by which it is afterward caused efficiently according to physical existence. Such is the relation of the sick person's health to the medicine.

2. Fourth, mutual priority in moral causes also seems to be admitted without hesitation. This is evident in things mutually connected, for example, in a form and its ultimate disposition. For each, as now existing, demands from God its conservation for the following instant, since this is proper to a permanent thing, and consequently each demands the conservation of the other, since neither can be conserved without the other. Therefore each morally causes or conserves the other for the following instant. But from this one may not argue to physical causes. First, because otherwise something could physically cause itself, just as it can morally, as is evident from the same example. Second, because from mutual moral priority it does not follow that something can precede itself or its cause according to the same existence or duration, but only that, as existing in this instant, it can precede itself as existing in the following one; or, as existing morally in the Divine knowledge and volition, precede itself as existing physically. The question, therefore, is reduced to physical causes, and we shall decide it by two assertions.

Mutual Priority in the Same Genus of Cause Is Repugnant.

3. This assertion is presupposed as certain throughout the Schools with Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 5, and St. Thomas there, lect. 2, who says: "For something to be cause and caused according to the same genus of cause is impossible." In material and formal causes this requires no proof, provided the nature of those causes is penetrated. In the efficient cause, however, it is easily proved from what was said in the preceding chapter. If two things efficiently caused one another, so that each were simultaneously prior and posterior by nature to the other, it would follow that each simultaneously depended and did not depend upon the influence of the other: depended, as is supposed; and simultaneously did not depend, because priority of nature implies the independence of the cause from the effect, that is, a sufficiency or complete title of being, especially in the efficient cause, independently of

the influence of the effect. To this must be reduced the common proof: if something were the efficient cause of its own efficient cause, it would exist in what is prior to the cause by which it is first produced and receives existence; therefore it would exist before it was produced and before it existed. These and other similar proofs drawn from priority, I say, must, if they are to have force, be reduced to the preceding one, because for a cause to exist in what is prior is nothing other than to exist with proximate potency for acting possessed independently of the influence of the effect.

4. It may perhaps be said: priority of nature is gratuitously explained through independence of this kind, for that priority in reality is nothing besides the office of cause. But the very point disputed is whether that office can be mutual, and therefore whether it necessarily implies, or does not imply, independence from the influence of the effect. It is not legitimate to answer by the very thing in controversy. But first, this is the common notion of priority of nature, as we saw in the preceding chapter. Next, that the office of cause necessarily brings such independence with it is proved, 1º because it belongs to the concept of cause that the effect follows upon it, is really added and supervenes upon it, and really presupposes it in the order of existing. Hence that self-evident principle: "Being is prior to operating," and "Operation follows upon being." But this following, addition, supervention, and presupposition, since it does not require precedence of time, is inexplicable in a real sense except through the independence which we assert. Certainly, what is added and supervenes upon another thing by the very terms presupposes that other thing as already posited from elsewhere.

5. 2º Common sense holds that a physical cause operates, not in order that it may be, but because it is. A bird does not fly in order to have wings, but because it has them; nor does a man see in order to have eyes, but because he has eyes. But if a cause can depend upon its effect with respect to first being, this order will be inverted. For the cause will operate in order to have a cause of being, and therefore in order to have that from which it is, which is to operate in order that it may be. This is confirmed: given such dependence, a cause could really be both means and end with respect to the same thing and according to the same respect. For if A and B efficiently caused one another, A according to physical existence would be a means to the existence of B, and according to the same existence would be an end of the same B. Indeed thing A would be a means and an end with respect to itself. For then God would intend the existence of thing A, taking as a means the existence of thing B, to which He takes as a means the very existence of thing A. Thing A will therefore be a means to a means of which it itself is the

end; but what is a means to a means is a means to the end, as no one is ignorant.

6. 3º It is most evident that nothing can first produce itself; for it would follow that the cause exists in what is prior to itself, and therefore exists before it exists. But this reasoning has no force if the cause need not exist independently of the effect. For that "before," that "in what is prior," if it does not signify this independence, can signify nothing else in the present matter than the office of cause. To say, therefore, that a thing cannot cause itself because it cannot be in what is prior to itself is to say that it cannot cause itself because it cannot be its own cause. This reason is a manifest begging of the question, or an answer by the very question itself. 4º If a thing can first be produced by its own effect, it will also be able to produce itself immediately. For it appears no more difficult that something be prior to itself than that it be prior to what is prior to it; nor that it give being to itself than that it fashion for itself a cause of being; nor that it be the *a priori* reason why it is than that it be the *a priori* reason why it has that from which it is. Finally, to omit other points, the common demonstration of the First Cause would thereby collapse, since it is founded on the fact that in the order of causes one must arrive at some cause which depends upon the influence of no cause.

Mutual Priority in Diverse Genera of Physical Cause Is Also Repugnant.

7. Thus the Scotists hold with the Subtle Doctor, and our authors commonly with the Eminent Doctor, d. 27, Met., against the Thomists, who commonly admit mutual priority in diverse physical genera even as a matter of fact. For they think that matter causes form in the genus of material cause and is caused by form in the genus of formal cause. Likewise they think that the ultimate disposition to form is caused by the form in the genus of efficient cause and is the cause of the form, preceding it in the genus of material or dispositive cause insofar as it disposes matter to receive the form. They commonly reason similarly in theological matters, for example, concerning the act of contrition, which they say precedes sanctifying grace after the manner of a disposition and is caused and preceded by that same grace as by an efficient cause. Mutual priority between matter and form, since according to the Thomists it is founded upon matter's existing through the existence of form, has been sufficiently refuted in tract. 1. We must now refute mutual priority between efficient and material, or dispositive, causes; from which every other mutual physical priority will likewise remain refuted.

8. It is repugnant that a form should first efficiently cause the ultimate disposition, for example, that the form of fire should efficiently cause heat in the instant in which heat previously disposes and prepares matter for that same form. Therefore the mutual priority asserted by the Thomists is repugnant. The antecedent is proved: it is repugnant that a form be understood as simply existing in what is prior to the first production of the heat while it itself is caused by the heat in the genus of material cause. But this would occur if the form of fire first efficiently caused heat in the instant in which the heat is a previous disposition. Therefore it is repugnant that the form of fire should first efficiently cause, and so forth. The consequence is correct, and the minor indubitable; for according to all, an efficient cause must simply preexist the production of the effect. The major is proved: if the form is understood as simply existing, it is understood as posited outside all its causes, as the Thomists themselves teach when treating the existence of prime matter. Therefore it presupposes those causes as posited in the order of things, since it is wholly contradictory for a thing to be actually posited outside causes which are not yet posited among things but are purely possible. Therefore it presupposes the heat as posited among things, since heat is one of the causes of the form in the material genus. But it is repugnant that the form, in what is prior to the first production of heat, should presuppose heat posited in the order of things, as is evident. Therefore it is repugnant that it be understood as simply existing in what is prior, and so forth.

9. I deliberately speak now, not of the "existence" of heat, but of its "production," in order to preclude the Thomists' solution, namely that a material cause does not require existence and therefore, although heat precedes the form as a material cause, it need not precede as existing, but can receive existence from the form as from an efficient cause. This solution, which we sufficiently rejected where treating the existence of prime matter, is of no avail in the present matter. For a material cause, whatever may be said of existence, at least requires its first production, by which it is posited among things in what is prior to the effect. Hence prime matter not yet terminating a creative action cannot be a material cause, even according to the Thomists. If, therefore, heat is the material cause of the form, it terminates its first production in what is prior to the form. But this is contradictory if the first production of heat arises from the form, for it follows that heat is presupposed as produced before the cause by which it is produced.

10. The objection is pressed, 1º: if heat is the material cause of the form, in the sign prior to the form it is understood as actually disposing matter, for

it is reduced to material cause precisely insofar as it disposes matter for the form. Therefore, in what is prior to the form, matter receives heat and undergoes it. Therefore in that prior state there is in matter a passion of heat, and consequently an eduction, which even among the Thomists is identified with the passion. But the eduction of heat cannot be understood in what is prior to its efficient cause, as is manifest. If, therefore, it is understood in what is prior to the form, the form is not then the efficient cause of the heat. Hence the objection is pressed, 2º: heat cannot exist in what is prior to its efficient cause; otherwise there will be no reason why mutual priority in the same genus of efficient cause should be repugnant. But heat exists in what is prior to the form. Therefore the form is not its efficient cause. The minor is proved, 1º because in what is prior to the form the heat is understood as outside all its causes, namely outside the material and efficient causes, for it has no formal cause, since it terminates their causalities, namely passion and eduction. 2º Because heat in that prior state communicates to matter the formal effect of being "hot and disposed" for the form; but a formal effect cannot be communicated by a form which does not exist.

11. The Thomists say that we confuse the signs of nature when we wish the sign of the efficient cause to be understood in the sign of the material cause, and conversely. But we are not ignorant that these signs are distinct and that one is not constituted by the other. We contend, however, that the sign of the material cause with respect to the form precedes the sign in which the form is understood as existing and capable of efficiently causing; and consequently that the heat which is already presupposed as produced and existing in the sign of the material cause cannot be caused by the form, lest otherwise heat exist and terminate its own efficient production before its efficient cause exists. We likewise contend that heat, in the sign in which it actually disposes matter, since it is already educed, presupposes its efficient cause, not as constituting that sign of disposition, but as preexisting in an earlier sign; just as a creature, being a being from another, presupposes the Creator, although it is not constituted by Him. From this we deduce that the form, which does not precede heat as disposing but follows it, is not its efficient cause. There is no confusion of signs in these points.

12. Another argument is commonly added here, *ad hominem*, as they say. According to the Thomists, accidents are received in the whole composite; hence heat is received not only in matter but also in the form of fire. Given this, mutual priority in the same genus follows, which even the Thomists judge repugnant. For heat is prior to the form in the genus of material cause,

as they hold; and then the form is prior to heat in the same genus of material cause, since it is its receptive and sustaining subject.

13. Whatever may be said of this, the general reason against this and every other mutual priority between physical causes, even of diverse genera, is that every physical cause is understood as existing in what is prior by nature to its effect. First, because it must be understood as already produced, or as terminating the action productive of itself, unless one absurdly wishes a thing not yet produced to be proximately capable of physically causing. But if it terminates an action, it already has being, because "every action of an active potency is terminated at being," as St. Thomas says, q. 1, *De potentia*, a. 3. Second, because "a cause is that from whose being another follows," as the same St. Thomas says, opusc. 31, speaking of cause as such, but of every true cause. Therefore it must be presupposed as previously possessing being. But if thing A exists in what is prior by nature to effect B, it cannot depend upon the causality of that effect in any genus of physical cause. Therefore, and so forth.

14. The minor is proved, 1º because if thing A exists in what is prior to B, it is already posited outside all its causes, which it consequently presupposes as existing in what is prior to itself, as is established from what was just said with St. Thomas. Therefore it is contradictory that one of the causes of thing A should be effect B; for otherwise thing A would presuppose as existing that very thing before which it itself exists, and effect B would preexist before the thing which exists before it; and A would be outside all its causes before being caused by one of them, which is to be caused before being caused and to exist before it is. If this is not contradictory, there is no reason why mutual causality in the same genus should be contradictory. 2º Because to exist in what is prior by nature is to exist with independence from the causality of the effect, not only in the same genus of cause but also in a different one, as the arguments proposed in n. 4 and following prove to anyone who considers them correctly. Hence it will be gathered that the difficulty of mutual priority between physical causes of diverse genera is the same as between causes of the same genus.

15. Finally, observe that the mutual priority between matter and form so celebrated by the Thomists, even if admitted, is not to the point. For there is no mutual causality there according to the same being of matter, but according to two really distinct beings, according to the Thomists. Matter, according to its wayfaring and inchoate being, causes the form, and is caused by the form according to formal and actual being, which is really distinguished from its wayfaring being. But there is no difficulty in this on the ground of mutual priority, just as there is none in the fact that an end

according to intentional being causes the means and is caused by the means according to physical being; or that a thing according to substantial being causes an effect by which it is caused according to accidental being. The sole question, therefore, is whether some thing according to one and the same being can cause that by which it is caused, whether in the same or in a diverse genus of cause. Hence, in the case of form and ultimate disposition, the Thomists must be asked whether heat, for example, exists in what is prior to the form of fire in the sign of material cause. If they affirm it, then heat exists in what is prior to its efficient cause, which is plainly repugnant. If they deny it, then the form does not cause the heat according to that being which the heat receives from the form, namely according to existence, but according to another wayfaring being really distinct from it; and thus this example of mutual priority is likewise irrelevant.

CHAPTER III.
The Objections Are Resolved.

1. Against the first assertion, although admitted by all, it can be objected, 1º from reason: fires A and B contain one another in the genus of efficient cause, since each contains all the individuals of its species except itself. Therefore they already have mutual priority at least in remote first act; therefore they will also be able to have it in proximate first act and in second act. 2º From examples: the parts of a natural minimum mutually conserve one another; two fires mutually foster one another; and fire which heats air is fostered by the heated air; the stones of an arch and the weights in a balance mutually suspend one another; horses drawing a carriage and the wheels themselves mutually assist one another; wine heats the stomach and is heated by it, which also occurs in hands rubbed together; the ingress of air causes the opening of a window and is caused by it; an act produces a habit and a habit an act; two men can kill one another; finally, it often occurs that two things mutually determine one another in the genus of formal cause, for example, the existence of Peter determines the existence of Paul, and is determined by it, toward constituting the relation of coexistence or the denomination "coexistent."

2. I answer to 1º by denying the second consequence, because two fires do not mutually contain one another as to be produced under chimerical circumstances in which each must exist before it is produced. Therefore neither contains the other as to be produced in the composite sense of its own mutual production by the other, just as neither is contained in the composite sense of a Divine decree or revelation concerning the

nonexistence of such a fire. Thus, although the will contains hatred, it does not contain it as to be produced in the composite sense of love, or in the divided sense of cognition of the object. Hence that mutual priority in remote first act does not imply an order to the same instant of time, but to different instants; for otherwise proximate or actual priority cannot occur. To 2º: those examples prove either nothing, or at most the mutual connection or reciprocal need of two things, which has no difficulty if it does not require real priority. Let us examine them individually.

3. The parts of a natural minimum without mutual influence indirectly conserve one another by resisting contraries, or even as concomitant conditions, because neither can exist without union with the other. Two conjoined fires resist contraries more strongly because "united power is stronger"; and thus they indirectly conserve one another without any need for a mutual action of one upon the other, just as a man conserves himself while defending himself against enemies without thereby being his own cause or prior to himself. In this manner also heated air fosters fire. The stones of an arch, and understand the same of weights in a balance, do not mutually cause one another, nor does the presence of one cause the presence of the other; but the stones merely have mutual connection and simultaneity in the office of causes of the presences, and the presences themselves in the character of effects.

4. It may be said: at least the presences of the stones in the arch mutually precede one another after the manner of a previous condition. For the presence of one is a necessary condition for the other to be proximately capable of conserving its own presence, and conversely. I answer: the previous condition for stone A to be proximately capable of conserving its formal presence is not the formal presence of stone B, but its radical presence, consisting in stone B's not being distant from this place, that is, in its lacking location in other places. The same must be understood of the radical presence of stone A with respect to B as capable of conserving its own formal presence. From this it follows only that the radical presences of both have simultaneity of nature or concomitance with one another in the office of cause or previous condition for the formal presences, which are likewise understood as simultaneous or concomitant in the character of effects. From this the answer to the example of the horses and wheels is also evident. It proves only that two causes can mutually assist one another in producing one or two effects connected with one another; in which event neither cause need be prior to the other, but both are understood as simultaneous by nature in what is prior to effects posterior to both.

5. The example of the wine and the stomach accomplishes nothing. For it is one thing for two things mutually to produce one another, and another for one to produce something in the other as in a subject, and conversely. Thus the stomach produces heat in the wine, and the wine another heat in the stomach, without either heat influencing the other, at least mutually. The same occurs in hands rubbed together, one of which excites heat in the other through motion and impulse; for there the heat of each arises from motion, and the motion of each from the motive power of each hand, with simultaneity of nature in causing. In the following example, the air, in what is prior to its ingress, impresses an impulse upon the window, and by that impulse the opening is caused. Therefore the opening of the window is not caused by the ingress of air, but is prior to it as the removal of an impediment; the ingress itself, however, is efficiently caused by the air. It may also be said that the air simultaneously by nature causes its own ingress and the impulse upon the window, whose opening results from the ingress and is caused by it in the genus of formal cause, and simultaneously by the impulse in the genus of efficient cause.

6. A habit does not efficiently cause the numerically same act by which it is efficiently caused, but another similar act. From this it follows only that there can be a certain mutual priority according to species, that is, that A can be produced by B and simultaneously produce another effect of the same species as B, which certainly does not touch the present difficulty. The example immediately following absurdly proves that a man can cause himself, just as he can kill himself. When two men stab one another, the death of one is not the cause of the death of the other; rather, each is the effect of the mutual wound, and the mutual wound is the effect of each man, neither of whom is the effect of the other. What shadow of mutual priority is there here? To the last example, say that neither existence is the formal cause of the other, but each is in some manner a formal cause of the concrete "coexistent," because each constitutes it by determining the other to constitute it. In this sense one is said to determine the other in the genus of formal cause, not as causing the other taken specifically, but as causing in the other the denomination "coexistent." In that office of determining, however, they are concomitant.

7. Against the second assertion these same examples, already resolved, are commonly objected. But since they prove either mutual priority in the same genus or none at all, they are ineptly brought forward here. More aptly it is objected, 1º: although mutual greaterness or priority under the same title is generally repugnant, if it arises from diverse titles it loses its repugnance. Hence two men can mutually exceed one another if one is

greater in virtue and the other in wisdom; or even mutually precede one another if one is prior in dignity and the other in age. Therefore, although mutual causality in the same genus is repugnant, it is not so in a different one. I answer by denying the consequence, because the same absurdity follows from mutual causality in a diverse genus as in the same, namely that a thing is presupposed as existing before the cause from which it receives first being, and therefore that it is caused before it is first caused, and so forth. But nothing similar follows from mutual greaterness or priority in the examples proposed.

8. It is objected, 2º: the introduction of one form precedes the expulsion of the other in the genus of formal cause; but, from another standpoint, the expulsion as a disposition is prior to the introduction. Therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved because the expulsion of the old form is intended by the agent as a disposition or means to the introduction of the new one; for the agent does not introduce the new form in order to expel the old one, but conversely; otherwise it would ultimately intend evil. Therefore the agent must execute the introduction after the expulsion, according to the principle, "What is prior in intention is posterior in execution." I answer by denying the minor together with its proof. For the agent neither intends the expulsion as a means to the introduction nor conversely, but intends each as an end, with this difference: it intends the introduction of the new form as a primary and direct end, but the expulsion of the old form as a secondary and indirect end. For whatever necessarily follows upon an end directly sought is also in some manner intended, according to the principle, "He who wills the antecedent wills the consequent," namely virtually and indirectly. In this sense it is not unfitting that the agent tend toward the evil of the old form, that is, toward its absence.

9. I speak according to the common opinion, in which the expulsion of the old form is the secondary formal effect of the new form, which necessarily presupposes the primary formal effect and consequently the new form united to matter. To this pertains Aristotle's principle, "The introduction of one is the expulsion of the other," namely causally. This appears certain in contrary accidental forms; for water does not receive heat because it loses cold, but conversely; nor does the expulsion of Grace precede sin, but follows it, for, as the Council of Trent says, "God does not abandon those once justified by His grace unless He is first abandoned by them." Hence, in the first instant of the generation of a composite, the following order of signs is commonly noted in matter. In the first sign there exists the ultimate disposition to the new form. In the second, or in two concomitant signs, there is the introduction of the new form and the

expulsion of the contrary disposition, because each is immediately posited in response to the exigency of the disposition of the first sign. In the third there is the expulsion of the old form in response to the exigency of the new one. The reason why, once the ultimate disposition to the new form has been posited, the old form is not expelled in the immediately following sign is that the accidental disposition is not immediately incompossible with the old substantial form, but only mediately, insofar as it demands the new substantial form, which is incompossible with the old, and simultaneously destroys the accidental disposition which the old form required.

10. It is objected, 3º: heat, being a disposition to the form of fire, precedes it in the instant of generation; but, from another standpoint, since it is a property of that same form, it follows it in the same instant, for properties are effects following upon forms. I answer from Fr. Suárez, d. 18, Met. s. 3, n. 9, 10, and 11, that heat and the other accidents which in the instant of generation are preparatory dispositions are not efficiently caused by the form in that first instant, even through natural emanation or resultancy, because they are presupposed as immediately produced by the extrinsic agent in what is prior to the form. Otherwise how would they previously dispose matter? They therefore emanate from, or are efficiently caused by, the form only after the manner of conservation in subsequent instants, in which they no longer precede the form in the order of nature, because the title of preparatory disposition ceases. For there is no longer need of an accidental determination of matter or of the agent in order that they cause or conserve this form, on which title of determination heat preceded in the first instant as a preparatory disposition. The form itself, once existing, demands to be conserved for subsequent instants, and therefore determines the agent toward conserving it as long as no stronger contrary exigency is present. Matter likewise, once possessing the form of fire, demands to retain it until another supervenes. Therefore in the remaining instants heat is a disposition not preparing but adorning and perfecting, and consequently posterior to the form, as Suárez says, likewise d. 27, Met. s. 2, n. 20.

11. If it is asked whether the ultimate disposition in the instant of generation should be called a "property" of the form, it seems that it should be affirmed, because for the name "property" it is sufficient that it be an accident connaturally and specially due to the composite, even if it does not actually emanate from the form or follow it entitatively. Nevertheless, the ultimate disposition in the sign in which it precedes the form and is abstracted from it is not understood as a property, nor does it receive this denomination until the form is understood as existing in what is posterior,

because the denomination "property" is constituted obliquely by the exigency of the form to which such a disposition is due.

12. It is objected, 4º, from the authority of Aristotle and St. Thomas. As regards Aristotle, whenever he admits mutual causality, he always gives efficient and final causes as his example. St. Thomas, however, whose passages M. Prado cites here q. 24, § 2, further admits mutual causality between matter and form, but not according to the same real being of matter. For he holds that matter taken specifically, or according to its incomplete being, is the material cause of form, while simultaneously being caused by form according to "being in act," by which expression St. Thomas understands the physically complete "being" of matter, as we showed in tract. 1, d. 2. Hence it follows only, which is most true, that matter is the cause of form and form is the intrinsic cause of the composite. Indeed, even if we grant that according to St. Thomas matter exists only through the existence of form, there follows only mutual causality according to two beings of matter, wayfaring and actual; and this is not the mutual priority here disputed, as we noted in the preceding chapter, n. 15.

13. St. Thomas also admits on the side of form a certain priority in the genus of formal cause with respect to dispositions, but he is speaking of dispositions not taken specifically but insofar as they are perfected and made better through association with the form, as he sufficiently indicates, q. 28, *De veritate*, a. 8. He likewise admits a certain mutual priority between creation and the creature. But this priority is improper and arises from our manner of conceiving, insofar as creation is conceived after the likeness of a way to the terminus, and the terminus after the likeness of a receptive subject. In reality, however, neither is creation properly prior to the terminus, as we said generally of action in c. 1, nor is the terminus its receptive subject, but a subject of mere adhesion, which does not require priority.

14. Finally, he acknowledges, I-II, q. 113, a. 8, ad 1, that "on the side of the Sun, illuminating is prior to removing darkness; but on the side of the air to be illuminated, being purged of darkness is prior to receiving light, in the order of nature." But that St. Thomas is not speaking of a real "order of nature" seems evident. For since light and darkness are immediate and formal contradictories, namely light and non-light, the purgation or removal of the one is the very formal positing of the other. It is therefore most formally the same thing for the air to be purged of darkness and to be illuminated. How, then, will there be a real order here? The Holy Doctor must therefore be explained as speaking of an improper "order of nature," according to an imperfect manner of conceiving, insofar as we apprehend

darkness after the likeness of a certain positive impediment which must first be removed before light enters.

CHAPTER IV.
On Mutual Priority with Respect to Second Being.

1. Supposing what we shall prove elsewhere, that it can be brought about by Divine power that the same thing, besides one total action, simultaneously terminate another action, it is asked whether mutual priority with respect to second being is possible, that is, with respect to new actions after each cause is presupposed simply to exist through other total actions. For example, if fires A and B are each produced by God alone through its own total action, can they by Divine power in the same instant mutually produce one another through new actions? The common opinion of our authors affirms this, whom Fr. Peynado cites and follows here, dist. 8, sect. 3, § 2. For in mutual priority of this kind, even in the same genus of cause, the absurdities of mutual priority with respect to first being cease. It does not follow that a thing exists before it simply exists, or before the cause by which it is first caused, but only that it exists as first produced before it is produced a second time, and before that cause by which it is produced a second time. In this no contradiction appears.

2. It is objected, 1º: the same thing cannot simultaneously be prior and posterior to another. But if fire A were cause and effect of fire B, it would simultaneously be prior and posterior by nature to it. I answer: it is not absurd that the same thing according to diverse actions be prior and posterior by nature to another, when it does not thereby follow that the thing exists before it is first caused. For although both denominations belong to the same thing with respect to the same thing, they do not belong according to the same respect. Thus the same thing can simultaneously exceed and be exceeded by the same thing according to diverse forms, for example, according to knowledge and virtue. Thus, although the same body cannot be locally above and below the heaven according to the same location, it can be so through two locations. Thus also, in the opinion which we now suppose concerning the possibility of two total actions, fire A, as produced by one action, can be independent of fire B and, as produced by another, dependent upon that same B. Accordingly, in our case fire A, as produced by God's action, is prior by nature to fire B and is posterior to it as produced a second time by the action of B itself.

3. If it is inferred: therefore fire A is a mediate cause of itself. The consequence can be granted, understood so that the fire with respect to first

being mediately causes itself with respect to second being. It can also be denied absolutely, because fire A does not cause fire B with respect to first being, according to which fire B in turn causes A, but only with respect to a second action from which fire B is abstracted insofar as proximately capable of causing fire A. For this second action is not a power or a prerequisite condition for fire B to cause A. But the cause of a cause is not a mediate cause of the thing caused when the immediate cause independently of its action has the force and proximate potency of causing, together with a complete title and sufficiency for being. From this it is evident that in this mutual causality there is nothing contrary to the concept of priority of nature. For that concept requires only that the cause, independently of its effect, have from elsewhere, either from itself or from another cause, sufficient reason to exist simply and a proximate potency for causing. In our case each fire certainly has this sufficiency and potency by virtue of the action through which it depends upon God alone.

4. It is objected, 2º: fire A is prior to fire B in the sign in which it is understood as proximately capable of causing it; but in the same sign it is posterior to fire B. Therefore, and so forth. The minor is proved because in that sign fire A is understood as existing and consequently as posited outside all its causes, to which it is posterior. But one of those causes is fire B, as is supposed. I answer by denying the minor. To the proof: fire A in that sign is understood only as posited outside all causes which it requires in order simply to exist and to be proximately capable of operating. But for this it does not require the action of fire B, being content with the action of God, which brings with it the causalities of matter and form. Therefore it need not be understood as outside fire B, because B is a superabundant cause, producing it under a second title and in no way necessary for fire A truly to exist and be capable of operating. Nor may it be said that this second action is repugnant because it does not determine the effect to exist, since it presupposes that the effect already exists from elsewhere. For it will be denied that the concept of action as such requires it to determine the effect to exist simply; it suffices that it determine the effect to exist under a new title, or by virtue of a new cause.

5. It is objected, 3º: if mutual causality with respect to second being is possible, fire B, first produced by fire A, which was produced by God alone, will be able in the same instant to produce that very cause of itself with respect to second being. I answer: although this hypothesis appears more difficult than the preceding one, it too is commonly admitted. For it does not follow from it that fire B is prior by nature to its first producing cause with respect to the first being of that cause, according to which that cause is itself

prior by nature. It follows only that fire B is prior to the same cause taken with respect to second being, according to which the cause itself does not preexist. Nor in the case proposed will fire A exist before it simply is or before it is first produced; rather, it will exist as first produced by another cause before it is produced a second time, or under a new title, by its own effect. Nor will fire B cease to be prior by nature to fire A insofar as it produces A a second time. For although it has a sufficiency for being dependent upon fire A as first produced, it does not have one dependent upon that fire as produced or to be produced a second time. Hence it is verified that B has a sufficiency for being and producing independently of its effect precisely as such, which seems sufficient for priority of nature.

6. It should be noted here that defenders of mutual priority with respect to second being commonly say that second actions are of themselves total and of themselves sufficient to sustain effects in the state of existence, and are joined with the first actions only accidentally, and therefore are only accidentally second. But this, stated without distinction, cannot stand. For in the case proposed in n. 1, if the second actions accidentally presuppose the first, they will be able to exist without the first. But if they thus exist, there will be mutual priority in the same genus with respect to first being, or to the only being, as will be evident upon consideration. Likewise, in the case of n. 5, if the second production of fire A can remain without the first, proceeding from God alone, notwithstanding that fire B is then first produced by A, it follows that it can occur that fire A is produced solely by fire B, which A first produces. And behold mutual priority in the same genus with respect to first, or only, being.

7. It must therefore be said that in the case of n. 1 the second actions indeterminately presuppose some one of the first, because they cannot both remain without both. I say indeterminately, because each second action can persevere without either one of the first individually, yet in such a way that one of the second actions then becomes first; and then the case of n. 5 will occur. But in this last case, the second production of fire A of itself indeterminately presupposes either a first production of that same A by another cause, or a first production of fire B by something other than fire A; for it can persevere without either one individually, but not without both. And although it now presupposes on the side of first act the production of fire B by A, since it does not presuppose it as an active power but as a condition, it will be satisfied if another equivalent condition is substituted. All these points will be recognized as true if they are attentively considered.

CHAPTER V.
Whether Something Can Produce Itself with Respect to Second Being.

1. Since we have said that priority of nature can be found in an effect with respect to its cause as regards second being, we now inquire whether similar priority can belong to some thing with respect to itself, which is to inquire whether something can produce itself with respect to second being. That it can in no way do so with respect to first being is altogether certain, for the reason already touched upon above and soon to be touched upon again. It is likewise certain that nothing can, even with respect to second being, produce itself naturally, because nature abhors the superfluous, and that second production would always be naturally superfluous and could never exist under circumstances in which it would not be useless for natural ends. Hence, if such a production is possible, it will be a supernatural action not merely as to mode but intrinsically and as to substance. From this it must likewise be certain that, if something can produce itself, it will be able to do so only as an obediential instrument elevated by Divine power. It is also commonly supposed or permitted in the present question that, from the terms themselves, one total action does not essentially exclude another for the same instant; and also that mutual priority with respect to second being, discussed in the preceding chapter, is not repugnant.

2. With these preliminaries established, the affirmative position is held by the Eminent Doctor, tom. 3, in 3, p. d. 49, s. 1, and d. 50, s. 4, whom Fathers Amicus, Arriaga, Tellez, Compton, Raynaudus, and not a few more recent authors distinguished for ability follow in manuscript. The negative position is much more common, not only among authors outside our school but also among our own authors, some of whom place such confidence in their arguments that they boast that Suárez's position can scarcely be defended. Nevertheless, those arguments do not appear to me so inescapable that they cannot receive a probable solution, which in a question concerning possibility suffices for affirming, according to what was said elsewhere. I shall therefore propose and answer the principal objections.

3. It is objected, 1º and principally: every producing principle is really distinguished from the terminus produced. Therefore it is repugnant that something should be a principle producing itself, even with respect to second being. The antecedent is proved, 1º because, as we said in Logic according to the mind of all, production is an evident sign of real distinction.

2º Because the producer is referred by a real relation to the produced. 3º Because this is commonly presupposed as self-evident by the Holy Fathers, who prove real distinction between the Divine Persons from the fact that it is established that there are real processions in the Trinity, and there can be no real procession or production except between things really distinct. The objection is pressed: a producing principle among creatures is a true cause, and therefore must be a "principle influencing being into another," according to Suárez's definition of cause. It must likewise be prior by nature to its effect, and such priority cannot stand in a cause with respect to itself unless the same thing is absurdly said to be prior and posterior to itself, dependent upon and independent of itself.

4. To the objection I first grant that it is evident that every principle first producing, or producing a terminus with respect to first being, is really distinguished from that terminus. Otherwise it would follow that the principle exists in what is prior to its first production, which is to exist before it is first produced, and consequently before it exists. I next grant that nothing can be produced by itself, even with respect to second being, as by a principal principle or principal cause. For a principal cause or principal principle has a power by its nature commensurate or proportioned to the effect, and therefore absolutely contains the effect even as to be first produced. Hence I again grant that every total cause and every adequate active principle, even with respect to the second being of the terminus, is really distinguished from the terminus, at least by an inadequate distinction, namely insofar as it implies the principal cause or power. But that an active principle which only produces a second time and acts only through an inadequate, instrumental power elevated by another superior cause must always be really distinguished from the terminus is not established by any sufficiently efficacious reason. Hence:

5. To 1º of the proof: production with respect to first being is an evident sign of real distinction. Production with respect to second being, however, always implies real distinction of the terminus from its adequate or principal principle, but not always from an inadequate and instrumental principle. To 2º: a real relation has place between the produced and what first produces it, or what produces it adequately or principally; otherwise if all these conditions are lacking in the producer. To 3º: the Holy Fathers speak of production with respect to first or only being, and likewise of connatural and necessary production, not of a superabundant production with respect to second being, especially insofar as arising from instrumental power. For they commonly teach that Christ the Lord, insofar as He includes body and soul, daily creates His body in the Eucharist, as Fr. Suárez shows, l.c., and

Raynaudus learnedly in tom. *De Eucharistia*. We always acknowledge as true this principle: "Where real production is given, two really distinct things are necessarily given." But for its truth it suffices that every real production whatsoever always presuppose a principle, at least a principal one, really distinct from the terminus. This is enough for the argument of the Fathers for the distinction of Persons in the Trinity.

6. Moreover, if one were permitted to argue from created productions which are not necessary, there could be in God two total productions of the same terminus; and consequently the Trinity of Persons, one unproduced and two produced, would not be rightly inferred from the duality of processions, since both processions could terminate in a single Person, or one could be a production by which the Son produced the Father with respect to second being. Production with respect to second being is therefore repugnant in God: first, because a real production which is not connatural and necessary but superfluous or superabundant, and consequently defectible, is repugnant there; second, because there can be no production there arising from an instrumental and obediential power; third, because production with respect to second being is necessarily an action distinct both from the principle and from the terminus, and such an action is repugnant in God *ad intra*. Hence it is evident, 1º why the Holy Spirit does not produce Himself or the other Persons with respect to second being. 2º Why it is rightly inferred that the Holy Spirit, because He proceeds from the Son, is distinguished from the Son; namely because procession in God, being first and necessary, implies distinction of the terminus from its principle. 3º Why the Trinity of Persons is inferred from the duality of processions; namely because the first procession presupposes an unproduced Person, while two processions, being necessary, correspond to two produced Persons.

7. What is added concerning Suárez's definition of cause has little force. First, because it can be denied that even among creatures every active principle always and in every event is a true cause. Second, because the definition can be understood of the distinction or otherness of the terminus with respect to a principle which is adequate in one of the four genera of causes, namely final, efficient, formal, and material; for in this sense it always influences into "another," at least with inadequate otherness. Nor does the point about priority of nature have force. For from our hypothesis it follows only that the same man, for example, as simply existing through the first action, is independent of himself as a cause; and, as existing under a second title or through a second action, depends upon himself as a cause. But this independence and dependence, in which priority and posteriority of nature

consist, since they arise from diverse actions and do not otherwise imply that the thing exists in what is prior to its first production, are not to be judged contradictory. There is an example in priorities of time, place, and dignity. For Peter, as existing today, precedes himself in time as he will exist tomorrow; and if bilocated in places A and B, he can be locally prior and posterior to himself. Philip also, as King of Spain, is prior in dignity to himself as Count of Flanders. Add that it appears no less difficult for the same thing with respect to the same thing to be prior and posterior by nature, independent and dependent; and yet this is admitted from what was said in the preceding chapter.

8. It may be said: in the present case not only is the subject of the denominations "prior" and "posterior" the same, but the denominating form is also the same, namely the complex composed of the two actions, first and second. But this can likewise be said in the examples just given. For Peter, in the order of time, place, and dignity, will also be denominated prior and posterior to himself by the same form, namely by the complex of two durations, two locations, or two dignities. And in the case of mutual priority with respect to second being, the same effect is denominated prior and posterior to its cause by the complex of two actions. Accordingly, in our case the denominating forms are distinguished as to what is signified directly. For priority in the abstract, which gives the denomination "prior," is not the complex of two actions taken indifferently, but is the first action signified directly while connoting the second obliquely; and conversely, posteriority in the abstract, which gives the denomination "posterior," is the second action signified directly while connoting the first obliquely. This distinction of forms, which is certainly real, because in reality by the name "priority of nature" the first action alone can be signified directly, or "as that which," and by the name "posteriority" the second alone, suffices for the coherence of both denominations in the same subject, as is evident in the examples adduced.

9. But it will be urged, 1º: it cannot be avoided that the second action by reason of itself is prior and posterior by the same entity, since action is prior to its terminus and posterior to its cause. I answer: action is not properly prior to the terminus, as we saw in c. 1. But it is asked: if it is not prior, at least it is not posterior to the terminus; yet the second action would be posterior to the terminus in our case. I answer by distinguishing this last statement: it would be posterior to the terminus insofar as the terminus exists independently of it, namely through the first action, I grant; insofar as the terminus exists dependently upon it, I deny. Therefore already on the side of the terminus, insofar as it is and is not prior to the second action,

there is some distinction; for the terminus, as prior, involves the first action, which it does not involve as not prior. Something similar would occur in the case of bilocation, for presence in place B would be locally posterior and distant from the body, not insofar as the body exists in B but insofar as it exists in A.

10. It will be urged, 2º: in our case the effect would be understood in the sign of the cause, which is plainly repugnant. I answer: nothing prevents an effect from being understood in the sign of the cause under that aspect under which it is not an effect, just as in mutual priority with respect to second being the effect is understood in a sign antecedent to the sign of its cause, which appears no less absurd. Accordingly, in our hypothesis the prior and posterior signs are inadequately identified, namely according to the entity of cause and effect; they are nevertheless distinguished according to the actions through which these are constituted in the being of two, just as occurs in the hypothesis of mutual priority, where the sign antecedent to the cause and the sign subsequent to the same cause are distinguished only according to the actions.

11. It will be urged, 3º: not the action alone but principally the effect itself taken specifically must be posterior to and dependent upon the cause, since it itself is what is principally produced and produced "as that which." But this is inconceivable unless the entities of cause and effect are distinguished. I answer: the effect taken specifically is indeed the subject which is principally denominated "posterior and dependent." Nevertheless it is so denominated not from its own entity but from the action as from a form intrinsically and formally included in the denomination "posterior and dependent as that which." Hence "specifically" must be distinguished. If it means that the entity of the effect, prescinding from the action or taken separately from it, has in itself everything sufficient to be denominated "posterior and dependent," this must be denied. But if it means that the entity of the effect, as distinct from the action but not separated from it, is the subject of those denominations from the action as from a form, this must be granted. Nor for this is a real distinction necessary between the entities of cause and effect, since a distinction and diversity of actions suffices, from what was said in n. 7.

12. Therefore, when the adversaries ask whether the thing taken specifically is produced by itself, or only reduplicatively insofar as produced a second time, say that the thing taken specifically is produced by itself if the term "specifically" denotes the subject truly receiving the denomination "produced"; but not if the term "specifically" excludes the second action from the formal constitution of that denomination. To denote this

constitution we employ those reduplications: the thing is caused by itself and is its own effect "with respect to second being, insofar as produced a second time, insofar as existing under a new title." We do not thereby intend the denomination "caused," and so forth, to fall only upon the second action and not also upon the entity of the thing. But if the adversaries insist that in every event a real distinction is required not only of forms but of subjects for the denominations "prior and posterior, independent and dependent," deny it outright until they prove it otherwise than by assertion. For those denominations in the present case signify nothing other than the denominations "producer" and "produced," and we are here defending that these can fall upon the same subject. Observe, however, that it may perhaps be denied that in our case the thing "depends upon itself," namely if, from n. 7, it is denied to be a true cause although it is an active principle. Consequently, priority of nature would then have to be denied, and only priority of origin admitted, which does not imply strict dependence of the terminus.

13. It is objected, 2º: the action by which a man would produce himself a second time would of itself and essentially presuppose another total action terminated at its effect. Therefore it would be a repugnant action. The consequence is proved, 1º because by that very fact it would be not only naturally but essentially superfluous and useless, since it would be incapable of existing except in circumstances in which it was unnecessary, or in which it presupposed its formal effect already provided, namely the denomination "produced." 2º Because it belongs to the concept of true action that it be a determination of the effect toward existing, an issuing forth and positing of it outside the cause, and a communication of perfection. But that action would have none of these. 3º Because it would be an adequate action, as the question seems to suppose; and from another standpoint it would not be adequate, since it would essentially demand the association of another action. This is confirmed: such an action would neither be creation, since it would not produce a man from nothing, nor eduction, since it would not be the union of its terminus to another subject. Likewise it cannot be explained whether it would be a transient or an immanent action. It is confirmed again: a means which essentially presupposes the end already obtained is repugnant. But action is a means to the existence of the effect. Therefore an action essentially presupposing the effect already existing is repugnant.

14. To the objection I grant the antecedent, because that action would be essentially second and would always presuppose another total action in the same instant. But I deny the consequence, notwithstanding the proofs. The first admits manifest counterexamples. For in the opinion which Fr. Peynado

defends with many, l. 3, d. 1, s. 5, an action reflexively producing another action is possible; likewise, according to many, a union of a union and a location of a location are possible. Yet in these there is equally an essential superfluity or uselessness. Accordingly, that action would indeed be essentially superfluous in relation to the need or natural exigency of the effect or of another natural thing, because it could never be naturally required or conduce to a merely natural end, which is common to many miracles. But it would not be superfluous in relation to the obediential capacity which man has, or certainly is not proved to lack, for existing under a second title and being produced by himself through a second action; for the exercise of that capacity altogether requires such an action. The same action is moreover useful for ends which God as supernatural Author can intend, for example, for the mystery of the Eucharist, which Fr. Suárez shows cannot conveniently be explained without such an action. Nor is what is added concerning the formal effect true. For the formal effect of that action is not to render something "produced" in just any manner, but "produced under a second title," or "produced by its own power"; and that formal effect is not presupposed as already provided by the action.

15. To 2º of the proof: not every action must be a determination of the effect toward existing simply, as though transferring it from non-being to being; otherwise no conservative action supervening after the first production would be possible. Therefore it suffices for the concept of action that it determine the effect toward existing under a new title, or by virtue and efficacy of a new principle, and that in this sense it presuppose indifference in the effect, as is seen in actions by which two things would mutually produce one another with respect to second being. That every action is an issuing forth and positing of the effect outside the cause is true, not in a material manner, as though an effect generated and nourished in the womb of a cause were born from it through action, but in a philosophically active manner, insofar as action determines the effect to be in the order of things by the efficacy of the power of the cause. This is what the action of which we speak accomplishes, for through it a man is truly determined to exist in the order of things under a second title by virtue of the efficacy and merit of his own power. But the adversaries do not prove that every power by whose efficacy an effect exists even under a second title must be really distinguished from the effect. For it is not contradictory that a thing issue from itself or be posited outside itself if this is philosophically understood in the sense just explained.

16. Nor must every action communicate a new perfection to the effect. It suffices if it again, or under a second title, communicates the same

perfection which it had, that is, if it causes it to retain the same perfection by the efficacy of a new cause, as is seen in every conservative action and especially in a reciprocal action by which two things would mutually produce one another with respect to second being, or by which an effect would produce its cause a second time. In this manner a man can communicate to himself a perfection which he already possesses, because he can retain it under a new title by virtue of his own power. To 3º of the proof: that action would be adequate, not in the genus of first production or of an action transferring the effect from non-being to being simply, for it does not belong to that genus, and adequately in that genus it is neither total nor partial, but in the genus of an essentially second production, because it would not require the association of another action belonging to the same genus. That it requires the association of another action belonging to a different genus and a different sign does not suffice to make it a strictly partial action.

17. To the first confirmation: the second action could be a creation, namely if an Angel produced himself a second time. It would then be production from nothing, that is, from no presupposed subject, which suffices to distinguish it from eduction. Nor does it matter that it would presuppose the terminus as preexisting and therefore would not be production of the terminus from the nothingness of the terminus. For "from nothing," taken in this sense, belongs only to the essence of creation which is a first production. Hence the conservation of accidents in the Eucharist is creation, although it does not bring the terminus forth from its own non-being. But if the form of fire, for example, produced itself a second time from matter, that production would be an eduction and would unite its terminus, not to itself, but to matter under a new title and by a new union. Finally, that action could be called immanent because it would not pass over into a foreign subject.

18. To the second confirmation: a means which of itself presupposes the end already obtained in every manner in which it can be obtained is indeed repugnant; but not if it presupposes of itself that the end has been obtained only in some one manner and tends toward obtaining it in another manner or under a new title. Such is the relation of the second action to the existence of the effect; and such likewise would be the reciprocal action by which an effect produced its cause with respect to second being.

19. Certain things should nevertheless be noted. 1º A man producing himself with respect to second being would not be a univocal cause of himself, because although he would be of the same species as himself, he would not act through a connatural and principal power, as every univocal

cause must act. Hence, if an Angel were elevated to produce another Angel, or the Sun to produce another Sun, no one would recognize in it the office of a univocal cause. 2º Nothing can be its own intrinsic, material, or formal cause without an inadequate distinction, because nothing can be whole and part with respect to itself. Likewise nothing can be its own receptive subject, because nothing can be united to itself, since union by its concept is a bond of two. 3º The purely physical dominion which some attribute to causes, even non-free causes, over their effects is very improper and can mean only that a cause has a right that, while its action remains, the effect should persevere. In this sense a cause can through a second action exercise dominion over itself.

20. I omit other arguments, which can easily be answered from what has been said. Now, after the solution of the objections, Suárez's position is further proved, 1º: what compelled all wise men to deny that anything can produce itself is principally that a producible thing, before it is made or produced, is nothing, while from nothing nothing can be made. Therefore, in order that a thing can truly produce anything, it must be presupposed as produced and posited outside nothingness. This is altogether contradictory if the thing is produced from no source other than itself. But this reasoning does not impugn the production of itself with respect to second being, since in what is prior to that production the thing is presupposed as already posited outside nothingness, truly produced, truly existing, and consequently truly capable of operating. Likewise such production is not impugned by the other argument, or this same argument otherwise proposed above, n. 3, n. 10, and 11. Add that it does not belong to the concept of action to produce something new, but to produce something anew; nor to produce what is absolutely unproduced, but what is unproduced by such a cause and in such a manner, as is evident in conservative actions. Therefore that second production is not repugnant because it produces nothing new.

21. 2º In the common opinion of our authors and the Scotists, bilocation of the same body is possible by Divine power. Yet in it the same, or equal, absurdities offer themselves at first sight: namely, that the same thing is before and after itself; that it is above and below itself; and that it is locally distant from itself, especially since distance founds a real relation. 3º It is no less absolutely certain that nothing can produce that by which it is produced than that nothing can produce itself. Therefore both principles are employed as equally certain in the Divine processions, the one for the distinction and the other for the Trinity of Persons. Nevertheless, the common opinion of our authors limits the former to production with respect to first being and

refuses to extend it to production with respect to second being. Therefore the latter can be limited in the same manner.

DISPUTATION V.
ON THE PLURALITY OF TOTAL CAUSES OF THE SAME EFFECT.

CHAPTER I.
Whether the Same Effect Can Be Produced Separately by Several Total Causes.

1. It is asked in this Disputation whether, for the same effect, there can be several total causes of the same genus, influencing either simultaneously or separately. I say, of the same genus; for that there are several causes, one of which is total in the genus of efficient cause, another in the genus of formal cause, etc., is beyond doubt. The question is principally, or indeed solely, about several causes in the genus of efficient cause; and first we must dispute about several causes influencing separately, or capable of influencing separately: namely, whether the same effect can be adequately contained in the power of several agents, such that the same fire, for example, which is now produced by fire A, could have been produced by fire B if the latter had been applied in place of the former to the same matter. The Thomists commonly deny that this can occur naturally, and most of them even deny it by God's absolute power, if the discussion concerns univocal causes; nevertheless, several of them grant, or seem to grant, it concerning equivocal causes, or causes one of which is univocal and the other equivocal. No one doubts this concerning the first cause, according to the statement of St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 2: "It is erroneous to say that God

cannot by Himself produce all the determinate effects which are produced through any created cause whatsoever."

2. The Thomists, therefore, assign to individual univocal causes, not indeed a single individual effect, for that would be evidently false, but distinct collections of several possible effects, such that the power of each cause is restricted to the effects contained within its own collection and cannot extend to others, even though they are of the same species. Nevertheless, the position affirming that the same effect can, from the nature of the thing, be produced separately by several total causes, whether univocal or equivocal, is defended by all Scotists with Scotus, and by nearly all of Ours with Fr. Suárez, d. 26, Met. s. 5, whom many others follow, such as Aversa, Echalez, Spinula, and most recently Manso and Aguilera. This position, which speaks of absolute effects, not modal ones, and much less of actions, seems true to me. And:

3. It is proved: Fire A, for example, which is now produced by fire B, is not determined by any specific predicate to proceed more from B than from C, as the Adversaries admit and as is manifest; nor, on the other hand, is it so determined by its own individuation; therefore, from no source whatsoever is it so determined. The minor premise is proved: 1º because fire A, by its own individuation, is no more dissimilar to those fires which are contained in C than to other fires contained in B, as all seem to suppose; but if it were determined to proceed more from B than from C, without doubt by that very determination it would be more dissimilar to the fires contained in C than to those contained in B. 2º Because, if fire A has such a determination, it could not arise from another equivocal cause, for example, from the sun, or from God alone, just as the action of fire B cannot, because it is of itself determined to arise from such a cause. 3º Because, according to the Thomists, the form of fire is individuated by matter; but from matter it does not receive a determination to arise more from fire B than from C, since certainly the same numerically identical disposed matter can receive form from whichever applied fire, whether C or B; therefore, etc.

4. Confirmation 1º: the activity of one univocal cause is not limited to a single individual effect, as all admit; therefore neither is the producibility of one effect limited to a single univocal cause. The consequence is clear, both because the contrary arguments are equally applicable to the activity of an individual cause, and also because there is no reason why the producibility of fire should be limited more than its activity, since producibility belongs to the passive genus, and from the very terms it is easier to be produced than to produce, just as it is easier to be known than to know. Hence producibility expresses an order not only to an equal cause, but also to a superior and

equivocal cause; whereas the activity of a univocal cause can extend only to an equal effect. The same point is pressed: an individual univocal cause does not act under the individual aspect found in the effect; otherwise it could produce only a single individual. Therefore it acts under a specific aspect; therefore the aspect which renders an effect producible by such a cause is specific likeness. But this likeness is found in every individual of the same species; therefore, etc.

5. To this purpose serves what St. Thomas noted in Summa Theologiae I, q. 45, a. 5, ad 1, namely, that the natural activity of a univocal cause does not extend to the whole species, because otherwise it could produce itself, since it is one of the individuals of its own species. From this reasoning of the Holy Doctor it is gathered, 1º that the whole species of an inferior effect is contained in an equivocal cause; for example, in the sun are virtually and eminently contained all individuals of heat or fire, because here the difficulty ceases, namely, that the sun could also produce itself. It is gathered, 2º that the power of a univocal cause does not contain the whole species because it does not contain itself; nevertheless, it extends to all individuals of its species except itself, for the reasoning of St. Thomas neither makes nor requires any other exception. It must therefore be said, according to the mind of the Angelic Doctor, that the aspect under which a univocal cause naturally acts, which aspect is also called the "object of active potency" and the "sphere of activity," is specific likeness; and this, since it requires distinction of individuals, is not found in a cause with respect to itself.

6. Confirmation 2º: one form does not determine for itself one unique matter in such a way that it is of itself incapable of being received in another numerically distinct matter. For the same soul of lion A, which according to the Thomists is individual, just as it is received in the matter of the food on which the lion is now feeding, could undoubtedly have been received in the matter of another food if the lion had been nourished by the other. For who would say that a lion nourished on lamb's flesh would have a different soul if it had been nourished on horseflesh? Similarly, one individual matter does not so determine for itself one unique form that it cannot separately or successively be informed by others of the same species. This is clear, 1º because it can be informed by others specifically diverse, as is certain; therefore, all the more by others numerically distinct. 2º Because a pig often eats a pig, and a wolf a wolf; and then the same matter which was under the soul of the wolf eaten is informed by the soul of the wolf eating it, which is of the same species. 3º *ad hominem*: because the same matter which now receives form from fire A could have received form from fire B if the latter had been applied in place of the former; otherwise fire B, applied to such

matter, would not burn it but would be like snow or ice, which no one would say. Yet that matter would not receive from fire B the numerically same form which it receives from fire A, if the doctrine of the Thomists in the present question is true; therefore it would receive another of the same species.

7. Then thus: therefore neither does one effect so determine for itself one unique efficient cause that it could not have been produced by another of the same species. The consequence is proved, both because the Thomists seem to philosophize no differently about such determination in matter and form receptively than in the efficient cause; and because matter is the material cause of form, and form, according to the Thomists, is the formal cause of matter; but it is more difficult that the same effect should be able to have several formal or material causes than several efficient causes. Likewise, because according to the Thomists form is individuated more by matter than by the agent; for nothing is more customary in their doctrine than that "matter is the principal, or sole, principle of individuation." If, therefore, an individual form nevertheless does not determine for itself an individual matter, why should it determine for itself an individual agent?

8. Confirmation 3º: if two fires are applied to matter capable of only one form, each will moderate its power, and each will concur partially toward the same fire, as the Adversaries do not deny. Therefore the fire then produced is already contained in both agents. You will say: it is contained in both partially, not totally. But against this, 1º: therefore individual univocal causes do not so determine for themselves, as though in exclusive ownership, their own particular stock of effects, that they do not have several effects common to all; and this would accord poorly with the doctrine of the Thomists. Against this, 2º: in the case supposed, each fire moderates its concurrence so that the other may influence at the same time; therefore it does not influence partially through lack of a power sufficient of itself, but because of concurrence with the other. For it would be inept to say that it moderates its concurrence or power if it acted with all its strength, or as much as it can of itself. Against this, 3º: each acting fire would contain that effect as a univocal and principal cause; for neither would act as an instrument of the other. Yet it is unheard of that a univocal cause should truly contain an effect wholly equal to itself and nevertheless not contain it totally, at least with the totality of a principal cause.

Contrary Arguments and Solutions.

9. Objection 1º: if the same effect is contained in several causes, no reason can be given why here and now it proceeds from one rather than

another. I answer: no other reason is needed except that one cause rather than another is here and now applied and unobstructed. That one rather than another is so disposed depends on the will of God, or even on the will of man, or on the various combination of things. It is more difficult to give a reason why fire A here and now produces, from among several numerically distinct effects which it contains, one rather than another. But this difficulty presses the Adversaries equally, since they admit that several individuals are contained in any fire whatsoever. Nor does recourse to matter help them, from n. 6; or, if it does help, it will also help us from n. 3. The common and true position of Ours is that the determination of the effect as regards the individual proceeds from the first Cause, which alone at its pleasure provides its concurrence to fire A toward effect B rather than C or another of the same species.

10. Objection 2º: univocal agents, numerically distinct, have, just as they have distinct powers, so also numerically distinct spheres of activity; therefore effects belonging to the sphere of one do not belong to the sphere of another. Confirmation 1º: fire A, by reason of its specific difference, is limited to a determinate species of effects; therefore by reason of its individual difference it is restricted to determinate individual effects. Confirmation 2º: an individual difference limits form no less in the being of nature, or in the aspect of an active principle, than in the aspect of essence or informing act; but under this latter aspect it so limits form that it cannot confer the same formal effect which another form confers; therefore also in the being of nature, or in the aspect of an active principle, it so limits form that it cannot produce the same effect which another produces. Confirmation 3º: the notion of active potency abstracted from all individuals of one species extends farther than the contracted and singular notion of active potency; but that abstract notion extends to all effects of the same species; therefore the contracted notion extends only to some.

11. To the objection, I deny the antecedent, unless perhaps the discussion concerns an inadequate distinction of spheres, or a distinction as regards only one individual, insofar namely as the sphere of each univocal agent includes the whole species except the agent itself, from n. 5; and therefore the natural spheres of two fires always differ in one individual, because one fire is included in the other's sphere and neither is included in its own. Apart from this, that spheres of activity ought not to be distinguished in univocal causes, although their powers are entitatively distinguished, is precisely our conclusion, which the objection does not refute. Nor is the sphere of activity the power of the cause, but the object of the power, or the aspect under which physical potency tends, just as in

intentional potencies the notion of luminous color is the sphere of the visual potency, the notion of sound that of the auditory potency, and so with the others. Therefore, just as the same color is contained within the sphere of every visual potency, so the same fire is contained within the sphere of every combustive physical potency distinct from itself.

12. To Confirmation 1º: from that antecedent it would be much more plausible to infer that fire A, by reason of its individual difference, is restricted to one single individual effect; but since the Adversaries deny that consequence, with greater right shall we deny the one they deduce. And the reason for denying both is that the specific difference of fire, for example, diversifies the generic nature and constitutes an essence simply diverse from the other species contained under the same genus, and therefore, with respect to them, removes from fire the character of a univocal cause, whose concept includes producing effects similar in essence, not specifically diverse. But individual difference indeed distinguishes numerically, yet does not diversify the essence, and therefore permits it to possess in any individual whatsoever the character of a univocal cause, which belongs to the specific concept of fire and which expresses an order to all effects specifically similar. Hence numerical difference does not make fire A a potency for some one or several individual effects only, but makes it this individual potency for all effects specifically similar. It is no different from a visual potency in an individual, which is not a potency for seeing only some colors, but is this potency for seeing all.

13. To Confirmation 2º: the objection returns, both in the limitation of form in the being of nature to one single individual effect, which limitation follows much more strongly from the limitation of form to one single formal effect; and in the visual potency compared with its object. Therefore I distinguish the major premise: it limits no less, etc., by limitation of identity with one single individual, I grant; for both in the being of nature and in the aspect of essence, form is contracted to identity with one individual. By limitation of causality toward distinct effects, I deny the major; and having granted the minor, I deny the consequence. The disparity between the formal effect and other extrinsic effects is manifest, because the formal effect intrinsically includes the form itself; hence distinction of forms cannot fail to result in a distinction, at least inadequate, in the formal effects. This reason does not apply in the effects of active power, as anyone can see.

14. To Confirmation 3º: by the same argument it could be proved that a singular visual potency extends only to some colors, and that a singular active potency extends only to one effect, since it stands to the abstract

notion as one individual to all. Therefore I distinguish the major: it extends farther, etc., by logical extension, or predicability, I grant; by physical extension, or real activity, which is a predicate of first intention, I deny the major; and having granted the minor, I deny the consequence. The meaning of the distinction is clear from Logic. For every abstract notion is more extensive than a contracted one, since it is made universal and predicable of many; and this extension, since it is of second intention, is not found in singulars. Hence in this sense the abstract notion is divided and limited by contraction. But predicates of first intention, so called because they belong to the object independently of the intellect, belong no more to the abstract notion than to the singular; for man as such is no more a rational animal than Peter is. Since, therefore, the extension of physical activity is undoubtedly a predicate of first intention, it belongs no more to fire as such than to fire A; wherefore either both or neither extend to all effects specifically similar. Here note that even of fire as such it is verified that it can produce every fire except itself, not indeed except itself as producing in the state of abstraction, for in that state it certainly neither produces nor is produced, but except itself as producing in the state of contraction.

15. Reply 1º: to specifically diverse causes correspond specifically diverse effects; therefore to numerically distinct causes there ought to correspond numerically distinct effects. I deny the consequence because of what was said in n. 12 and because of the counterinstances indicated there. Reply 2º: specific difference causes a cause not to contain all effects of the same genus, for example, a lion not to contain all animals; therefore numerical difference ought to cause a cause not to contain all effects of the same species, for just as specific difference limits a genus, so numerical difference limits a species. But again I deny the consequence for the same reasons; nor does the added proof obstruct, in which the customary distinction has place: "just as, and in the same way," I deny; "just as, but in a different way," I grant. Specific difference limits by simply diversifying the essence and therefore by varying the aspect of acting; but numerical difference limits while preserving the essence whole and unchanged and making no change in the aspect of acting, for the aspect of acting is not taken from individuation. Reply 3º: therefore one fire can do as much as all fires. I distinguish the consequence: as much as all can produce simultaneously, I deny; as much as all can separately or distributively produce, I grant the consequence. Thus one matter in this sense can receive as much as all; one visual potency can see as much as all; one man can bear as much weight as a thousand men equal in strength.

16. Hence one fire contains infinitely many fires syncategorematically, that is, not so many that there cannot be more, because in the species of fire, as in every other, more and more individuals can be given without end. Nor does there follow from this, as some object, infinite perfection in every fire. For the power to produce effects in some way infinite does not argue infinity of potency, but rather the power to produce simultaneously more and more without limit, or more and more perfect effects without bound; and this belongs to Divine potency alone. But the ability to produce, not simultaneously but separately, effects equal in perfection and syncategorematically infinite, agrees perfectly with finitude of potency. Thus the human intellect can produce infinitely many cognitions, and the will infinitely many affections, as all commonly suppose. Nor can the Thomists disagree; for although they assign to each fire its own collection or series of possible effects, nevertheless in each series there cannot be a finite number of effects. Otherwise it could happen that all the effects of fire A had already been successively produced and corrupted while fire A remained; in which event fire A would remain wholly barren and no more capable of burning than snow or ice. I certainly would not want such a fire applied to me.

17. Objection 3º: an effect participates in the perfection of its cause; but the numerically same effect cannot participate in numerically distinct perfections; therefore it cannot arise from two numerically distinct causes. I answer: this participation must not be understood crudely, as though the numerically same perfection of the cause, or some part of it, passed into the effect; otherwise a creature would be a fragment of God, since it is a participation of Divine perfection. Participation, therefore, in the present case signifies imitation by virtue of causality; and this imitation is greater or less according as there is greater or less likeness of perfection, and therefore it belongs especially to effects of a univocal cause. But there is not even a shadow of contradiction in one effect's being able to imitate the perfection of several similar causes causing separately. In what sense an effect is said to be contained "formally" in a univocal cause was explained in disp. 2, c. 5, n. 20.

18. Objection 4º: an effect depends essentially and of itself upon the cause by which it is determinately produced; therefore it cannot exist without that cause and consequently cannot be produced by another. Confirmation: if the same effect can arise from two causes, neither will be a cause of itself, but a cause accidentally, because it will be accidental to the effect that it be caused by one rather than by the other; hence there will be no essential order between cause and effect. The objection absurdly proves that an effect which is now produced by fire A cannot be produced by God

alone, since it depends essentially on fire A. The confirmation also absurdly proves that no second cause is a cause essentially with respect to an absolute effect, since through actions it belongs to the effect that it not be caused by God alone. Therefore, to the objection, I deny the antecedent because of the word "essentially," since no absolute effect according to itself depends essentially except upon God. I say "according to itself," because if an effect reduplicates the action by which it is produced by a second cause, it certainly depends essentially upon that cause, since action is a mode of the cause.

19. I nevertheless grant that the effect depends essentially upon the created cause determinately producing it, because so to depend means nothing other than actually to receive being from such a cause, although that cause is not a cause without which the effect cannot exist. Unless this is true, no essential dependence will be found in an absolute effect except upon God. Thus matter essentially depends on form, and indeed *a priori* according to the Thomists; and yet the same matter can separately depend upon many forms. To the confirmation: there is equivocation in the phrase "accidentally." For if it merely excludes necessity and means the same as "contingently," every second cause is an accidental cause with respect to an absolute effect. But if it excludes a true and proper influx proceeding from the native power of the cause, neither of the causes separately producing the same effect is an accidental cause; rather, each, while actually producing, is an essential cause by the essentiality of influx. For of each is verified what St. Thomas says, I-II, q. 85, a. 5: "A thing is indeed essentially the cause of another when, according to the power of its nature or form, it produces the effect." Hence between cause and effect there need not be an essential order by the essentiality of necessity; an essential order by the essentiality of influx is sufficient.

20. Objection 5º: the intellects of Peter and Paul cannot produce numerically the same cognitions, however similar. Likewise whiteness A cannot produce the numerically same visual species which whiteness B produces. Therefore the same must be reasoned about other causes and effects. The objection proves against the Thomists, or certainly against the doctrine deduced from St. Thomas in n. 5, that the whole species of an inferior effect is not contained in an equivocal cause; for intellect with respect to cognition, and whiteness with respect to a species, are equivocal causes. Moreover, all recognize a disparity between vital acts and other absolute effects. For if a vital act is a mode really indistinct from its own production, as many think, this does not belong to the present question, and it cannot be produced by God alone, just as no action of a created cause can,

as no one doubts. But if it consists in an absolute quality, even so, from the concept of an essentially immanent act, it in some way savors of or imitates the nature of modes and expresses a special respect and relation to a determinate potency; by reason of which respect acts arising from numerically distinct potencies are individually more heterogeneous than two acts arising from the same potency. Hence even the Thomists themselves teach that our vital acts cannot be produced by God alone, as may be seen in Froylanus, hic q. 3, a. 5, § 4. A similar individual heterogeneity and imitation of modes is commonly recognized in species arising from numerically distinct whitenesses because of their special relations to determinate objects. Therefore no one disputes concerning such effects whether numerically the same can be contained in several causes, but only concerning those which are wholly absolute and have no otherwise known relation to a determinate cause, but are altogether indifferent to proceeding either from their proper cause or from God alone, such as fires, heats, etc.

21. Finally, note 1º: although individual A contains, in the aspect of a cause, all other individuals of its species, it can nevertheless be accidentally impeded from producing this or that one. For if individual B has already been produced by another cause and corrupted, it can no longer be produced naturally by individual A, according to the common opinion concerning the natural impossibility of reproduction. But this is accidental and arises from a contingent supposition; nor does it remove the fact that individual B could first have been produced by A in place of another cause. Similarly, it is accidental that an effect cannot produce its own univocal cause by which it is in fact produced and which it therefore presupposes as already produced. For the same effect could of itself have arisen from another cause, and then it could produce that cause from which it now arises. Hence the same man who is now the son of Peter and grandson of Paul could have been their father and grandfather if, namely, he had arisen from other men.

22. Nor does Ecclus. 7 obstruct this: "Honor father and mother, because unless through them you had been born, you would not have been." For this is true given the present providence by which God decreed that this man should be born only from these parents. Yet God could have decreed otherwise no less naturally. A man owes gratitude and honor to those parents from whom he in fact receives being, although he could have received it from others, just as gratitude is owed to one who lends a garment and punishment to one who steals it, although another could equally have stolen or lent it. Nor again does St. Thomas, Quodlib. V, a. 8, obstruct this when he teaches that it is impossible for the same son to be born if either

the father or the mother is different, and that a seal is not numerically the same if either the wax or the body of the seal is different. For he speaks of the son as such, or insofar as he reduplicates the generative action and relation to such parents, not of the son according to himself, or insofar as he is this man. A seal is constituted by a figure, which is a mode essentially affixed to matter, and therefore cannot fail to change with the matter itself.

23. Note 2º: our position speaks of individuals of the same species equally perfect. For if, as some think, individuals of the same species can be unequal in perfection, then the less perfect individuals cannot be total causes of the more perfect. Note 3º: the same effect cannot be caused by two intrinsic causes each of which is total in the same genus, whether material or formal. For since an intrinsic cause causes in no other way than by exhibiting its own entity, if the entity of the cause is twofold, the effect or composite cannot fail to become twofold, at least inadequately. On this we said more in tr. 1, d. 5, c. 4. Nevertheless, that the same effect can be caused separately by two extrinsic material causes is clear from what was said in n. 6. Note 4º: for the same act of the will which intrinsically regards the end as object, there cannot be two total ends, because no act can change the object intrinsically regarded or separately regard distinct objects. Hence such acts, in relation to the end, stand like actions in relation to the efficient cause. Yet an external act, or an internal commanded act, which of itself does not regard the end as object, can be elicited separately for several and diverse total ends.

CHAPTER II.
Whether the Same Effect Can by Divine Power Be Produced Simultaneously by Two Total Causes.

1. We now ask whether two or more total causes, which we have said can separately produce the same effect, can produce it simultaneously, not in such a way that they moderate themselves in the manner stated in the preceding chapter, n. 9, but so that each is total in second act. A total cause in second act is "one which actually influences by an influx sufficient to place the effect in reality without need of another cause of the same order." It is now disputed whether this can occur by Divine power. The first opinion denies it, and is held by the Scotists and most Thomists, together with a few of Ours. The second, on the contrary, affirms it, and is defended by the Excellent Doctor, d. 25, Met. s. 4, and with him by nearly all of Our authors. Among the Thomists M. Prado adheres to it, citing the leading Thomists Capreolus and Cajetan; Aversa, Echál, Trinitar., Spinula, Manso, Aguilera, and several others also adhere to it.

2. This latter opinion is proved: the same effect, as was just shown and is now supposed, can be contained totally in two causes, at least equivocal ones; for example, the same light in two suns, if two existed, or the same heat of water in two fires. Hence it can separately terminate the total actions of two causes. If, therefore, it cannot terminate the same simultaneously, this can arise solely from the fact that one total action, from the concept of adequacy or totality, essentially imports the negation of another existing at the same time concerning the same effect. But it is false that a total action essentially imports such a negation; therefore by Divine power the same effect can be produced simultaneously by two total causes. The subsumed minor premise is proved: because the concept of a total action includes only such sufficiency for the existence of the effect that it does not need the assistance of another; for in this it is distinguished from a partial action. But one sufficiency does not from the terms essentially deny another, nor is not needing something the same as essentially excluding it. Hence from the fact that Peter's sight suffices to see color A, and does not need Paul's sight in order to perceive it totally, it does not follow that Paul's sight cannot simultaneously see the same color totally.

3. Confirmation 1º: a place totally occupied by one body can by Divine power be occupied simultaneously by another body if two bodies are interpenetrated, as all admit can occur. Likewise, according to the Scotists, the same body can simultaneously be located by two adequate locations; and the same matter can simultaneously be completed by two adequate forms. Likewise, according to the Thomists, the same humanity can simultaneously be terminated by the three Divine subsistences, which are certainly total. Therefore the same effect can likewise terminate two total actions simultaneously. The consequence is clear because in these cases the arguments of the Adversaries are manifestly broken, especially those drawn from totality and dependence.

4. Confirmation 2º: according to the Scotists cited by Mastrius, d. 8, n. 73, and often elsewhere, the action of the first cause concurring with the second is of itself sufficient for the effect in such a way that it does not need the concurrence of the second cause, although the latter truly influences at the same time. This doctrine also seems common among the Thomists, of whom M. John of St. Thomas, hic q. 10, a. 5, acknowledges as possible two total actions toward the same effect, one belonging to God alone and the other also to the creature. But once it is admitted that, besides one total action which of itself is fully sufficient to place the effect in reality, another action can exist in the same instant, even if the latter is called partial, the

foundations of the contrary opinion collapse entirely, as will be completely evident to anyone who weighs and applies them. Therefore, etc.

5. Nor is Mastrius′s answer at n. 74 satisfactory, when he says that God′s concurrence in second act, although in reality sufficient for the effect, is nevertheless insufficient "in the mode of application" and needs the companionship of the second cause. For Mastrius himself, n. 73, attacks the opinion of those who say that God′s concurrence in second act is partial, "because," he says, "it is as unworthy to abase the first cause in second act as in first act." But God would be abased in second act if He were posited as needing the concurrence of a second cause. Yet it is equally unworthy to abase the first cause in the mode of applying concurrence, for no baseness falls upon God either in the thing or in the mode. Therefore God′s concurrence, even as regards the mode, does not need a created cause, but by itself suffices for the effect. Hence the difficulty remains entire, which Mastrius admits is "solid."

6. Nor again is the answer satisfactory by which the Thomists say that the first and second causes concur toward the same effect under diverse aspects, the first under the common aspect of being, the second under a particular and specific aspect. For whatever may be true of the aspect under which they act, I ask whether the action of the first cause by itself suffices to place the effect in reality, even if the action of the second cause were absent. If you affirm it, the whole obstacle raised by your arguments remains. If you deny it, you posit God′s action as in reality partial and as needing another′s assistance, which on your principles is to abase the first cause. Hence also rejected is what they say concerning the example of the three subsistences divinely terminating the same humanity, namely, that they would terminate it under diverse aspects. For whatever may be true of this, certainly each would terminate it just as the subsistence of the Word now terminates it, which without doubt terminates it totally. You will say: it terminates totally intensively, not extensively. Against this: it so terminates that it needs no assistance of another; and this suffices for our example. Again against this: it terminates no less than a created subsistence; and the latter is simply total.

Objections Proposed and Solved.

7. But since in questions of this kind the principal proof is the solution of objections, we shall proceed to it at once. Objection 1º: if one effect proceeded simultaneously from two total causes, it would actually depend upon each, since every effect actually depends upon a cause essentially influencing it; yet, on the other hand, it would not depend upon both, since

it does not need the influx of both but is content with either one. The objection is answered, 1º from the preceding number, for it equally follows that the effect both depends and does not depend upon the second cause if it is produced simultaneously by a total action belonging to God alone. 2º Against the Thomists, in a human nature terminated by three subsistences, which similarly would depend and not depend upon each. 3º Against the Scotists, in matter simultaneously receiving two forms, upon each of which it would depend, at least *a posteriori*, and simultaneously not depend. I answer, therefore, that the effect depends determinately upon both causes by a dependence of causality, because it truly receives being from both; nevertheless, it does not depend determinately upon both by a dependence of need, but only indeterminately and vaguely upon either of them, because it needs those causes in no other way. I speak of natural need, because essentially no absolute thing needs or depends upon anything except God. See what was said in the similar case in the preceding chapter, where the Scotists employ this same doctrine.

8. But one may insist 1º: an effect cannot fail to need a determinate cause, for it cannot be produced by a vague cause. But see the solution of this subtlety in the similar case, tr. 1, d. 3, c. 1, n. 15. And ask those making the objection how prime matter vaguely needs some form, a body some location, a hungry man some bread, a traveler some horse, and so in innumerable other cases, although it is certain that matter cannot be informed by a vague form, nor a hungry man be satisfied by vague bread, etc. One may insist 2º: neither total cause would be an essential cause, but each accidental. But we already solved this in a similar case with the Scotists in the preceding chapter. We now add that the essentiality of a cause does not presuppose necessity on the part of the effect except with this addition: "on the supposition that another cause is not present." We also add, because of what was said in d. 2, c. 1, n. 10, that both causes would influence with inclination, because under circumstances in which God does not will one to be moderated to the other, each demands to influence totally upon the disposed and applied recipient.

9. One may insist 3º: if an effect needed no cause, it could be produced by none, but would be a being from itself; therefore, if it does not need two total causes, it cannot be produced by two. Add that true dependence is contradictory in that sense in which there is no need, both from the terms themselves and because God depends in no way upon creatures precisely because He needs them in no way; therefore a dependence of causality in a determinate sense is contradictory if there is no need in that same sense. I answer: besides the counterinstances of n. 7, the argument equally attacks

two total causes in first act separately productive of the same effect. For if the effect needed no cause it could be produced by none, either simultaneously with another or separately. Therefore if it does not need two total causes in first act, it cannot even be produced separately by two, unless there is a dependence of producibility in that sense in which there is no need. Hence the Scotists must solve the argument, and indeed the Thomists also, since it equally proves that an effect cannot be produced by a second cause if it can be produced by God alone.

10. Therefore I deny the consequence. For although vaguely needing some cause is the foundation of producibility, nevertheless, once this foundation is posited, the structure, so to speak, of producibility and production can rise higher from elsewhere and can be had from several causes, even ones not necessary; nor is it bound to follow the measure of need. Thus one who is not a man or an angel cannot be sanctified by Grace; and yet one can grow more and more in holiness without end, although one does not grow in the being of man or angel. To what is added, I deny the antecedent because of what has just been said. For although dependence is contradictory where there is no need whatsoever, nevertheless, given a vague need, determinate dependence can exist. But God in no way depends upon creatures because He in no way needs them, either determinately or vaguely. More expeditiously, to all these points it can be answered that the word "dependence" is sometimes taken for need and sometimes for satisfaction of need; in the latter way it is taken when the production of an effect by a cause is spoken of. Satisfaction can be determinate even though the need is vague, as is clear from the example of the hungry man, traveler, and the others in n. 8. But observe that we are speaking of the effect considered according to itself; for if it is taken as produced through two actions, without doubt it determinately needs both total causes.

11. Objection 2º: each of the causes in the case of the question would be total, as is supposed; yet, on the other hand, it would not be total, because the concept of a total cause includes that it not influence in companionship with another. But this objection remains rejected from n. 2 by the proper concept of a total cause in second act, and is manifestly answered by the examples in nn. 3 and 4. Therefore it does not belong to the essential concept of a total cause that it influence alone, that it be unique, or that it exclude every influx besides its own; but only that its action, independently of another's action, suffice to place the effect in reality. Hence it can admit the companionship or accompaniment of another purely materially, that is, of another which is not joined to it in such a way that both mutually assist one another, nor so that they concur through the same influx, nor through

two influxes mutually connected and coordinated, in which sense it is proper to a partial cause to influence in companionship with another; but rather so that each stands materially with respect to the other's influx and influences just as though the other were not present. It is also commonly said that the individual causes are total, not by a totality of exclusion, but by a totality of sufficiency; or by a positive, not negative, totality.

12. One may insist 1º: a total cause leaves nothing in the effect unproduced; therefore it leaves nothing to be produced by another cause. I deny the consequence. For just as one subsistence leaves nothing unterminated in a nature, one form leaves nothing incomplete in matter, one vision leaves nothing unseen in a color, one comprehensive cognition leaves nothing unknown in an object; and nevertheless something remains to be terminated, completed, seen, and known by another, namely, the whole nature, the whole matter, the whole color, the whole object; so in our case. Let this be understood provided that the word "leaves" does not imply an order of priority essentially among the causes, for such an order must be denied, but "leaves to be produced" means the same as "permits to be produced."

13. One may insist 2º: one of the total causes would either act upon what has already been acted upon, or would do nothing. I deny the assumption, because both would be first producers, or would produce the effect in the first instant of its existence, and indeed in signs wholly unconnected with one another and materially accompanying one another without any order of priority of one cause to the other, but only of both to the effect. Therefore neither would act upon what had already been acted upon, since neither would presuppose a term produced by the other; rather each would produce the whole and bring the whole out of non-being into being. Repeat the counterinstances of nn. 3 and 4. For similarly, if two forms were posited in the same matter, one would either complete what was already completed or would complete nothing; and so in the other cases. But if you wish the effect, first produced by one total cause, to be preserved in the following instant by the same and simultaneously by another through a new action, then this new action no more acts upon something already acted upon than does any other preservative action arriving after the first production. Its endeavor does not tend to make what has been acted upon begin to be, but to prevent it from falling back into non-being; and in this sense what has already been acted upon can indeed be acted upon.

14. One may insist 3º: what is totally produced cannot be produced more. I distinguish: it cannot be produced more by a production essentially presupposing another prior production, let that pass; by a production not

presupposing another but purely accompanying it, I subdistinguish: it cannot be produced more, nor twice or several times, I deny; it cannot be produced more, but can be produced several times, I grant. Thus a stone comprehensively and therefore totally known by one angel can simultaneously be comprehended by several others. Add the other counterinstances so often adduced.

15. One may insist 4º: neither of those causes would adequately correspond to the whole producibility and whole dependence of the effect; therefore neither would be an adequate cause. I answer: each cause adequately corresponds to the entire intrinsic producibility of the effect by an adequacy of sufficiency, because each suffices for that whole producibility to be produced. Nevertheless, from this there does not follow an adequacy of exclusion, which would essentially exclude other equally sufficient adequacies. Thus one comprehension adequately corresponds to the whole cognoscibility of an object and yet does not exclude other comprehensions. Similarly, if the dependence of the effect is taken for need, each cause adequately corresponds to it by an adequacy of sufficiency, because each fully satisfies it. But if dependence is taken for actual causality, since this is twofold in our case, each cause does not adequately correspond to the whole of it extensively, because it does not adequately correspond to the pair of actions. But we deny that the concept of a simply adequate cause includes extensively corresponding to the dependence of the effect so understood. Nevertheless it could be called wholly adequate intensively, in the way that one man intensively equals the perfection of two.

16. Objection 3º: if two luminous agents, each of a power as four, produced as total causes one light as four, they would expend absolutely their whole power; yet they would not expend the whole of it; therefore a contradiction would follow. The minor premise is proved: those two luminous agents could produce a light as eight, or at least two lights each as four; therefore, while producing only one, they do not operate as much as they can; therefore they do not expend their whole power. I answer: by the same argument it can be proved that two interpenetrated bodies do not occupy place as much as they can; that two forms received in the same matter do not inform as much as they can; that those two luminous agents, if they produced one light separately or even successively, as if light produced by one were afterwards preserved by the other, or after corruption miraculously reproduced by the other, would not act as much as they can, since they can separately or successively produce two lights as four. Therefore I deny the minor premise. To the proof I distinguish the first consequence: they do not operate as much as they can by whatsoever

actions, I grant; as much as they can by total actions directed toward light A, I deny the first and second consequences. For an agent to be exhausted for this instant it is not required that it act as much as it can by all the actions which it contains to be posited in a divided sense; it suffices that it act as much as it can by one action adequate to its power. Thus fire A, while actually producing fire B equal to itself, is truly exhausted for that instant because it exercises one action adequate to itself and directed toward fire B, although it does not act as much as it can in a divided sense through the other actions which it contains, directable toward fires C, R, etc.

17. Now each luminous agent of which we are speaking can separately from the other produce that one light totally, and indeed by an action adequate to the power of the agent, by which, if posited, the agent would be exhausted and act as much as it can, that is, according to its whole strength. Therefore in the two luminous agents there are contained two total productions of the same light, at least separately positible, each of which, if posited, would be an exhaustion of the cause′s power and its supreme endeavor. Suppose, therefore, and this is our hypothesis, that these very actions exist simultaneously; and you will find the powers of both luminous agents exhausted, although they produce only one light as four. For why should they be exhausted separately and not simultaneously if the actions are the same and the term the same? They could indeed, through other actions, simultaneously produce two lights as four, just as they could separately or successively. Yet this does not remove the fact that these actions directed toward one light are adequate and exhausting, both simultaneously and separately. Thus the unions by which two forms would be united to the same matter would adequately exhaust the informative power of each form, although through other unions the same forms could inform two matters. Certainly, exhaustion of a cause, as it is now understood, consists in the endeavor which its power applies in acting, and this endeavor is the action. Therefore, if two luminous agents apply equal endeavors and exhibit equal actions concerning the same effect as they would concerning two effects, they cannot fail to be equally exhausted.

18. But reply 1º: one light as four is not equivalent to two lights as four. I distinguish: it is not equivalent in the being of entity, I grant; it is not equivalent in the aspect of an effect when it terminates two total actions, I deny. For one light, as produced by two total actions, consumes an endeavor of the agents equivalent to that which would be consumed concerning two lights. The same must be said of one light produced separately or successively by two causes. Reply 2º: one luminous agent as eight cannot be exhausted by producing one light as four; therefore two luminous agents,

each as four, cannot be exhausted by producing that same light. I distinguish the antecedent: if the luminous agent as eight produces that light by one total action, I grant; if by two, I deny the antecedent. And under the same distinction I deny the consequence. One agent possessing twice the power of the effect can also produce it through two total actions, either arising from distinct parts of the agent or even projected by the same power; and if it did so in the case of the argument, the luminous agent as eight would be no less exhausted than if it produced one light as eight or two as four. You will say with Fr. Ulloa: the decree applying Omnipotence would then not have a mode of tending worthy of God, for thus it would tend: "I will that the agent as eight produce produce the effect as four." But what need is there of that frivolous repetition, "produce produce," when the decree can be conceived thus: "I will that the agent as eight produce the effect as four through two total actions." If an angel knew a stone through two numerically distinct cognitions simultaneously posited, which at least by Divine power is not contradictory on that author's principles, would God's decree therefore tend thus: "I will that the angel know know the stone"?

19. Reply 3º: actions adequate to the power of agents place in second act the whole of what the agents contain in first act; but the two luminous agents mentioned contain two effects as four; therefore actions adequate to the power of those agents ought to place two effects in second act. Add that twofold action is a twofold effect in becoming, to which there ought to correspond a twofold effect in accomplished being. I distinguish the major: the whole of what the agents contain in first act as to be produced through all their actions, I deny; what they contain as to be produced through some truly adequate actions, I grant the major. And with the minor similarly distinguished, I deny the consequence. Read again what was said in n. 17. Nor does what is added concerning the effect in becoming obstruct this; for action is not so much the effect in becoming as the very becoming of the effect, as though a way toward it, and really distinct from the effect. But there can be two ways to the same term even philosophically, as is clear in two successive productions.

20. Reply 4º: causes do not expend their powers precisely concerning actions, but principally concerning the entity of the effect; therefore, if in the proposed case there is not a twofold entity of the effect, the powers of two causes cannot be expended. I answer: action is the exercise of powers, the endeavor, and the formal reason for consuming the powers of a cause. Hence although the effect principally, or as that which, consumes the powers of the cause, it does not consume them apart from action, but with and through it, as through the exercise of consuming. If this exercise is

multiplied as total, expenditure of powers is necessarily multiplied, whether the entity of the effect is one or multiple. Therefore in the proposed case the single effect stands just as a double one in relation to consuming the powers of the two causes, because each cause influences just as if the other were not present and posits the same action which it would posit apart from the other, and therefore makes the same expenditure of powers which it would make by producing separately or successively. Hence just as an effect successively produced by each would stand as though double, so also one produced simultaneously by both.

21. Objection 4º: an effect produced by two total causes would owe its entire being wholly to each; but it is contradictory that something be owed simultaneously to two creditors, wholly to each. Confirmation: it is proper to a total cause to have dominion over the effect; but dominion of the same thing cannot belong simultaneously to two masters, especially with reciprocal independence of one from the other. I answer: it is sufficient for us that our position have place in purely physical causes, whatever may be true of moral causes, that is, rational and free ones, for example, in two fires with respect to a third. But for an effect to owe its being to causes of this kind signifies nothing other than so to exist that this causal proposition is verified: "The effect has being because it received it from these causes." For a produced fire is not owed to the producing fire in such a way that it must be handed over to it for enjoyment or free disposal. But in this sense the same effect can owe its being to two causes, wholly to each by a totality not of exclusion but of sufficiency, just as the same stone is wholly comprehended by each angel. To the confirmation: the dominion belonging to a purely physical total cause is highly improper; for there does not belong to a fire acting totally "the free faculty of disposing of a thing without injury to another," which is the definition of true dominion. But improper dominion, taken precisely for the right of producing or preserving an effect without need of another, can without difficulty belong to two causes independent of one another.

22. Reply: if an effect were capable of gratitude, it would owe to each cause a recompense proportioned to the entity received. Therefore either it would double the recompense and so render more than it receives, namely twice as much; or it would divide it between both causes and so would not recompense each according to its merits, since each gave the whole being. I answer: the effect, under that hypothesis, would not be bound to double gratitude or recompense proportioned to the entity received, because it would receive the whole being from each cause in such a way that it nevertheless did not need the bestowal of both nor require it. On this

account the obligation of the effect toward each is diminished, and therefore it would be bound only to recompense both just as if they were partial causes, namely, by dividing the recompense. Or, if you prefer, say that a quasi-total gratitude would have to be doubled, because gratitude is owed not only for the gift received but also for the endeavor of the giver. There would then be two total endeavors, and each cause would endeavor to give the whole just as if the other gave nothing.

23. Objection 5º: the same cause cannot simultaneously produce two effects adequate to itself, although it can produce them separately; therefore neither can the same effect be produced simultaneously by two adequate causes, although it can be produced separately by them. I answer: the antecedent is denied by many, because if fire A can separately produce two fires equal to itself, it already truly contains them. Therefore, although it produces them simultaneously, it will not produce more than it contains nor give what it does not have. And although it is true that an effect cannot exceed the perfection of a total cause, this can be understood of intensive excess, not of purely extensive excess, such as there is in two fires with respect to one. Nevertheless, it is more true that a cause, unless a new power accrues to it, in which event it will no longer be the same cause but another, cannot adequately produce anything greater or more perfect than itself, even extensively, unless from another aspect it is intensively inferior. For it would truly give what it does not have, no less than one who gave two coins while possessing only one. Otherwise it would not be easy to refute one who admitted even intensive excess. Nor does it obstruct that one fire contains two fires to be produced separately; for this means only that it can produce one without the other, by reason of which they do not exceed the perfection of the cause even extensively.

24. Therefore, granting the antecedent, I deny the consequence. The disparity consists in this, that in producing one adequate effect the cause expends all its powers and consequently is rendered for that time incapable of another; but the effect, by terminating one adequate action, does not expend powers nor grow weary through endeavor, but behaves merely passively, and therefore will be able simultaneously to terminate another action. One may insist: just as the power of the cause is exhausted through one adequate effect, so the producibility of the effect is exhausted through one adequate cause. I answer: it is not exhausted "just as and in the same way." For the cause is exhausted through supreme endeavor and expenditure of all its powers; and therefore, if in a composite sense it did anything else, it would act beyond or above its powers. But the producibility of the effect is exhausted only insofar as, when one total action is posited, nothing in it

remains unproduced; and this does not prevent the same thing from being produced twice or several times, since no labor results thereby in the effect itself. Thus the same intellect cannot simultaneously comprehend several objects equal to it in cognoscible being, and yet the cognoscibility of the same object can simultaneously be comprehended by several intellects, because although exhaustion occurs in both cases, it occurs differently.

25. To forestall other difficulties, note 1º: two total causes in our hypothesis could influence by powers and actions natural as regards substance, namely, by the same powers and actions through which they can influence separately toward the same effect, God applying His Omnipotence to each in the same instant just as He would apply it at different times. Nevertheless, those actions would be supernatural as regards mode, insofar as they would exist in circumstances not naturally due, namely, one in the composite sense of the other, because God supernaturally so wills. Note 2º: the same action cannot arise from two total causes, either simultaneously or separately, because otherwise it could exist without either of them; which is contrary to the concept of action, since action by its own essential concept is a modal determination of the cause from which it arises. Nor is it lawful from this to argue to the entity of an absolute effect, as anyone can see. Note 3º: granted that every action posits a term distinct from itself, lest it be a way without a term, it does not therefore follow that a twofold action posits a twofold term; just as from the fact that every vision tends toward an object distinct from itself, it does not follow that a twofold vision tends toward a twofold object.

26. Note 4º: this argument is defective: when one total action is posited, the effect is posited; therefore, when that same action is absent, the effect is absent. It is defective, I say, because it argues from the opposite of the antecedent to the opposite of the consequent, no differently from this: if there is a man, there is an animal; therefore, if there is no man, there is no animal. Hence, although each total action implies the existence of the effect, nevertheless, when either action is absent, the effect can remain by virtue of the other. Note 5º: although there cannot be in the same instant a twofold privation or formal defect of the same thing, there can nevertheless be a twofold radical or inferential defect, and indeed adequately, because there can be two causes simultaneously and adequately implying the cessation of the same thing. For if two substantial forms were introduced simultaneously into the same matter, each would adequately imply the cessation of the form previously possessed. Thus, although there cannot be a twofold formal existence of one effect, there can indeed be a twofold inferential existence consisting in two actions.

27. Note 6º: an entirely identical effect cannot proceed simultaneously, nor separately, from two intrinsic causes of the same genus, because of what was said at the end of the preceding chapter. Nevertheless, the same form in the genus of sustentative causality can be caused simultaneously by two matters, as we said elsewhere. Note 7º: when St. Thomas seems to contradict our position, he is speaking of ordinary power, or according to the nature of the thing, as Cajetan explains in I, q. 52, a. 3. Prado, Metaph. p. 2, controv. 16, a. 4, should also be seen, teaching that St. Thomas very rarely disputes concerning God's absolute power. Finally note: the same act of the will, if it intrinsically regards the end as object, cannot have two total ends either simultaneously or separately; the reason for this we also gave in the preceding chapter. It does not apply to an external act with respect to the ends of the agent; for one can walk both for recreation and in order to meet a friend, and indeed in such a way that if either of those ends were absent, the walk would exist because of the other.

CHAPTER III.

Whether the Same Effect Can Naturally Be Produced Simultaneously by Two Total Causes in Second Act.

1. The common opinion of philosophers in every School denies this, as the Excellent Doctor relates and follows, d. 26, Met. s. 4, n. 22. Nevertheless, Fr. Henao, empyr. exercit. 16, s. 9, Fr. Quirós, hic d. 53, s. 5, and, according to him in s. 6, the Nominalists and some other ancient and modern authors affirm it; Fr. Ulloa, Physi. specul. d. 3, n. 131 sqq., subscribes to this opinion, at least if the immediate application of two causes to the same particle of the subject is posited by miracle, in which sense Cajetan also affirms it, I, q. 52, a. 3. This second opinion is not improbable, and can be recommended, 1º by overturning the contrary foundations. There are two principal ones. First: nature hates and avoids what is superfluous; but a twofold total action is superfluous for one effect, since one suffices. For the same reason a twofold form in the same matter, the bilocation of one body, and the penetration of two are naturally repugnant. Second: two corporeal agents cannot naturally be applied simultaneously to the same part of a subject, because they cannot immediately touch the recipient from the same side unless they interpenetrate; but interpenetration is naturally impossible.

2. Neither argument is compelling. Not the first; for, omitting the fact that nature does not always avoid what is superfluous, as is clear in the production of monsters, a twofold total action can be not only useful but necessary in order to satisfy the natural exigency of the causes. For two fires

equally applied to one part of matter, since each adequately contains the form to be produced, each naturally demands to produce it adequately. You will say: they do not so demand when both are simultaneously present and equally prepared. But you restrict without grounds that general principle, that a necessary cause, when applied to a disposed recipient and impeded by no contrary, demands fully to explicate its fecundity and to act with all its powers. At least, since I assert this exigency, it is not lawful for you, until you refute it from elsewhere, to allege the superfluity of the actions. Nor likewise is it lawful to argue from superfluity against Scotists and Thomists who hold that God's action is always simply sufficient for the effect independently of the action of the creature, as we saw in the preceding chapter, n. 4; for given this, the action of the second cause likewise seems superfluous.

3. Moreover, a twofold total action, even with respect to the effect, although not necessary, is not useless; for it serves to make the existence of the effect more firm and secure, since if either action fails, the effect can exist and be preserved by virtue of the other. This is highly advantageous to the effect and rightly desirable. Thus a manifold power adequately containing the same effect, against which the argument likewise applies, is not useless to the effect, because it serves to make the same effect capable of being produced more easily or more certainly, since if one cause is absent another can be present. You will say: action is essentially a means to the existence of the effect; but a twofold total means with respect to the same end is superfluous. But a twofold total means conduces to obtaining the end under two titles and therefore more securely; likewise, to satisfying the intentions or exigencies of two agents. Add that the law of avoiding the superfluous does not bind free agents; hence two angels could simultaneously move the heavens in such a way that at their pleasure they produce the same motion as total causes. Nor is the natural repugnance of bilocation, penetration, and plurality of forms in the same matter taken from superfluity, but from the peculiar nature of quantity and from the character of substantial form known by experience.

4. The second argument is not compelling, because if a globe of uniformly combustible matter is thrown into a furnace, several parts of the fire will naturally be applied simultaneously to the central point of the globe although they do not interpenetrate. Moreover, although the agents had to interpenetrate, nevertheless, once penetration were supposed, they would naturally act as total causes, since nothing would then retard the adequate power of each. Hence the entire miracle would consist in penetration and not at all in the simultaneity of total actions. For God's concurrence toward acting totally would then be naturally due to each agent; nor would the

actions be supernatural as regards mode by reason of a decree applying Omnipotence, but only presuppositively by reason of the penetration of the agents. Thus, although it is a miracle that a stone be located near the moon, nevertheless, once placed there and left to itself, that it fall to the earth is entirely natural.

5. The same opinion is commonly proved 2º by reason: two total causes in first act, simultaneously applied to the same recipient, first of all do not both remain idle, as is certain. Nor, secondly, does one of them remain idle, leaving the whole office of acting to the other, because of two fires simultaneously applied neither has a greater right to act than the other. Finally, they do not act partially, as though one moderated its influx for the sake of the other, as the authors of the first opinion maintain. For this conflicts with the character of a necessary cause, whose nature it is to act with all its powers upon disposed matter; and also because one fire does not perceive the presence of the other, nor can it be informed of it so as to moderate its activity to the other. It remains, therefore, that each cause influence totally toward the form then to be produced.

6. It is commonly proved 3º from examples. For 1º the same foundation can be related totally to several terms. 2º There can be a manifold connection adequately implying the same term; thus several total causes in first act imply the possibility of the same effect. 3º Several mortal sins can simultaneously and adequately cause the expulsion of the same Grace. 4º Several priests pronouncing the form simultaneously will consecrate the same host as total causes. 5º An angel can simultaneously have several adequate presences, for it can be made present to an entire hall, for example, although half of it or a hundredth part suffices for it. 6º The soul of a brute, if posited indivisible, is educed from original matter and simultaneously from the matter of food, either of which suffices for it to exist; and at least the rational soul is united to both matters by two total unions. 7º The same action can be exercised for two simultaneously adequate ends. 8º There can also be two adequate moral causes, as if, at the prayers or commands of two men, you did something which you would equally do for the sake of either. 9º The same object is naturally and adequately comprehended by several cognitions at the same time.

7. Nevertheless, one should not depart from the first and most common opinion. Its proof can be restored thus: because from the terms it is superfluous and vain to employ a greater endeavor where a lesser suffices. Hence one who rushed with great force to crush a fly would deservedly be laughed at. Therefore, when the endeavor of a partial cause suffices, a total one will be pointless. Add that several total actions for one effect cannot fail

to be a prodigal expenditure of the causes′ power, no differently from spending a thousand gold coins to purchase a thing worth only one. The reason *a priori* is that causes do not intend actions for the sake of actions but for the sake of effects, to which, if they could impart existence without actions, they would omit them as useless. Nor again do they demand to explicate their power through actions except insofar as through them they obtain the effect, which alone imitates and reflects the perfection of the agent. Therefore, when two causes cannot intend two effects nor explicate their power in them, because there is present only a subject capable of one, they will pointlessly and uselessly, and contrary to their own exigency, posit two total actions. Hence you will gather that the whole natural utility of an action is taken from the effect; therefore, if it is superfluous for the effect, it will be useless in every respect.

8. You will also gather that for one cause to influence totally it is a naturally necessary condition that no other cause be present with an equal right of influencing toward the same effect. For if another is present, each will be moderated, the supreme endeavor will be diminished, and both will influence through partial actions, or through one total action essentially dependent upon both causes, as happens when the intellect together with a habit or species produces an act. What was objected in n. 5 concerning a fire′s being informed is frigid. For who informs fire of the presence of disposed matter so that it may burn at once? Who informs the intellect of the presence of a species so that it may concur with it, or of the presence of an acquired habit so that it may moderate its power to it? Who, in the case of the question, informs the agents of the incapacity of the recipient so that they do not produce several forms which they contain but only one? The reason for moderation, therefore, is that the first cause should not naturally concur with second causes except according to the due measure of the effect to be produced. Hence, when the effect here and now to be produced does not call for two total actions, God as Author of nature applies His Omnipotence only to two partial actions or to one total action.

9. Confirmation 1º: although two agents simultaneously applied contain two forms in first act, they do not demand to produce more than one when one matter suffices; therefore, if one total action suffices for the effect, those two agents demand to elicit only one, although they contain two in first act. For the same reason applies in both cases. Hence to that general doctrine, that a necessary cause demands to act with all its powers, or as much as it can, this limitation must be added: "as much as it can according to the due measure and need of the effect," just as the Adversaries add this other one: "as much as it can according to the due measure and need of the subject."

You will say: one fire, if it were alone, would demand to act totally; therefore it demands the same in companionship with another, for it cannot change its natural exigency and innate appetite from the extrinsic circumstance of another fire's presence. I deny the consequence. Nor for that reason do I admit a change of innate appetite; for fire never had an appetite to act totally under these circumstances.

10. Confirmation 2º: if two agents could naturally produce the same effect simultaneously by two total actions, the same agent whose power far surpassed the effect could likewise naturally produce it by two or several simultaneous total actions; for example, the sun could naturally produce fire A by a thousand total actions simultaneously posited, and water, while deprived by fire of intense cold, could produce a remiss cold by several total actions. The consequence is contrary to everyone's judgment and is therefore denied by Henao and Quirós. Yet it plainly follows if it is unqualifiedly true that a necessary cause acts with all its powers and demands fully to explicate its fecundity, and that a manifold action is not useless because it conduces to greater security of the effect. Therefore all must limit that exigency of a necessary cause and disregard that supposed greater security of the effect, because it presupposes prodigality of active power, just as the greater advantage of a seller in receiving a thousand gold coins for a worthless thing presupposes the buyer's prodigality.

11. From what has been said you will easily solve whatever the Adversaries bring forward from reason. We shall now pass through the crowd of examples in n. 6. The first is false in relations of informing to informed, receiving to received, producing to produced, or conversely. That it is true in relations of the first genus, namely likeness, equality, etc., does not obstruct, because each likeness has its own distinct term, and it is proved from no source to be contradictory that the same man at the same time be similar or equal to several. The second absurdly proves that one cause can simultaneously produce innumerable adequate effects, just as it simultaneously implies their possibility by reason of the connection discussed below in disp. 7. The disparity, therefore, is both because the connection of a cause in first act with the possibility of an effect is not precisely for the sake of the term as action is, but principally for the sake of the power of the cause, which would fail if that connection failed; and because it is not capable of moderation or partiality as influx in second act is.

12. The third similarly proves that several adequate effects can be produced simultaneously by the same cause, just as a thousand degrees of Grace can be expelled by one sin, and a thousand sins by one degree of

Grace. Therefore sins expel Grace not by physical influx but by themselves in the genus of formal cause, in which genus there is no place for moderation. Nor do sins exist precisely for the expulsion of Grace, but for other evil ends intended by the sinner. But if you consider sin under the aspect of a moral cause expelling Grace by means of a Divine decree, say that God removes Grace by one decree in view of two sins simultaneously committed; or even that two sins morally move toward two, or quasi-two, decrees of God concerning the expulsion of Grace, which are not useless but rather fitting, so that a twofold sin may be hated according to its deserts.

13. The fourth, first of all, does not speak of causes operating naturally. Secondly, it is easily solved, because it can be said that several priests in that event influence through one physical or moral action which depends upon all simultaneously. The fifth is turned back against the objector, because an angel cannot naturally have simultaneously several simply adequate presences, that is, presences which are not actual or aptitudinal parts of one absolutely total presence. But that within the sphere of the space to which an angel can naturally extend its presence it can contract it at pleasure and exist in only a hundredth part proves indeed that an angel is not like a body, which necessarily has the whole presence of which it is capable; but it does not prove that that hundredth part is a presence adequate to the whole angelic power. Or say that it is adequate in a qualified sense, insofar as it suffices in certain circumstances.

14. The sixth similarly is turned back against the objector, for it is certain that neither the soul of a brute nor a rational soul can naturally inform simultaneously two simply adequate bodies. Original matter, therefore, is not absolutely and simply adequate, since it is of itself ordered to compose together with the matter of food one adequate body naturally due to the soul. It is nevertheless called adequate in a qualified sense and as though temporarily, insofar as it suffices for the beginning of life. The seventh has place only in an external action which according to itself does not depend essentially or immediately upon the end, for example, walking. I admit that this can be exercised for two total ends and caused by them through two acts of will by which it is commanded and determined, not efficiently but connexively, as though through two total causalities of ends. Nevertheless, causalities of this kind are not useless, because they do not exist precisely for the sake of the effect, but serve both that the twofold goodness of the ends may be loved and that the will may be perfected in itself and liberty exercised. The eighth is solved in the same way. For if you are adequately moved by the prayers of each man, you will necessarily have two acts of will, which are as causalities with respect to the external act, from which they do

not receive their entire utility, since they simultaneously serve to love or esteem that twofold motive and also to exercise liberty.

15. The ninth is excellent for dissipating supposed contradictions when this question is disputed concerning God's absolute power; but now, when natural superfluity is at issue, it is irrelevant, because cognitions do not exist for the sake of the object but of the intellect alone. Hence several cognitions are not superfluous when several intellects are present. The opposite occurs in physical actions, which neither intrinsically perfect the cause nor derive utility from anywhere except the due measure and need of the effect.

DISPUTATION VI.
ON THE POWER BY WHICH CREATED CAUSES PRODUCE THEIR EFFECTS.

We suppose what was proved in disp. 2, c. 5, namely, that created causes truly effect something by a power proper to themselves, and not only something accidental but also something substantial, as is sufficiently gathered from what was said there. We likewise suppose what is equally certain, that the name and office of efficient cause belong not only to accidents but also, and principally, to substances; for we most truly say that the sun illuminates, fire burns, etc. We inquire, however, in what the power of effecting, or active power proper to a created cause, consists: whether in accidents alone, or also in substances themselves. By the name "active power" we understand that from which an action immediately arises, or that by which a cause in first act is rendered fecund, that is, by which it is rendered capable immediately of attaining operation and effect. Here the common distinction between the principles "that which" and "that by which" must be kept before one's eyes. The principle "that which" is called that to which the operation, or the denomination of operating, is principally attributed, namely the person or *suppositum*, according to the dictum, "Actions belong to *supposita*." The principle "that by which" is called that which acts as a part or power of some *suppositum*. It is commonly subdivided, especially among the Thomists, into the immediate principle "that by which" and the mediate and radical principle "that by which"; or, in other terms, into the principle "that by which" by way of a power

immediately influencing, and the principle "that by which" by way of a root from which the power emanates. Action also is commonly called a principle "that by which," but in a very different sense, namely, not by way of that which influences but by way of influx, not by way of an agent but by way of an exercise by which another acts. But the principle "that by which," as it is now taken, truly influences and acts, though it is called "that by which" in relation to the *suppositum* which it serves. You have an example in visual potency and actual vision, for each is that "by which" a man sees, but in very different ways.

Now in the proposed question all Thomists tenaciously hold that the power by which created causes produce their effects, both substantial and accidental, is in no way identified with substance but consists adequately in accidents, although these do not act as principal causes when they produce nobler effects, but only as instrumental powers of a substantial thing. Thus they grant to the substance of fire, for example, the office of a true and proper principal cause, both by way of the principle "that which" and also by way of the radical principle "that by which," for so they call substantial form. Yet they hold it wholly impossible that a created substance be a power immediately operative of any effect, even partially. On the contrary, all the Scotists with the Subtle Doctor, the Nominalists also, and nearly all of Ours with the Excellent Doctor, d. 18, Met. ss. 2 and 3, consistently hold that created substance, not only as the principle "that which" and radical "that by which," but also as an immediate power, is operative of many effects, both substantial and accidental. Among these authors, however, some grant and others deny that substance is assisted by accidents in the production of another substance. Some hold substance to be operative of accidents only in itself; others also in an extraneous subject; and others add further limitations of lesser importance. What is to be held by us shall be explained in distinct Assertions.

CHAPTER I.
Created Substance Is a Power Immediately Active of Another Substance.

1. Thus Ours with the Scotists against the Thomists. It is proved by a common but most efficacious argument: there is among created things a power adequately productive of substance, as the Thomists admit; but such a power cannot consist in accident alone; therefore it must, at least in part, consist in substance, which consequently is a power immediately active of another substance, whether adequately or inadequately, from which manner

we abstract. The minor premise is proved. An adequately productive power cannot be more imperfect and less noble than the effect; but accident is less noble than substance, as no one doubts; therefore a power adequately productive of substance cannot consist in accident alone. The major premise is proved: an adequately productive power must contain the whole perfection of the effect either formally, eminently, or at least equivalently, that is, either according to the same species, or according to another more eminent one, or at least one equal in perfection. But it contains the whole perfection of the effect in none of these ways if it is less noble than the effect, as is clear of itself. Therefore, etc. The major premise, which alone could be denied, seems most evident. For an adequately productive power communicates and confers upon the effect its whole perfection, and cannot confer what it does not contain, according to the self-evident principle, "No one gives what he does not have."

2. Nor say that accident virtually contains substance. For to contain virtually, unless the phrase is taken in the sense soon to be attacked, is nothing other than to be able to produce. But it is contradictory to be able adequately to produce where there is not an entitative perfection equal to or greater than the effect to be produced. Unless this principle is unshaken, the infinite perfection of Omnipotence will not be well proved from the virtual containment of infinitely many effects; nor will there be any basis for refuting one who attributes to the lowest degree of heat a power adequately active of the whole universe, at least as regards effects produced by eduction; or at least one who acknowledges in heat a power adequately productive of light, or in a material accident a power adequately operative of spiritual accidents. Certainly anyone who wished to foist such and similar paradoxes upon us would immediately be rejected by all because of the disproportion of the power to the effect, which disproportion would at once be proved from inequality of perfection.

3. The Thomists, to evade the force of the argument, employ various expressions. In sum they say that commensuration of perfection with the effect must be sought only in the principal cause, which with respect to substance is always some substance equally or more perfect, but not in the instrumental power, such as an accident producing substance. For this power does not act as "that which" but as "that by which," not in its own name or by its own power, but in the power and name of the substance whose part it plays and by which it is strengthened, so that under its auspices it produces an effect which by its own strength it cannot produce as a principal cause. Thus an agent, giving or selling in the name of the person who commissioned him, transfers ownership of a thing which he himself

does not possess. Thus also an ambassador or viceroy validly treats and completes public affairs in the king's name which he could not complete by his own authority. Hence accident, in the order of physical operation, is virtually substance, just as a viceroy in the order of governing is virtually king.

4. But this answer is most forcefully rejected, and at the same time our proof is strengthened. 1º It is not enough that the principal cause, not immediately influencing of itself, be commensurate in perfection with the effect, if the whole immediate power is not commensurate. This is proved both because a perfection which does not influence stands materially with respect to the perfection of the effect, for it does not communicate itself to it. Thus, although it is truly said that "the musician" or "the theologian builds," nevertheless music or theology stands materially with respect to the perfection of the building, because it does not influence. This is especially true when the perfection of the cause influences neither mediately nor immediately, that is, neither immediately in the effect nor in the power from which the effect arises, as occurs in our case, since according to the Thomists substance neither immediately influences another substance nor the accident from which it arises. For they do not hold the emanation of accident from substance to occur through influx or action, but by mere connection and exigency, lest otherwise substance be immediately active of some effect. Thus Peter's abundance of riches does nothing toward enriching Paul either personally or through a servant if he neither directly communicates riches to Paul nor gives them to the servant to communicate. The argument is pressed: a cause pours its perfection into the effect only insofar as it influences the effect. Therefore if it influences neither immediately nor mediately, it in no way pours its perfection into the effect but retains it in itself inert and sterile.

5. 2º Whatever may be true of the principal cause, it cannot be denied that an adequate power must be commensurate in perfection with the effect. For our proof returns, namely, that otherwise it would give what it does not have, and that in that case the lowest little entity could be a total power for whatsoever effects. You will say: a power gives perfection only as "that by which." Against this: to give as "that by which" by way of power is truly and properly to give. First, because a power immediately influencing is truly and properly a cause, since the definition of cause properly belongs to it, especially that Thomistic definition: "A cause is that upon which the being of another follows." Secondly, because that properly gives from which the effect properly receives; but the effect properly receives from that upon which it properly depends insofar as produced by such an action. Yet the

action most properly depends upon the principle "that by which" by way of a power, since without it the action is essentially incapable of existing, whereas according to the Thomists it can exist without the principle "that which." Thirdly, because substantial form, although it is called a term "that by which" and is said to be produced as "that by which," while only the composite is said to be produced as "that which," nevertheless most truly receives perfection from the cause. Therefore, although a power immediately influencing is called a principle "that by which," it most truly gives perfection to the effect. It will therefore always stand that a total power, if less noble than its effect, truly and properly gives what it does not have.

6. 3º An accident in its own name and by its own power cannot adequately produce substance, as you admit; therefore neither can it in the power and name of substance. The consequence is proved: an accident, insofar as it is active in the power of substance, either receives some power distinct from itself or receives nothing beyond its own entity. If you say the first, it is first of all alien to the mind of the Thomists, and secondly it is useless; for if the power superadded to the accident is a substance which immediately assists it in influencing, substance will already be immediately operative. If it is another accident, the argument returns with the same force. But if you say the second, then for an accident to act in the power of substance is to act by the force of its own entity alone. Yet this is precisely the same power by which the accident would act if it acted in its own name. Therefore, if it could not act in its own name, neither could it act in the power of substance. Thus a boy cannot sustain a weight beyond his own strength in the name of a giant if he receives from the giant no strength beyond what he has when left to himself. Hence it is vainly said that an accident is "strengthened" by substance. For how is it strengthened if it receives no vigor beyond what is proper to itself, or beyond what intrinsically belongs to the accident when left to itself and operating under its own name?

7. The point is pressed by turning back the moral examples. If an agent, ambassador, or viceroy received no power beyond what he possesses as a private person, he would validly complete no public contract or business in the name of the one who commissioned him or of the king. Therefore, if an accident receives from substance no power beyond what it intrinsically possesses as an accident, it will be unable in the name of substance to produce any effect beyond its own powers. Hence you see that these examples are not relevant, because to the agent and ambassador there is in reality communicated a true power not inferior or less noble than the moral

effect upon which it immediately influences, whether that power consists in the will of the prince morally persisting and operating under the condition of the delegate's will, or in anything else; this is of no concern to us. The argument is pressed again by another retortion. An ambassador or agent can do nothing in the name of another who is intrinsically incapable of immediately doing that very thing himself; otherwise someone could be constituted governor of a commonwealth in the name of a lion or a horse. Therefore likewise an accident can do nothing in the name of substance if the latter is intrinsically incapable of immediately producing that very effect, as in fact it is according to the Thomists.

8. Hence, 4º, the doctrine of the answer is rejected. A horse is no more intrinsically incapable of immediately governing in a political manner than created substance, according to the Thomists, is incapable of acting immediately; but because of that incapacity it would be wholly contradictory or frivolous for someone to act in the horse's stead, or to be appointed to govern under the horse's name or in its power. Therefore, etc. Add that it cannot fail to be a disgrace and imperfection in substance that, because of incapacity for acting, it needs the vicarious power of an accident, like a minor needing a guardian who enters contracts in his name, or like one unable to write whose testament another signs in his name. And indeed in these examples the need proceeds from weakness or lack of skill accidentally possessed; but in substance it would proceed from complete intrinsic incapacity.

9. Hence it is clear how vainly it is said that an accident in the order of operating is "virtually substance." For, given substance's incapacity to operate immediately, this signifies rather that the accident is wholly incapable of operating, just as whatever in the order of governing or understanding is virtually an ass is in reality wholly incapable of governing or understanding. This will be clearer from the following syllogism: substance is incapable of immediately operating; but accident is virtually substance in the order of operating; therefore accident is virtually incapable of immediately operating. Certainly, what is virtually substance in the operative line has virtually what substance has formally in that line, as is clear by induction through all things which are said to be virtually this or that. But substance formally has an essential incapacity to operate immediately; therefore accident has the same incapacity virtually if it is virtually substance in the operative line. Add that if accident acts because it is virtually substance, it would act better, or at least equally well, if it were formally substance, just as what is formally fire heats no less well than what is virtually fire.

10. Nor is it more helpful to say that an accident in the order of operating is "as though the spirit and quintessence of substance," as M. Aguilera most recently speaks. For from Thomistic doctrine it follows that accident is as though the spirit and quintessence of the essential incapacity to operate immediately; for this incapacity and nothing else in the order of operating can be extracted from substance, however much you employ the alembic of reason. Thus in the order of governing or understanding, the spirit and quintessence of an ass will be the spirit and quintessence of incapacity for those offices.

11. 5º From the same examples with which the Adversaries commonly arm themselves. For according to their doctrine, when the Eucharistic accidents convert a drop of water into wine, they adequately produce a new form of wine. When fire is elicited by the striking of flint, heat and motion are the adequate power producing the fire. Likewise, accidents then present are the adequate power generating little animals from putrefaction. But in these cases there is present no substance of wine, fire, or animal whose name the accidental power acts in and which, as principal cause, strengthens the weakness of the accident. Therefore the accident then adequately produces substance, unstrengthened, not in the power of substance, but by its own power, despite inequality of perfection; which is remarkable and contrary to the doctrine of the Thomists.

12. They say that in these cases the substance from which the accidental power was cut off or left behind is the principal cause of the effect, although it is now separated or nonexistent. But first, a nonexistent cause, although it formerly existed, is now nothing and devoid of all vigor and perfection. How, then, does it strengthen the accidents? How does it discharge the office of principal cause, whose nature, according to you, is to cause more properly than an accident? How does it give being if it does not have being? How does it communicate perfection if it now contains none? Will it suffice for Peter to enrich Paul that he was formerly very rich if he is now utterly poor? You will say: the principal cause still exists, not in itself but in the power left behind. But to exist in the power is nothing other than for the entity of the accident to exist. This entity does not contain the perfection of the effect as "that which"; nor, on the other hand, does the principal cause any longer contain it. Therefore the effect receives a perfection contained in none of its causes.

13. Secondly, if heat were produced and preserved by God alone, it would do the same as it does now, and yet it would not be a power left or cut off by any fire or other created substance. Indeed, in fact the heat excited in flint never existed in any fire, nor did the accidents which produce a mouse from

putrefaction ever exist in any mouse. Therefore these accidents act in the name of no fire or mouse. Nor have recourse to a possible fire or mouse. For a cause which neither exists nor ever existed truly causes nothing, as all admit. Besides, the power now operating neither is nor ever was proper to that cause. Add that on Thomistic principles no cause truly acts as "that which" through a power not united to it. Hence they deny that the intellect can by Divine power be elevated through an extrinsic aid to produce the beatific vision. But accidental power certainly is not united to a nonexistent cause.

14. 6º Finally, the answer in n. 3 is refuted because by the same terms it could be defended that an accident intrinsically constitutes a substantial composite in the name of matter or form. For if you object that substance cannot be made from non-substances, I shall grant this of non-substances composing in their own name or by their own power, of non-substances not strengthened by substance, or which are not virtually substances in the order of constituting; but I shall deny it of non-substances which compose in the power and name of substance, which are strengthened by substance, which in the order of constituting are virtually substances, and which are as though the spirit and quintessence of substance. By this distinction I shall similarly evade whatever else you object. See what was said in tr. 1, d. 1, c. 8.

15. Our Assertion can further be proved thus: while fire burns tow, the heat of the acting fire produces in the recipient a heat equal to itself, namely, that which results in the first instant as a property of the generated form and which, according to the Thomists, is produced by the generator. Therefore it cannot in the same instant produce the form of fire; therefore this is produced by the substance of the acting fire. The first consequence is proved: no power, in the same instant in which it produces an effect adequate to itself, can produce another, especially a superior one, since it is certain that the whole active power is exhausted by an adequate effect. But the heat produced in the recipient is an effect adequate to the acting heat, since it is wholly equal to it as regards species and intensity and proceeds from it as from a univocal power. Therefore the heat of the acting fire cannot in the same instant produce the form of fire. You will say: heat is an effect adequate to heat insofar as the latter acts by its own power, but not insofar as it acts in the power of fire. Against this, 1º: heat insofar as it is the power of fire is the same heat as insofar as it is its own power, without any addition or real distinction, as you admit; therefore it cannot be really adequately matched and exhausted insofar as acting by its own power without also being adequately matched and exhausted insofar as acting in the power of fire. Against this, 2º: heat in the recipient is produced by the acting heat, not

only taken entitatively, but also insofar as active in the power of fire; for it is produced according to everything which it possesses by its nature, and by its very nature it possesses the character of a power of fire. But the produced heat, insofar as active in the power of fire, is wholly adequate to the acting heat even insofar as active in the power of fire. Therefore, etc.

16. The same Assertion is also commonly proved because, if substance does not immediately influence, it will not properly and essentially be the cause of another substance by the essentiality of influx or causality. The consequence is denied by the Adversaries, and rightly, for otherwise it would follow that accident alone is a true cause of substance and therefore the principal cause. Nevertheless, it is commonly proved because if substance does not immediately influence another substance, and on the other hand does not influence mediately, since it does not influence the accident, it will be the cause of substance neither immediately nor mediately; for it is a cause only insofar as it influences. And although it were called a mediate cause, it would not therefore be an essential cause, according to what was said in d. 2, c. 1, n. 18. But because it can be answered that for the property of an operating cause as "that which" it suffices that it operate through a power which it physically possesses as its own, for by this reason the operations of the humanity are properly attributed to the Person of the Word, and this answer requires a longer discussion which we do not presently need; therefore, leaving aside that proof, the consequence is proved from the Thomists' own doctrine.

17. A cause for which it makes no difference whether it exists or does not exist in order to be denominated as causing does not properly and essentially cause. But if substance influences only through an accidental power, it is denominated as causing in the same way whether it exists or does not exist, through the action of the accident left behind or cut off from it, as is clear in the examples of n. 11 and in others to be objected from the following chapter, and as the Adversaries suppose. Therefore, etc. The major premise seems undeniable. For who would say that, in order properly to cause, that is, to give being, it makes no difference whether the cause is something or nothing, especially if it has long since ceased to exist, or whether it actually contains or does not contain the perfection of the effect either as "that by which" or as "that which"? Nevertheless, it is proved, 1º because it is contradictory properly to cause as "that which" without any proportion to the effect. But a cause, when it does not exist or when it is non-being, has no proportion to the effect; for, as St. Thomas says with the Philosopher, De potentia, q. 3, a. 4, "There is no proportion of non-being to being." Therefore, etc. 2º Because it is contradictory for an effect properly to

be produced as "that which" when it does not exist; therefore it is likewise contradictory for a cause properly to produce as "that which" when it does not exist. For, as the Angelic Doctor says in the place cited, "The thing made is acted upon in the same mode in which the maker acts; but the agent acts according as it is in act." 3º Because a *suppositum* not actually existing, or not actually possessing a nature, would not properly operate as "that which" through the operation of the nature, even if it had previously existed or possessed the nature. Therefore likewise, etc.

18. Finally, our Assertion is proved because it is not repugnant to created substance to be an active power; therefore there is no reason to deny it immediate influx into another substance. The consequence is sound among the Thomists. The antecedent is proved: it is not repugnant to substance to be an immediately passive or receptive power, as is clear both in prime matter and in the substance of the whole composite, which according to the Thomists immediately receives accidents. Therefore neither is it repugnant for substance to be an immediately active power or potency. The consequence is proved both because the contrary arguments either attack both potencies in substance or neither, as will soon appear; and also because it is incongruous that in distributing potencies only that which savors of defect and imperfection should be attributed to substance, while that which savors of perfection is attributed to accident. For substance is far more perfect than accident, and, as St. Thomas says, Summa Theologiae I, q. 25, a. 1: "It is manifest that each thing, insofar as it is in act and perfect, is according to this an active principle of something; but each thing undergoes passion insofar as it is deficient and imperfect." Other proofs can be drawn from the solution of the objections which we now add.

CHAPTER II.

Reply to the Arguments of the Contrary Opinion.

1. In this chapter we shall solve the arguments by which the Thomists deny that substance can be immediately operative of any effect. Objection 1º: several proverbial sayings or maxims worn by common use among philosophers. First: "Substance is for its own sake"; but an operative potency is for operation, toward which it is essentially and primarily ordered. Therefore substance cannot be an operative potency or power. Second: "Potency is specified by act"; but the act or operation of an active potency is an accident. Since, therefore, substance cannot be specified by an accident, substance cannot be an operative potency. Third: "Act and potency ought to be in the same genus"; likewise, "The perfectible and that which perfects are

in the same line." Therefore, since operation is an act perfecting the operative potency, this potency must belong to the accidental line or genus just as operation does. Fourth: according to Aristotle's doctrine, "Only that which has a contrary acts"; but substance has no contrary. Fifth: "Act is better and more excellent than potency," which is taken from Aristotle, Metaph. IX, c. 8; but the act of an operative potency, since it is an accident, cannot be more excellent than substance. Therefore substance is not an operative potency. Sixth: "Being is prior to operating"; therefore being ordered to existence is prior to being ordered to operation. But substance is ordered to existence; therefore operative potency, which is ordered to operation, is something posterior to and consequent upon substance.

2. I answer: if the contest is to be fought with proverbs, we too have maxims at hand which, unless I am mistaken, are more appropriate. First: "Each thing operates according as it is in act." Thus St. Thomas very frequently, and from him all others commonly. But the substance of fire, for example, is immediately in act through its substantial form; therefore it immediately operates through the same. Second: "Each thing stands to acting as it stands to being." Thus in express words St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae III, q. 77, a. 3. But substance stands immediately to being; therefore it stands immediately to acting. Third: "That on account of which something is such is itself more such." This is exceedingly well known from the Philosopher, Poster. I. But accident is immediately operative on account of substance; therefore substance is more immediately operative. Fourth: "The good is diffusive of itself." All approve this, taken from St. Dionysius, De Divinis Nominibus, c. 4. But substance is immediately good of itself; therefore it is immediately diffusive of itself; therefore it immediately diffuses its perfection into the effect. Fifth: "The more perfect the act, the more perfect a potency it requires." This too is commonly employed and is sufficiently clear from the example of vital acts. But the production of the substance of fire is a more perfect act than the production of heat; therefore, since the production of heat requires the whole active potency of another heat, the production of substance will require another more perfect potency, namely a substantial one. Sixth: "The mode of operating follows the mode of being." This is extremely common and is taken from St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I, q. 50, a. 5. But substance has a more perfect mode of being than accident; therefore it also has a more perfect mode of operating. Yet to operate immediately is a more perfect mode of operating, as is clear in God. I omit others; for these suffice to prevent the Thomists from flattering themselves over their abundance of maxims.

3. The objections made against us are explained without difficulty. To 1º: substance is for its own sake insofar as it is not for the sake of intrinsically affecting another adequately distinct *suppositum*. Nevertheless, this does not prevent it also from being in some way for the sake of operation. First, because according to the Adversaries it is a true principal cause and a true principle "that which" and radical "that by which." But the concept of a true operative principle and true root includes an order to operation. Secondly, because this is proved by the old maxim, "Being is for the sake of operation," or "Each thing is for the sake of its operation." Explaining this, M. Froylanus, hic q. 3, a. 2, § 9, says that "substance is for the sake of operation as for an effected end, or an end to be perfected through substance itself," just as "the Incarnation is said to be for the salvation of men as for an effected end consequent upon the Incarnation itself." Therefore substance is already in some way for the sake of operation and ordered to it. And why could operative potency not in the same way be ordered to operation, although it is identified with substance?

4. Because, you say, operative potency is ordered essentially and primarily, that is, under its primary concept, to operation. But against this: passive potency is likewise ordered essentially and primarily to passion. For we conceive the order to passion just as primarily in passive potency as such as we conceive the order to operation in operative potency as such. Nor is passion less accidental than operation, as no one doubts. Yet according to the Adversaries passive potency, both of substantial form and of accidents, is identified with substance, since the substance of matter immediately receives form and the substance of the whole composite immediately receives accidents. What, then, prevents the same from being said of operative potency? You will say: although passive potency, conceived precisely under the aspect of such, is essentially and primarily ordered to passion, nevertheless, since such potency is not the primary concept of substance but a secondary one, though really identified with it, it does not follow that substance is essentially and primarily ordered to passion. But why should not the same be said to you? Why could it not with equal right be said that operative potency is really identified with substance, yet does not belong to its primary concept but to a secondary one, because substance is defined neither by active nor passive potency? Add that accident itself is not defined by an order to operation, but by an order to a subject. Hence under the concept of accident it is not essentially and primarily ordered to operation; yet it identifies operative potency with itself.

5. Moreover, even granting the order essentially and primarily, we say that operative potency is ordered to operation as to a mere means, and to

the effect as to an end. For in things which produce an effect distinct from the action, the end is not the action but the effect, as Aristotle frequently teaches, especially Metaph. IX, t. 17. But to the effect that potency is ordered as to an end for which; while the potency itself, when identified with substance, is the end for which, because when it operates immanently it intends intrinsically to perfect itself, and when it operates transitively it intends to explicate its power insofar as this is a certain good and advantage of the potency itself. Hence it finally follows that substantial potency is so for the sake of operation that ultimately it is for the sake of itself. Hear Froylanus in the place cited: "We add with Cajetan that each thing is for the sake of its operation, that is, for the sake of itself as perfect and conjoined with the operation itself; and thus the proverb is to be understood."

6. To 2º: there is a counterinstance, 1º in passive potency, which is likewise specified by passion. 2º In radical potency, which in the being of a root must be specified by what is rooted in it. 3º Because Logic is specified by being of reason according to the Thomists, which is harsher than for substance to be specified by an accident. 4º Because the argument proves that operative potency is something modal, since operation is a mode. It is then turned back: potency is specified not only by action but also, and indeed more, by the effect. For the will is specified more by love than by the mere production of love. Therefore, when the effect is substance, the potency ought to be substantial. Finally I answer: operation is not an intrinsic specifying principle of potency, for such a specifying principle is the specific difference of each thing, or also the physical form in composite things, but merely an extrinsic and indicative specifying principle, insofar as from the perfection or character of operations and effects we recognize and infer the perfection of potencies and their specific distinction from one another; and not only of potencies but also of *supposita*. Thus we distinguish man from brutes by the act of reasoning, and generally from the nobility and diversity of operations we infer the excellence and difference of subsistent things as from a sign or indication. In this sense nothing prevents substance from being specified by an accidental operation, especially when this is a way to a substantial effect.

7. To 3º: the counterinstance returns in the passive potency of matter, whose act is passion; likewise in any substance which without doubt is immediately perfectible by accidents, as fire by properties, the soul by acts or potencies, etc.; likewise in matter, which is certainly perfectible by a spiritual soul without therefore being in the spiritual line; likewise in an accidental potency, which is in the genus of quality, although its act or operation is in a very different genus, namely the predicament of action.

Therefore that maxim, however formulated, must be explained by all as concerning act and potency, perfectible and perfective, which are mutually ordered to constitute one thing essentially, namely a substantial composite. For they must be in the same genus, not just any genus, but the substantial one, because substance is not made from non-substances. It can also be explained of the act of existence and logical potency, or possibility of existing; of these alone is it true that act and potency divide every genus. I omit that the Adversaries in these and other arguments falsely suppose every action to be accidental.

8. To 4º: if that statement is universally true, light will not act because it has no contrary; nor will the potencies of the soul act because they lack a contrary; likewise, substance will not be a principal cause, because a principal cause is that which primarily and more properly acts. Aristotle, therefore, must be understood either of radical contrariety, which belongs also to substances insofar as they root contrary qualities, as water and fire; or of contrariety broadly taken, insofar as it signifies incompossibility in the same subject, which is found also in substances; or rather of privative contrariety, insofar as an agent must presuppose in the recipient the privation of the form which it attempts to introduce.

9. To 5º: a limitation must be employed by all. Otherwise passion will be more excellent than matter; and the reception of an accident, and the accidental form itself, will be better than the substance of the composite which it immediately actuates. Nor say that Aristotle is not speaking of passive potency, for the contrary will be clear to one reading the cited Metaph. IX, texts 19–19; and certainly that pronouncement is more plausible concerning passive potency than active potency, because the passive is by its genus more imperfect. Add that neither can it have universal place in the active potency, both because light is active of heat and yet is not more imperfect than its production; because the simple apprehension "stone" is not more excellent than the intellect or intellectual potency; and also because the act of sin is not better than the potency of sinning, just as disease is not better than the potency of becoming sick. Hence Aristotle himself limits his dictum to acts belonging to the genus of the good. It must therefore be said that this dictum, taken generally, is true only in a threefold sense. 1º Of substantial potency and act, because form is always more excellent than matter. 2º Of logical act and potency, because it is better for every thing actually to exist than to be able to exist. 3º Of act compared with potency insofar as the latter involves privation of act, because potency with act is better than potency with privation.

10. To 6º: the counterinstance presses again in passive potency, for certainly being is prior to undergoing passion or receiving; likewise in radical potency, since being is prior to rooting accidents; likewise in an operative accident itself, in which being or *inesse* is likewise prior to operating. Therefore I deny the consequence, unless perhaps the discussion concerns a priority of reason insofar as we first conceive the thing as constituted in itself before comparing it with operations, and therefore apprehend its order to operation, understand a transcendental and not predicamental order, as though posterior and consequent. In this way even God's omnipotence is conceived as something posterior to and consequent upon the Divine essence.

11. But reply 1º, from the College of Complutum: this causal proposition is true in a real and physical sense, "Because a thing simply exists in itself, it is operative of another"; therefore operative being is something really subsequent to and caused by being simply, or substantial being. I deny the antecedent. For that causal proposition is no more true than this one: "Because a thing simply exists, it roots accidents," or "it receives them," or "it operates principally and as that which"; likewise no more than this: "Because an accident exists, it is operative of another." In these, according to the Adversaries, there is no physical but only logical or metaphysical causality. Reply 2º, from the same source: operative being is not first being; therefore it is not substantial being. The antecedent is proved, both because first being constitutes the thing in order to itself with prescision from everything else, whereas operative being formally expresses an order to another; and because operative being is not the formal effect of substantial form, for the formal effect of the latter is to give species to the composite, and no composite receives species from operative being.

12. I deny the antecedent if it speaks in a real sense and of the nobler operative being. To the first proof: first being, unless it is wholly unfecund and sterile, necessarily expresses in a real sense an order to operation. Therefore it is false that it constitutes the thing in order to itself with a real prescision or distinction from everything else. If, however, you speak of a prescision of reason which does not conflict with real identity, let it pass. And ask what you will say to the counterinstance in radical operative being or operative being as "that which," and in receptive being with respect to accidents. To the second proof: operative being, insofar as it belongs to the whole composite, is a formal effect of substantial form, and from it the species of the composite is taken. For we define man, for example, as "rational animal," which means the same as being operative of sensation and reasoning. I say, operative being not in just any mode, but by way of a

substantial power; just as according to the Adversaries, being operative by way of a root or principle "that which," and being receptive of accidents, is a formal effect of substantial form really indistinct from the species of the composite.

13. Reply 3º, concerning the principal point: substantial being is first act regarding existence as second and ultimate act, and operative being is first act regarding operation as second and ultimate act; therefore these two beings are really distinguished. The consequence is proved, 1º because it is contradictory for two second acts so diverse to proceed from the same first act. For they differ more from one another than the acts of seeing and hearing, or the acts of understanding and willing, which require distinct potencies. 2º Because existence and operation are not acts subordinated to one another, nor can they be attained under the same formal aspect. 3º Because two ultimate acts, one of which comes after the other, are contradictory. 4º Because while substance exists and does not operate, substantial being is reduced to its second act and operative being is not reduced to its own; but it is repugnant that of two things really identified one be reduced to second act without the other.

14. I answer: the whole argument has most evident counterinstances, both in radical first act, which regards the emanation of accidents as second act; in the potency of matter, which regards passion and existence as two wholly diverse second acts; in the receptive potency of accidents, which, although identified with the substance of the whole composite, regards reception as second act; and in the essence of an accident, which according to the Adversaries is really the same potency and first act with respect to existence and operation. Moreover, I deny the antecedent as regards the first part, because it falsely supposes a real distinction of essence from existence. But if you wish that distinction to be allowed, I deny the consequence, because two second acts, although they differ greatly so as to modify the potency in diverse ways, can be regarded by the same really existing first act, as the Adversaries are bound to admit in the examples or counterinstances just indicated. That the acts of seeing and hearing, although performed in diverse organs, require really distinct active potencies is denied by the Scotists and several of Ours, who say the same of the acts of understanding and willing. But granted that they require them, the distinction of the soul's potencies is not proved precisely from diversity of acts but also from other sources, as we shall see in its place; although, given from elsewhere the real distinction of potencies, diversity of acts sufficiently proves their specific diversity. From this the answer to the first proof is clear.

15. To 2º, it can be said that those acts are subordinated to one another insofar as operation essentially presupposes the existence of its principle, as occurs in the existence and operation of an accident. For since operation essentially presupposes existence, according to the dictum, "Operating follows upon being," and since existence is ordered to operation, according to the dictum, "Being is for the sake of operating," some subordination or coordination between the two acts cannot be denied. Likewise, both belong to the same generic line, "act of a substantial potency," which can be called the formal aspect in which they agree and under which they are attained, although in other respects they differ greatly from one another. Hence they can also be regarded in a real sense as inadequate or partial acts, because neither exhausts the whole potency of its principle taken really, but each is part of the collection of all acts corresponding to such a potency. Yet in a formal sense each can be called adequate, one with respect to objective potency insofar as formally opposed to non-being and a chimera, the other with respect to physical operative potency formally taken; although these potencies are really identified. The Adversaries are compelled to assent to all this by the counterinstances given shortly before.

16. To the third proof: existence is not an ultimate act except with respect to objective potency formally taken; see tr. 1, d. 2, c. 4, n. 19. Hence operation can come after it, just as passion and reception come after it, although they are acts of the same potency; and just as judgment comes after apprehension, which is an adequate and ultimate act of apprehensive potency formally as such, although judgment is an act of the same potency really considered, for judicative and apprehensive potencies are not really distinguished. To 4º: after the clearest counterinstance has been premised in the essence of an accident, which often exists without operating, and also in apprehensive potency, which, while apprehending and not judging, is likewise reduced to its act without judicative potency being reduced to its own, say that operative being is truly reduced through existence to one act really its own, although so long as it does not act it is not reduced to every act to which it can be reduced. And what is easier or more frequent than that the same potency containing several acts be reduced to one and not to another really distinct act?

17. Objection 2º: what is proper to God cannot be communicated to created substance; but to identify with oneself the potency of operating is proper to God; therefore, etc. Confirmation 1º: other attributes of God, such as justice and wisdom, are participated by created substance only through accidents; therefore likewise the potency of operating. Confirmation 2º, from Froylanus: if substance were immediately operative, it would identify

with itself the ultimate difference of accident, namely the aspect of a proximate principle, which is the ultimate difference of an immediately operative accident; and from this it would also identify operation with itself, because the aspect of a proximate principle is no less outside the line of substance than operation itself, and therefore the reason of identity is equal in both cases, just as, if man identified with himself the ultimate difference of an ant, he would also identify with himself the ultimate differences of all things. Then thus: therefore substance would be simply infinite. It is proved because it would identify with itself the ultimate actuality of a genus expressing a perfection simply simple; for it would identify operation, and this is the ultimate actuality in the operative line, which expresses a perfection simply simple and found in God.

18. I answer to the objection: it is proper to God to identify with Himself an operative potency, not just any potency, but one infinite and independent of every other, both in being and in operating. Such a potency is certainly not communicated to creatures, although they too have their own finite potency dependent in both ways upon the first Cause. Likewise, the name of principal cause is proper to God, since it belongs to Him preeminently. Does it therefore follow that created substance cannot be a principal cause? It is also proper to God to be good, according to Christ's statement, Luke 18: "No one is good except God alone." Does it therefore follow that created substance will not be good? And it is remarkable that what is proper to God should be communicable to accident but not to substance. If you infer: therefore created substance is potent through essence. I deny the consequence absolutely, because the phrase "through essence" is commonly taken as opposed to "through participation"; but whatever a creature is, it is through participation. If, however, by "through essence" you understand the same as through something identified with the essence, I grant the consequence. And I ask you whether an accident is potent through essence, whether created substance is a principal cause through essence, or good through essence, or even a being through essence.

19. To Confirmation 1º: it could similarly be proved that goodness and perfection, or even the very aspect of substance, are communicated to substance only through accidents. Therefore in the fact that justice and wisdom are identified with substance, a special repugnance is found by theologians and writers on the soul. For now it is enough to say that justice and wisdom consist in immanent operation or presuppose it, unless they are considered extrinsically. But a creature cannot identify its operation with itself, because it must be immediately subject to God's dominion not only in being but also in operating.

20. In Confirmation 2º it is supposed what had to be proved, namely, that the aspect of a proximate principle is the ultimate difference of an immediately operative accident. We now defend the opposite, namely, that this is a predicate common to substances and accidents and is diversified in them through the differences proper to each: namely, because substance is a proximate principle by way of something standing through itself, accident by way of something inhering; and in particular, the soul by way of a living principle, fire by way of an elemental substance, heat by way of a quality having a contrary, and so with the others. Thus, although substance is immediately receptive, it does not identify with itself the ultimate difference of an immediately receptive accident, such as quantity or vital potency according to the Thomists. Thus also, although an accident is a principal cause, as when heat produces heat as a univocal cause, it does not therefore identify with itself the ultimate difference of substance.

21. Objection 3º: if substantial form is the immediate principle of acting, it will always be in the perpetual exercise of acting; just as, because the soul is the immediate principle of vivifying, it cannot be in a subject without actually vivifying it or constituting it as living. I answer: the soul is the immediate principle of vivifying in the genus of formal cause; and if it is supposed united to the subject, it cannot fail to confer upon it its formal effect, since that effect is not distinct from the form as united to the subject. But form, as it is a principle of acting, further requires several conditions, such as application to the recipient, God's decree, etc. If it lacks these, as it can, it will not be in the exercise of acting. And the example is turned back: for the rational soul, although it is the immediate principle of vivifying the body, does not always actually vivify, as is clear in the separated soul. Therefore it can likewise be the immediate principle of acting although it does not always act. You will say that you are speaking of the united soul. But this is to posit the soul conjoined with the exercise of vivifying, which is union. Therefore similarly posit form conjoined with the exercise of acting, and thus it will always act. Secondly, there is a counterinstance in accidental form, for example heat, which is always in the exercise of qualifying the subject or constituting it as hot and is not always in the exercise of acting. Likewise there is a counterinstance in receptive potency, for the form of water, although it always informs its subject, is not always in the exercise of receiving cold.

22. Objection 4º: if the rational soul were immediately active of intellection, the soul could not know itself. It is proved because it would follow that extremes are really identified when the medium is really distinguished from each; for potency and object are extremes between which

cognition mediates, and cognition in that event would be really distinguished from the potency and object which would then be really the same. But it is repugnant that the extremes be more distinguished from the medium than from one another. But this objection is inopportunely introduced here by some, since it belongs to the doctrine of the soul, where we shall show by proper arguments the immediate activity of the soul toward vital acts. For now there is a clear counterinstance in the soul or an angel knowing its intellectual potency. For then potency and object are extremes distinguished more from the medium than from one another. Similarly, agent and recipient are extremes between which an eductive action mediates; and yet, when the intellectual potency produces and receives any cognition, agent and recipient are more distinguished from the medium than from one another. Therefore it must be denied that cognition mediates locally, or in any other proper sense, between potency and object. Rather it is the formal aspect by which the potency is rendered immediately knowing and the object immediately known. Therefore it is called a medium only improperly, insofar as it is apprehended after the manner of something mediating. Or, lest you dispute about the word, let it be a medium, but by way of the exercise of representing and no otherwise. In this sense nothing prevents the extremes from being more distinguished from the medium than from one another.

23. Objection 5º, especially for the adequate activity of accident toward substance: it often happens that a substantial effect is produced when no substance is present suitable for influencing. Therefore substance is then produced by accidents alone. The antecedent is proved because when fire is excited by the heat of glowing iron or by the striking of flint, when wine is produced from a drop of water in a consecrated chalice, when little animals arise from putrefaction, indeed when all living things are generated by the power of seed, no substance is present which contains effects of this kind or can suitably be regarded as influencing. Confirmation 1º: although action is an entity more imperfect than the effect, nevertheless it adequately produces it by adequacy of influx, because it acts only as "that by which." Therefore, since accident also acts as "that by which," it will be able adequately to produce substance by adequacy of power, although entitatively it is more imperfect. Confirmation 2º, from a certain recent author: no created cause contains the whole perfection of the effect, but nevertheless it is called adequate in the genus of second cause. Therefore, although accident does not contain the whole perfection of substance, it can produce it as an adequate power. The major premise is proved, both because every created power needs the assistance of the first cause; because every created

cause is perfected by its effect, and therefore the effect adds a new perfection which the cause does not prepossess; and because the complex composed of created cause and effect is something more perfect than the cause alone, which would not be so if the whole perfection of the effect were contained in the cause, as is clear in the complex of God and creature, which is not more perfect than God alone.

24. To the objection, I distinguish the antecedent: when no substance suitable for influencing univocally is present, I grant; when none is present either univocally or equivocally, I deny the antecedent and the consequence. To the proof: we already saw in the preceding chapter that the Thomists are equally pressed by those examples, since they must find a suitable substance which then truly and properly influences as principal cause and principle "that which," and which is truly equal to the effects in perfection. For recourse to the substance from which the accidental power was cut off or left behind is useless, both because often the accident was left by no particular substance suitable for such an effect, as in the case of an animal generated from putrefaction; and because the substance from which the now-influencing power was cut off, for example seminal power, often no longer exists and therefore is incapable of truly and properly causing, as we sufficiently showed at the end of the preceding chapter. Whatever substance, therefore, the Adversaries find suitable to influence by way of a true principal cause, we shall say that the same influences by way of a power. But if they are content with a nonexistent substance, we too shall be content with the same. For it is no more difficult for a nonexistent thing to influence as a power than to influence as a true and proper principal cause. Indeed it is less difficult; for, as St. Thomas says, Contra Gentiles III, c. 67: "The cause of the action is more that by whose power the action is done than even that which acts; just as the principal agent acts more than the instrument."

25. Therefore fire produced by glowing iron can be attributed to many little fires hidden within the pores of the iron, as many also think concerning flint. But if only heat separated from fire is supposed to be there, recourse must be had to the influx of the heavens, as also in the production of metals or minerals. For the celestial bodies are universal causes whose office is not only to assist inferior causes by a certain general concurrence, but also to supply their defects by a greater influx when disposed matter is present and no sufficiently proportioned sublunary cause is present. Nor does it obstruct that the substance of celestial bodies is distant from the earth; for it can nevertheless immediately influence, according to what was said in disp. 3, c. 3, Assertion 3. The conversion of water into wine through the Eucharistic accidents is attributed to Divine power by St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae

III, q. 77, a. 3, ad 2. But the generation of animals from putrefaction is expressly attributed by the Holy Doctor to the sun and stars, Summa Theologiae I, q. 105, a. 1, ad 1, where he speaks in the same way of the generation of plants and minerals. But if celestial bodies, as inanimate, do not seem sufficient for the production of living things, recourse must be had, with the common opinion of Ours and the Scotists, to the first Cause, whose role it is to supply the defect or insufficiency of the second cause whenever disposed matter requires a form.

26. This recourse appears more difficult in the ordinary generation of animals from seed. For if a peculiar concurrence of the first Cause is always needed there, provision does not seem to have been made sufficiently by nature for the propagation of living things, since their second and specific causes are found to be insufficient of themselves. Many say that the power of seed is not merely accidental, but that there is found in it a substantial part immediately active. But because this does not avoid the fact that seminal power produces an effect nobler than itself, namely, for example, the soul of a horse, several weighty authors quite probably judge that the mother's soul, at least in viviparous animals, immediately influences the soul of the offspring, and, when a man is generated, the union of the rational soul with the body. Yet we do not presently need these opinions. For recourse to the first Cause is approved with Scotus by Fr. Suárez, cited d. 18, s. 2, and is excellently defended by him from objections from n. 39 onward.

27. The power of seed, therefore, disposes and organizes the little body, although Scotus, according to Fr. Suárez, n. 32, thinks seminal power insufficient even for this office. Once the ultimate disposition is posited, God as Author of nature supplies the defect of seminal active power for producing the soul of the brute by way of a principal cause, just as He alone creates the rational soul, as is certain. Nor does this proceed from the imperfection of animals, but rather from their perfection, which does not permit another mode of origin from a second cause, just as it is a great perfection of man that his soul can be produced only by God alone. Nor is provision therefore less well made for the propagation of living things. First, because their own condition requires no other providence. Thus it is no defect of nature or providence that no creature is sufficient to act without God's simultaneous concurrence. Secondly, because the propagation of living things is not therefore less certain and regulated, just as neither is their preservation, which according to all proceeds throughout nearly the whole period of life from God either alone or principally. Finally, by the example of the propagation of men.

28. You will say 1º: recourse to the first Cause for an influx more than general is not philosophical. I distinguish: when a sufficiently suitable second cause can be assigned, I grant; when none can be assigned, I deny, as is clear in the production of the rational soul. And I ask you whether recourse to a nonexistent cause for principal influx is more philosophical, against that saying of St. Thomas received by all, "Each thing stands to acting as it stands to being," especially since principal influx is more proper, according to the same St. Thomas cited above, n. 24. You will say 2º: the generation of living things will be miraculous if God concurs toward it as a particular cause. I deny the consequence. For God does not act miraculously whenever He concurs as a particular cause, that is, through an influx more than general, but only when He concurs contrary to or above the exigency of natural things. This does not occur in the present case, since God concurs according to the exigency of matter ultimately disposed. The solution is evident from the example of the rational soul. Add that this concurrence can be called proper to a universal cause, since it is naturally due from the office of universal cause and Author of nature.

29. You will say 3º: therefore in human generation the father will not properly be the principal cause of the child; therefore he will not properly be the father. I distinguish the first consequence: he will not properly be the principal cause with the propriety which the human species requires in a created agent, I deny; with propriety simply so called, I grant the first consequence and deny the second absolutely. In order that the human species be propagated, it requires nothing else in the created agent except 1º the principal role of supplying matter and an instrumental and dispositive power of matter; 2º the propriety of a cause without which not, or determining cause, which the effect naturally needs, whence in Ecclus. 7 you are commanded to honor your parents, "because unless through them you had been born, you would not have been." And this very thing is what is required and sufficient among men for the name "father" properly so called. Less activity is required for the name "mother," if the more common opinion denying active concurrence to the mother is true. But the propriety of a principal cause simply acting does not belong to a human father, not only because he is a purely mediate cause; nor only because he in no way produces the soul of the offspring, indeed not even the union except perhaps instrumentally; but also because he often does not exist at the instant of generation or animation, and although he exists, this is accidental, since he then discharges the office of cause in the same way whether he is already dead or not. But that a nonexistent cause cannot be principally acting has, I think, been sufficiently shown. Hence in Sacred Scripture the principal

action in the formation and animation of the human body is attributed to God, as in Job 10 and 2 Macc. 7.

30. Now to Confirmation 1º at n. 23: I deny the consequence. For action so acts purely as "that by which" that it does not properly cause or give being, but is a pure determination of another toward causing and giving. Hence not the action itself but that of which it is a determination must contain the perfection of the effect. But active power truly and properly causes and gives being to the effect, as we saw in the preceding chapter, and in this sense truly acts as "that which," or is truly that which acts, although it is said to act as "that by which" when compared with the *suppositum*. Therefore, lest it give what it does not have, it must contain the whole perfection of the effect. To Confirmation 2º: the major premise contains an evidently false paradox, one to be rejected even by Thomists. For to contain the whole perfection of an effect, as all understand in the present matter, is nothing other than to have in oneself a perfection equal or superior to it, and furthermore so fecund that it can produce the effect without the assistance of another created agent. Who doubts that in this sense fire contains fire, heat heat, light light?

31. Nor do the proofs have force. Not the first, because the general concurrence of the first Cause is not required because every created cause is unequal in perfection to its effect, but because every cause and effect must be immediately subject to God's dominion and depend essentially upon Him. Not the second, because for a cause to be perfected by an effect means that it is better off with the effect than with its absence. For this it is enough that the effect add a new really distinct perfection not prepossessed by the cause in the individual, although prepossessed in species, either the same or a nobler one, as when the sun is perfected by light. Not the third, because the complex of God and a creature is not more perfect than God alone precisely because God contains the creature with simply infinite eminence, than which nothing better can be conceived. But where the eminence is finite, that maxim has force: "Finite added to finite makes a greater whole." Thus a silver coin added to a gold coin makes a greater sum, although the silver coin is contained eminently in the gold one.

32. Finally observe that potency belonging to the predicament of Quality is not potency as such, for otherwise every passive potency and every radical operative potency would likewise be a quality, but only that potency which from elsewhere is established to be accidental and distinct from quantity. Observe further that operative potency need not be ordered to operation as a means to an end; for it can be ordered to operation, or rather to the effect, by way of an agent procuring an end. Finally observe that Aristotle, when he

says that fire acts not as fire but as hot, means only that heat is a condition without which not, in which sense fire is said not to act unless applied; or also that heat is a power partially influencing the effects of fire. Concerning the mind of St. Thomas we shall say something in the following chapter.

CHAPTER III.
Accident Often Immediately Influences Substance as an Instrumental Cause.

Thus the Excellent Doctor (cit. d. 18, s. 2, n. 14), whom many modern authors follow with Father Compton. The contrary is maintained by the Scotists and several of our authors, such as Fathers Hurtado, Arriaga, Oviedo, Lynceus, and Peynado. But before the proof, the notion of instrumental cause must be set forth, which above (disp. 2, c. ult.) we left unexplained.

§ 1. What Is an Instrumental Cause?

1. Since the name "instrument" is very ambiguous and almost equivocal, it has led authors into various explanations; on these Father Suárez treats at length and very well (d. 17, Met. s. 2). I shall first set down some less proper acceptations. 1º By antonomasia a principal cause is said to be one which depends upon none, and makes the others depend upon itself in acting, and therefore uses them as instruments. In this sense the First Cause alone is principal, while all second causes are instrumental. Thus St. Thomas often speaks, especially (*De potentia*, q. 3, a. 7), saying: "God is the cause of every action, insofar as every agent is an instrument of the Divine power acting." Yet this acceptation is exceedingly broad and does not prevent everyone from attributing to many created causes the office of principal cause with respect to various effects.

2. 2º Anything given to a *suppositum* as a principle of acting is commonly called an instrument, even if it is equally perfect as, or even nobler than, the effect. Thus both substantial and accidental form, as well as integral parts, such as the hands, feet, etc., are called instruments of the *suppositum*, to which alone the name of principal cause is attributed, that is, of the principle "which acts." This acceptation also is regarded as less proper. 3º Anything substituted in place of another in order to exercise some action, even an imperfect one, is called an instrument. Hence an impetus impressed upon a stone is called an instrument of the thrower. But neither is this acceptation proper and strict; nor is that one by which certain agents are called

instruments of others because they are appointed to act in their stead or to supply their deficiency, although they are not immediately assisted by them in acting. Hence the Scotists, as may be seen in Mastrius (hic disp. 7, n. 98), deny, and rightly, that seeds are properly instruments of living things.

3. In order, therefore, to reach the strict acceptation, the Thomists commonly say that a thing acts as an instrument when it operates through a power belonging to another or received from another; but that it acts as a principal cause when it operates through its own power. Yet they are opposed because either that power received from another is distinct from the entity of the instrumental cause, or it is not. If the first is said, scarcely any natural instruments will exist; for heat, for example, while acting as an instrument of fire, and a species while concurring toward cognition, do not act through a power distinct from themselves. If the second is said, no created cause will properly be principal, since all receive their entity and power from God, and many receive them also from other second causes. Akin to this is the explanation of those who say that a principal cause operates in its own name, while an instrumental cause operates in another's name. This too is rejected, both because it does not explain what is required for operating in one's own or another's name, and because it applies only to moral or political instruments, as when an officer is called the instrument of a judge because he acts in the judge's name and authority; whereas in natural instruments it has no place except by a strained metaphor.

4. To the same point tends another exposition of the Thomists, namely that an instrumental cause is one which does not act except insofar as moved by another, whereas a principal cause is one which does not need another's motion. But this is to remove from created causes the character of principal cause, since according to the Thomists all need God's physical premotion in order to act. They say that they are speaking of a motion of the instrument which is the entire reason for acting. But a motion of this sort belongs to mechanical instruments (to which the name "instrument" belongs by first imposition, and therefore many expressions of St. Thomas are understood of these), and indeed not even to all of them. For although a blacksmith's hammer does not act except insofar as moved, the motion is not the entire reason for acting, but also its innate weight. In instruments of nature, however, no motion distinct from the instrument itself is required, as is clear in heat instrumentally concurring toward the generation of fire and toward the nutrition of a living thing.

5. I know that the Thomists do not wish heat to be called an instrument of fire, but rather an instrumental power of fire. Yet, first, St. Thomas often speaks in this way, for example (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 115, a. 1, ad 5), where

he calls heat an instrument of fire and an instrument of the soul for the generation of flesh. Next, if heat is the immediate active power of the substance, it truly and properly is a cause of that substance, since the definition of cause properly belongs to it, as we saw in chapter 1; but it is not a principal cause; therefore it is properly an instrumental cause, and consequently properly an instrument. Finally, if heat, or any other accident, is the one immediate power of the principal cause, it is improperly called an instrumental power; rather it should be called a primary and principal power, just as the immediate power or authority of a king is primary and principal power, and only that power which belongs to inferior ministers who operate as instruments of the king is instrumental. Add that, from the terms themselves, an instrumental power is the power of an instrument, just as an intellectual power is the power of the intellect. Therefore, if the power of heat is instrumental, heat itself is an instrument.

6. The Scotists, with whom several of our authors agree, say that an instrument is that which concurs only dispositively, without immediately attaining the production of the effect principally intended; but that a principal cause is one which immediately influences the form chiefly intended. This explanation too is rightly rejected, because there are many instruments, both natural and supernatural, which immediately concur toward the production of the principal effect, as Father Suárez proves by induction (loc. cit., n. 11). And certainly it seems evident that instruments of art, not only through the impulse of the craftsman but also through their innate weight, immediately concur toward the form of a house or statue. Some of our authors wish an instrument to be that to which no formality of the effect corresponds. Yet there are instruments to which some formality of the effect does correspond; for example, the phantasm, or act of the imagination, to which, insofar as it concurs instrumentally toward the intelligible species, the formality of representation corresponds. Add that when forceps are made by forceps, or a hammer by a hammer, as by an instrument, there is complete correspondence of formalities.

7. It must therefore be said with the Excellent Doctor (loc. cit., from n. 17) that an instrumental cause is one which produces an effect nobler than itself, or of a higher order, or at least one to which its activity is not proportioned unless it is assisted by a superior agent through a special concurrence. The last clause is added on account of causes concurring obedientially, such as mechanical instruments and those natural things which can be elevated to supernatural action. For such causes, although they produce effects equal or inferior in entity, concur only instrumentally because of the disproportion of their activity, as if the sun were divinely to

produce another sun, or an angel an ant. Conversely, a principal cause properly so called will be one which immediately produces an effect equal to or inferior to itself in such a way that it does not need the special assistance of a superior agent. I say "special assistance" or "concurrence," because it is not contrary to the character of a principal cause to need God's general concurrence, which is required for an effect under the title of participated being.

8. Hence you will infer that every instrumental cause is partial in the order of operative power, because, as we showed above, no power inferior to its effect can be total or adequate with respect to that effect. Hence it must always be assisted by a principal cause immediately influencing the effect. By reason of this assistance the instrumental cause is said to act as strengthened, and even as elevated, because by it the cause is borne to a point to which it cannot rise by its own merits. Therefore, when an accident is said, as an instrumental cause, to influence substance, the immediate influence of the acting substance is not denied, but rather presupposed, and indeed as the chief influence, since it belongs to the principal cause. Yet conversely not every partial cause is instrumental; for a cause can need another's assistance and nevertheless be principal, because it does not need the assistance of a superior cause, but of an inferior or equal one. Thus the intellect is a principal cause of natural cognition, although it needs the assistance of a species.

9. An instrument is commonly divided into conjoined and separated. A conjoined instrument is one joined to the principal agent by union or by physical contact; thus heat is an instrument of fire, and a pen of the writer. A separated instrument is one joined to the principal agent in neither of these ways; in this manner the sacraments are commonly said to be instruments of the Humanity of Christ existing in heaven. Each division is also commonly subdivided into an instrument conjoined or separated in existing but not in causing, and conversely. But although it is true that an instrument can be conjoined in causing and locally separated in existing, it cannot be temporally separated, so as to cause in the manner of an instrument properly so called when the principal agent does not exist. It must likewise be denied that an instrument strictly so called can be separated in causing, although in a broad sense it may be called an instrument.

§ 2. The Stated Assertion Is Proved.

10. It is possible for an accident to be endowed with a connatural power for immediately producing a substance; therefore in fact several accidents

are such, for example heat and the other proper accidents of fire, which consequently immediately influence substance as instrumental causes. The antecedent is expressly granted by Oviedo and Arriaga, nor is it denied by Peynado and others, and it is easily proved. For such an accident would be repugnant for this reason, that it would always be inferior to substance and no power can attain the production of an effect nobler than itself. But this reason indeed proves that substance cannot be adequately produced by an accident; it by no means proves that it cannot be produced partially and instrumentally. This is evident *a priori*, for the precontainment of the whole perfection of the effect pertains only to a total cause or power, as all admit. It is also evident from examples accepted by common philosophy, for the visual species is inferior to the act of seeing toward which it concurs; the same occurs in the act of imagination with respect to the intelligible species, in this species itself with respect to intellection, and in an acquired habit with respect to acts of the will.

11. Now the consequence is proved because in fact there are several accidents in whose presence a substance is always produced, whether its proper and specific substantial cause is present or not. Thus whenever heat as eight is present with due dryness, from whatever source it comes, fire is produced. Therefore heat connaturally and immediately influences the substance of fire. This consequence is clear, for if an accident connaturally capable of producing fire existed, it would show its power by no more evident sign. Confirmation 1º: by no other reason do we infer that fire is active of fire and heat of heat than because we certainly see that such effects are always produced in their presence, while from another source no ground of repugnance appears in substance being active of substance and accident of accident. Therefore, if from no consideration is it repugnant for an accident to be instrumentally active of substance, and if moreover substance is always produced in the presence of certain accidents, those accidents must in fact be regarded as active of substance.

12. Confirmation 2º: recourse to universal causes, especially to the First Cause, for an influence beyond the general concurrence should be avoided as far as possible and should not be adopted except where and insofar as philosophical principles establish the disproportion of the particular cause, as is customary among all philosophers. But in the generation of animals from putrid matter, of metals in the recesses of the earth, of fire in a mirror, etc., philosophical principles do not establish the disproportion of the proximate accidents for a partial concurrence, from n. 10. Therefore, as regards such concurrence, recourse must not be had to universal causes, although recourse is had to them for the concurrence of a principal cause,

for which philosophical principles prove the accidents to be disproportionate. One may say: if recourse is had to superior causes for the principal influence, why not also for the total influence? But I ask in turn, why is recourse had to superior causes for the total influence in the production of many effects and not of all? One will reply: because philosophical principles do not compel this in all effects, but they do compel it in some because of the disproportion of the particular cause. For the same reason, therefore, we are led to have recourse to superior causes for the principal influence, not for the total influence.

13. Confirmation 3º: if accidents do not concur toward the production of substance, substance will often produce an effect more perfect than itself. For example, fire A will produce fire B equal to itself and, in addition, in itself its own properties, as I suppose with the adversaries; these together with fire B will constitute something more perfect than the substance of fire A alone. Father Peynado answers 1º, and Lynceus before him, that an equivocal cause can produce an effect more perfect than itself extensively, though not intensively. Thus light as four produces light as three and heat as four. Therefore, since fire produces its own properties as an equivocal cause, it matters nothing that those properties together with fire B constitute a composite extensively more perfect.

14. Yet this solution appears altogether to be rejected. First, because there would be no reason why a fire half a palm in extent could not by itself produce a fire two palms in extent, or even one of any extension whatsoever, which would be only extensively more perfect than its cause. Nor does it matter that it is not an equivocal cause, for it is equally general to every efficient cause that it cannot produce anything more perfect than itself. Hence, if in an equivocal cause this principle is restricted to intensive perfection, why not also in a univocal cause? Second, because fire B is equal to fire A both extensively and intensively, since it is of the same species and quantity. Therefore it adequately exhausts the whole power of fire A both extensively and intensively; therefore there cannot remain in fire A, in the composite sense, power to produce anything else. Finally, because in finite things whatever perfection is added to another of equal things makes something absolutely greater and more estimable. Therefore fire A, as a total cause, will produce something simply better than its own entity. As to the example of light, first, it is not established how much heat light as four produces. Next, heat as four perhaps does not compensate for the degree of light lacking from light as three. In short, it must be denied that so much heat can be produced by that light that, together with the light produced, it absolutely surpasses the perfection of the acting light.

15. Peynado answers 2º, and Lynceus before him, that fire A never produces a fire extended through as many parts as it itself possesses; just as, according to the common doctrine, one quality never produces another equal to itself in degrees, but three degrees of heat, for example, produce two, two produce only one, and one by itself produces none. Therefore fire A always, by an excess of parts, surpasses or equals the composite formed by its properties and fire B. But neither is this solution better. For 1º, if a fire one palm in extent were divinely made to penetrate a piece of wood likewise one palm in extent and prepared for combustion, the fire, on the supposition of this miracle, would naturally burn it, since it is a necessary cause intimately applied to a disposed patient. It would therefore produce a fire one palm in extent, altogether equal to the agent; for there is no reason why one part of the wood rather than another should remain unburned, since each part corresponds in place to an equal number of parts of the acting fire and all are supposed equally disposed.

16. 2º From this doctrine it follows that if readily combustible matter, for example gunpowder, is continued for the space of one cubit, the whole cannot be burned if combustion is supposed to begin from a fire four fingers in extent; for the first fire will burn three fingers of matter, the second two, the third one, and the fourth none. Hence combustion will stop at the sixth finger of matter. But the consequence manifestly contradicts experience. For if gunpowder is continuously scattered even over the space of a league, once a spark of fire is applied, the whole will immediately blaze up. Hence there is no parity with qualities. For experience establishes that active qualities diminish more and more in intensity and extension the farther they are propagated. But substance admits neither intension nor remission, nor is it limited in extension if it finds disposed matter, as experience itself makes manifest.

§ 2. The Meaning of St. Thomas Is Explained.

17. Finally, our assertion is strengthened by the authority of St. Thomas. For the Holy Doctor, as everyone knows, very frequently asserts that accidents immediately produce substantial effects; but he does not intend to deny to substances an immediate influence upon the same effects. Therefore he grants to accidents only a partial and instrumental influence upon substance, such as we now defend. The minor is proved against the Thomists, who cite St. Thomas as the undoubted patron of the opinion denying that substance is immediately operative of any effect. For in *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 69, rat. 9, the Angelic Doctor speaks thus: "If acting follows

upon being in act, it is unfitting that a more perfect act should lack action; but substantial form is a more perfect act than accidental form. Therefore, if accidental forms which are in corporeal things have certain actions, much more does substantial form have some proper action. Such action, however, is not to dispose matter, because this is done through alteration, for which accidental forms suffice. Therefore the form of the generator is a principle of action so that a substantial form may be introduced into the generated thing."

18. One may say: St. Thomas calls that action which arises from accidents in virtue of substance the proper action of substantial form. For there he asserts "that from the action of accidental forms substantial forms are produced, insofar as they act instrumentally in virtue of substantial forms." But against this, 1º St. Thomas grounds proper action in the character of act, which character belongs immediately to substantial form, and more perfectly than to accidental form. Therefore, if immediately acting belongs to an accident under the title of act, it is unfitting that substantial form should not act immediately, since that title belongs more perfectly to it. Against this, 2º if the production of substance immediately arises from accidents alone, it will no more be a proper action of substance, nor more in virtue of substance, than alteration, for example heating, which proceeds from heat alone. But this is openly contrary to St. Thomas in the cited place. Therefore, etc. The major is proved: according to the Thomists, to act in virtue of substance is to act by a power received from substance through emanation; likewise, for an action to be proper to substance is for the action to arise from an accidental power proper to substance, and thus to be attributed to substance as to the agent "which acts." But both heating and ignition arise from the power of heat, received through emanation from the substance of fire, to which it is proper; and fire is said just as properly to heat as the principle "which acts" as it is said to burn. Therefore, etc.

19. Against this, 3º in St. Thomas's manner of speaking, for one thing to act in virtue of another is to act through a power subordinated to another, by which it is assisted through the latter's immediate concurrence. Therefore, for an accident to act in virtue of substance does not destroy but establishes the immediate concurrence of substance. The antecedent is proved: St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5) says "that if there are many subordinated agents, the second agent always acts in virtue of the first," and therefore "all things act in virtue of God Himself." He teaches this more fully in *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 70, where from the fact that a creature operates in virtue of God he infers the immediate concurrence of God, saying: "As the lowest agent is found to be immediately active, so the power of the first

agent is found to be immediate in producing the effect." In the same place he confirms this by the example of the question with which we are concerned: "Therefore, just as," he says, "it is not unfitting that one action be produced by some agent and its power," namely its accidental power, "so it is not unfitting that the same effect be produced by an inferior agent and by God, immediately by both, although in different ways." Here he plainly supposes that an action arises immediately, by immediacy of power, from a created substance and its accident, just as the same effect arises by a similar immediacy from God and the creature; otherwise the comparison would be useless and beside the point.

20. Hence you have that whenever St. Thomas says that an accident, in virtue of substance, instrumentally produces substantial effects nobler than itself, he thereby confirms our opinion. For instruments properly so called require the actual concurrence of the principal agent, and they act in its power precisely insofar as they are assisted by it while it simultaneously concurs. But when the Holy Doctor says that in created things every action is through qualities or by means of qualities; that in no creature is operative power or potency the same as substance; that the proximate principle of operation must be an accident; and similar things, he must be understood of a complete, proximate, and ready power or potency. For with respect to actions distinct from simple emanation, such a potency in created things always requires some accidental co-principle or complement, without which it is called only a "mediate" or "remote" potency. In this sense prime matter is not said to be capable of receiving form except by means of accidental dispositions; and while it is under the form of fire, it has only a remote potency for the form of water. Similarly, fire existing in India is only mediately and remotely able to burn wood in Europe. Yet by these manners of speaking the immediacy of the potency, considered in itself, for receiving and burning is not removed. By contrast, because God needs no assistance distinct from Himself in order to be completely and proximately capable of producing any effects whatsoever, He is rightly said, in preference to second causes, to be His own power or to identify His power with Himself.

21. I add that the fundamental argument of the Thomists is openly rejected by St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5), who says: "As matter is for the sake of form, so form, which is first act, is for the sake of its operation, which is second act; and thus operation is the end of the created thing." Note that matter is for the sake of form primarily and essentially. I add again that St. Thomas explains how the same effect is produced simultaneously by God and by a creature by the example of an effect produced together by principal and instrumental causes. Thus he says in the

cited *Contra Gentiles* III, c. 70: "The same effect is not attributed to the natural cause and to the Divine power as though it were made partly by God and partly by the natural agent, but wholly by each according to a different mode, just as the same effect is wholly attributed to the instrument and also wholly to the principal agent." From this doctrine we say that substance and accident immediately influence, by one and the same action in reality, a substantial effect which is produced wholly by each agent by totality of effect, though not by totality of cause.

§ 4. Is Substance of Itself a Power Adequately Productive of Substance?

22. From what has been said there arises the doubt whether, for example, the substance of fire, so far as concerns itself, is a power adequately productive of another substance, although in second act it is always or often assisted by accidents. The negative part can be proved because there is no sufficient basis for asserting such an adequate power. First, not from experience, because substance always operates with the equipment and accompaniment of accidents, by which it therefore always appears to be assisted. Next, not from the fact that the substance of fire, for example, is equal to another substance of fire and contains all its formalities; for equality of perfection or correspondence of formalities does not of itself establish active power, not even a partial one. Hence neither the sun is productive of another sun, nor union of another union, nor a mule of another mule. One may say: from another source experience establishes the fecundity of fire for producing another fire. Against this: if experience shows no fecundity, none is to be admitted, however great the proportion of perfection may be. Therefore, if experience does not show adequate fecundity, as it does not in fire, such fecundity must not be admitted even though equality of perfection is present.

23. The affirmative part, however, is proved because a univocal cause, or even an equivocal cause more perfect than its effect, if it is supposed truly active and fecund, according to the common judgment of philosophers is not to be restricted to merely partial activity without a very compelling foundation. No such foundation is present here. For the fact that substance is generally assisted by an accident can arise, not from a defect in a power adequate in itself, but from the fact that the power which substance expends in producing and conserving its own properties must be supplied. Indeed, even if substance made no expenditure elsewhere, it could moderate its concurrence and admit the companionship of an accident, just as the will

does with an acquired habit, and one fire with another equally applied and sufficient fire. Moreover, an accident is adequately active of an accident, as heat of heat. Therefore substance can also be adequately active of substance, especially of one of the same species, since in each case there is the same commensuration. This part appears more probable.

24. Therefore, to the foundation of the negative part it should be said that, given equality of perfection and experience of fecundity, adequate power is rightly inferred unless something prevents it, as may be seen in heat and other accidents. It will be objected: an accident cannot adequately produce another accident of equal intensity; therefore neither can substance produce another substance of equal perfection. I answer: an accident can adequately produce another which is indeed less intense but nevertheless of the same species; for greater or lesser intensity does not vary the species, especially if the degrees are homogeneous. Therefore substance will be able adequately to produce another of the same species; this suffices for us. Moreover, in substance there is no experience corresponding to that which, in an accident, concerns diminution of intensity.

25. It will again be objected that substance as an adequate power can never naturally be reduced to act, since it always concurs partially with accidents and is occupied in part with its own properties; therefore it is not a natural power. I answer 1º: it is enough that a natural power can be reduced to act either formally or equivalently, that is, either by producing the effect in question or at least by producing another equivalently. The power of substance, insofar as adequate, does this; for the influence which it exercises upon its properties and at the same time upon substance as a principal cause is equivalent to the total influence which it would exercise upon another substance if it were assisted by no accident. I answer 2º: the power of substance, insofar as adequate, can indeed naturally be exercised or reduced to act. For if matter already disposed from another source were applied to fire B in the first instant of its production, that fire could adequately produce another fire by substantial power alone. First, in that instant it is not occupied in producing its properties, as we noted (disp. 4, c. 3, n. 10); next, it is not assisted by its proper accidents, for in that instant these are occupied in instrumentally producing fire B itself; finally, neither must it be assisted by the accidents of the patient, because at that time these can naturally be occupied in altering other nearby matter.

§ 5. Arguments Against the Activity of Accidents Upon Substance Are Resolved.

26. Objection 1º: there is no necessity to attribute to accidents an influence upon substance, since substance of itself has sufficient power and contains the whole perfection of another substance. I answer: that necessity, at least physical, was sufficiently proved in § 2, and the adequate sufficiency of substance in itself does not prevent this, since it is generally occupied with its own properties. Add that it is also often occupied to some extent in disposing the patient. For example, in order that fire be produced, heat as eight must exist in the patient, which is often produced by the acting fire. But it is not produced by the heat as eight of the acting fire alone, since heat alone does not produce another equally intense heat. Therefore it is produced also by the substance of the fire. It is replied: where a univocal cause is present, the concurrence of an equivocal cause is not due; but the substance of fire is a univocal cause of another fire, whereas the accident is an equivocal cause. Therefore, etc. I answer by distinguishing the major premise: at most it is true of a univocal cause not occupied with other productions; such is not the substance of fire.

27. Objection 2º: no formality of substance corresponds to an accident; therefore an accident in no way contains the perfection of substance and consequently is in no way productive of substance. First, the objection proves that an accident influencing substance is altogether repugnant, contrary to most authors of the opposing opinion. Next, I answer 1º: correspondence of formalities, that is, likeness or univocity in predicates, is not necessary in equivocal causes, as is seen in substance, which according to the adversaries is productive of accident, and in a habit concurring toward an act. Yet this difference exists between an equivocal cause more perfect than its effect and one less perfect than its effect, or between a principal and an instrumental cause: the former is unlike its effect in such a way that it supereminently surpasses it, and therefore is said to contain it eminently; the latter is at once unlike it and inferior to it, and therefore contains the effect purely virtually. In other respects they are equal in dissimilarity of predicates with respect to the effect; for certainly there is no greater likeness of substance to accident than of accident to substance.

28. I answer 2º by denying the antecedent: for heat, for example, agrees with fire in the predicate or formality "productive of heat," which according to the adversaries belongs to both. Nor does it matter that this formality

belongs to both only insofar as it abstracts from substance and accident. For the formality of representation also belongs to the phantasm and the intelligible species only insofar as it abstracts from material and spiritual; and it is common to a species and cognition only insofar as it prescinds from vital and non-vital, just as the formality of vital activity is common to the intellect and beatific vision only insofar as it prescinds from substantial and accidental, natural and supernatural. Yet such correspondence or agreement is regarded as sufficient for the relation of cause and effect.

29. One may say: when two causes partially influence an effect, there must correspond to each a peculiar formality of the effect which is not found in the other; thus the supernatural character of an act of faith corresponds especially to the habit, and its vital character to the intellect. But the formality "productive of heat" corresponds no more to heat than to the substance of the acting fire. I answer: this rule does not hold universally, as is clear when two fires partially concur toward a third, or when the will and an acquired habit partially produce an act. Therefore, the fact that it is verified in many cases arises from the particular condition of the causes and effects, especially from the fact that one partial cause needs another because it lacks in itself a perfection sufficient for the effect, as happens in the example of the act of faith. From what has been said you will infer that the aspect under which an accident produces substance is the aspect "productive of accident." Or, if preferred, say that it is the same aspect under which substance itself produces, as must be said in the example of an acquired habit. For instruments which in operating are subordinated to another, just as they do not produce effects as their own but as proper to the agent they serve, so they need not assign to themselves a proper aspect under which they act, but can tend under the same aspect under which the principal cause tends.

30. Objection 3º: a material potency cannot produce spiritual acts; therefore neither can an accidental power produce substantial effects, for there is equal disproportion in each case. I answer by denying the consequence, because a material potency, for example the visual potency, is in fact proved by no argument to be active of spiritual acts, nor does it have proportion to them even under the aspect of a proximate disposition; but just as an accident has proportion to substance under the aspect of a proximate disposition for it, so it can also have proportion under the aspect of an active instrument, unless something prevents it. Yet if some material power were proved by a suitable argument from reason or experience to be instrumentally active of a spiritual effect, the distance of genus would be no

obstacle. Thus in fact very many judge concerning the material phantasm with respect to a spiritual species.

31. Objection 4º: the location and quantity of an agent do not influence any effect, especially a substantial one; yet substance is produced only in their presence. Therefore the fact that fire is produced in the presence of heat proves nothing. The example of cognition also supports this, since according to the common opinion cognition does not efficiently influence love. I answer: in location and quantity a positive disproportion to the effects of the agent in which they exist is proved. In location, because it is a mode instituted for no other purpose than to determine the thing ultimately to such a place; in quantity, because if it were active it would be a most universal cause, since it intervenes in every corporeal production. For the same reason the activity of prime matter in the operations of the composite is commonly denied. Similarly, the disproportion of cognition for efficiently producing love is commonly proved in Psychology from various absurdities which would follow; for example, that the habit of charity would be superfluous for the love of God above all things, because the influence of a preceding supernatural cognition would suffice; likewise, that an individual cognition would be as it were a universal cause of various and even contrary affections, because under the same cognition love and hatred, efficacious and inefficacious volition, intense and remiss volition, etc., can be elicited. But in our case nothing is brought forward which weakens the evidence of experience.

32. Finally, one may ask whether only the accidents of the agent concur toward substance, or the accidents of the ultimately disposed patient, or both together. The last appears to be affirmed with Father Compton and others. For both are commonly of the same nature and are sufficiently applied to concur. Nor is it an obstacle that the accidents by which the patient is ultimately disposed are properties of the generated form. For, as I already touched upon in n. 25, the form in the first instant of generation does not produce those properties which at the same time are dispositions preparing the subject. Therefore it can then efficiently depend upon them, although it conserves them in the following instants, when it itself is already conserved by God alone.

CHAPTER IV.

On the Power Productive of an Accidental Effect.

1. I assert 1º: substance is a power immediately active of its own properties, or accidents, in itself. Thus our authors with the Scotists against

the Thomists. Those are called "properties" or "proper accidents" which intrinsically perfect a substance and permanently pertain to its connatural state, for example heat in fire, cold in water, the potencies in the soul. Such accidents are said to "emanate, flow, and result" from their proper substance. This "emanation," according to the Thomists, consists in the fact that the substance of fire, for example, is naturally connected with heat, and at the same time requires that the same action by which it itself is produced also be productive of heat as a secondary and consequent term. Hence they wish the properties to be immediately produced by the agent generating or creating the substance, and indeed by the same action. The Scotists, however, and our authors with Father Suárez (d. 18, Met. s. 3), say that emanation is an action immediately arising from the substance itself in which the properties exist.

2. Assertion 1º is proved: substance is productive of its proper accident, as St. Thomas expressly teaches (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 77, a. 6); but it is not productive through another accident, since none intervenes between substance and the first property, as is certain. Therefore it is productive through itself as an immediate power. Confirmation, forestalling the solution of the adversaries: although substance is said to be "in a certain manner active" of its proper accident, as St. Thomas speaks there in the response to 2, because emanation is not "through transmutation" but through "natural resultance," as the Holy Doctor explains in the same place in the response to 3, nevertheless in some true sense it is an efficient principle of its proper accident, since St. Thomas unreservedly calls it an "active principle" and "productive," and the Thomists themselves admit that a property physically depends upon substance "in the genus of efficient cause," as may be seen in the College of St. Thomas of Alcalá (q. 11, n. 86). But this cannot stand if substance influences in no other way than by requiring that the accident be produced by the same production by which substance itself is produced. Therefore, etc.

3. The minor is proved 1º because, according to the Thomists, celestial matter requires that form be produced by the same action by which it itself is produced, and they say the same of elemental matter in the first creation of the world; yet matter is in no way an efficient principle of form. 2º Because substance is in no way an efficient principle of the action by which it itself is produced; therefore it is in no way an efficient principle of the action by which the accident is produced, if this action is really the same as the former. But it is contradictory for something to be an efficient principle of an effect without also being an efficient principle of the action, as is manifest. Therefore, etc. The objection is pressed: that which neither

immediately influences through itself nor roots or sustains an effective power is in no way an efficient principle. But if the contrary doctrine is true, substance neither immediately produces the accident nor roots or sustains the power effective of it, since it certainly does not root or sustain the power of the agent by which the substance itself is produced. Another refutation will be given a little below.

4. Assertion 1º is proved 2º by the familiar experiment of heated water, which, once removed from the fire, recovers its coldness from within itself. No suitable principle of this can be assigned except the substance of the water. The Thomists meet this with a twofold solution. The first is that some degree of cold always remains in the water, which, once the contrary is removed, intensifies itself and suffices for greater intensity because from conjunction with its proper substance or root it receives strength. But against this stands the fact that if remiss cold, when conjoined with its proper root, can produce more intense cold, it will be able to do so also when separated; which contradicts experience. The consequence is clear, both because substance, if it cooperates in nothing through itself, cannot increase its strength, and because according to the Thomists, for intense heat to produce fire and for the accidents of wine to produce wine, it is immaterial whether they are or are not conjoined with their proper root; for they act equally in its power whether conjoined or separated. This is also clear in the seeds of living things.

5. The second and more common solution is that this new cold is not produced through a new action, but through the same action by which the substance of the water was generated; this action, once the contrary is removed, by a new unfolding of itself perfects its secondary term, which is the cold of the water. But against this, 1º often the cause which generated the water is no longer present or even existing, and consequently its action does not persevere. Against this, 2º even if that action perseveres, it cannot be the production of cold if it can exist without the cold. For since action by its concept is the ultimate determination for the production of a term, secondary as well as primary, it is altogether contradictory for it to exist without some term of itself; otherwise it would be the ultimate determination and at the same time would not be, because it would leave some indifference and would need further determination.

6. Against this, 3º, and Thomistic emanation is attacked generally: the production of substance is often creation, while the production of properties is eduction, as is seen in the rational soul and also in the form of water and other elements at the beginning of the world according to the Thomists. Therefore it cannot be really the same action, because otherwise it would

simultaneously depend and not depend upon a presupposed subject. The argument is pressed also in forms that are educed: no form can be produced by the same action as the subject from which it is educed, both because it would follow that the subject is physically presupposed for the production of itself, and because this is precisely why the Thomists deny the eduction of an elemental form from matter at the beginning of the world, since at that time the form was produced by the same action as matter. But cold is educed from the form of water, and every other property from the form to which it belongs, since according to the Thomists accidents are received in the whole composite. Therefore it cannot be produced by the same action as the form.

7. Objection 1º: there is the proverb, "He who gives the form gives what follows upon the form," which is chiefly understood of properties and of the motions of heavy and light things toward their center. Therefore the same agent produces the form and the properties consequent upon it. Add 1º that an operation beginning with the being of the thing is attributed to the one generating or creating the thing. Add 2º that "Everything moved is moved by another," and therefore agent and patient must be distinct; but if substance produced in itself its own properties, the same thing would be agent and patient, mover and moved. I answer: he who gives the form gives the things which naturally follow it mediately and imputatively, insofar as by giving the form he gives a power immediately active and naturally connected with the consequents. In this sense also it is said that "the cause of the cause is the cause of the thing caused," especially when the immediate cause is naturally connected with the effect.

8. Hear St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5), where, speaking of God, he says: "He is not only the cause of actions insofar as He gives the form which is the principle of action, as the generator is said to be the cause of the motion of heavy and light things, but also," etc. Here he plainly supposes that the generator is the cause of the motion of heavy things in no other way than insofar as it gives the form which is the principle of that motion. To the first addition, the same answer applies, except that it must be understood of an operation which is necessary, or at least not beyond the intention of the generator; otherwise it is not attributed to it. To the second: everything moved is moved by another at least mediately, or even immediately in part, insofar as the First Cause concurs toward every motion. For the rest, the adversaries must admit that the same potency can undergo and receive the motion which it causes, in the intellective and volitional potencies.

9. Objection 2º: properties are not produced by substance through an action properly so called, but through emanation or resultance; therefore no

action of substance terminated at them is given. I answer: physically speaking, emanation is a true action, as Father Suárez effectively shows (loc. cit.); morally or according to common usage, however, it is called not so much an action as an addition or appendix to the action terminated at the substance, from which the properties result by natural necessity, as though consummating it by constituting the substance in its connatural state. In this sense properties are said not so much to be produced as to result from the production of substance. The difference, therefore, between emanation and action is taken from the character of the term, because emanation is the production of a term pertaining to the intrinsic and connatural state of a thing, whereas action is the production of any other effects.

10. I assert 2º: substance is also immediately productive of many accidents in an extraneous patient. Thus generally the same authors cited for the preceding assertion. It is proved because heat, for example, produced in an extraneous patient is of the same species as the proper heat of fire. Moreover, heat can be produced by a transient action, as is established. Therefore, if the substance of fire is productive of its proper heat, why not also of heat in an extraneous subject? Confirmation: when fire disposes wood for combustion, it produces in it heat as eight, which is the ultimate disposition for fire. But it does not produce this through the power of its proper heat alone. Therefore it also employs substantial power. The minor is proved because, according to common philosophy, one quality does not univocally produce another of equal intensity; but heat as eight, by which the patient is ultimately disposed, is equal in intensity to the heat of the acting fire. Experience itself teaches the same in other accidents, which generally act more intensely upon an extraneous patient when conjoined with their proper substance than when separated from it; this sufficiently indicates the immediate cooperation of substance.

11. One may say 1º: the Eucharistic accidents act with the same power and intensity as if they were with their proper substance. I answer: in the Eucharist God supplies the cooperation of substance in order to conceal the mystery from the senses, just as He supplies it when water is there converted into wine. One may say 2º: if the substance of water is productive of cold *ad extra*, why does it not also produce cold while the water is intensely hot? I answer: because it is prevented by the intense heat inhering in it, which preoccupies the proximate subject by its action; or also because its proper cold is a prerequisite condition for water to produce another's cold, because by the order of nature it first requires that it perfect itself before operating *ad extra*.

12. One may say 3º: the heat of fire is a sufficient univocal cause for the production of heat in an extraneous subject; but in the presence of a univocal cause the concurrence of an equivocal cause, such as the substance of fire with respect to heat, is not due. Therefore the sun, although of itself productive of fire, does not concur toward it when another fire is present. Therefore, etc. I answer: first, the heat of fire by itself does not suffice for the production of heat at the intensity at which it is often produced in an extraneous patient, as we saw in n. 10. Hence it is not surprising if the cooperation of substance is required. Next, the doctrine of the minor is not universally true, as is clear in light, which produces heat even when another heat is present. In universal causes, such as the sun, the reason is different, because their power seems to have been instituted by nature to supply for sublunary causes; hence it concurs only when these are deficient.

13. Observe, however, that not all accidents which a substance produces in itself can be produced by that substance in an extraneous patient. For some by their nature cannot be produced by a transient action, for example gravity and lightness. Observe again that some wish substance not immediately to influence those accidents which are equivocally produced by its own accidents in an extraneous subject. This indeed is true in some cases, for example in the species which the accidents of a substance send to the senses; yet it is not true in all, for the substance of the sun concurs toward the heat which its light equivocally produces in the air. This therefore depends upon the specific character of the various effects. We intend nothing more than that substance is immediately active of many accidents in an extraneous patient, especially of those which are univocally produced by its own qualities, and particularly of those which are dispositions for some substantial form.

14. I assert 3º: accidents can immediately produce other accidents, not only with substance cooperating, but sometimes also by themselves, both as univocal causes, as when the heat of water produces heat in the hand, and as equivocal causes, as when color produces visual species. The assertion is certain for all and confirmed by the testimony of experience. Nor is there any doubt that an accident can be a true principal cause of another accident inferior to itself, or even of one of the same species, at least one less intense, according to the proper concept of principal cause given in the preceding chapter, § 1; though not according to the less proper acceptation of principal cause as an agent "which acts," in the manner of a *suppositum* possessing or sustaining an active power. Moreover, when we grant activity to accidents, we do not speak of all of them. For not all accidents of the nine Predicaments are active, except perhaps through the natural resultance of

certain purely modal effects; in this sense quantity, for example, produces its proper location. We speak, therefore, of qualities, and not even of all of these, for figure, commonly numbered among qualities, is not active. Of qualities, some are active of like effects, others of unlike effects, and others equally of like and unlike effects. Whoever wishes more on these matters should consult the Excellent Doctor (cit. d. 18, s. 4).

CHAPTER V.
On Obediential Potency.

Thus far we have treated of the natural power productive of substance and accident. Now we must briefly treat of obediential power or potency.

§ 1. What Is Obediential Potency?

1. Every potency which does not operate except at the command of a rational agent can be called an obediential potency, especially if of itself it does not require either to act or to undergo. Hence wood or stone is said to be in passive obediential potency for an artistic form, and mechanical instruments are said to act through obediential potency. But here obediential potency is taken more strictly for the aptitude of things to be subjected and obedient to God when He supernaturally decrees, whether in receiving or acting. It can therefore be defined as: "The aptitude of things, according to the will of God and by His assistance not due to the things themselves, to perform a function which they are naturally unable to perform." This definition accords with the doctrine of St. Thomas (*De potentia*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 18).

2. This potency is therefore called "obediential" because it cannot be reduced to act by its own exigency, nor by that of another thing belonging to the order of nature, but by the command of God as supernatural Author; hence it is opposed to "natural" potency, that is, a potency naturally reducible to act. It is called "elevable" because by God's assistance it is placed in a state proximately capable of rising to the function of a higher order or one placed outside its natural sphere. It is also called "inchoate and remote" because it can never naturally become proximate or ready; and because active obediential potency, if taken strictly, is never adequate and sufficient for its effect even in the genus of second cause unless there is added to it a principal power of the supernatural order. I say "if taken strictly," because that potency which acts supernaturally only as to mode is also called obediential less properly. Such a potency can of itself have a

natural power adequate to the effect and action, although because of the circumstances the general concurrence of the First Cause is not due to it; as if God supplied to water concurrence for cooling in the presence of a stronger fire. We are now speaking of active obediential potency through an action supernatural as to substance. Through a supernatural action, I say, because although the effect may be natural in itself, if it lies outside the natural sphere of the agent, it is produced obedientially by an action intrinsically supernatural; as if fire were elevated to produce water.

3. Hence obediential potency can also belong to a supernatural thing with respect to an effect natural in entity, as if grace were elevated by God to produce heat, which lies outside its connatural sphere. It can likewise belong to a thing natural in entity, as it belongs to the intellect with respect to the beatific vision, which lies above its natural sphere. This potency consists in the natural entity of the intellect itself, and the same should be understood of other things natural in entity, and is really identified with it, because the intellect in its natural entity possesses the ability to obey God by cooperating with the light of glory in producing the beatific vision. Hence such a potency is natural "entitatively and subjectively"; nevertheless it is not called a "natural potency" absolutely, because only a potency respecting effects producible by itself through natural action, or effects for which it does not of itself need the companionship of a supernatural co-principle, is so called. Therefore the natural and obediential potencies of the intellect are identified subjectively; but completively and terminatively they are distinguished: completively, because one in the character of proximate and adequate potency is completed only through supernatural and undue co-principles, while the other is completed through natural and due ones; terminatively, because one respects supernatural terms or cognitions, the other natural ones. By this kind of terminative distinction the ordinary and extraordinary potencies of God, or the potency of God as supernatural Author, are also commonly distinguished, although subjectively they are one and the same. Thus too, on the opinion identifying the potencies with the soul, intellect and will are distinguished in reality only terminatively.

4. Obediential potency is commonly divided into passive, or receptive of a supernatural form or of one naturally unreceptible in such a subject; and active, or productive of a supernatural term or one naturally improducible by such a potency. Each certainly exists in our soul: passive potency with respect to grace and other supernatural gifts; active potency with respect to acts of faith, charity, vision, etc. But there is a difference between the two potencies: active potency, as we noted in n. 2, is inadequate and partial in its own genus, namely in the genus of efficient cause, even of a second cause,

and therefore does not act unless assisted by a supernatural active co-principle; whereas passive potency is, or can be, adequate in the character of a receptive subject, and in this genus does not require a supernatural co-principle. For if the soul, in order to receive grace, needed a superadded supernatural potency, would this potency be received immediately and adequately in the soul, or by means of another supernatural potency? If the second is chosen, I shall ask the same of that other potency, and we shall proceed to infinity. If the first is said, then the soul, in order to receive some supernatural form, does not need a supernatural passive potency; and once this is granted, there is no reason why it should need such a potency in order to receive grace.

5. Hence the elevation of passive obediential potency consists in God's supernatural decree to produce in it, or dependently upon it as upon a subject, some form naturally unattainable by it in virtue of itself. The elevation of active obediential potency, however, consists in its conjunction with a supernatural assistance or active co-principle, or even in God's decree applying Omnipotence to concur specially with some thing toward an effect or action supernatural and undue. By reason of such elevation each potency, although natural in entity, is said to perform its function as "supernaturalized." It should be noted here that to passive obediential potency can be reduced "informative" obediential potency, which belongs to a form for informing several matters simultaneously, or more properly for informing another possible matter specifically diverse from one to which it is naturally adapted; likewise "terminable" obediential potency, which created nature possesses so that it may be terminated by the subsistence of the Word.

6. A twofold question is commonly raised here. First: whether active obediential potency is a power immediately influencing the supernatural effect together with the supernatural co-principle, or whether that co-principle is the entire power or entire reason for acting in the manner of a power, for example the light of glory with respect to the beatific vision, and the habit of faith or charity with respect to their acts. Second: whether in every created thing there is an obediential potency elevable to produce anything whatsoever. Both questions, especially the first, properly belong to theologians, by whom they are commonly treated at very great length, and are treated most fully by Father Ripalda (t. 1, *De ente supernaturali*, disp. 30). Yet because philosophers often allude to these controversies, we shall not omit them altogether, but shall treat them sparingly, or merely touch upon them.

§ 2. The Light or Habit Is Not the Entire Reason for Acting, or the Entire Power, for Supernatural Acts.

7. Thus the whole School of the Society together with the whole School of the Scotists against the Thomists. The Thomists, although in Catholic fashion they acknowledge a true and proper activity of the soul, intellect, and will toward supernatural acts, nevertheless attribute the whole influence in the manner of a power to the supernatural principle, such as the light or an intrinsically infused habit; and in general they deny that in things natural in entity there can be found an obediential potency which is a power even partially active of a supernatural effect. Thus, according to the Thomists, the soul truly produces the vision of God as the principle "which acts," and the intellect also truly produces it as the principle "by which," in the manner of a potency; but neither the soul nor the intellect produces the vision in the manner of a power, for in this manner the light alone acts. Our opinion, however, is that the adequate power for the vision consists in the complex formed by the light and the intellect, so that not only the light but also the intellect truly influences as a partial power.

8. It is proved 1º from the Council of Trent, sess. 6, can. 4, defining thus: "If anyone shall say that the free choice of man, moved and excited by God, cooperates in nothing by assenting to God who excites and calls, but like something inanimate does nothing at all and behaves merely passively, let him be anathema." From this oracle of faith we have, 1º that free choice truly cooperates with Divine grace; but from the terms themselves, to cooperate is to operate together with another. We have, 2º that free choice does not behave merely passively, but truly does something. Therefore it contributes more to a supernatural act than receiving grace and the act produced by grace alone, for all this is merely passive behavior. They say that the soul and free choice truly act and cooperate as the principle "which acts," in the manner of substance, and as the principle "by which," in the manner of a potency.

9. But they are opposed, 1º because if neither the soul nor the will is an immediate power, to be a principle "which acts" or "by which" signifies nothing else in reality than to be something receiving from an extrinsic agent the whole active power, and from this power the supernatural act. But this does not go beyond the bounds of mere passivity. Thus prime matter behaves merely passively toward form and toward the operations of form. One may say: the light of glory is a power appropriated and adapted to the

soul and given for the end that the soul may be rendered capable of vision. Against this: form too is appropriated to matter and is given for the end that the whole composite in which matter is included may be rendered capable of acting as the principle "which acts." And the parity is pressed: according to the Thomists, the power of assisting grace is not subordinated to the will but subordinates the will to itself. For although Palancus asserts the opposite (hic q. 22, n. 19), Master Bolivar the Dominican teaches that this is absurd (tract. de Vision., dub. 4, n. 33). Therefore that power is not otherwise appropriated to the soul or will except insofar as it is usefully united to it as a more excellent form which subordinates its subject to itself. But in this sense substantial form is beyond doubt appropriated to matter.

10. They are opposed, 2º because a thing which neither immediately influences through itself nor through another that influences in its name or in its power does not truly act. But the will or soul does not immediately influence the vision through itself, nor does the light otherwise influence in the name of the soul or in the power of the soul. Therefore, etc. The major is established because the Thomists themselves assign no other mode of acting. As we saw above in chapter 1, they preserve the true activity of substance as a radical principle "which acts" and "by which" only insofar as the accident influences in the name and power of substance. The minor is proved as to the second part, both because to act in the power of another is to act through a power received from or rooted in the other, at least through emanation, as the Thomists themselves explain where they treat of the activity of accident, whereas the power of the light certainly is not rooted in or received from the soul; and also because that which acts in the name and power of another acts as subordinated to the other, as St. Thomas teaches, cited above in chapter 3, § 3, and as is clear by induction through political, mechanical, and natural instruments. But according to the Thomists the light does not act as subordinated to the soul. The argument is pressed: the soul does not produce the vision as an instrumental cause, as all Thomists teach according to the testimony of Palancus (hic q. 21, n. 41); nor, on the other hand, as a principal cause. Therefore it does not produce it in any manner. The minor is clear, both because the light is not an instrumental power of the soul, otherwise it would be a power subordinated to it, and because neither does the soul contain the whole perfection of the vision, nor is the production of the vision principally attributed to it.

11. They are opposed, 3º because if the will acts through grace as through the whole power, it will be said to "cooperate" with grace only in the most improper sense, which conflicts with the cited Council, Scripture, and the Fathers. The consequence is proved because no one is said to cooperate with

his own adequate power, but to operate through it. Thus a man does not co-love with his own will, nor co-understand with his intellect, nor co-walk with his walking potency, nor cooperate with an agent to whom he has committed the whole affair, but loves through the will, understands through the intellect, etc. Hence only in the most improper sense will that statement in Wis. 9 be verified: "Send her from your holy heavens … that she may labor with me." To this the Apostle alluded in 1 Cor. 15, saying: "I have labored more abundantly than all of them; yet not I, but the grace of God with me," that is, as St. Augustine explains (*De gratia et libero arbitrio*, c. 5), "not alone, but the grace of God with me; and by this neither the grace of God alone nor he alone, but the grace of God with him." Most improperly, I say, no less than if it were said: my visual potency sees with me; my intellect understands with me; my worker, by whose hands alone I cultivate the vineyard, labors with me. Certainly one who asks a companion to labor with him would be considered a mocker if he committed all the labor to his companion while himself immediately laboring in nothing.

12. This same point is pressed: the grace of God truly "assists" us in operating, as is known from Scripture, Councils, and Fathers. But "he who is assisted also does something through himself," as St. Augustine says on Ps. 78, "Help us, O God." Therefore our soul also does something through itself; therefore it does not act only through grace. For one who is so assisted by a companion that he does nothing except through that companion would ridiculously be said to "do something also through himself," although he could be called an agent as the principle "which acts," because the companion would act in his name. This is confirmed from St. Thomas (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 12, a. 5), saying: "Since the natural power of the created intellect does not suffice for seeing the essence of God, it is necessary that by Divine grace there superaccumulate to it a power of understanding; and this increase of intellectual power we call the illumination of the intellect. And this is the light of which it is said in Apoc. 21," etc. Here you plainly see that the light is an increase and augmentation of power, and therefore is not the whole power but presupposes something of power in the intellect. Otherwise it could truly be said that first grace is an increase of grace; or that light given to dark air is an increase of illuminating power; or that money bestowed upon a poor man who previously had none is an increase of money. Note that St. Thomas speaks of "power," not of the principle "which acts," nor of the principle "by which" in the manner of a potency.

13. Finally, they are opposed because Trent in the cited canon defines that activity of free choice which the Calvinists, against whom it acts, did

not acknowledge but denied. Yet the Calvinists certainly acknowledged activity in the manner of the principle "which acts" and in the manner of volitional potency. For even the impious heresiarch Calvin himself, cited by Camerarius (*De libero arbitrio*, l. 10, c. 5), speaks thus: "The question is not whether the will acts, which is beyond doubt, but whether it acts from itself or according to the mode of Divine action; for who denies that it is through the will that man wills?" Then in c. 9 he states his opinion thus: "We teach that man is so acted upon by the grace of God that he nevertheless acts at the same time; yet he so acts at the same time that the whole efficacy of the action is and remains in the Spirit of God." See other words of Calvin in Ripalda (l.c.) and Maldonatus on John 15:5.

14. It is proved 2º: the soul truly lives physically through the vision of God, and the vision itself, or its production, is a physical and vital motion of the soul, as no one doubts. But vital motion is motion from within according to all. Therefore the soul truly produces the vision from within itself. But this cannot stand if the light is the whole power. Therefore, etc. The minor is proved, 1º from what was said in n. 10, because if the soul neither immediately influences nor produces or roots the influencing power, it does not truly act. 2º Because for a production to be from within the subject, as is required for life, it is not enough that it be from a power intrinsically inhering in the subject if that power is impressed from without and is in no way rooted in the subject. Thus the sensations of the soul of a brute are not from within matter, nor is matter their vital principle. Thus too the production of heat in the air by light inhering in it is not vital. Likewise the upward motion of a stone arising from an impetus impressed upon it from without, although intrinsically received by the stone, is not vital.

15. Nor does it help that the Thomists say that the power of the light is consonant with, adapted to, and appropriated to the soul. First, because this also is verified of form with respect to matter, from n. 9. Second, because light too is sufficiently consonant with and adapted to air; for "air, according to the nature of its species, is in the ultimate disposition for receiving light by reason of its transparency," as St. Thomas says (*De veritate*, q. 28, a. 3, ad 9). Third, because an impetus toward upward motion can be not violent but highly consonant with the nature of a stone, namely if it is impressed by God alone; for according to the Thomistic doctrine given above, disp. 1, c. 2, whatever is done by God cannot be violent, but rather is conformable to the principal and prevailing inclination of things. Nor does it help to say that the power of the light is given for an effect contained within the sphere of the intellective potency. For if the natural sphere is meant, the vision certainly is not contained within it; but if the supernatural sphere is meant, this means

nothing else than that the vision is contained within the sphere of the intellect as possessing the light of glory. But illumination or heating is likewise contained within the sphere of air as possessing light, and upward motion within the sphere of a stone as possessing impetus. Add that natural intellection and beatific vision agree with each other no more than the downward and upward motions of a stone, at least if the impetus is impressed by God alone.

16. It is proved 3º from the consideration of liberty: supernatural love is free; therefore it must proceed from a power free in first act. But the habit of charity is not free in first act; therefore it is not the whole and sole power. The minor assumed is clear because the habit of charity cannot determine itself to the act or to omission of the act. Otherwise omission of the act, even when sinful, would be imputed to the habit, and merit and demerit would properly belong to it; which is absurd. They say that the habit is free as the principle "by which," and permissively, insofar as it permits the will by its own power to omit or impede the supernatural act. But against this the proof is renewed, 1º: the supernatural act is immediately free to the will, as is established; therefore it immediately proceeds from the will by immediacy of power. The consequence is proved, both because if it does not so proceed, it will be free to the will only insofar as the will can by its own power posit a natural act impeding the supernatural one, or omit that natural act, from which omission the supernatural act follows from the power of the habit alone. But in this way the supernatural act is free only through the mediation of the natural omission, and consequently only mediately free. Also, because it pertains to the nature of an immediately free act that the will can immediately restrain it and cease from it. This is unintelligible unless the act immediately depends upon the will's proper power. Hence, in order to preserve God's immediate power to impede or destroy any effect whatsoever, every effect must immediately depend upon God by immediacy of power, as the Thomists do not doubt.

17. It is renewed 2º: a free act, according to the common opinion of the Thomists, is intrinsically and essentially free; therefore from its intrinsic principles it is a positive determination and choice of one object or motive in preference to others which here and now can attract the will. Therefore the formality of positive determination and choice must be precontained in its adequate active power, which consequently must itself be positively determinative and elective. But the habit is not positively determinative and elective, both because otherwise it would no longer be merely permissively free, as the Thomists say, but positively free; and because it would follow, contrary to the judgment of all, that the habit is free choice. For as St.

Thomas says (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 83, a. 3): "Choice is proper to free choice; for from this we are said to possess free choice, that we can receive one thing while refusing another, which is to choose; and therefore the nature of free choice must be considered from choice." Therefore the power of the will must concur together with the habit. Add that according to the given solution the liberty and determinative force of the will toward a supernatural act is constituted from its natural power, for the will freely elicits such an act precisely insofar as by its own power it can elicit its omission or a natural act by which the supernatural act is impeded. Since, therefore, liberty is essentially constituted by the power to omit, it cannot be constituted from the power of the habit alone, but must additionally include natural power. Therefore the habit is not the whole power freely determining toward a salutary act. Once this is granted, the contrary arguments collapse. I omit many others which our theologians vigorously propose and develop.

§ 3. Response to the Objections.

18. Objection 1º: the intellect does not produce the vision except insofar as elevated; but the light is the entire reason for elevating; therefore it is also the entire reason for acting. Confirmation: operation follows being; but the habit is the entire reason for being supernaturally. Therefore it is also the entire reason for acting supernaturally. I answer: by the same form of argument it can be proved that the application of fire is the entire reason for burning, and cognition the entire reason for loving, because fire does not burn except insofar as applied, nor does the will love except insofar as illuminated by cognition. Moreover, the argument is retorted: the will does not elicit a meritorious act except insofar as free; but the habit is not the whole liberty or whole reason of liberty, from n. 17. Therefore the habit is not the entire reason for eliciting. Accordingly, I answer by distinguishing the major premise: with an elevation which functions as the entire power, I deny it; with an elevation which functions as a complement of power, I grant the major and minor premises and deny the consequence. To the confirmation: operation does not necessarily follow being as the whole power of acting, but often as a prerequisite or partial power. The Thomists must admit this in the following retortion: operation follows being; but substance is the whole reason for being; therefore it is also the whole reason for acting. Or in this: to operate freely follows being free; but the habit is not the entire reason why the will is free toward a salutary act; therefore neither is it the entire reason why it freely operates that act. Add the objection from

the application of fire, which would be the whole reason for burning because burning follows upon being applied.

19. Objection 2º: before elevation the intellect is essentially disproportionate to producing the vision of God; but an essential disproportion is not removed through elevation. Therefore even given elevation the intellect cannot produce the vision. But I ask whether before elevation there is in the soul and intellect an essential disproportion to producing the vision as the principle "which acts" and as the principle "by which" in the manner of a potency; and, if there is, whether it is removed through elevation. The intellect, therefore, before elevation is essentially disproportionate to producing the vision as the whole power, and this disproportion is not removed through elevation. Yet it is not essentially disproportionate to producing the vision as a partial power; for with respect to this it is only naturally disproportionate, by a disproportion which indeed cannot be removed but can nevertheless be supernaturally overcome through an elevating co-principle which, notwithstanding that disproportion, assists the intellect in influencing.

20. Objection 3º: from our opinion it follows that the vision is partly natural and partly supernatural, since it proceeds from a power partly natural and partly supernatural. Indeed, the vision will be absolutely natural, because denomination follows the weaker part. I answer by denying the consequence, because just as the vision does not derive naturalness from the soul and intellect, although these are natural and, according to the Thomists, properly act as the principle "which acts" and the principle "by which" in the manner of a principal cause; likewise, just as the intrinsic liberty of an act does not become natural from a free power which is partly natural; likewise, just as an intelligible species is not partly material and partly spiritual although it is produced by a material phantasm and a spiritual intellect; so the beatific vision is not partly natural although it proceeds from a power partly natural in entity. Rather, it is wholly supernatural because it is an indivisible act absolutely surpassing the exigency and sufficiency of all nature, as the concept of supernatural being requires. For nature can neither innately require the vision as due to itself nor suffice for its production without supernatural assistance. As to the statement that denomination follows the weaker part, first, this is not universally true but admits countless exceptions; next, it supposes something false in the present matter if it speaks of parts of the vision, for there are none. The reason why the vision does not savor of the weaker part of its principle in respect of naturalness is that the naturalness of that part cooperates only insofar as supernaturally elevated. I ask the Thomists why substance produced by an

accident does not savor of the weakness of the accident. They will say that the reason is because substance must savor only of the character of the principal cause, which is another substance. But I ask again: why then does the beatific vision not savor of the naturalness of the intellect which, according to the Thomists, truly produces it as a principal cause?

21. From these things you will infer, 1º that the vision is no less intrinsically supernatural than the light, although the vision, and not the light, arises from an inadequate power natural in entity. The reason is that supernaturalness consists in something indivisible, namely in simply surpassing the sufficiency and exigency of all nature, which belongs equally to the vision and to the light. Nor can the Thomists disagree, since according to them the vision intrinsically depends upon the intellect as upon a truly active principle, and an act of charity, intrinsically free, essentially presupposes a natural power capable of impeding it; although the light or habit does not so depend or presuppose. You will infer, 2º that it is ineptly objected against us that a man or angel will be able to see God by the powers of nature. For this expression absolutely signifies the ability to see God in a naturally possible manner and without the assistance of grace, or the ability, by the powers of nature left to themselves and neither elevated nor assisted by supernatural powers, to see God. Thus one would ineptly say that a boy can carry a thousand pounds of iron by his own strength because he possesses some partial and inchoate strength. And ask the adversaries whether it can suitably be said that man has a natural and indeed adequate potency for seeing God because according to them the intellect is the whole potency for seeing God, since the light is not added in the manner of a potency.

22. Hence you will infer, 3º that our opinion in no way favors the error of Pelagius or of the Semi-Pelagians. For Pelagius said that nature through itself suffices for the business of eternal salvation, both for the end and for salutary works, and that grace is not necessary except perhaps for acting more easily. The Semi-Pelagians acknowledged the necessity of grace for progress and consummation, but not for the beginning of salvation; for they wished nature to suffice at least for the beginning of faith without assisting grace. Read St. Thomas (*Quodlibet* I, a. 7) and the great Augustine (*De praedestinatione sanctorum*, c. 2), where he distinctly sets forth the Semi-Pelagian error, just as he sets forth the error of Pelagius in Epist. 90, ad Hilar., in *De gratia Christi*, and very frequently elsewhere. Our opinion destroys such errors, for it grants to nature some power toward supernatural acts, but one so insufficient and inept that, left to itself and deprived of the assistance of grace, it cannot avail even for the least supernatural act. See

the great Augustine (*De gratia Christi*, c. 47), and you will find this very opinion of ours expressly approved by the Doctor of Grace. The Thomists will not so easily free themselves from the error of Calvin, as may be gathered from what was said in the preceding section, not by way of censure but by force of consequence. Nor will they with equal ease repel the error of Pelagius if they grant that the whole "potency" for salutary acts is natural, as they seem to grant, since they attribute activity in the manner of a potency not to the habit but to the will.

23. Objection 4º, against our proof drawn from vital activity: the vital character of the vision is not precontained in the intellect but in the light alone; therefore it does not require the immediate influence of the intellect. The antecedent is proved, 1º because the vital character of the vision is supernatural, or is supernaturalness itself, and this is not contained in the intellect. 2º, and this comes almost to the same thing, because the vision is supernatural life in second act; therefore there corresponds to it supernatural life in first act, which the intellect, as distinct from the light, does not possess. 3º Because the light does not act under the aspect of supernaturalness as such; otherwise it could produce whatever is supernatural. Therefore it acts under the aspect of supernatural vital activity; therefore vital activity also corresponds to the light. The objection proves, 1º that the vital activity of intellect or free choice is merely material to supernatural acts, and consequently that in eliciting such acts free choice behaves "as something inanimate," contrary to the definition of Trent. It proves, 2º that an act of charity, insofar as it is a positive determination and choice, is not supernatural, because under that aspect it is contained not in the habit but in the will. It proves, 3º that the intellect does not act as a principal cause of the vision, because containing the perfection of the effect is proper to a principal cause, as the Thomists teach concerning the production of substance by an accident. It proves, 4º that the light truly lives and understands through the vision, since it is a truly and properly vital principle and produces the vision vitally in a true and proper sense, more than the intellect does.

24. It must therefore be said that the vital character and whole perfection of the vision are virtually precontained in the intellect as in a partial cause; wholly, I say, not by totality of cause but by totality of effect. For when an indivisible effect arises from several partial causes, the whole effect depends upon each one; for that which lacks parts depends wholly upon anything upon which it depends. Yet the whole effect does not depend upon each one by totality of cause, that is, upon each as upon a total cause, because it so depends wholly upon one that it would not depend upon it at

all unless it simultaneously depended wholly upon the other. Hence all predicates of the vision are really produced by the intellect, but all together are also produced by the light. Speaking of acts of the will, St. Bernard beautifully teaches this in his treatise *De gratia et libero arbitrio*, near the end, in these words: "Not partly grace and partly free choice, but each performs the whole in one indivisible work; the whole indeed this one, and the whole that one." The same is clear in an act produced by a species and the intellect, or by the will and an acquired habit. Moreover, the containment of the vision in the intellect is neither univocal nor eminent, but purely virtual and instrumental; this does not require equality or excess of perfection, but can be found in a thing far inferior, as in an accident with respect to substance, and also in a species and acquired habit with respect to intellection and love.

25. Hence, to the objection I deny the antecedent if it means precontainment purely virtual, as in an inadequate cause. To proof 1º: the supernaturalness of the vision is also virtually contained in the intellect in the manner stated, because the whole vision is really produced by the intellect as a partial cause and the whole is really produced by the light. I say "really," for in the formal sense only the vital character of the vision is said to correspond to the intellect, and only its supernaturalness to the light, because to one considering the predicates of the vision no other ground appears for the necessity of the intellect's concurrence except that the vision is vital, nor for the concurrence of the light except that the vision is supernatural. Hence the intellect is said to concur under the aspect of vital activity, while the light concurs under the aspect of supernaturalness, as the formal aspect under which each acts; although both the light and the intellect together produce every other formality of the vision as a formal aspect which is produced. The matter is clear from the example of the species and intellect concurring toward natural cognition under diverse formal aspects. Nor is it an obstacle that the intellect is not supernatural in entity nor the light vital, because to produce a whole effect in the manner of a partial cause agreement in all predicates, equality, or superiority is not required, as is clear in a non-vital species producing vital cognition, and in the other examples of the preceding number.

26. To proof 2º, I answer by distinguishing the consequence: supernatural life in first act by identity corresponds to it, I deny; life supernatural by elevation, that is, supernaturalized through an elevating co-principle, I grant. For it suffices that there correspond to the vision in first act an adequate principle in which vital activity and supernaturalness are included, although without identity between them; such is the complex formed by intellect and light. Thus cognition, which is vital representation in

second act, does not correspond in first act to a representation vitally identical, but to a complex formed by the representative species and the vital intellect. One may say: therefore there is in the vision some formality not found in the total power, namely the "identity" of vital activity and supernaturalness. I answer: first, the same follows concerning the identity of representation and vital activity in every cognition. Next, the identity of two formalities is not a peculiar formality rationally distinct from those which it identifies. Finally, even if it is a peculiar formality, it suffices that it be found eminently or equivalently in the complex formed by intellect and light, for this complex is more perfect, or at least not less perfect, than the vision insofar as it includes that identity. Nor is that formality among those which must formally be contained in the cause, as may be seen in the example given.

27. To proof 3º: it could similarly be proved that the species is not required for cognition, because the intellect acts under the aspect of vital activity, not of just any vital activity but of representative vital activity; otherwise it could produce whatever is vital. Moreover, I distinguish the first consequence: under the aspect of supernatural vital activity really, I grant; vitally in a formal sense, I deny the consequence. I similarly distinguish the second consequence. Accordingly, in the real sense supernatural vital activity is produced by the light, as we have shown; but in the formal sense the aspect under which the light acts is not supernatural vital activity, at least explicitly. Nor, however, is it a supernaturalness indifferent to vital and non-vital, but determinately vital either implicitly or by connection. Thus risibility, although it is not formally animality, is nevertheless connected with it, for it is not indifferent to animal and non-animal. The same can be explained by the example of vital representation.

28. Finally observe that the light and the intellect produce the vision by one action, really indivisible and common to both. This is evident of itself if a vital act is really indistinct from its own production. And whatever may be held concerning this distinction, it is easily proved: the action of the intellect is intrinsically supernatural, since it is essentially connected with a supernatural term. Therefore it cannot proceed from the intellect alone, but must also proceed from the light. Therefore the light truly acts through the action of the intellect. Therefore another action of the light in addition would be superfluous. One may say with Palancus: the same action cannot proceed from powers specifically distinct and simultaneously concurring under diverse formal aspects, both because actions are specified and consequently diversified by diversity of principles and of the formal aspect under which they act, and because those powers do not constitute a

principle essentially one in the operative line, since they are not related as act and potency in that line. But against this stands the fact that "one and the same action proceeds from the first and second agent," namely from God and the creature, as St. Thomas says (*Summa Theologiae* I, q. 105, a. 5, ad 2). Yet God and the creature are principles supremely diverse, they concur simultaneously under diverse formal aspects, and they are not related as act and potency. Accordingly, action is diversified by diversity of principles and formal aspect only when the actions are otherwise presupposed or proved to be numerically distinct; nor does one action require a principle essentially one except by unity of order, subordination, or coordination toward the same effect.

§ 4. Anything Can Be Divinely Elevated to Produce Anything, With Certain Exceptions.

29. Thus, with Father Suárez, most of our authors and very many others, including Thomists, whom Father Ripalda cites and follows (t. 1, *De ente supernaturali*, d. 40, s. 2), against Father Vázquez, whom several others of our authors and the Scotist Mastrius follow. I said "with certain exceptions," because no creature can be elevated to produce itself with respect to its first being, nor to produce an act essentially true of its own nonexistence; and in general those productions must be excepted in which some special repugnance is discovered which is not common to created things as such. Some except things producible by creation alone, but improperly, because it is not repugnant that a creature be divinely elevated as an instrument for creating, as we shall say elsewhere with Father Suárez.

30. The assertion is proved 1º because God can do whatever does not imply contradiction, and no contradiction follows from water being divinely elevated to produce grace, and similarly in other cases. The adversaries may say: in the present matter the question is not so much what God can do as what creatures can do, namely whether in fact there inheres in all creatures an active obediential potency for anything whatsoever. But this question, since it concerns not possibility but fact and pertains to existing creatures, should not be decided from mere non-repugnance but from experience or other indications, none of which favors the affirmative part. Add that the extension of a power to any effects whatsoever is undoubtedly a great perfection of a creature, which should not in fact be asserted without a positive and compelling foundation. But against this, 1º questions concerning the capacity of a form to be divinely received in several matters, or of matter to receive several forms simultaneously, or of a nature to be

simultaneously terminated by several subsistences, or of a body to exist simultaneously in several places or penetrate another body, and in general whatever questions concern some miracle regarding existing creatures, can with equal right be called "questions of fact." Yet the adversaries everywhere decide such questions affirmatively from non-repugnance.

31. Against this, 2º: the question about the extension of obediential potency is more about possibility than about fact, for it asks whether such an action of a creature, insofar as obedient to its Creator, implies contradiction. If this is decided negatively, the question of fact concerning a potency implanted in things is thereby, as a consequence, decided affirmatively. It is explained: from the non-repugnance of a hypothesis we rightly infer that it is in fact contained under the potency of God because in God we presuppose potency for everything which in itself does not imply contradiction. But in water too we presuppose a potency, at least obediential, for every action which, if considered as proceeding from water, does not involve contradiction in itself; for by that very fact such an action is not incapable of arising from water. Therefore from the non-repugnance of such an action it is rightly inferred that it is in fact contained under the obediential potency of water. One may say: the potency in water for such an action must first be proved; for if no potency in water is given, an action as proceeding from water will undoubtedly imply contradiction. But I infer: therefore in every question of possibility the potency in God for such a hypothesis must first be proved; for if no potency for it is given in God, the hypothesis will undoubtedly imply contradiction. The practice of all must therefore be condemned who first prove that a hypothesis considered in itself is not repugnant, in order thence to infer that there is potency in God for executing it.

32. Against this, 3º: questions concerning obediential potency directly or principally regard the breadth of God's Omnipotence and His absolute dominion over creatures; and since the breadth of Divine dominion must be measured by the mere non-repugnance of a hypothesis, from the same consideration the creature's obediential potency must be measured, even if it in some way pertains to a question of fact. Hence our assertion is proved 2º because every conceivable breadth and commendation must be attributed to Divine dominion and Omnipotence where no repugnance appears. But it is, from the terms themselves, a greater breadth of Omnipotence and a greater commendation of Divine dominion that God can use any creature as an instrument for any effects whatsoever than that He cannot. Thus the fact that the sun through heat as an instrument can produce more effects than fire can through the same instrument greatly commends the power of the

sun above the power of fire. For the higher an active power is, the higher the effect to which it can make an instrument produce, as St. Thomas aptly observes (*De potentia*, q. 6, a. 1, ad 18), concluding thus: "Hence nothing prevents created nature from being in potency for doing, through Divine power, things which an inferior power cannot do. And this is called the potency of obedience, according as every creature obeys the Creator." He says "in potency for certain things," not for all, because of the exceptions made in n. 29. For the rest, according to St. Thomas "every creature" possesses this potency.

33. Finally, it is proved because several adversaries grant in creatures a passive obediential potency for any form whatever, for example in water for receiving grace, in an angel for receiving heat, etc. But there is no greater difficulty in active potency. One may say: passive potency does not signify perfection, whereas active potency does. But against this: purely obediential active potency, as asserted by us, signifies no more than transcendental perfection, since it is founded upon the character of creature or created being as such. But passive potency also signifies transcendental perfection, for it can belong only to a real and positive being. Hence you will resolve what was objected in n. 30 about a perfection not to be asserted without a compelling foundation. For we do not assert some new specific perfection, or one which shines forth more in one creature than in another, but a perfection generally included in the concept of creature; and for asserting this there is a compelling foundation, namely God's dominion. Yet it must not be denied that in intellect and will obediential potency for supernatural acts, both passive and active, is a special perfection, because it is founded not on the general concept of creature but on the proper concept of rational creature. Although it does not innately require such effects, it is nevertheless connaturally required by them as their proper active and passive principle. The same must be said of the passive obediential potency which belongs to the rational soul for receiving grace.

§ 5. Contrary Arguments Are Forestalled.

34. In order to forestall the contrary arguments, keep the following observations before your eyes. 1º Although wood, for example, possesses of itself an inchoate and partial power for producing fire, that power cannot be completed or rendered proximately capable through the companionship of an acting fire or another natural co-principle, because the power of wood toward fire is purely and strictly obediential, and consequently cannot be exercised except through a supernatural action; and in relation to an action

of this kind it cannot be completed by a natural co-principle. Thus the obediential potency of matter, which nevertheless is not so strictly obediential, for receiving several forms simultaneously cannot be exercised even though natural agents productive of several forms are simultaneously present, because that potency is instituted to obey God as supernatural Author, not to comply with natural agents.

35. 2º From our opinion it does not follow that a brute can be elevated to see God, nor a stone to understand or act freely. For, as Father Arriaga very well observes, for a brute to be elevated so that it sees God is for it to be elevated so as to be an intrinsic constituent of this denomination or concrete, "seeing God." But this cannot be done without overturning the essence of such a denomination, since it is essentially constituted from the vision and a rational subject, just as man is constituted from matter and soul. Since, therefore, God cannot invert the essences of things, He cannot cause there to exist the denomination "seeing God" constituted by a non-rational subject or by a form which is not an intuitive vision of God, just as He cannot make a man exist without matter or soul. Therefore a brute or stone can, in the genus of purely active cause, be divinely elevated to produce an intellection or vision of God, if the latter consists in an absolute quality, or even to receive it; but it cannot be elevated in the genus of intrinsic cause so as to constitute the concrete "understanding" or "seeing God." Thus God can by Himself produce vision, heat, or a soul, yet He cannot be the constitutive subject which with those forms constitutes the denominations "seeing," "hot," or "animate." I said "if it consists in an absolute quality," because if vision or intellection is a mode really indistinct from its own production, it cannot be produced by a stone or brute, unless perhaps a reflexive action of an action is possible, as Father Peynado holds with other adversaries. For if this opinion is granted, any thing can also be divinely elevated to produce the actions of other things.

36. From what has been said you will infer that if a brute produced and received intellection or love, it would act neither vitally nor freely: not vitally, because it would not act with an aptitude for constituting the denomination "understanding" or "loving," and consequently neither "living" through such acts; not freely, because the denomination "acting freely" essentially includes a rational subject presupposed as understanding. Therefore those forms would not then provide their proper and essential formal effects because of the incapacity of the subject, according to what was said in disp. 2, c. 2, n. 15. The same must be said of grace divinely united to a stone or brute. One may say: an intellection produced by a stone and received in it would be from within the stone and in the stone's interior.

Why therefore would it not be vital to the stone? I answer: because the intellection would possess this accidentally, not essentially, that is, not from the proper exigency of the act itself; but such essentiality is included in the concept of life on the part of the term or effect. Hence neither would the direct or reflexive action by which the stone caused the intellection be vital, because although the action itself would essentially depend upon the stone by reason of itself, it would not do so essentially by reason of its term.

37. You will also infer that corporeal eyes, or the materially visual potency of man, can be elevated to produce the vision of God, but not to see God, because it is not an intellective potency, which the denomination "seeing God" intrinsically and essentially includes. Similarly, the visual potency can divinely produce audition, and the auditory potency a vision of color, without the visual potency thereby being able to become hearing or the auditory potency seeing, for the same reason. I presuppose a distinction of the potencies from the soul. For if adequate real identity is posited, the visual potency truly in the real sense understands, loves, hears, etc.; yet not in the formal sense, because formally it signifies only an order to acts belonging to the line restricted to the perception of luminous color. Through such acts it certainly does not understand or hear, etc., since it cannot happen that an act which is merely a perception of luminous color should be a perception of sound, of God, or of another object, unless its essence is changed.

38. 3º Although the natural sphere of activity of each thing is limited to certain genera or species of effects, the sphere of obediential activity nevertheless extends to everything in which, as produced by such a power, no contradiction is involved. For the farther this sphere extends, the more God's dominion over all things and His Omnipotence are commended. Therefore we ought to be liberal in extending the limits of this sphere. Nor should you infer from this that a creature usurps for itself the sphere of Divine activity because it can act under the aspect of being as such, which is the sphere of the activity of Omnipotence. First, the unlimited character of being, or being in its whole extension, does not correspond to a creature as it does to Omnipotence, as is evident from the limitations stated in n. 29. Next, the aspect of being as corresponding to Omnipotence is the aspect of being as producible principally or totally and independently of another concausal agent; but as corresponding to a creature, it is the aspect of being as producible purely instrumentally. Therefore, just as a created intellect does not usurp the sphere of the Divine intellect although it can attain whatever God knows and tends under the aspect of true and knowable as such, because the true as such corresponds to the Divine intellect as

knowable in an infinite mode and with infinite clarity, but to the created intellect only as finitely and imperfectly knowable, so must it be said in our case.

39. Hence you will gather that a creature's obediential potency is infinite terminatively, insofar as it respects syncategorematically infinite effects; yet it is not infinite subjectively, because it respects so many effects only as an imperfect, inchoate, and instrumental power. Thus this cognition of mine, "everything knowable," is terminatively infinite and respects as many objects as Divine knowledge does; yet it is not subjectively infinite, because the confused and imperfect mode of respecting them diminishes it. One may say: the obediential potency which we posit can be extended not only to innumerable effects but also to effects more and more perfect without end. Therefore it will be infinitely perfect. The consequence is clear because a power is more perfect to the extent that the effect is greater; hence a power capable of an effect as four is more perfect than one capable of an effect as two. I distinguish the antecedent: in such a way that it labors more or expends more power upon more perfect effects than upon less perfect ones, I deny; in such a way that it concurs equally on its own part toward both, I grant the antecedent and deny the consequence. The proof of the consequence holds in natural power, especially principal power, but not in purely obediential instrumental power. For this latter contributes, as it were, its one penny of power equally to greater or lesser effects, and the greater or lesser character of these effects is attributed not to it but to the cause elevating and assisting it. Thus one who contributes one penny with others toward a sum of one hundred gold coins is not shown to be richer than if he contributed toward a sum of fifty; nor does one labor more who with strength as one carries with nine men a weight as ten than if with four men he carried a weight as five. And to come to a more proper example, a created intellect, although finite, can concur toward a vision of God clearer and clearer without end if the light is increased, because it does not expend more strength on its own part.

40. 4º Obediential potency, especially that which is not required by the effect and which can be called "transcendental," to distinguish it from that which belongs especially to the potencies of the soul for supernatural acts of understanding and loving, by which it is essentially required, need not contain the effect formally or eminently, that is, either as a univocal cause or as an equivocal principal and more perfect cause, but only purely virtually and in the manner of an instrument elevable by a superior agent. This mode of containment, as we have often said, does not require in the cause likeness to or equality of perfection with the effect, nor correspondence or

agreement of formalities except at a very generic level. Indeed, in the present matter agreement in the character of being from another suffices, provided no repugnance arises from the other considerations discussed in n. 29. By this containment of pure inchoate and instrumental virtuality, therefore, a stone truly contains an angel, heat contains grace, etc.

41. 5º Water can also be divinely elevated to produce heat in itself. In that event the heat would be violent to the water, notwithstanding the definition of the violent as "that whose principle is from without, the patient contributing no power." For this can be understood of a principle at least principal, which even then would be from without, and of a patient contributing no power from its own inclination. Nor does it follow that water has a potency immediately destructive of itself, or a potency coexisting with its own destruction; it has only a potency mediately destructive of itself, insofar as it is productive of a thing causing or requiring the destruction of water, not indeed in the composite sense of the action proceeding from the water, but in the divided sense. For the heat would not require the destruction of the water as something to be composed with that action; rather, once produced by the water, it would require to be conserved by God alone and thus to bring about the corruption of the water.

42. 6º The elevation of anything to anything can be made by extrinsic assistance, as they say, that is, by the mere assistance of Omnipotence applied by a supernatural decree to concur, without any supernatural quality intrinsically received in the elevated thing, and consequently without any intrinsic change of it. This must especially be said in the elevation of obediential potency for creating instrumentally. One may say: water is intrinsically incapable of producing grace. Therefore, if through elevation it is not intrinsically changed, once the elevation is posited it still retains the same incapacity; and otherwise it would pass from being incapable to being capable without any change in itself. I distinguish the antecedent: it is intrinsically incapable of producing grace by itself and without God's supernatural concurrence, I grant; it is intrinsically incapable of producing grace together with such a concurrence of God, I deny the antecedent. For with respect to this it is only extrinsically incapable, with an incapacity consisting in the absence of elevation or of the application of Omnipotence. I then distinguish the consequence: it still retains the same intrinsic incapacity, I grant, for even once the elevation is posited, water remains intrinsically incapable of producing grace by itself; it retains the same extrinsic incapacity, I deny the consequence, for the absence of extrinsic assistance which rendered the water extrinsically incapable of producing together with God supernaturally concurring is removed through elevation.

43. Therefore water does not pass from being intrinsically incapable to intrinsically capable, but only from being extrinsically incapable, not through a defect of all power but through a defect of an extrinsic complement, to being proximately capable by a potency extrinsically completed. Such a transition does not require intrinsic change, as is clear. Consequently, in elevated water the denomination of being proximately capable of producing grace is partly intrinsic, insofar as it includes the partial and inchoate power of the water, and partly extrinsic, insofar as it signifies the companionship of Omnipotence actually applied. In this latter respect alone does a new potency accrue to the water through elevation. The terms indeed appear intricate, but the matter is sufficiently clear from the example of a man who, incapable by himself of sustaining a weight requiring the strength of two men, is rendered capable by the extrinsic assistance and application of another man.

Philosophical Course of Salamanca

Luis de Lossada's *Cursus Philosophicus* is a landmark work of eighteenth-century Jesuit scholastic philosophy, prized for the force of its argumentation, the clarity of its method, and its vigorous engagement with the Thomist controversies of its age.

Composed while its author held the chair of Philosophy at the Royal College of Salamanca, and long regarded among the finest philosophical courses produced by the Society of Jesus, the work presents a complete philosophical curriculum in logic, natural philosophy, generation and corruption, psychology, and metaphysics. Rooted in the tradition of Aristotle and formed above all by the doctrine of the Eximious Doctor, Francisco Suárez, Lossada writes as a disciple who defends the mind of St. Thomas Aquinas even against those who claimed the name Thomist as exclusively their own, refuting them, as he generally does, by the authority of St. Thomas himself.

This English edition presents Lossada's three tomes in four volumes for greater ease of reading and consultation, while preserving the structure, arguments, and intellectual seriousness of the Latin text. It was written for seminarians, clergy, scholars, students of scholasticism, and serious readers seeking a substantial guide to Catholic philosophy and the classical metaphysical tradition.

Contained in this Series:

T. 1: On Logic, or Rational Philosophy
T. 2: On Physics, or Natural Philosophy
T. 3: On Natural Philosophy, the World, and Psychology
T. 4: On Psychology, and Metaphysics

† IHS

Translated by Osvaldo R.